Contesting globalization: Organized labor, NAFTA, and the 1997 and 1998 fast-track fights

Politics and Society

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 119-150

  Shoch, James ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034387209     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329200028001006     Document Type: Review

References (195)

1. The first wave of globalization took place during the fifty years or so that ended in world war. The second wave occurred in the 1950s and 1960s. Richard Higgott, "Economics, Politics and (International) Political Economy: The Need for a Balanced Diet in an Era of Globalisation," New Political Economy 4, no. 1 (1999).
2. At this point in the debate on globalization and its consequences, the literature has simply become too vast to cite in any detail. But for a comprehensive recent discussion, see David Held Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
3. Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); I. M. Destler and John S. Odell, Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1987).
4. Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); I. M. Destler and John S. Odell, Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in United States Trade Politics (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1987).
5. See Michael Lusztig, "The Limits of Rent Seeking: Why Protectionists Become Free Traders," Review of International Political Economy 5, no. 1 (1998): 38-63; Oona A. Hathaway, "Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection," International Organization 52, no. 3 (1998): 575-612.
6. See Michael Lusztig, "The Limits of Rent Seeking: Why Protectionists Become Free Traders," Review of International Political Economy 5, no. 1 (1998): 38-63; Oona A. Hathaway, "Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection," International Organization 52, no. 3 (1998): 575-612.
7. Terms suggested by Robert Cox and Bob Jessop, respectively. Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Bob Jessop, "Post-Fordism and the State," in Ash Amin, ed., Post-Fordism: A Reader (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994).
8. Terms suggested by Robert Cox and Bob Jessop, respectively. Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Bob Jessop, "Post-Fordism and the State," in Ash Amin, ed., Post-Fordism: A Reader (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994).
9. For two extremely useful overviews and analyses, see Frederick W. Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA: The Nature of Politics and the Art of Political Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); George W. Grayson, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Regional Community and the New World Order (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995).
10. For two extremely useful overviews and analyses, see Frederick W. Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA: The Nature of Politics and the Art of Political Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); George W. Grayson, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Regional Community and the New World Order (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995).
11. For the next two paragraphs, see Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA, 69-77; William P. Avery, "Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining," Political Science Quarterly 113, no. 2 (1998): 281-305.
12. For the next two paragraphs, see Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA, 69-77; William P. Avery, "Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining," Political Science Quarterly 113, no. 2 (1998): 281-305.
13. On general patterns of business support for NAFTA, see Ronald W. Cox, "Corporate Coalitions and Industrial Restructuring: Explaining Regional Trade Agreements," Competition & Change 1 (1995): 13-30.
14. As Sandra Masur, director of Public Policy Analysis for Eastman Kodak and leader of the influential Business Roundtable's efforts on behalf of NAFTA, explained, American business supported NAFTA because "U.S. manufacturing must pursue joint production [with Mexico] to keep costs down and compete against European and Japanese competitors who pursue similar strategies." Sandra Masur, "The North American Free Trade Agreement: Why It's in the Interest of U.S. Business," Columbia Journal of World Business 26, no. 2 (1991): 101. According to a 1992 Roper poll, 40 percent of some 450 U.S. corporate executives said it was "very" or "somewhat" likely that their companies would shift some production to Mexico to Mexico... if NAFTA is ratified." For large companies the figure was 55 percent. Samuel Bowles and Mehrene Larudee, "Nafta: Friend or Foe?" New York Times (15 November 1993).
15. As Sandra Masur, director of Public Policy Analysis for Eastman Kodak and leader of the influential Business Roundtable's efforts on behalf of NAFTA, explained, American business supported NAFTA because "U.S. manufacturing must pursue joint production [with Mexico] to keep costs down and compete against European and Japanese competitors who pursue similar strategies." Sandra Masur, "The North American Free Trade Agreement: Why It's in the Interest of U.S. Business," Columbia Journal of World Business 26, no. 2 (1991): 101. According to a 1992 Roper poll, 40 percent of some 450 U.S. corporate executives said it was "very" or "somewhat" likely that their companies would shift some production to Mexico to Mexico... if NAFTA is ratified." For large companies the figure was 55 percent. Samuel Bowles and Mehrene Larudee, "Nafta: Friend or Foe?" New York Times (15 November 1993).
16. In the same 1992 Roper poll, 24 percent of the executives surveyed admitted that it was either very or somewhat likely that "Nafta will be used by [their] company as a bargaining chip tokeep wages down in the U.S." Bowles and Larudee, "Nafta: Friend or Foe?" On NAFTA as an element of a strategy of industrial restructuring at labor's expense see Mark E. Rupert, "(Re)Politicizing the Global Economy: Liberal Common Sense and Ideological Struggle in the US NAFTA Debate," Review of International Political Economy 2 no. 4 (1995): 658-92; Kim Moody, "NAFTA and the Corporate Redesign of America" Latin American Perspectives 22, no. 1 (1995): 95-115.
17. In the same 1992 Roper poll, 24 percent of the executives surveyed admitted that it was either very or somewhat likely that "Nafta will be used by [their] company as a bargaining chip tokeep wages down in the U.S." Bowles and Larudee, "Nafta: Friend or Foe?" On NAFTA as an element of a strategy of industrial restructuring at labor's expense see Mark E. Rupert, "(Re)Politicizing the Global Economy: Liberal Common Sense and Ideological Struggle in the US NAFTA Debate," Review of International Political Economy 2 no. 4 (1995): 658-92; Kim Moody, "NAFTA and the Corporate Redesign of America" Latin American Perspectives 22, no. 1 (1995): 95-115.
18. In the same 1992 Roper poll, 24 percent of the executives surveyed admitted that it was either very or somewhat likely that "Nafta will be used by [their] company as a bargaining chip tokeep wages down in the U.S." Bowles and Larudee, "Nafta: Friend or Foe?" On NAFTA as an element of a strategy of industrial restructuring at labor's expense see Mark E. Rupert, "(Re)Politicizing the Global Economy: Liberal Common Sense and Ideological Struggle in the US NAFTA Debate," Review of International Political Economy 2 no. 4 (1995): 658-92; Kim Moody, "NAFTA and the Corporate Redesign of America" Latin American Perspectives 22, no. 1 (1995): 95-115.
19. On a theoretical note, in a study of labor's influence on congressional voting on NAFTA in 1993, John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula suggest that large sectors of labor can be expected to support protectionism or to oppose trade liberalization, regardless of whether a "Stolper-Samuelson" or a "specific-factors" model of trade policy preference formation is assumed. According to Stolper-Samuelson theories, which assume that factors of production - broadly defined as capital, labor, and land - are perfectly mobile owners of abundant factors will support free trade, while owners of scarce factors will back protectionism. Thus, in an advanced country such as the United States, in which labor is the scarce factor of production, labor as a whole should support protectionism. On the other hand, according to specific-factors models, which assume that production factors are immobile or sector specific, thus leading business and labor preferences to be determined at the industry or sector level, most workers should also support protectionism since a disproportionate share of the workforce is employed in labor-intensive, import-competing industries. See John A. C. Conybeare and Mark Zinkula, "Who Voted against NAFTA? Trade Unions versus Free Trade," World Economy 19, no. 1 (1996): 2-3. In fact, labor opposition to NAFTA was stronger than either set of models would predict. Both Stolper-Samuelson and specific-factors models assume that capital is geographically immobile. But even if production factors are immobile across different industrial sectors, as assumed in specific-factors models, capital is often internationally mobile while labor is not. Consequently, labor feared that by increasing both the reality and the threat of a manufacturing capital flight to low-wage Mexico, NAFTA would have negative domestic employment and wage effects well beyond those created by an increase in imports produced by Mexican-owned firms. Robert C. Feenstra, "Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 4 (1998): 31-50.
20. On a theoretical note, in a study of labor's influence on congressional voting on NAFTA in 1993, John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula suggest that large sectors of labor can be expected to support protectionism or to oppose trade liberalization, regardless of whether a "Stolper-Samuelson" or a "specific-factors" model of trade policy preference formation is assumed. According to Stolper-Samuelson theories, which assume that factors of production - broadly defined as capital, labor, and land - are perfectly mobile owners of abundant factors will support free trade, while owners of scarce factors will back protectionism. Thus, in an advanced country such as the United States, in which labor is the scarce factor of production, labor as a whole should support protectionism. On the other hand, according to specific-factors models, which assume that production factors are immobile or sector specific, thus leading business and labor preferences to be determined at the industry or sector level, most workers should also support protectionism since a disproportionate share of the workforce is employed in labor-intensive, import-competing industries. See John A. C. Conybeare and Mark Zinkula, "Who Voted against NAFTA? Trade Unions versus Free Trade," World Economy 19, no. 1 (1996): 2-3. In fact, labor opposition to NAFTA was stronger than either set of models would predict. Both Stolper-Samuelson and specific-factors models assume that capital is geographically immobile. But even if production factors are immobile across different industrial sectors, as assumed in specific-factors models, capital is often internationally mobile while labor is not. Consequently, labor feared that by increasing both the reality and the threat of a manufacturing capital flight to low-wage Mexico, NAFTA would have negative domestic employment and wage effects well beyond those created by an increase in imports produced by Mexican-owned firms. Robert C. Feenstra, "Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 4 (1998): 31-50.
21. Thus, in the House, those members who relied most heavily on campaign contributions from union political action committees - all Democrats - cast lopsided votes against NAFTA. More specifically, in districts where Democratic members got 20 percent of more of their total campaign contributions from labor PACs, 77 percent of those members opposed the treaty. But those Democrats who received more money from business PACs than labor PACs split on the issue, voting against the treaty by a narrow 82-88 margin Jon Healey and Thomas H. Moore, "Clinton Forms New Coalition to Win NAFTA Approval," CQ Weekly (20 November 1997): 3183. Statistical studies that find significant labor effects on either House or Senate NAFTA voting include Conybeare and Zinkula, "Who Voted against NAFTA?"; Sharyn O'Halloran, "Comment," in Susan Collins, ed., Imports, Exports, and the American Worker (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Leo H. Kahane, "Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Interpretation," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 5, no. 4 (1996): 394-409; Janet M. Box-Steffensmeir, Laura W. Arnold, and Christopher J. S. Zorn, "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement," American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997): 324-38; Eric M. Uslaner, "Let the Chips Fall Where They May? Executive and Constituency Influences on Congressional Voting on NAFTA," Legislative Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1998): 347-71 ; Jeffrey W. Steagall and Ken Jennings, "Unions, PAC Contributions and the NAFTA Vote," Journal of Labor Research 17, no. 3 (1996): 515-21; Robert E. Baldwin and Christopher S. Magee, "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," NBER Working Papers Series No. 6376 (1998).
