Simulating the unthinkable: Gaming future war in the 1950s and 1960s

Social Studies of Science

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 163-223

  Ghamari Tabrizi, Sharon ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Herman Kahn; Man machine simulation; Modelling; Operations research; RAND corporation; Realism; War gaming

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034382792     PISSN: 03063127     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030631200030002001     Document Type: Article

References (280)

1. Both these quotations were published in Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann, Techniques of Systems Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RM-1829-1, 3 December 1956; revised June 1957), at 2 and 3.
2. Lieutenant Commander Frank Haak, 'Formula for the Future - Operations Research', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol. 87, No. 4 (April 1961), 50-55, at 50.
3. Herbert Simon and Allen Newell, 'Heuristic Problem Solving: The Next Advance in Operations Research', Operations Research, Vol. 6 (January-February 1958), 1-10, at 5.
4. Jay Forrester, 'Systems Technology and Industrial Dynamics', Technology Review, Vol. 59 (June 1957), 417-22, 428-32, at 418.
5. George Morgenthaler, 'The Theory and Application of Simulation in Operations Research', in Russell Ackoff (ed.), Progress in Operations Research, Vol. I (NewYork: John Wiley, 1961), 363-420, at 367.
6. F.C. Brooks and L.W. Merriam, 'CORG Plans Tomorrow's Army Today', ARMY (February 1956), 28-31, at 30.
7. Lieutenant General Gordon B. Rogers, 'Battles Without Bloodshed', Army Information Digest, Vol. 15, No. 12 (December 1960), 32-45, at 35. On the same page, Rogers echoes earlier rhetoric: In operational and research war games, every effort is made to reduce the personal standard of measurement and to apply objective data in coming to any conclusion. [The Army's] war gaming facility has been specially designed to reduce personal bias and individual inexperience and substitute for it measurements and standards . . .
8. Philip M. Morse and George E. Kimball, Methods of Operations Research (New York: Wiley & MIT Press, 1st edn revised, 1951), 10a (emphasis in original).
9. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), 162.
10. Richard Kostelanetz, 'One-Man Think Tank', New York Times Sunday Magazine (1 December 1968), 58-59, 82-96, 105-06, 112-14, 122-24, at 105.
11. Robert H. Roy, 'The Development and Future of Operations Research and Systems Engineering', in Charles Flagle, William Huggins and R.H. Roy (eds), Operations Research and Systems Engineering (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960), 8-27, at 25.
12. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 256.
13. General Thomas White, 'Strategy and the Defense Intellectuals', Saturday Evening Post (4 May 1963), 10-12, at 12.
14. For example, in 1961, an operations researcher complained: System now replaces system without full-scale stressful operation of either the old or the new. Tactical nuclear weapons, guided missiles, infantry squad radios, and many others have yet to be tried in combat. Moreover, the wise and experienced combat commander is now rarely a source of experience translatable into crude data. In many cases, the systems under study include elements he has never employed; or, if he has, under very different circumstances from those now envisioned. Donald Meals, 'Trends in Operations Research', Operations Research, Vol. 9, No. 2 (March-April 1961), 252-57, at 253. In his book, Inventing Accuracy, Donald MacKenzie's account of scepticism regarding missile accuracy parallels the arguments senior commanders advanced against the newly dominant status of systems analysis in the 1960s. As MacKenzie shows, veteran senior officers based their arguments on the historical experiences of strategic air power manned by seasoned pilots in World War II and the Korean War, over against untested missiles. Thus MacKenzie quotes from the testimony of Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay in 1964, regarding the shaky findings from Polaris testing: We have only had one test, it was not under full operational conditions, we fired one Polaris out in the Pacific with a warhead on it. It was not truly operational. It was modified to some extent for the test. Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 342. MacKenzie interprets LeMay's scepticism from the point of view of the Air Force's stake in creating a distinct strategic mission for the manned bomber (ibid., 345) . Interestingly, this argument, which positioned the historical experience of the strategic bomber force against the abstractions of missile testing, was put forward in 1981 (ibid., 358-59).
