Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement

Economics Letters

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 105-112

  Ganuza, Juan José ^a   Pechlivanos, Lambros ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

Author keywords

D44; H57; Horizontal differentiation; L51; Procurement; Project design

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034387687     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00201-3     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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