22. Thus, in the House, those members who relied most heavily on campaign contributions from union political action committees - all Democrats - cast lopsided votes against NAFTA. More specifically, in districts where Democratic members got 20 percent of more of their total campaign contributions from labor PACs, 77 percent of those members opposed the treaty. But those Democrats who received more money from business PACs than labor PACs split on the issue, voting against the treaty by a narrow 82-88 margin Jon Healey and Thomas H. Moore, "Clinton Forms New Coalition to Win NAFTA Approval," CQ Weekly (20 November 1997): 3183. Statistical studies that find significant labor effects on either House or Senate NAFTA voting include Conybeare and Zinkula, "Who Voted against NAFTA?"; Sharyn O'Halloran, "Comment," in Susan Collins, ed., Imports, Exports, and the American Worker (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Leo H. Kahane, "Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Interpretation," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 5, no. 4 (1996): 394-409; Janet M. Box-Steffensmeir, Laura W. Arnold, and Christopher J. S. Zorn, "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement," American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997): 324-38; Eric M. Uslaner, "Let the Chips Fall Where They May? Executive and Constituency Influences on Congressional Voting on NAFTA," Legislative Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1998): 347-71 ; Jeffrey W. Steagall and Ken Jennings, "Unions, PAC Contributions and the NAFTA Vote," Journal of Labor Research 17, no. 3 (1996): 515-21; Robert E. Baldwin and Christopher S. Magee, "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," NBER Working Papers Series No. 6376 (1998).
23. Thus, in the House, those members who relied most heavily on campaign contributions from union political action committees - all Democrats - cast lopsided votes against NAFTA. More specifically, in districts where Democratic members got 20 percent of more of their total campaign contributions from labor PACs, 77 percent of those members opposed the treaty. But those Democrats who received more money from business PACs than labor PACs split on the issue, voting against the treaty by a narrow 82-88 margin Jon Healey and Thomas H. Moore, "Clinton Forms New Coalition to Win NAFTA Approval," CQ Weekly (20 November 1997): 3183. Statistical studies that find significant labor effects on either House or Senate NAFTA voting include Conybeare and Zinkula, "Who Voted against NAFTA?"; Sharyn O'Halloran, "Comment," in Susan Collins, ed., Imports, Exports, and the American Worker (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Leo H. Kahane, "Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Interpretation," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 5, no. 4 (1996): 394-409; Janet M. Box-Steffensmeir, Laura W. Arnold, and Christopher J. S. Zorn, "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement," American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997): 324-38; Eric M. Uslaner, "Let the Chips Fall Where They May? Executive and Constituency Influences on Congressional Voting on NAFTA," Legislative Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1998): 347-71 ; Jeffrey W. Steagall and Ken Jennings, "Unions, PAC Contributions and the NAFTA Vote," Journal of Labor Research 17, no. 3 (1996): 515-21; Robert E. Baldwin and Christopher S. Magee, "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," NBER Working Papers Series No. 6376 (1998).
24. Thus, in the House, those members who relied most heavily on campaign contributions from union political action committees - all Democrats - cast lopsided votes against NAFTA. More specifically, in districts where Democratic members got 20 percent of more of their total campaign contributions from labor PACs, 77 percent of those members opposed the treaty. But those Democrats who received more money from business PACs than labor PACs split on the issue, voting against the treaty by a narrow 82-88 margin Jon Healey and Thomas H. Moore, "Clinton Forms New Coalition to Win NAFTA Approval," CQ Weekly (20 November 1997): 3183. Statistical studies that find significant labor effects on either House or Senate NAFTA voting include Conybeare and Zinkula, "Who Voted against NAFTA?"; Sharyn O'Halloran, "Comment," in Susan Collins, ed., Imports, Exports, and the American Worker (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Leo H. Kahane, "Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Interpretation," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 5, no. 4 (1996): 394-409; Janet M. Box-Steffensmeir, Laura W. Arnold, and Christopher J. S. Zorn, "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement," American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997): 324-38; Eric M. Uslaner, "Let the Chips Fall Where They May? Executive and Constituency Influences on Congressional Voting on NAFTA," Legislative Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1998): 347-71 ; Jeffrey W. Steagall and Ken Jennings, "Unions, PAC Contributions and the NAFTA Vote," Journal of Labor Research 17, no. 3 (1996): 515-21; Robert E. Baldwin and Christopher S. Magee, "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," NBER Working Papers Series No. 6376 (1998).
25. Thus, in the House, those members who relied most heavily on campaign contributions from union political action committees - all Democrats - cast lopsided votes against NAFTA. More specifically, in districts where Democratic members got 20 percent of more of their total campaign contributions from labor PACs, 77 percent of those members opposed the treaty. But those Democrats who received more money from business PACs than labor PACs split on the issue, voting against the treaty by a narrow 82-88 margin Jon Healey and Thomas H. Moore, "Clinton Forms New Coalition to Win NAFTA Approval," CQ Weekly (20 November 1997): 3183. Statistical studies that find significant labor effects on either House or Senate NAFTA voting include Conybeare and Zinkula, "Who Voted against NAFTA?"; Sharyn O'Halloran, "Comment," in Susan Collins, ed., Imports, Exports, and the American Worker (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Leo H. Kahane, "Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Interpretation," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 5, no. 4 (1996): 394-409; Janet M. Box-Steffensmeir, Laura W. Arnold, and Christopher J. S. Zorn, "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement," American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997): 324-38; Eric M. Uslaner, "Let the Chips Fall Where They May? Executive and Constituency Influences on Congressional Voting on NAFTA," Legislative Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1998): 347-71 ; Jeffrey W. Steagall and Ken Jennings, "Unions, PAC Contributions and the NAFTA Vote," Journal of Labor Research 17, no. 3 (1996): 515-21; Robert E. Baldwin and Christopher S. Magee, "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," NBER Working Papers Series No. 6376 (1998).
26. Thus, in the House, those members who relied most heavily on campaign contributions from union political action committees - all Democrats - cast lopsided votes against NAFTA. More specifically, in districts where Democratic members got 20 percent of more of their total campaign contributions from labor PACs, 77 percent of those members opposed the treaty. But those Democrats who received more money from business PACs than labor PACs split on the issue, voting against the treaty by a narrow 82-88 margin Jon Healey and Thomas H. Moore, "Clinton Forms New Coalition to Win NAFTA Approval," CQ Weekly (20 November 1997): 3183. Statistical studies that find significant labor effects on either House or Senate NAFTA voting include Conybeare and Zinkula, "Who Voted against NAFTA?"; Sharyn O'Halloran, "Comment," in Susan Collins, ed., Imports, Exports, and the American Worker (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Leo H. Kahane, "Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Interpretation," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 5, no. 4 (1996): 394-409; Janet M. Box-Steffensmeir, Laura W. Arnold, and Christopher J. S. Zorn, "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement," American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997): 324-38; Eric M. Uslaner, "Let the Chips Fall Where They May? Executive and Constituency Influences on Congressional Voting on NAFTA," Legislative Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1998): 347-71 ; Jeffrey W. Steagall and Ken Jennings, "Unions, PAC Contributions and the NAFTA Vote," Journal of Labor Research 17, no. 3 (1996): 515-21; Robert E. Baldwin and Christopher S. Magee, "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," NBER Working Papers Series No. 6376 (1998).
27. Thus, in the House, those members who relied most heavily on campaign contributions from union political action committees - all Democrats - cast lopsided votes against NAFTA. More specifically, in districts where Democratic members got 20 percent of more of their total campaign contributions from labor PACs, 77 percent of those members opposed the treaty. But those Democrats who received more money from business PACs than labor PACs split on the issue, voting against the treaty by a narrow 82-88 margin Jon Healey and Thomas H. Moore, "Clinton Forms New Coalition to Win NAFTA Approval," CQ Weekly (20 November 1997): 3183. Statistical studies that find significant labor effects on either House or Senate NAFTA voting include Conybeare and Zinkula, "Who Voted against NAFTA?"; Sharyn O'Halloran, "Comment," in Susan Collins, ed., Imports, Exports, and the American Worker (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Leo H. Kahane, "Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Interpretation," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 5, no. 4 (1996): 394-409; Janet M. Box-Steffensmeir, Laura W. Arnold, and Christopher J. S. Zorn, "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement," American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997): 324-38; Eric M. Uslaner, "Let the Chips Fall Where They May? Executive and Constituency Influences on Congressional Voting on NAFTA," Legislative Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1998): 347-71 ; Jeffrey W. Steagall and Ken Jennings, "Unions, PAC Contributions and the NAFTA Vote," Journal of Labor Research 17, no. 3 (1996): 515-21; Robert E. Baldwin and Christopher S. Magee, "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," NBER Working Papers Series No. 6376 (1998).
28. Thus, in the House, those members who relied most heavily on campaign contributions from union political action committees - all Democrats - cast lopsided votes against NAFTA. More specifically, in districts where Democratic members got 20 percent of more of their total campaign contributions from labor PACs, 77 percent of those members opposed the treaty. But those Democrats who received more money from business PACs than labor PACs split on the issue, voting against the treaty by a narrow 82-88 margin Jon Healey and Thomas H. Moore, "Clinton Forms New Coalition to Win NAFTA Approval," CQ Weekly (20 November 1997): 3183. Statistical studies that find significant labor effects on either House or Senate NAFTA voting include Conybeare and Zinkula, "Who Voted against NAFTA?"; Sharyn O'Halloran, "Comment," in Susan Collins, ed., Imports, Exports, and the American Worker (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998); Leo H. Kahane, "Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Interpretation," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 5, no. 4 (1996): 394-409; Janet M. Box-Steffensmeir, Laura W. Arnold, and Christopher J. S. Zorn, "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement," American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 (1997): 324-38; Eric M. Uslaner, "Let the Chips Fall Where They May? Executive and Constituency Influences on Congressional Voting on NAFTA," Legislative Studies Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1998): 347-71 ; Jeffrey W. Steagall and Ken Jennings, "Unions, PAC Contributions and the NAFTA Vote," Journal of Labor Research 17, no. 3 (1996): 515-21; Robert E. Baldwin and Christopher S. Magee, "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," NBER Working Papers Series No. 6376 (1998).
29. In his provocative new book, Taylor Dark disputes the widely shared view that labor's political influence declined during the post-World War II era, but I think he overstates his case. See Taylor Dark, The Unions and the Democrats: An Enduring Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
30. For the next four paragraphs, see I. M. Destler, "Trade Politics and Labor Issues: 1953-95," in Collins, ed., Imports, Exports, and the American Worker.
31. Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, "American Labor's Stake in International Trade," in Walter S. Adams, ed., Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1979); Paul Midford, "International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski's Model of Political Alignments," International Organization 47, no. 4 (1993): 538-39, 555-57.
32. Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern, "American Labor's Stake in International Trade," in Walter S. Adams, ed., Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1979); Paul Midford, "International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski's Model of Political Alignments," International Organization 47, no. 4 (1993): 538-39, 555-57.
33. By curbing the import of cars and car parts and encouraging foreign countries to produce in the United States by limiting the amount of imported parts and labor permitted in cars sold in this country.
34. For a thorough analysis of this bill and the politics surrounding it, see Susan C. Schwab, Trade-Offs: Negotiating the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1994).