15. For example, in 1961, an operations researcher complained: System now replaces system without full-scale stressful operation of either the old or the new. Tactical nuclear weapons, guided missiles, infantry squad radios, and many others have yet to be tried in combat. Moreover, the wise and experienced combat commander is now rarely a source of experience translatable into crude data. In many cases, the systems under study include elements he has never employed; or, if he has, under very different circumstances from those now envisioned. Donald Meals, 'Trends in Operations Research', Operations Research, Vol. 9, No. 2 (March-April 1961), 252-57, at 253. In his book, Inventing Accuracy, Donald MacKenzie's account of scepticism regarding missile accuracy parallels the arguments senior commanders advanced against the newly dominant status of systems analysis in the 1960s. As MacKenzie shows, veteran senior officers based their arguments on the historical experiences of strategic air power manned by seasoned pilots in World War II and the Korean War, over against untested missiles. Thus MacKenzie quotes from the testimony of Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay in 1964, regarding the shaky findings from Polaris testing: We have only had one test, it was not under full operational conditions, we fired one Polaris out in the Pacific with a warhead on it. It was not truly operational. It was modified to some extent for the test. Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 342. MacKenzie interprets LeMay's scepticism from the point of view of the Air Force's stake in creating a distinct strategic mission for the manned bomber (ibid., 345) . Interestingly, this argument, which positioned the historical experience of the strategic bomber force against the abstractions of missile testing, was put forward in 1981 (ibid., 358-59).
16. For example, in 1961, an operations researcher complained: System now replaces system without full-scale stressful operation of either the old or the new. Tactical nuclear weapons, guided missiles, infantry squad radios, and many others have yet to be tried in combat. Moreover, the wise and experienced combat commander is now rarely a source of experience translatable into crude data. In many cases, the systems under study include elements he has never employed; or, if he has, under very different circumstances from those now envisioned. Donald Meals, 'Trends in Operations Research', Operations Research, Vol. 9, No. 2 (March-April 1961), 252-57, at 253. In his book, Inventing Accuracy, Donald MacKenzie's account of scepticism regarding missile accuracy parallels the arguments senior commanders advanced against the newly dominant status of systems analysis in the 1960s. As MacKenzie shows, veteran senior officers based their arguments on the historical experiences of strategic air power manned by seasoned pilots in World War II and the Korean War, over against untested missiles. Thus MacKenzie quotes from the testimony of Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay in 1964, regarding the shaky findings from Polaris testing: We have only had one test, it was not under full operational conditions, we fired one Polaris out in the Pacific with a warhead on it. It was not truly operational. It was modified to some extent for the test. Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 342. MacKenzie interprets LeMay's scepticism from the point of view of the Air Force's stake in creating a distinct strategic mission for the manned bomber (ibid., 345) . Interestingly, this argument, which positioned the historical experience of the strategic bomber force against the abstractions of missile testing, was put forward in 1981 (ibid., 358-59).
17. For example, in 1961, an operations researcher complained: System now replaces system without full-scale stressful operation of either the old or the new. Tactical nuclear weapons, guided missiles, infantry squad radios, and many others have yet to be tried in combat. Moreover, the wise and experienced combat commander is now rarely a source of experience translatable into crude data. In many cases, the systems under study include elements he has never employed; or, if he has, under very different circumstances from those now envisioned. Donald Meals, 'Trends in Operations Research', Operations Research, Vol. 9, No. 2 (March-April 1961), 252-57, at 253. In his book, Inventing Accuracy, Donald MacKenzie's account of scepticism regarding missile accuracy parallels the arguments senior commanders advanced against the newly dominant status of systems analysis in the 1960s. As MacKenzie shows, veteran senior officers based their arguments on the historical experiences of strategic air power manned by seasoned pilots in World War II and the Korean War, over against untested missiles. Thus MacKenzie quotes from the testimony of Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay in 1964, regarding the shaky findings from Polaris testing: We have only had one test, it was not under full operational conditions, we fired one Polaris out in the Pacific with a warhead on it. It was not truly operational. It was modified to some extent for the test. Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 342. MacKenzie interprets LeMay's scepticism from the point of view of the Air Force's stake in creating a distinct strategic mission for the manned bomber (ibid., 345) . Interestingly, this argument, which positioned the historical experience of the strategic bomber force against the abstractions of missile testing, was put forward in 1981 (ibid., 358-59).
