A test of the structure of PAC contracts: An analysis of house gun control votes in the 1980s

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 41-63

  McGarrity, Joseph P ^a   Sutter, Daniel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL ARKANSAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034390672     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1061612     Document Type: Article

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