35. The bill also contained a tougher and expedited unfair trade practices procedure, including the designation of violations of workers' rights as unfair trade practices, and an expanded training and adjustment assistance program. A measure requiring that advance notification be given of plant closures involving 100 or more workers, originally included in the bill, was eventually passed as a freestanding piece of legislation.
36. Sponsored by Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-MO).
37. On Clinton's success in both moving public opinion and in winning over Democratic legislators, see Uslaner, "Let the Chips Fall Where They May?"; Eric M. Uslaner, "Trade Winds: NAFTA and the Rational Public," Political Behavior 20, no. 4 (1998): 341-60; C. Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink, "The Passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement in the U.S. House of Representatives: Presidential Leadership or Presidential Luck?" Presidential Studies Quarterly 27, no. 1 (1997): 52-70.
38. On Clinton's success in both moving public opinion and in winning over Democratic legislators, see Uslaner, "Let the Chips Fall Where They May?"; Eric M. Uslaner, "Trade Winds: NAFTA and the Rational Public," Political Behavior 20, no. 4 (1998): 341-60; C. Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink, "The Passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement in the U.S. House of Representatives: Presidential Leadership or Presidential Luck?" Presidential Studies Quarterly 27, no. 1 (1997): 52-70.
39. On Clinton's success in both moving public opinion and in winning over Democratic legislators, see Uslaner, "Let the Chips Fall Where They May?"; Eric M. Uslaner, "Trade Winds: NAFTA and the Rational Public," Political Behavior 20, no. 4 (1998): 341-60; C. Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink, "The Passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement in the U.S. House of Representatives: Presidential Leadership or Presidential Luck?" Presidential Studies Quarterly 27, no. 1 (1997): 52-70.
40. For additional discussion of the events covered in this section through the summer of 1997, see I. M. Destler, Renewing Fast-Track Legislation (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997), 16-27; I. M. Destler, "Congress and Foreign Trade," in Robert A. Pastor and Rafael Fernandez de Castro, eds., The Controversial Pivot: The U.S. Congress and North America (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998). 127-39.
41. For additional discussion of the events covered in this section through the summer of 1997, see I. M. Destler, Renewing Fast-Track Legislation (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997), 16-27; I. M. Destler, "Congress and Foreign Trade," in Robert A. Pastor and Rafael Fernandez de Castro, eds., The Controversial Pivot: The U.S. Congress and North America (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998). 127-39.
42. Because of the complexity of the GATT agreement and the resulting uncertainty as to its effects, the accord did not evoke the visceral responses that NAFTA had from U.S. workers, for whom the flight of manufacturing capital to Mexico had constituted a palpable threat. Consequently, labor largely sat out the fight over the approval of the less controversial GATT deal, and the agreement was eventually passed with substantial bipartisan majorities. Thus, I will not discuss it here.
43. For the next five paragraphs, see Aaron Bernstein, "NAFTA: A New Union-Busting Weapon?" Business Week(21 January 1997): 4; Paul Blustein, "Fast-Track Trade Plan Pits White House against Top Congressional Democrats," The Washington Post (22 March 1997): A11; John Maggs, "Trading Places," The New Republic (14 April 1997): 15-16; Robert S. Greenberger, "Clinton to Delay Fast-Track Trade Bill until Fall," The Wall Street Journal (23 May 1997): A2; Dan Balz, "The Battle to Seize the Heart and Soul of the Democrats;" The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (9 June 1997): 11-12; David Corn, "Dick Gephardt: Working-Class Hero, On-the-Make Pol or Both?" The Nation (7 July 1997): 11-16; Jonathan Cohn, "Hard Labor," The New Republic (6 October 1997): 21-26.
44. For the next five paragraphs, see Aaron Bernstein, "NAFTA: A New Union-Busting Weapon?" Business Week(21 January 1997): 4; Paul Blustein, "Fast-Track Trade Plan Pits White House against Top Congressional Democrats," The Washington Post (22 March 1997): A11; John Maggs, "Trading Places," The New Republic (14 April 1997): 15-16; Robert S. Greenberger, "Clinton to Delay Fast-Track Trade Bill until Fall," The Wall Street Journal (23 May 1997): A2; Dan Balz, "The Battle to Seize the Heart and Soul of the Democrats;" The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (9 June 1997): 11-12; David Corn, "Dick Gephardt: Working-Class Hero, On-the-Make Pol or Both?" The Nation (7 July 1997): 11-16; Jonathan Cohn, "Hard Labor," The New Republic (6 October 1997): 21-26.
45. For the next five paragraphs, see Aaron Bernstein, "NAFTA: A New Union-Busting Weapon?" Business Week(21 January 1997): 4; Paul Blustein, "Fast-Track Trade Plan Pits White House against Top Congressional Democrats," The Washington Post (22 March 1997): A11; John Maggs, "Trading Places," The New Republic (14 April 1997): 15-16; Robert S. Greenberger, "Clinton to Delay Fast-Track Trade Bill until Fall," The Wall Street Journal (23 May 1997): A2; Dan Balz, "The Battle to Seize the Heart and Soul of the Democrats;" The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (9 June 1997): 11-12; David Corn, "Dick Gephardt: Working-Class Hero, On-the-Make Pol or Both?" The Nation (7 July 1997): 11-16; Jonathan Cohn, "Hard Labor," The New Republic (6 October 1997): 21-26.
46. For the next five paragraphs, see Aaron Bernstein, "NAFTA: A New Union-Busting Weapon?" Business Week(21 January 1997): 4; Paul Blustein, "Fast-Track Trade Plan Pits White House against Top Congressional Democrats," The Washington Post (22 March 1997): A11; John Maggs, "Trading Places," The New Republic (14 April 1997): 15-16; Robert S. Greenberger, "Clinton to Delay Fast-Track Trade Bill until Fall," The Wall Street Journal (23 May 1997): A2; Dan Balz, "The Battle to Seize the Heart and Soul of the Democrats;" The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (9 June 1997): 11-12; David Corn, "Dick Gephardt: Working-Class Hero, On-the-Make Pol or Both?" The Nation (7 July 1997): 11-16; Jonathan Cohn, "Hard Labor," The New Republic (6 October 1997): 21-26.
47. For the next five paragraphs, see Aaron Bernstein, "NAFTA: A New Union-Busting Weapon?" Business Week(21 January 1997): 4; Paul Blustein, "Fast-Track Trade Plan Pits White House against Top Congressional Democrats," The Washington Post (22 March 1997): A11; John Maggs, "Trading Places," The New Republic (14 April 1997): 15-16; Robert S. Greenberger, "Clinton to Delay Fast-Track Trade Bill until Fall," The Wall Street Journal (23 May 1997): A2; Dan Balz, "The Battle to Seize the Heart and Soul of the Democrats;" The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (9 June 1997): 11-12; David Corn, "Dick Gephardt: Working-Class Hero, On-the-Make Pol or Both?" The Nation (7 July 1997): 11-16; Jonathan Cohn, "Hard Labor," The New Republic (6 October 1997): 21-26.
48. For the next five paragraphs, see Aaron Bernstein, "NAFTA: A New Union-Busting Weapon?" Business Week(21 January 1997): 4; Paul Blustein, "Fast-Track Trade Plan Pits White House against Top Congressional Democrats," The Washington Post (22 March 1997): A11; John Maggs, "Trading Places," The New Republic (14 April 1997): 15-16; Robert S. Greenberger, "Clinton to Delay Fast-Track Trade Bill until Fall," The Wall Street Journal (23 May 1997): A2; Dan Balz, "The Battle to Seize the Heart and Soul of the Democrats;" The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (9 June 1997): 11-12; David Corn, "Dick Gephardt: Working-Class Hero, On-the-Make Pol or Both?" The Nation (7 July 1997): 11-16; Jonathan Cohn, "Hard Labor," The New Republic (6 October 1997): 21-26.
49. For the next five paragraphs, see Aaron Bernstein, "NAFTA: A New Union-Busting Weapon?" Business Week(21 January 1997): 4; Paul Blustein, "Fast-Track Trade Plan Pits White House against Top Congressional Democrats," The Washington Post (22 March 1997): A11; John Maggs, "Trading Places," The New Republic (14 April 1997): 15-16; Robert S. Greenberger, "Clinton to Delay Fast-Track Trade Bill until Fall," The Wall Street Journal (23 May 1997): A2; Dan Balz, "The Battle to Seize the Heart and Soul of the Democrats;" The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (9 June 1997): 11-12; David Corn, "Dick Gephardt: Working-Class Hero, On-the-Make Pol or Both?" The Nation (7 July 1997): 11-16; Jonathan Cohn, "Hard Labor," The New Republic (6 October 1997): 21-26.
50. The industrial unions' resolve was heightened by the findings of a study conducted for the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican governments by Cornell University labor economist Kate Bronfenbrenner. The three-year survey, which the U.S. Labor Department initially sat on found that 60 percent of union organizing efforts in manufacturing after NAFTA were met by management threats to close the factories, compared with 29 percent before NAFTA. Kate Bronfenbronner, Final Report: The Effects of Plant Closings or the Threat of Plant Closings on the Right of Workers to Organize (Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1997).
51. In early November, the Senate voted 69-31 in favor of a cloture resolution defeat an attempted filibuster and allow consideration of the fast-track bill. Given the substantial size of many states, protectionist interests are more easily counterbalanced by pro-free trade interests than is the case in smaller House districts. In addition, states with low levels of unionization are overrepresented in the Senate, again predisposing the upper chamber toward free trade. On the latter point, see Daniel Wirls, "The Consequences of Equal Representation: The Bicameral Politics of NAFTA in the 103rd Congress," Congree & the Presidency 25, no. 2 (1998): 129-45.
52. Forty-three Democrats and 160 to 170 Republicans would have voted for fast track. For these estimates, see Claude E. Barfield, "Politics of Trade and Fast Track in the United States" (paper presented at the First Academic Colloquium of the Americas, University of Costa Rica, March 1998, AEI Speeches [Online]. Available: http:/www.aei.org/sp/ spbarfld.htm).
53. Although unions did gain a net 100,000 new members in 1998.
54. A July Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll showed that 42 percent of Americans believed that NAFTA had a negative impact on the United States - up from 35 percent in mid-1994 - while only 32 percent believed it had had a positive impact. Respondents also opposed granting Clinton new fast-track authority by a 62 to 32 percent margin. Other polls also showed that the public was generally skeptical of free trade and by a wide margin supported the use of trade agreements to protect the environment and raise living standards. For polling results on NAFTA and fast track, see Julie Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track,"The National Journal (9 August 1997): 1595; William Schneider, "Democrats Battling Over Their Future," The National Journal (13 September 1997): 1810. For more general surveys of public opinion on trade and trade policy, see Alan Tonelson, "Public Opinion Demands Fixes to Trade Policy," The Seattle Post-Intelligencer (30 April 1997): A13; The Public Perspective (August/September 1997): 36-37.