18. R.H.S. Crossman, 'Western Defense in the 1960s', Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (August 1961), 324-41, at 324 and 325. Crossman's description of the war gamester's disposition is worth quoting in full: A new profession has been created in the United States, the profession of war gamester. His job is, by the severest and most abstract kind of hypothetical logic, to work out the possible moves and counter-moves of nuclear war and on this basis to suggest to the politician and the practical soldier what strategic decisions they should take. The qualifications of a war gamester combine those of a chess player and a soothsayer. He needs a clear mathematical mind, which can abstract itself from all human considerations, assimilate facts like an adding machine, and then, with absolute predictability and accuracy, produce the logical conclusions from the particular sets of facts which have been fed into his thinking machine. The war gamester, in fact, is a human computer. RAND strategist Albert Wohlstetter was incensed by such observations and framed his reply in a 1964 essay. He retorted: Many of these comments exhale a faint but distinct odor of invidious comparison: the British against the Yanks, the older against the new military writers, World War II operational researchers against contemporary strategists and systems analysts, military against civilians, practical men against professors, followers of the heart against those relying on their heads. There are differences, of course. . . . However, they are hardly the differences between Truth and Error, or Virtue and Sin. A. Wohlstetter, 'Sin and Games in America', in Martin Shubik (ed.), Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior (New York: John Wiley, 1964), 209-25, at 221.
19. R.H.S. Crossman, 'Western Defense in the 1960s', Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (August 1961), 324-41, at 324 and 325. Crossman's description of the war gamester's disposition is worth quoting in full: A new profession has been created in the United States, the profession of war gamester. His job is, by the severest and most abstract kind of hypothetical logic, to work out the possible moves and counter-moves of nuclear war and on this basis to suggest to the politician and the practical soldier what strategic decisions they should take. The qualifications of a war gamester combine those of a chess player and a soothsayer. He needs a clear mathematical mind, which can abstract itself from all human considerations, assimilate facts like an adding machine, and then, with absolute predictability and accuracy, produce the logical conclusions from the particular sets of facts which have been fed into his thinking machine. The war gamester, in fact, is a human computer. RAND strategist Albert Wohlstetter was incensed by such observations and framed his reply in a 1964 essay. He retorted: Many of these comments exhale a faint but distinct odor of invidious comparison: the British against the Yanks, the older against the new military writers, World War II operational researchers against contemporary strategists and systems analysts, military against civilians, practical men against professors, followers of the heart against those relying on their heads. There are differences, of course. . . . However, they are hardly the differences between Truth and Error, or Virtue and Sin. A. Wohlstetter, 'Sin and Games in America', in Martin Shubik (ed.), Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior (New York: John Wiley, 1964), 209-25, at 221.
20. Haak, op. cit. note 2, 51, 55.
21. F.O. Miksche, 'The Soldier and Technical Warfare', Military Review (August 1962), 71-78, at 73, 75 and 78.
22. P.M.S. Blackett, 'Operational Research; Recollections of Problems Studied', in H.G. Thursfield (ed.), Brassey's Annual; The Armed Forces Year-Book, 1953 (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 106.
23. John Slessor, The Central Blue (London: Cassell, 1956), 487 (emphasis in original), 524-25.
24. While there is no room in this paper to prove the point, one can find intriguing resonances between RAND norms and the creative principles worked out by the artistic avant garde of the period. For an overview of the modernist experiments of the Cold War, see Daniel Belgrad, The Culture of Spontaneity: Improvisation and the Arts in Postwar America (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998).
25. H. Kahn (ed.), A Paradigm for the 1965-1975 Strategic Debate (Harmon-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute, HI-202-FR, 22 November 1963), 62.
26. H. Kahn, The Alternative World Futures Approach (Croton-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute, HI-787-RR [draft], 21 November 1966), Section A1, 12.
27. Frank Collbohm, Scientific Aids to Decision-Making -A Perspective (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1032, 31 January 1957), 3.