55. A July Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll showed that 42 percent of Americans believed that NAFTA had a negative impact on the United States - up from 35 percent in mid-1994 - while only 32 percent believed it had had a positive impact. Respondents also opposed granting Clinton new fast-track authority by a 62 to 32 percent margin. Other polls also showed that the public was generally skeptical of free trade and by a wide margin supported the use of trade agreements to protect the environment and raise living standards. For polling results on NAFTA and fast track, see Julie Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track,"The National Journal (9 August 1997): 1595; William Schneider, "Democrats Battling Over Their Future," The National Journal (13 September 1997): 1810. For more general surveys of public opinion on trade and trade policy, see Alan Tonelson, "Public Opinion Demands Fixes to Trade Policy," The Seattle Post-Intelligencer (30 April 1997): A13; The Public Perspective (August/September 1997): 36-37.
56. A July Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll showed that 42 percent of Americans believed that NAFTA had a negative impact on the United States - up from 35 percent in mid-1994 - while only 32 percent believed it had had a positive impact. Respondents also opposed granting Clinton new fast-track authority by a 62 to 32 percent margin. Other polls also showed that the public was generally skeptical of free trade and by a wide margin supported the use of trade agreements to protect the environment and raise living standards. For polling results on NAFTA and fast track, see Julie Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track,"The National Journal (9 August 1997): 1595; William Schneider, "Democrats Battling Over Their Future," The National Journal (13 September 1997): 1810. For more general surveys of public opinion on trade and trade policy, see Alan Tonelson, "Public Opinion Demands Fixes to Trade Policy," The Seattle Post-Intelligencer (30 April 1997): A13; The Public Perspective (August/September 1997): 36-37.
57. A July Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll showed that 42 percent of Americans believed that NAFTA had a negative impact on the United States - up from 35 percent in mid-1994 - while only 32 percent believed it had had a positive impact. Respondents also opposed granting Clinton new fast-track authority by a 62 to 32 percent margin. Other polls also showed that the public was generally skeptical of free trade and by a wide margin supported the use of trade agreements to protect the environment and raise living standards. For polling results on NAFTA and fast track, see Julie Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track,"The National Journal (9 August 1997): 1595; William Schneider, "Democrats Battling Over Their Future," The National Journal (13 September 1997): 1810. For more general surveys of public opinion on trade and trade policy, see Alan Tonelson, "Public Opinion Demands Fixes to Trade Policy," The Seattle Post-Intelligencer (30 April 1997): A13; The Public Perspective (August/September 1997): 36-37.
58. On this point, see Christoph Scherrer, Free Trade Elites and Fair Trade Masses: Why Has Public Opinion Mattered So Little? (Berlin: John F. Kennedy-Institut für Nordamerikastudien, 1994), Working Paper No. 65.
59. For discussion of these studies, see Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track"; Diane E. Lewis, "Report Hits NAFTA on Jobs," Boston Globe (27 June 1997): D1; "The NAFTA Effect: When Neighbors Embrace," The Economist (5 July 1997): 21-23.
60. For discussion of these studies, see Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track"; Diane E. Lewis, "Report Hits NAFTA on Jobs," Boston Globe (27 June 1997): D1; "The NAFTA Effect: When Neighbors Embrace," The Economist (5 July 1997): 21-23.
61. For discussion of these studies, see Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track"; Diane E. Lewis, "Report Hits NAFTA on Jobs," Boston Globe (27 June 1997): D1; "The NAFTA Effect: When Neighbors Embrace," The Economist (5 July 1997): 21-23.
62. See especially William Greider, One World Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997); George Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," The Atlantic (February 1997): 47-58.
63. See especially William Greider, One World Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997); George Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," The Atlantic (February 1997): 47-58.
64. See especially William Greider, One World Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997); Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997); George Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," The Atlantic (February 1997): 47-58.
65. Amy Borrus, "Business Is in a Hurry for Fast-Track," Business Week (15 September 1997): 38-39; Peter H. Stone, "Business Pushes for Fast-Track," The National Journal (27 September 1997): 1903-4.
66. Amy Borrus, "Business Is in a Hurry for Fast-Track," Business Week (15 September 1997): 38-39; Peter H. Stone, "Business Pushes for Fast-Track," The National Journal (27 September 1997): 1903-4.
67. On the rise of Republican populism and economic nationalism, see John B. Judis, "The Tariff Party," The New Republic (30 March 1992): 23-25; John B. Judis, "White Squall," The New Republic (11 March 1996): 26-30; Ben Wildavksy, "Going Nativist?" The National Journal (27 May 1995): 1278-81; David Frum, Dead Right (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 136-41. On the role of this group in the fast-track fight, see Peter Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt," The New Republic (1 December 1997): 22-26.
68. On the rise of Republican populism and economic nationalism, see John B. Judis, "The Tariff Party," The New Republic (30 March 1992): 23-25; John B. Judis, "White Squall," The New Republic (11 March 1996): 26-30; Ben Wildavksy, "Going Nativist?" The National Journal (27 May 1995): 1278-81; David Frum, Dead Right (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 136-41. On the role of this group in the fast-track fight, see Peter Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt," The New Republic (1 December 1997): 22-26.
69. On the rise of Republican populism and economic nationalism, see John B. Judis, "The Tariff Party," The New Republic (30 March 1992): 23-25; John B. Judis, "White Squall," The New Republic (11 March 1996): 26-30; Ben Wildavksy, "Going Nativist?" The National Journal (27 May 1995): 1278-81; David Frum, Dead Right (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 136-41. On the role of this group in the fast-track fight, see Peter Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt," The New Republic (1 December 1997): 22-26.
70. On the rise of Republican populism and economic nationalism, see John B. Judis, "The Tariff Party," The New Republic (30 March 1992): 23-25; John B. Judis, "White Squall," The New Republic (11 March 1996): 26-30; Ben Wildavksy, "Going Nativist?" The National Journal (27 May 1995): 1278-81; David Frum, Dead Right (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 136-41. On the role of this group in the fast-track fight, see Peter Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt," The New Republic (1 December 1997): 22-26.
71. On the rise of Republican populism and economic nationalism, see John B. Judis, "The Tariff Party," The New Republic (30 March 1992): 23-25; John B. Judis, "White Squall," The New Republic (11 March 1996): 26-30; Ben Wildavksy, "Going Nativist?" The National Journal (27 May 1995): 1278-81; David Frum, Dead Right (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 136-41. On the role of this group in the fast-track fight, see Peter Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt," The New Republic (1 December 1997): 22-26.
72. On these points see Barfield, "Politics of Trade," from which most of the accompanying statistics are taken. See also Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt"; James A. Barnes and Richard E. Cohen, "Divided Democrats," The National Journal (15 November 1997): 2304-7.
73. On these points see Barfield, "Politics of Trade," from which most of the accompanying statistics are taken. See also Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt"; James A. Barnes and Richard E. Cohen, "Divided Democrats," The National Journal (15 November 1997): 2304-7.
74. On these points see Barfield, "Politics of Trade," from which most of the accompanying statistics are taken. See also Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt"; James A. Barnes and Richard E. Cohen, "Divided Democrats," The National Journal (15 November 1997): 2304-7.
75. Southern House Democrats had been much more supportive of NAFTA than were their colleagues in the rest of the country, backing the deal 53-32, while the rest of the caucus opposed it by almost a 3 to 1 margin. Since 1991, however, the number of white Democratic House members from the thirteen southern states had declined from 79 to only 42.
76. Overall, whereas 40 percent of all House Democrats voted for NAFTA, 54 percent of those party members who were in the House in 1993 but not in 1997 voted for the accord, while only 30 percent of those who were House members in both years voted for the deal.
77. Only 20 percent of Democrats who were members of the House in both 1993 and 1997 planned to vote for fast track, a drop of 10 percent compared with the support for NAFTA within this group. Barfield, "Politics of Trade."
78. For the points in this paragraph, see Barnes and Cohen, "Divided Democrats"; Julie Kosterlitz, "The Pinstripers Ignored 'Ordinary Americans,"' The National Journal (1 November 1997): 2191-92; Michael Frisby and Bob Davis, "Missing in Action: As Trade Vote Looms, Clinton Is Hurt by Lack of Steady Supporters," The Wall Street Journal (6 November 1997): A1.
79. For the points in this paragraph, see Barnes and Cohen, "Divided Democrats"; Julie Kosterlitz, "The Pinstripers Ignored 'Ordinary Americans,"' The National Journal (1 November 1997): 2191-92; Michael Frisby and Bob Davis, "Missing in Action: As Trade Vote Looms, Clinton Is Hurt by Lack of Steady Supporters," The Wall Street Journal (6 November 1997): A1.
80. For the points in this paragraph, see Barnes and Cohen, "Divided Democrats"; Julie Kosterlitz, "The Pinstripers Ignored 'Ordinary Americans,"' The National Journal (1 November 1997): 2191-92; Michael Frisby and Bob Davis, "Missing in Action: As Trade Vote Looms, Clinton Is Hurt by Lack of Steady Supporters," The Wall Street Journal (6 November 1997): A1.
81. John Maggs, "Before and NAFTA," The New Republic (1 September 1997): 11-12; Nancy Dunne, "Clinton Goes to the Wire to Save Fast-Track," The Financial Times (7 November 1997): 7.
82. John Maggs, "Before and NAFTA," The New Republic (1 September 1997): 11-12; Nancy Dunne, "Clinton Goes to the Wire to Save Fast-Track," The Financial Times (7 November 1997): 7.
83. E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Why the Democrats Bolted," The Washington Post (14 November 1997): A27.
84. Thomas B. Edsall, "Big Labor Flexes Its Muscle Once Again," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (24 November 1997): 11.
85. For recent overviews of the literature on interest group behavior, see Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and Political Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); John R. Wright, Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1996); Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, Interest Group Politics, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998); Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1998).
86. For recent overviews of the literature on interest group behavior, see Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and Political Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); John R. Wright, Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1996); Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, Interest Group Politics, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998); Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1998).
87. For recent overviews of the literature on interest group behavior, see Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and Political Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); John R. Wright, Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1996); Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, Interest Group Politics, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998); Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1998).
88. For recent overviews of the literature on interest group behavior, see Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and Political Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); John R. Wright, Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1996); Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, Interest Group Politics, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998); Paul S. Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., The Interest Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying and Policymaking in Washington (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1998).
89. On labor's electoral efforts in 1996, see Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 184-87; Barnes and Cohen, "Divided Democrats"; Elizabeth Drew, Whatever It Takes: The Real Struggle for Political Power in America (New York: Penguin, 1998), 69-77, 246-47; Steve Rosenthal, "Building to Win, Building to Last," in Jo-Ann Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement: Inside the AFL-CIO (New York: Verso, 1998), 99-111; Robin Gerber "Building to Win, Building to Last: The AFL-CIO COPE Takes on the Republican Congress," in Robert Biersack, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., After the Revolution: PACs and Lobbies in the Republican Congress (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999). More generally on interest group involvement electoral campaigns, see Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Electioneering (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1999); Paul Herrnson, "Interest
90. On labor's electoral efforts in 1996, see Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 184-87; Barnes and Cohen, "Divided Democrats"; Elizabeth Drew, Whatever It Takes: The Real Struggle for Political Power in America (New York: Penguin, 1998), 69-77, 246-47; Steve Rosenthal, "Building to Win, Building to Last," in Jo-Ann Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement: Inside the AFL-CIO (New York: Verso, 1998), 99-111; Robin Gerber "Building to Win, Building to Last: The AFL-CIO COPE Takes on the Republican Congress," in Robert Biersack, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., After the Revolution: PACs and Lobbies in the Republican Congress (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999). More generally on interest group involvement electoral campaigns, see Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Electioneering (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1999); Paul Herrnson, "Interest Groups, PACs, and Campaigns," in Herrnson, Shaiko, and Wilcox, eds., The Interest Group Connection.
91. On labor's electoral efforts in 1996, see Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 184-87; Barnes and Cohen, "Divided Democrats"; Elizabeth Drew, Whatever It Takes: The Real Struggle for Political Power in America (New York: Penguin, 1998), 69-77, 246-47; Steve Rosenthal, "Building to Win, Building to Last," in Jo-Ann Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement: Inside the AFL-CIO (New York: Verso, 1998), 99-111; Robin Gerber "Building to Win, Building to Last: The AFL-CIO COPE Takes on the Republican Congress," in Robert Biersack, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., After the Revolution: PACs and Lobbies in the Republican Congress (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999). More generally on interest group involvement electoral campaigns, see Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Electioneering (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1999); Paul Herrnson, "Interest Groups, PACs, and Campaigns," in Herrnson, Shaiko, and Wilcox, eds., The Interest Group Connection.
92. On labor's electoral efforts in 1996, see Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 184-87; Barnes and Cohen, "Divided Democrats"; Elizabeth Drew, Whatever It Takes: The Real Struggle for Political Power in America (New York: Penguin, 1998), 69-77, 246-47; Steve Rosenthal, "Building to Win, Building to Last," in Jo-Ann Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement: Inside the AFL-CIO (New York: Verso, 1998), 99-111; Robin Gerber "Building to Win, Building to Last: The AFL-CIO COPE Takes on the Republican Congress," in Robert Biersack, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., After the Revolution: PACs and Lobbies in the Republican Congress (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999). More generally on interest group involvement electoral campaigns, see Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Electioneering (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1999); Paul Herrnson, "Interest Groups, PACs, and Campaigns," in Herrnson, Shaiko, and Wilcox, eds., The Interest Group Connection.
93. On labor's electoral efforts in 1996, see Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 184-87; Barnes and Cohen, "Divided Democrats"; Elizabeth Drew, Whatever It Takes: The Real Struggle for Political Power in America (New York: Penguin, 1998), 69-77, 246-47; Steve Rosenthal, "Building to Win, Building to Last," in Jo-Ann Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement: Inside the AFL-CIO (New York: Verso, 1998), 99-111; Robin Gerber "Building to Win, Building to Last: The AFL-CIO COPE Takes on the Republican Congress," in Robert Biersack, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., After the Revolution: PACs and Lobbies in the Republican Congress (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999). More generally on interest group involvement electoral campaigns, see Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Electioneering (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1999); Paul Herrnson, "Interest Groups, PACs, and Campaigns," in Herrnson, Shaiko, and Wilcox, eds., The Interest Group Connection.
94. On labor's electoral efforts in 1996, see Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 184-87; Barnes and Cohen, "Divided Democrats"; Elizabeth Drew, Whatever It Takes: The Real Struggle for Political Power in America (New York: Penguin, 1998), 69-77, 246-47; Steve Rosenthal, "Building to Win, Building to Last," in Jo-Ann Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement: Inside the AFL-CIO (New York: Verso, 1998), 99-111; Robin Gerber "Building to Win, Building to Last: The AFL-CIO COPE Takes on the Republican Congress," in Robert Biersack, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., After the Revolution: PACs and Lobbies in the Republican Congress (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999). More generally on interest group involvement electoral campaigns, see Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Electioneering (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1999); Paul Herrnson, "Interest Groups, PACs, and Campaigns," in Herrnson, Shaiko, and Wilcox, eds., The Interest Group Connection.
95. On labor's electoral efforts in 1996, see Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 184-87; Barnes and Cohen, "Divided Democrats"; Elizabeth Drew, Whatever It Takes: The Real Struggle for Political Power in America (New York: Penguin, 1998), 69-77, 246-47; Steve Rosenthal, "Building to Win, Building to Last," in Jo-Ann Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement: Inside the AFL-CIO (New York: Verso, 1998), 99-111; Robin Gerber "Building to Win, Building to Last: The AFL-CIO COPE Takes on the Republican Congress," in Robert Biersack, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., After the Revolution: PACs and Lobbies in the Republican Congress (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999). More generally on interest group involvement electoral campaigns, see Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Electioneering (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1999); Paul Herrnson, "Interest Groups, PACs, and Campaigns," in Herrnson, Shaiko, and Wilcox, eds., The Interest Group Connection.
96. The margin rises to a staggering 23 to 1 if "soft" money contributions to political parties are included.
97. For these and subsequent PAC contribution figures, see Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics 1997-1998 (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1998), 101-3.
98. For a detailed account of the labor mobilization against fast track, see David Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed," in Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement. See also Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 199; Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track"; Darrell West and Burdett A. Loomis, The Sound of Money (New York: Norton, 1999), 5-7; Jill Abramson with Steven Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill: Labor," New York Times (12 November 1997): A1; Glenn Burkins, "Labor Fights against Fast-Track Measure," The Wall Street Journal (16 September 1997): A24; Frank Swoboda, "Labor Plans Ads, Lobbying on Trade Pacts," The Washington Post (17 September 1997): A6; Harold Meyerson, "No Brainer, No Votes," The LA Weekly (14-20 November 1997): 11.
99. For a detailed account of the labor mobilization against fast track, see David Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed," in Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement. See also Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 199; Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track"; Darrell West and Burdett A. Loomis, The Sound of Money (New York: Norton, 1999), 5-7; Jill Abramson with Steven Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill: Labor," New York Times (12 November 1997): A1; Glenn Burkins, "Labor Fights against Fast-Track Measure," The Wall Street Journal (16 September 1997): A24; Frank Swoboda, "Labor Plans Ads, Lobbying on Trade Pacts," The Washington Post (17 September 1997): A6; Harold Meyerson, "No Brainer, No Votes," The LA Weekly (14-20 November 1997): 11.
100. For a detailed account of the labor mobilization against fast track, see David Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed," in Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement. See also Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 199; Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track"; Darrell West and Burdett A. Loomis, The Sound of Money (New York: Norton, 1999), 5-7; Jill Abramson with Steven Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill: Labor," New York Times (12 November 1997): A1; Glenn Burkins, "Labor Fights against Fast-Track Measure," The Wall Street Journal (16 September 1997): A24; Frank Swoboda, "Labor Plans Ads, Lobbying on Trade Pacts," The Washington Post (17 September 1997): A6; Harold Meyerson, "No Brainer, No Votes," The LA Weekly (14-20 November 1997): 11.
101. For a detailed account of the labor mobilization against fast track, see David Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed," in Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement. See also Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 199; Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track"; Darrell West and Burdett A. Loomis, The Sound of Money (New York: Norton, 1999), 5-7; Jill Abramson with Steven Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill: Labor," New York Times (12 November 1997): A1; Glenn Burkins, "Labor Fights against Fast-Track Measure," The Wall Street Journal (16 September 1997): A24; Frank Swoboda, "Labor Plans Ads, Lobbying on Trade Pacts," The Washington Post (17 September 1997): A6; Harold Meyerson, "No Brainer, No Votes," The LA Weekly (14-20 November 1997): 11.
102. For a detailed account of the labor mobilization against fast track, see David Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed," in Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement. See also Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 199; Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track"; Darrell West and Burdett A. Loomis, The Sound of Money (New York: Norton, 1999), 5-7; Jill Abramson with Steven Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill: Labor," New York Times (12 November 1997): A1; Glenn Burkins, "Labor Fights against Fast-Track Measure," The Wall Street Journal (16 September 1997): A24; Frank Swoboda, "Labor Plans Ads, Lobbying on Trade Pacts," The Washington Post (17 September 1997): A6; Harold Meyerson, "No Brainer, No Votes," The LA Weekly (14-20 November 1997): 11.
103. For a detailed account of the labor mobilization against fast track, see David Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed," in Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement. See also Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 199; Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track"; Darrell West and Burdett A. Loomis, The Sound of Money (New York: Norton, 1999), 5-7; Jill Abramson with Steven Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill: Labor," New York Times (12 November 1997): A1; Glenn Burkins, "Labor Fights against Fast-Track Measure," The Wall Street Journal (16 September 1997): A24; Frank Swoboda, "Labor Plans Ads, Lobbying on Trade Pacts," The Washington Post (17 September 1997): A6; Harold Meyerson, "No Brainer, No Votes," The LA Weekly (14-20 November 1997): 11.
104. For a detailed account of the labor mobilization against fast track, see David Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed," in Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement. See also Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 199; Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track"; Darrell West and Burdett A. Loomis, The Sound of Money (New York: Norton, 1999), 5-7; Jill Abramson with Steven Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill: Labor," New York Times (12 November 1997): A1; Glenn Burkins, "Labor Fights against Fast-Track Measure," The Wall Street Journal (16 September 1997): A24; Frank Swoboda, "Labor Plans Ads, Lobbying on Trade Pacts," The Washington Post (17 September 1997): A6; Harold Meyerson, "No Brainer, No Votes," The LA Weekly (14-20 November 1997): 11.
105. For a detailed account of the labor mobilization against fast track, see David Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed," in Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement. See also Dark, Unions and the Democrats, 199; Kosterlitz, "Muddy Track"; Darrell West and Burdett A. Loomis, The Sound of Money (New York: Norton, 1999), 5-7; Jill Abramson with Steven Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill: Labor," New York Times (12 November 1997): A1; Glenn Burkins, "Labor Fights against Fast-Track Measure," The Wall Street Journal (16 September 1997): A24; Frank Swoboda, "Labor Plans Ads, Lobbying on Trade Pacts," The Washington Post (17 September 1997): A6; Harold Meyerson, "No Brainer, No Votes," The LA Weekly (14-20 November 1997): 11.
106. On "outside" lobbying by interest groups, see West and Loomis, The Sound of Money; Ken Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
107. On "outside" lobbying by interest groups, see West and Loomis, The Sound of Money; Ken Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
108. Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed," 199.
109. Corn, "Dick Gephardt: Working-Class Hero."
110. Julie Kosterlitz, "The Wages of Trade," The National Journal (18 October 1997): 2076-79.
111. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Rhinehart, 1944).
112. For example, unions held demonstrations with Friends of the Earth and the Sierra club in half a dozen cities to call attention to NAFTA's environmental effects on Mexican border towns. Abramson with Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill." See also Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed"; Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt."
113. For example, unions held demonstrations with Friends of the Earth and the Sierra club in half a dozen cities to call attention to NAFTA's environmental effects on Mexican border towns. Abramson with Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill." See also Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed"; Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt."