28. All quotations in this paragraph are from Kahn, op. cit. note 9, 124, 125 and 349.
29. Quotations from Kahn, op. cit. note 21, 62, 3.
30. A word or two on Monte Carlo sampling. Its extreme flexibility and potential for performing pseudo-experiments on untestable or improbable referents made it very similar in kind to war-gaming. Herman Kahn, originally trained as a mathematical physicist, was instrumental in translating the technique from physics to modelling future war. The chief problem on which Monte Carlo was originally elaborated and refined, from 1944-48, was nuclear fission. Physicists wished to track the diffusion of neutrons through plutonium or some other radioactive substance. Neutron behaviour was stochastic; that is to say, an individual particle might randomly recoil from the plutonium nucleus, or be absorbed by it, or cause the nucleus itself to split, thereby releasing more neutrons. Whereas each one of these possibilities had a specific probability at specific temperatures, the actual behaviour of neutrons was random. The only way one could calculate the varying possibilities and ratios of the scattering, fission or fusion of the neutrons en masse was to select a representative sample of some finite quantity of individual particles, and follow their paths. This following, or sampling - which designated the field of experimentation in Monte Carlo simulations - was known as taking a 'random walk', or the 'life history' of individual particles. In the case of hydrogen weapons research, the boundary conditions could not be realistically reproduced in the laboratory. Stanislaw Ulam recalled how the Monte Carlo estimate was understood as a substitute for, or equivalent to, differential equations: We decided to look for ways to find, as it were, homomorphic images of the given physical problem in a mathematical schema which could be represented by a system of fictitious 'particles' treated by an electronic computer . . . S. Ulam, 'John von Neumann, 1903-1957', Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 64, No. 3, Part 2 (May 1958), 1-49, at 34. Since Monte Carlo was employed to address problems that did not yield to analysis, one was compelled to construct one's simulation with good guesses. Herman Kahn remarked: The formulae [for evaluating definite integrals] are a powerful guide to one's intuition in designing useful sampling schemes but can rarely be used in a routine way. They are suggestive and normative rather than explicitly directive. H. Kahn, 'Use of Different Monte Carlo Sampling Techniques', in Herbert Meyer (ed.), Symposium on Monte Carlo Methods (New York: Wiley, 1956), 146-90, at 156. The importance of intuition in model-building came into sharp focus in Kahn's 1956 opus on Monte Carlo, in which he observed: The ability to set up an efficient Monto Carlo problem depends more on the intuition of the computer [the human analyst] than on being able to evaluate the formulae given, and paraphrasing may make the ideas clearer, thus helping to create a sound intuition. H. Kahn, Applications of Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, RM-1237-AEC, 19 April 1954, revised 27 April 1956), 124. Kahn was acutely aware of the determinedly conjectural nature of the Monte Carlo method. In a 1957 paper on Monte Carlo, he emphasized the non-natural reference of the idealized model of Monte Carlo. He opened the subject with the customary identification of Monte Carlo with gambling games, adding that 'The game of chance can be a direct analogue of the problem being studied or it can be an artificial invention': H. Kahn and I. Mann, Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1165, 30 July 1957), 3 (emphasis in original). In a recent essay, Peter Galison has stressed the artificial nature of the Monte Carlo experiment, arguing that Monte Carlo simulations are situated 'in an alternative reality . . . on which "experimentation" [can] be conducted': P. Galison, 'Computer Simulation and the Trading Zone', in Galison and David J. Stump (eds), The Disunity of Science (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 118-57, at 119. In his 1957 paper (op. cit. above), Kahn went to great lengths to delineate the non-natural dimension of importance sampling, declaring: 'The simulation should not be faithful' [10]. On the contrary, importance sampling deliberately biased the frequency towards important, but less probable events. For example, in a problem concerning the vulnerability of military hardware or an airfield to offensive attack, Kahn suggested a Monte Carlo estimate which defined the radius of offensive missile damage, the Circular Probable Error (CEP), as smaller than the actual average: 'Since we are interested here in destruction, if we Monte Carlo from a distribution defined from a smaller CEP than that which obtains in the real world, we will find that more of the interesting processes (hits) happen in the simulated experiments than would happen naturally' [11].