114. For example, unions held demonstrations with Friends of the Earth and the Sierra club in half a dozen cities to call attention to NAFTA's environmental effects on Mexican border towns. Abramson with Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill." See also Glenn, "Fast Track Derailed"; Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt."
115. "Labor is practicing the politics of intimidation either with outright threats or implied threats... that labor will withdraw any campaign support, either financial or otherwise" to fast-track supporters, said California Rep. Calvin M. Dooley, chairman of the New Democratic Coalition. Ronald Brownstein, "Trade Is Still the Exception to Clinton's Rule," Los Angeles Times (7 November 1997): A24. While such labor warnings were mostly targeted at Democrats, union lobbyists also pressured some two dozen northeastern and midwestern Republicans.
116. Many lawmakers who opposed fast track had studied what happened to several dozen Democratic congressmembers who voted for NAFTA in 1993 and then lost to Republicans in 1994, partly because alienated union members stayed away from the polls. Abramson with Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill."
117. For studies that find evidence of labor PAC influence on congressional voting on labor issues, see Gregory M. Saltzman, "Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACs," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40, no. 2 (1987): 163-79; Allen Wilhite and John Theilman, "Labor PAC Contributions and Labor Legislation: A Simultaneous Logit Approach," Public Choice 53, no. 3 (1987): 267-76; Woodrow Jones, Jr. and Robert K. Keiser, "Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money," Social Science Quarterly 68, no. 1 (1987): 170-76; Alan Neustadtl, "Interest Group PACsmanship: An Analysis of Campaign Contributions, Issue Visibility, and Legislative Impact," Social Forces 69, no. 2 (1990): 549-64. For reviews of the wider literature on the effects of PAC spending on congressional voting behavior, see Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Instincts; Wright, Interest Groups and Congress; Thomas Gais, Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
118. For studies that find evidence of labor PAC influence on congressional voting on labor issues, see Gregory M. Saltzman, "Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACs," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40, no. 2 (1987): 163-79; Allen Wilhite and John Theilman, "Labor PAC Contributions and Labor Legislation: A Simultaneous Logit Approach," Public Choice 53, no. 3 (1987): 267-76; Woodrow Jones, Jr. and Robert K. Keiser, "Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money," Social Science Quarterly 68, no. 1 (1987): 170-76; Alan Neustadtl, "Interest Group PACsmanship: An Analysis of Campaign Contributions, Issue Visibility, and Legislative Impact," Social Forces 69, no. 2 (1990): 549-64. For reviews of the wider literature on the effects of PAC spending on congressional voting behavior, see Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Instincts; Wright, Interest Groups and Congress; Thomas Gais, Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
119. For studies that find evidence of labor PAC influence on congressional voting on labor issues, see Gregory M. Saltzman, "Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACs," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40, no. 2 (1987): 163-79; Allen Wilhite and John Theilman, "Labor PAC Contributions and Labor Legislation: A Simultaneous Logit Approach," Public Choice 53, no. 3 (1987): 267-76; Woodrow Jones, Jr. and Robert K. Keiser, "Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money," Social Science Quarterly 68, no. 1 (1987): 170-76; Alan Neustadtl, "Interest Group PACsmanship: An Analysis of Campaign Contributions, Issue Visibility, and Legislative Impact," Social Forces 69, no. 2 (1990): 549-64. For reviews of the wider literature on the effects of PAC spending on congressional voting behavior, see Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Instincts; Wright, Interest Groups and Congress; Thomas Gais, Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
120. For studies that find evidence of labor PAC influence on congressional voting on labor issues, see Gregory M. Saltzman, "Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACs," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40, no. 2 (1987): 163-79; Allen Wilhite and John Theilman, "Labor PAC Contributions and Labor Legislation: A Simultaneous Logit Approach," Public Choice 53, no. 3 (1987): 267-76; Woodrow Jones, Jr. and Robert K. Keiser, "Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money," Social Science Quarterly 68, no. 1 (1987): 170-76; Alan Neustadtl, "Interest Group PACsmanship: An Analysis of Campaign Contributions, Issue Visibility, and Legislative Impact," Social Forces 69, no. 2 (1990): 549-64. For reviews of the wider literature on the effects of PAC spending on congressional voting behavior, see Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Instincts; Wright, Interest Groups and Congress; Thomas Gais, Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
121. For studies that find evidence of labor PAC influence on congressional voting on labor issues, see Gregory M. Saltzman, "Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACs," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40, no. 2 (1987): 163-79; Allen Wilhite and John Theilman, "Labor PAC Contributions and Labor Legislation: A Simultaneous Logit Approach," Public Choice 53, no. 3 (1987): 267-76; Woodrow Jones, Jr. and Robert K. Keiser, "Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money," Social Science Quarterly 68, no. 1 (1987): 170-76; Alan Neustadtl, "Interest Group PACsmanship: An Analysis of Campaign Contributions, Issue Visibility, and Legislative Impact," Social Forces 69, no. 2 (1990): 549-64. For reviews of the wider literature on the effects of PAC spending on congressional voting behavior, see Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Instincts; Wright, Interest Groups and Congress; Thomas Gais, Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
122. For studies that find evidence of labor PAC influence on congressional voting on labor issues, see Gregory M. Saltzman, "Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACs," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40, no. 2 (1987): 163-79; Allen Wilhite and John Theilman, "Labor PAC Contributions and Labor Legislation: A Simultaneous Logit Approach," Public Choice 53, no. 3 (1987): 267-76; Woodrow Jones, Jr. and Robert K. Keiser, "Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money," Social Science Quarterly 68, no. 1 (1987): 170-76; Alan Neustadtl, "Interest Group PACsmanship: An Analysis of Campaign Contributions, Issue Visibility, and Legislative Impact," Social Forces 69, no. 2 (1990): 549-64. For reviews of the wider literature on the effects of PAC spending on congressional voting behavior, see Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Instincts; Wright, Interest Groups and Congress; Thomas Gais, Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
123. For studies that find evidence of labor PAC influence on congressional voting on labor issues, see Gregory M. Saltzman, "Congressional Voting on Labor Issues: The Role of PACs," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40, no. 2 (1987): 163-79; Allen Wilhite and John Theilman, "Labor PAC Contributions and Labor Legislation: A Simultaneous Logit Approach," Public Choice 53, no. 3 (1987): 267-76; Woodrow Jones, Jr. and Robert K. Keiser, "Issue Visibility and the Effects of PAC Money," Social Science Quarterly 68, no. 1 (1987): 170-76; Alan Neustadtl, "Interest Group PACsmanship: An Analysis of Campaign Contributions, Issue Visibility, and Legislative Impact," Social Forces 69, no. 2 (1990): 549-64. For reviews of the wider literature on the effects of PAC spending on congressional voting behavior, see Baumgartner and Leech, Basic Instincts; Wright, Interest Groups and Congress; Thomas Gais, Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
124. See the studies of congressional voting on NAFTA cited in note 12 above. For other studies that find PAC effects on congressional trade voting, see Cletus C. Coughlin, "Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation," Economic Inquiry 23, no. 3 (1985): 437-48; Suzanne C. Tosini and Edward Tower, "The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patterns," Public Choice 54, no. 1 (1987): 19-25; Stephen V. Marks, "Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987," Public Choice 75, no. 1 (1993): 21-42; Stanley D. Nollen and Dennis P. Quinn, "Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade, and Protectionism in the U.S. Congress, 1987-88," International Organization 48, no. 3 (1994): 491-525.
125. See the studies of congressional voting on NAFTA cited in note 12 above. For other studies that find PAC effects on congressional trade voting, see Cletus C. Coughlin, "Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation," Economic Inquiry 23, no. 3 (1985): 437-48; Suzanne C. Tosini and Edward Tower, "The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patterns," Public Choice 54, no. 1 (1987): 19-25; Stephen V. Marks, "Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987," Public Choice 75, no. 1 (1993): 21-42; Stanley D. Nollen and Dennis P. Quinn, "Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade, and Protectionism in the U.S. Congress, 1987-88," International Organization 48, no. 3 (1994): 491-525.
126. See the studies of congressional voting on NAFTA cited in note 12 above. For other studies that find PAC effects on congressional trade voting, see Cletus C. Coughlin, "Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation," Economic Inquiry 23, no. 3 (1985): 437-48; Suzanne C. Tosini and Edward Tower, "The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patterns," Public Choice 54, no. 1 (1987): 19-25; Stephen V. Marks, "Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987," Public Choice 75, no. 1 (1993): 21-42; Stanley D. Nollen and Dennis P. Quinn, "Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade, and Protectionism in the U.S. Congress, 1987-88," International Organization 48, no. 3 (1994): 491-525.
127. See the studies of congressional voting on NAFTA cited in note 12 above. For other studies that find PAC effects on congressional trade voting, see Cletus C. Coughlin, "Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation," Economic Inquiry 23, no. 3 (1985): 437-48; Suzanne C. Tosini and Edward Tower, "The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patterns," Public Choice 54, no. 1 (1987): 19-25; Stephen V. Marks, "Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987," Public Choice 75, no. 1 (1993): 21-42; Stanley D. Nollen and Dennis P. Quinn, "Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade, and Protectionism in the U.S. Congress, 1987-88," International Organization 48, no. 3 (1994): 491-525.
128. For general discussions of PACs and their strategies, see Gais, Improper Influence; Theodore J. Eismeier and Philip H. Pollock III, Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American Elections (New York: Quorum, 1988); Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadt, and Mark Weller, Dollars and Votes: How Business Campaign Contribution Subvert Democracy (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1998).
129. For general discussions of PACs and their strategies, see Gais, Improper Influence; Theodore J. Eismeier and Philip H. Pollock III, Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American Elections (New York: Quorum, 1988); Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadt, and Mark Weller, Dollars and Votes: How Business Campaign Contribution Subvert Democracy (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1998).
130. For general discussions of PACs and their strategies, see Gais, Improper Influence; Theodore J. Eismeier and Philip H. Pollock III, Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American Elections (New York: Quorum, 1988); Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadt, and Mark Weller, Dollars and Votes: How Business Campaign Contribution Subvert Democracy (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1998).
131. For general discussions of PACs and their strategies, see Gais, Improper Influence; Theodore J. Eismeier and Philip H. Pollock III, Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American Elections (New York: Quorum, 1988); Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadt, and Mark Weller, Dollars and Votes: How Business Campaign Contribution Subvert Democracy (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1998).
132. Gais, Improper Influence, 167-69; Eismeier and Pollock, Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American Elections; Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller, Dollars and Votes, 150-57; Brooks Jackson, Honest Graft: Big Money and the American Political Process (New York: Knopf, 1988).
133. Gais, Improper Influence, 167-69; Eismeier and Pollock, Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American Elections; Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller, Dollars and Votes, 150-57; Brooks Jackson, Honest Graft: Big Money and the American Political Process (New York: Knopf, 1988).
134. Gais, Improper Influence, 167-69; Eismeier and Pollock, Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American Elections; Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller, Dollars and Votes, 150-57; Brooks Jackson, Honest Graft: Big Money and the American Political Process (New York: Knopf, 1988).