31. A word or two on Monte Carlo sampling. Its extreme flexibility and potential for performing pseudo-experiments on untestable or improbable referents made it very similar in kind to war-gaming. Herman Kahn, originally trained as a mathematical physicist, was instrumental in translating the technique from physics to modelling future war. The chief problem on which Monte Carlo was originally elaborated and refined, from 1944-48, was nuclear fission. Physicists wished to track the diffusion of neutrons through plutonium or some other radioactive substance. Neutron behaviour was stochastic; that is to say, an individual particle might randomly recoil from the plutonium nucleus, or be absorbed by it, or cause the nucleus itself to split, thereby releasing more neutrons. Whereas each one of these possibilities had a specific probability at specific temperatures, the actual behaviour of neutrons was random. The only way one could calculate the varying possibilities and ratios of the scattering, fission or fusion of the neutrons en masse was to select a representative sample of some finite quantity of individual particles, and follow their paths. This following, or sampling - which designated the field of experimentation in Monte Carlo simulations - was known as taking a 'random walk', or the 'life history' of individual particles. In the case of hydrogen weapons research, the boundary conditions could not be realistically reproduced in the laboratory. Stanislaw Ulam recalled how the Monte Carlo estimate was understood as a substitute for, or equivalent to, differential equations: We decided to look for ways to find, as it were, homomorphic images of the given physical problem in a mathematical schema which could be represented by a system of fictitious 'particles' treated by an electronic computer . . . S. Ulam, 'John von Neumann, 1903-1957', Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 64, No. 3, Part 2 (May 1958), 1-49, at 34. Since Monte Carlo was employed to address problems that did not yield to analysis, one was compelled to construct one's simulation with good guesses. Herman Kahn remarked: The formulae [for evaluating definite integrals] are a powerful guide to one's intuition in designing useful sampling schemes but can rarely be used in a routine way. They are suggestive and normative rather than explicitly directive. H. Kahn, 'Use of Different Monte Carlo Sampling Techniques', in Herbert Meyer (ed.), Symposium on Monte Carlo Methods (New York: Wiley, 1956), 146-90, at 156. The importance of intuition in model-building came into sharp focus in Kahn's 1956 opus on Monte Carlo, in which he observed: The ability to set up an efficient Monto Carlo problem depends more on the intuition of the computer [the human analyst] than on being able to evaluate the formulae given, and paraphrasing may make the ideas clearer, thus helping to create a sound intuition. H. Kahn, Applications of Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, RM-1237-AEC, 19 April 1954, revised 27 April 1956), 124. Kahn was acutely aware of the determinedly conjectural nature of the Monte Carlo method. In a 1957 paper on Monte Carlo, he emphasized the non-natural reference of the idealized model of Monte Carlo. He opened the subject with the customary identification of Monte Carlo with gambling games, adding that 'The game of chance can be a direct analogue of the problem being studied or it can be an artificial invention': H. Kahn and I. Mann, Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1165, 30 July 1957), 3 (emphasis in original). In a recent essay, Peter Galison has stressed the artificial nature of the Monte Carlo experiment, arguing that Monte Carlo simulations are situated 'in an alternative reality . . . on which "experimentation" [can] be conducted': P. Galison, 'Computer Simulation and the Trading Zone', in Galison and David J. Stump (eds), The Disunity of Science (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 118-57, at 119. In his 1957 paper (op. cit. above), Kahn went to great lengths to delineate the non-natural dimension of importance sampling, declaring: 'The simulation should not be faithful' [10]. On the contrary, importance sampling deliberately biased the frequency towards important, but less probable events. For example, in a problem concerning the vulnerability of military hardware or an airfield to offensive attack, Kahn suggested a Monte Carlo estimate which defined the radius of offensive missile damage, the Circular Probable Error (CEP), as smaller than the actual average: 'Since we are interested here in destruction, if we Monte Carlo from a distribution defined from a smaller CEP than that which obtains in the real world, we will find that more of the interesting processes (hits) happen in the simulated experiments than would happen naturally' [11].