135. Gais, Improper Influence, 167-69; Eismeier and Pollock, Business, Money, and the Rise of Corporate PACs in American Elections; Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller, Dollars and Votes, 150-57; Brooks Jackson, Honest Graft: Big Money and the American Political Process (New York: Knopf, 1988).
136. In 1982, business PACs gave only about 40 percent of their contributions in House races to Democrats. By 1992, this had jumped to almost 57 percent. On the advantage in the receipt of corporate PAC contributions enjoyed by members of the House majority party, see Thomas J. Rudolph, "Corporate and Labor PAC Contributions in House Elections: Measuring the Effects of Majority Party Status," Journal of Politics 61, no. 1 (1999): 195-206; Gary W. Cox and Eric Magar, "How Much Is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?" American Political Science Review 93, no. 2 (1999): 299-309.
137. In 1982, business PACs gave only about 40 percent of their contributions in House races to Democrats. By 1992, this had jumped to almost 57 percent. On the advantage in the receipt of corporate PAC contributions enjoyed by members of the House majority party, see Thomas J. Rudolph, "Corporate and Labor PAC Contributions in House Elections: Measuring the Effects of Majority Party Status," Journal of Politics 61, no. 1 (1999): 195-206; Gary W. Cox and Eric Magar, "How Much Is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?" American Political Science Review 93, no. 2 (1999): 299-309.
138. Including contributions from both "corporate" and "trade, membership, and health" PACs.
139. See Cohen, "Dems Feel the Squeeze"; Cohen and Barnes, "Divided Democrats"; Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt"; Abramson with Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill"; Edsall, "Big Labor Flexes Its Muscle Once Again"; Meyerson, "No-Brainer, No Votes."
140. See Cohen, "Dems Feel the Squeeze"; Cohen and Barnes, "Divided Democrats"; Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt"; Abramson with Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill"; Edsall, "Big Labor Flexes Its Muscle Once Again"; Meyerson, "No-Brainer, No Votes."
141. See Cohen, "Dems Feel the Squeeze"; Cohen and Barnes, "Divided Democrats"; Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt"; Abramson with Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill"; Edsall, "Big Labor Flexes Its Muscle Once Again"; Meyerson, "No-Brainer, No Votes."
142. See Cohen, "Dems Feel the Squeeze"; Cohen and Barnes, "Divided Democrats"; Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt"; Abramson with Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill"; Edsall, "Big Labor Flexes Its Muscle Once Again"; Meyerson, "No-Brainer, No Votes."
143. See Cohen, "Dems Feel the Squeeze"; Cohen and Barnes, "Divided Democrats"; Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt"; Abramson with Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill"; Edsall, "Big Labor Flexes Its Muscle Once Again"; Meyerson, "No-Brainer, No Votes."
144. See Cohen, "Dems Feel the Squeeze"; Cohen and Barnes, "Divided Democrats"; Beinart, "The Nationalist Revolt"; Abramson with Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill"; Edsall, "Big Labor Flexes Its Muscle Once Again"; Meyerson, "No-Brainer, No Votes."
145. While business PACs gave $47.5 million to House Democrats in 1994, that figure had dropped to $33 million in 1996. Meanwhile, labor PACs increased their contributions to Democrats from $32.5 million in 1994 to $37.3 million in 1996.
146. The figure for all Democratic challengers, including both winners and losers, was 71 percent.
147. As the fast-track vote approached, Democrats took note of a recent special election in Staten Island where a strong Democratic candidate lost because the Republicans were able to spend $800,000 on soft-money-funded ads, while the Democratic Party lacked the funds to reply.
148. Martha Gibson and Stephen Carter demonstrate that as in NAFTA voting, the larger was labor's share of a member's total PAC contributions, the more likely the member was to oppose fast track. This time, though, the Democrats' heightened dependence on labor money spelled defeat for Clinton's proposal. Martha L. Gibson and Stephen Carter, "The Politicization of Fast Track" (paper presented at the meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, September 1998).
149. Brownstein, "Trade Is Still the Exception to Clinton's Rule."
150. Barnes and Cohen, "Divided Democrats," 2306.
151. John F. Harris, "Clinton Hits 'Fast-Track' Opponents," The Washington Post (28 October 1997): A4.
152. Peter Beinart, "Why the Center Can't Hold," Time (24 November 1997): 52.
153. Abramson with Greenhouse, "The Trade Bill."
154. See Steven Greenhouse, "Two Feuding Democratic Voices Call a Truce," New York Times (9 August 1998): 20; John Judis, "New Labor, New Democrats - New Alliance?" The American Prospect (September-October 1998): 12-14.
155. See Steven Greenhouse, "Two Feuding Democratic Voices Call a Truce," New York Times (9 August 1998): 20; John Judis, "New Labor, New Democrats - New Alliance?" The American Prospect (September-October 1998): 12-14.
156. On the late summer and fall 1998 fast-track fight, see Paul Magnusson, "Newt May Have Put Fast-Track on an Even Slower Boat," Business Week (13 July 1998): 49; David Hosansky, "Tenuous Bipartisan Alliance on Trade Succumbs to Election-Year Tensions," CQ Weekly (1 August 1998): 2072; Julie Kosterlitz, "A Vote the Dems Would Like to Trade In," The National Journal (12 September 1998): 2108; David Hosansky, "House Vote Signals a Key Reversal of U.S. Support for Free Trade," CQ Weekly (26 September 1998): 2603-4.
157. On the late summer and fall 1998 fast-track fight, see Paul Magnusson, "Newt May Have Put Fast-Track on an Even Slower Boat," Business Week (13 July 1998): 49; David Hosansky, "Tenuous Bipartisan Alliance on Trade Succumbs to Election-Year Tensions," CQ Weekly (1 August 1998): 2072; Julie Kosterlitz, "A Vote the Dems Would Like to Trade In," The National Journal (12 September 1998): 2108; David Hosansky, "House Vote Signals a Key Reversal of U.S. Support for Free Trade," CQ Weekly (26 September 1998): 2603-4.
158. On the late summer and fall 1998 fast-track fight, see Paul Magnusson, "Newt May Have Put Fast-Track on an Even Slower Boat," Business Week (13 July 1998): 49; David Hosansky, "Tenuous Bipartisan Alliance on Trade Succumbs to Election-Year Tensions," CQ Weekly (1 August 1998): 2072; Julie Kosterlitz, "A Vote the Dems Would Like to Trade In," The National Journal (12 September 1998): 2108; David Hosansky, "House Vote Signals a Key Reversal of U.S. Support for Free Trade," CQ Weekly (26 September 1998): 2603-4.
159. On the late summer and fall 1998 fast-track fight, see Paul Magnusson, "Newt May Have Put Fast-Track on an Even Slower Boat," Business Week (13 July 1998): 49; David Hosansky, "Tenuous Bipartisan Alliance on Trade Succumbs to Election-Year Tensions," CQ Weekly (1 August 1998): 2072; Julie Kosterlitz, "A Vote the Dems Would Like to Trade In," The National Journal (12 September 1998): 2108; David Hosansky, "House Vote Signals a Key Reversal of U.S. Support for Free Trade," CQ Weekly (26 September 1998): 2603-4.
160. Juliet Eilperin, "House Defeats Fast-Track Trade Authority," The Washington Post (26 September 1998): A10; Jonathan Peterson, "Democrats Call House Defeat of Fast-Track Trade Bill Bid to Humiliate Them," Los Angeles Times (26 September 1998): A18.
161. Juliet Eilperin, "House Defeats Fast-Track Trade Authority," The Washington Post (26 September 1998): A10; Jonathan Peterson, "Democrats Call House Defeat of Fast-Track Trade Bill Bid to Humiliate Them," Los Angeles Times (26 September 1998): A18.
162. Bill Clinton also opposed the Republicans' attempt to put Democrats on the spot before the November elections, especially after it became clear that he would need Democratic support to fend off impeachment over the Monica Lewinsky scandal.
163. While spending only about $5 million on TV ads in 1998, labor spent $18 million on a tightly targeted "GOTV" effort coordinated by 400 field activists, up from 135 in 1996, and focused on 8 Senate races and 45 tight House races, down from more than 100 two years earlier. Aaron Bernstein and Richard S. Dunham, "Unions: Laboring Mightily to Avert a Nightmare in November," Business Week (19 October 1998): 53; Steven Greenhouse, "Republicans Credit Labor for Success by Democrats," New York Times (6 November 1998): A28; Aaron Bernstein, "Labor Helps Turn the Tide - The Old Fashioned Way," Business Week (16 November 1998): 45; David Magleby and Marianne Holt, "The Long Shadow of Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Ads," Campaigns & Elections (May 1999): 22-27.
164. While spending only about $5 million on TV ads in 1998, labor spent $18 million on a tightly targeted "GOTV" effort coordinated by 400 field activists, up from 135 in 1996, and focused on 8 Senate races and 45 tight House races, down from more than 100 two years earlier. Aaron Bernstein and Richard S. Dunham, "Unions: Laboring Mightily to Avert a Nightmare in November," Business Week (19 October 1998): 53; Steven Greenhouse, "Republicans Credit Labor for Success by Democrats," New York Times (6 November 1998): A28; Aaron Bernstein, "Labor Helps Turn the Tide - The Old Fashioned Way," Business Week (16 November 1998): 45; David Magleby and Marianne Holt, "The Long Shadow of Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Ads," Campaigns & Elections (May 1999): 22-27.
165. While spending only about $5 million on TV ads in 1998, labor spent $18 million on a tightly targeted "GOTV" effort coordinated by 400 field activists, up from 135 in 1996, and focused on 8 Senate races and 45 tight House races, down from more than 100 two years earlier. Aaron Bernstein and Richard S. Dunham, "Unions: Laboring Mightily to Avert a Nightmare in November," Business Week (19 October 1998): 53; Steven Greenhouse, "Republicans Credit Labor for Success by Democrats," New York Times (6 November 1998): A28; Aaron Bernstein, "Labor Helps Turn the Tide - The Old Fashioned Way," Business Week (16 November 1998): 45; David Magleby and Marianne Holt, "The Long Shadow of Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Ads," Campaigns & Elections (May 1999): 22-27.
166. While spending only about $5 million on TV ads in 1998, labor spent $18 million on a tightly targeted "GOTV" effort coordinated by 400 field activists, up from 135 in 1996, and focused on 8 Senate races and 45 tight House races, down from more than 100 two years earlier. Aaron Bernstein and Richard S. Dunham, "Unions: Laboring Mightily to Avert a Nightmare in November," Business Week (19 October 1998): 53; Steven Greenhouse, "Republicans Credit Labor for Success by Democrats," New York Times (6 November 1998): A28; Aaron Bernstein, "Labor Helps Turn the Tide - The Old Fashioned Way," Business Week (16 November 1998): 45; David Magleby and Marianne Holt, "The Long Shadow of Soft Money and Issue Advocacy Ads," Campaigns & Elections (May 1999): 22-27.
167. "The only thing worse than no agreement," one administration official said, "was the agreement it looked like we might get." Joseph Kahn and David E. Sanger, "Impasse on Trade Delivers a Stinging Blow to Clinton," New York Times (5 December 1999): A1.
168. Less Dramatic fights will be fought over bills to lower U.S. tariffs and quotas on goods from sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America, and possibly over continued U.S. participation in the WTO (which the AFL-CIO does not oppose). For much of the information in this paragraph and the next, see "Trade Winds Swirling Over China Vote," The National Journal (12 December 1999): 3618-20.
169. Twenty-four percent of those turning out came from union households, and according to an AFL-CIO poll, 71 percent of union members voted Democratic in a year that saw the party pick up five House seats.
170. Kirk Victor and Eliza Newlin Carney, "Labor's Political Muscle," The National Journal (4 September 1999): 2478-82.
171. James L. Tyson, "In High-Tech Age, Unions Can Score," Christian Science Monitor (20 July 1999): 1; Julie Kosterlitz, "Searching for New Labor," The National Journal (4 September 1999): 2470-77; Paul Buhle and Steve Fraser, "A New Day for Labor," The Nation (20 September 1999): 7-8. More generally, see Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement.
172. James L. Tyson, "In High-Tech Age, Unions Can Score," Christian Science Monitor (20 July 1999): 1; Julie Kosterlitz, "Searching for New Labor," The National Journal (4 September 1999): 2470-77; Paul Buhle and Steve Fraser, "A New Day for Labor," The Nation (20 September 1999): 7-8. More generally, see Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement.
173. James L. Tyson, "In High-Tech Age, Unions Can Score," Christian Science Monitor (20 July 1999): 1; Julie Kosterlitz, "Searching for New Labor," The National Journal (4 September 1999): 2470-77; Paul Buhle and Steve Fraser, "A New Day for Labor," The Nation (20 September 1999): 7-8. More generally, see Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement.
174. James L. Tyson, "In High-Tech Age, Unions Can Score," Christian Science Monitor (20 July 1999): 1; Julie Kosterlitz, "Searching for New Labor," The National Journal (4 September 1999): 2470-77; Paul Buhle and Steve Fraser, "A New Day for Labor," The Nation (20 September 1999): 7-8. More generally, see Mort, ed., Not Your Father's Union Movement.
175. A highly publicized poll released in November 1999 by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland found that 72 percent of the U.S. public believed that too little attention is paid in trade talks to "working Americans," and 78 percent thought that the WTO should pay more attention to labor and environmental standards. Mark Suzman, "Trade: Clinton Links Environment to Trade Deals," The Financial Times (17 November 1999): 6.
176. "Some Republicans aren't going to be there on trade issues," said Dan Schnur, a California GOP consultant. "Ultimately, business is going to form relationships with elements of both parties." Richard S. Dunham and Amy Borrus, "Still the Party of Big Business?" Business Week (14 September 1998): 150-60. Business interests calling for renewed support for the Democrats included the Business-Industry Political Action Committee, a corporate lobbying coalition; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and the editorialists at Business Week. See "There's More Than One Party of Business," Business Week (4 May 1988): 182; Richard S. Dunham, "Is the GOP the Only Party of Business?" Business Week (4 May 1998): 154; Thomas B. Edsall, "Giving Republicans the Business," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (22 June 1998): 10; "Building the Chamber's Clout," Business Week (22 March 1999): 51.
177. "Some Republicans aren't going to be there on trade issues," said Dan Schnur, a California GOP consultant. "Ultimately, business is going to form relationships with elements of both parties." Richard S. Dunham and Amy Borrus, "Still the Party of Big Business?" Business Week (14 September 1998): 150-60. Business interests calling for renewed support for the Democrats included the Business-Industry Political Action Committee, a corporate lobbying coalition; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and the editorialists at Business Week. See "There's More Than One Party of Business," Business Week (4 May 1988): 182; Richard S. Dunham, "Is the GOP the Only Party of Business?" Business Week (4 May 1998): 154; Thomas B. Edsall, "Giving Republicans the Business," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (22 June 1998): 10; "Building the Chamber's Clout," Business Week (22 March 1999): 51.
178. "Some Republicans aren't going to be there on trade issues," said Dan Schnur, a California GOP consultant. "Ultimately, business is going to form relationships with elements of both parties." Richard S. Dunham and Amy Borrus, "Still the Party of Big Business?" Business Week (14 September 1998): 150-60. Business interests calling for renewed support for the Democrats included the Business-Industry Political Action Committee, a corporate lobbying coalition; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and the editorialists at Business Week. See "There's More Than One Party of Business," Business Week (4 May 1988): 182; Richard S. Dunham, "Is the GOP the Only Party of Business?" Business Week (4 May 1998): 154; Thomas B. Edsall, "Giving Republicans the Business," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (22 June 1998): 10; "Building the Chamber's Clout," Business Week (22 March 1999): 51.
179. "Some Republicans aren't going to be there on trade issues," said Dan Schnur, a California GOP consultant. "Ultimately, business is going to form relationships with elements of both parties." Richard S. Dunham and Amy Borrus, "Still the Party of Big Business?" Business Week (14 September 1998): 150-60. Business interests calling for renewed support for the Democrats included the Business-Industry Political Action Committee, a corporate lobbying coalition; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and the editorialists at Business Week. See "There's More Than One Party of Business," Business Week (4 May 1988): 182; Richard S. Dunham, "Is the GOP the Only Party of Business?" Business Week (4 May 1998): 154; Thomas B. Edsall, "Giving Republicans the Business," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (22 June 1998): 10; "Building the Chamber's Clout," Business Week (22 March 1999): 51.
180. "Some Republicans aren't going to be there on trade issues," said Dan Schnur, a California GOP consultant. "Ultimately, business is going to form relationships with elements of both parties." Richard S. Dunham and Amy Borrus, "Still the Party of Big Business?" Business Week (14 September 1998): 150-60. Business interests calling for renewed support for the Democrats included the Business-Industry Political Action Committee, a corporate lobbying coalition; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and the editorialists at Business Week. See "There's More Than One Party of Business," Business Week (4 May 1988): 182; Richard S. Dunham, "Is the GOP the Only Party of Business?" Business Week (4 May 1998): 154; Thomas B. Edsall, "Giving Republicans the Business," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition (22 June 1998): 10; "Building the Chamber's Clout," Business Week (22 March 1999): 51.
181. Eliza Newlin Carney, "What? A Smiling 'New Democrat?"' The National Journal (6 December 1997): 2476-77.
182. Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress, 1999-2000 (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2000), 106.
183. The figures are taken from a report prepared by the Center for Responsive Politics. Susan B. Glasser and Juliet Eilperin, "GOP Scrambles to Counter Business's Aid to Democrats," Washington Post (10 November 1999): A6.
184. See Julie Kosterlitz, "Trade Crusade," The National Journal (9 May 1998): 1054-57; Bob Davis, "CEOs, Stymied in Capital on Trade, Lobby Hinterland," The Wall Street Journal (15 June 1998): A30; Michael Phillips and Helene Cooper, "Business Launches Free Trade Offensive," The Wall Street Journal (29 November 1999): A2.
185. See Julie Kosterlitz, "Trade Crusade," The National Journal (9 May 1998): 1054-57; Bob Davis, "CEOs, Stymied in Capital on Trade, Lobby Hinterland," The Wall Street Journal (15 June 1998): A30; Michael Phillips and Helene Cooper, "Business Launches Free Trade Offensive," The Wall Street Journal (29 November 1999): A2.
186. See Julie Kosterlitz, "Trade Crusade," The National Journal (9 May 1998): 1054-57; Bob Davis, "CEOs, Stymied in Capital on Trade, Lobby Hinterland," The Wall Street Journal (15 June 1998): A30; Michael Phillips and Helene Cooper, "Business Launches Free Trade Offensive," The Wall Street Journal (29 November 1999): A2.
187. Including filing complaints under U.S. trade laws with labor rights provisions and under the NAFTA side agreements, working with European Union colleagues under the EU Works Council Directive, bringing cases to the International Labor Organization, and pressing for corporate codes of conduct, filing lawsuits, and other mechanisms.
188. Lance Compa, "Free Trade, Fair Trade, and the Battle for Labor Rights" (paper presented at the conference on "The Revival of the Labor Movement?" School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, October 1998). See also Lance Compa, "A Fast Track for Labor," The American Prospect (September-October 1998): 60-64.
189. Lance Compa, "Free Trade, Fair Trade, and the Battle for Labor Rights" (paper presented at the conference on "The Revival of the Labor Movement?" School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, October 1998). See also Lance Compa, "A Fast Track for Labor," The American Prospect (September-October 1998): 60-64.
190. Buhle and Fraser, "A New Day for Labor."
191. In an important recent study of 93 nations, Dani Rodrik shows that democracies pay higher wages than autocracies for a given level of manufacturing productivity. This suggests that more democratic developing countries might eventually be persuaded to agree to modest international labor standards, since they are at a competitive disadvantage with respect to more repressive developing countries in which wages are lower. Dani Rodrik, "Democracies Pay Higher Wages," Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 3 (1999): 707-38. For a useful discussion of Rodrik's findings, see Aaron Bernstein, "Labor Standards: Try a Little Democracy," Business Week (13 December 1999): 42-43.
192. In an important recent study of 93 nations, Dani Rodrik shows that democracies pay higher wages than autocracies for a given level of manufacturing productivity. This suggests that more democratic developing countries might eventually be persuaded to agree to modest international labor standards, since they are at a competitive disadvantage with respect to more repressive developing countries in which wages are lower. Dani Rodrik, "Democracies Pay Higher Wages," Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, no. 3 (1999): 707-38. For a useful discussion of Rodrik's findings, see Aaron Bernstein, "Labor Standards: Try a Little Democracy," Business Week (13 December 1999): 42-43.
193. See the sketch of elements of such a program by Thomas I. Palley, assistant director of public policy for the AFL-CIO, in "How to Say No to the IMF," The Nation (21 June 1999): 21-22. For a fuller argument, see Thomas I. Palley, Plenty of Nothing: The Downsizing of the American Dream and the Case for Structural Keynesianism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). See also Jeff Faux, "A New Grand Bargain,The American Prospect (17 January 2000): 20.
194. See the sketch of elements of such a program by Thomas I. Palley, assistant director of public policy for the AFL-CIO, in "How to Say No to the IMF," The Nation (21 June 1999): 21-22. For a fuller argument, see Thomas I. Palley, Plenty of Nothing: The Downsizing of the American Dream and the Case for Structural Keynesianism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). See also Jeff Faux, "A New Grand Bargain,The American Prospect (17 January 2000): 20.
195. See the sketch of elements of such a program by Thomas I. Palley, assistant director of public policy for the AFL-CIO, in "How to Say No to the IMF," The Nation (21 June 1999): 21-22. For a fuller argument, see Thomas I. Palley, Plenty of Nothing: The Downsizing of the American Dream and the Case for Structural Keynesianism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). See also Jeff Faux, "A New Grand Bargain,The American Prospect (17 January 2000): 20.