32. A word or two on Monte Carlo sampling. Its extreme flexibility and potential for performing pseudo-experiments on untestable or improbable referents made it very similar in kind to war-gaming. Herman Kahn, originally trained as a mathematical physicist, was instrumental in translating the technique from physics to modelling future war. The chief problem on which Monte Carlo was originally elaborated and refined, from 1944-48, was nuclear fission. Physicists wished to track the diffusion of neutrons through plutonium or some other radioactive substance. Neutron behaviour was stochastic; that is to say, an individual particle might randomly recoil from the plutonium nucleus, or be absorbed by it, or cause the nucleus itself to split, thereby releasing more neutrons. Whereas each one of these possibilities had a specific probability at specific temperatures, the actual behaviour of neutrons was random. The only way one could calculate the varying possibilities and ratios of the scattering, fission or fusion of the neutrons en masse was to select a representative sample of some finite quantity of individual particles, and follow their paths. This following, or sampling - which designated the field of experimentation in Monte Carlo simulations - was known as taking a 'random walk', or the 'life history' of individual particles. In the case of hydrogen weapons research, the boundary conditions could not be realistically reproduced in the laboratory. Stanislaw Ulam recalled how the Monte Carlo estimate was understood as a substitute for, or equivalent to, differential equations: We decided to look for ways to find, as it were, homomorphic images of the given physical problem in a mathematical schema which could be represented by a system of fictitious 'particles' treated by an electronic computer . . . S. Ulam, 'John von Neumann, 1903-1957', Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 64, No. 3, Part 2 (May 1958), 1-49, at 34. Since Monte Carlo was employed to address problems that did not yield to analysis, one was compelled to construct one's simulation with good guesses. Herman Kahn remarked: The formulae [for evaluating definite integrals] are a powerful guide to one's intuition in designing useful sampling schemes but can rarely be used in a routine way. They are suggestive and normative rather than explicitly directive. H. Kahn, 'Use of Different Monte Carlo Sampling Techniques', in Herbert Meyer (ed.), Symposium on Monte Carlo Methods (New York: Wiley, 1956), 146-90, at 156. The importance of intuition in model-building came into sharp focus in Kahn's 1956 opus on Monte Carlo, in which he observed: The ability to set up an efficient Monto Carlo problem depends more on the intuition of the computer [the human analyst] than on being able to evaluate the formulae given, and paraphrasing may make the ideas clearer, thus helping to create a sound intuition. H. Kahn, Applications of Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, RM-1237-AEC, 19 April 1954, revised 27 April 1956), 124. Kahn was acutely aware of the determinedly conjectural nature of the Monte Carlo method. In a 1957 paper on Monte Carlo, he emphasized the non-natural reference of the idealized model of Monte Carlo. He opened the subject with the customary identification of Monte Carlo with gambling games, adding that 'The game of chance can be a direct analogue of the problem being studied or it can be an artificial invention': H. Kahn and I. Mann, Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1165, 30 July 1957), 3 (emphasis in original). In a recent essay, Peter Galison has stressed the artificial nature of the Monte Carlo experiment, arguing that Monte Carlo simulations are situated 'in an alternative reality . . . on which "experimentation" [can] be conducted': P. Galison, 'Computer Simulation and the Trading Zone', in Galison and David J. Stump (eds), The Disunity of Science (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 118-57, at 119. In his 1957 paper (op. cit. above), Kahn went to great lengths to delineate the non-natural dimension of importance sampling, declaring: 'The simulation should not be faithful' [10]. On the contrary, importance sampling deliberately biased the frequency towards important, but less probable events. For example, in a problem concerning the vulnerability of military hardware or an airfield to offensive attack, Kahn suggested a Monte Carlo estimate which defined the radius of offensive missile damage, the Circular Probable Error (CEP), as smaller than the actual average: 'Since we are interested here in destruction, if we Monte Carlo from a distribution defined from a smaller CEP than that which obtains in the real world, we will find that more of the interesting processes (hits) happen in the simulated experiments than would happen naturally' [11].
33. A word or two on Monte Carlo sampling. Its extreme flexibility and potential for performing pseudo-experiments on untestable or improbable referents made it very similar in kind to war-gaming. Herman Kahn, originally trained as a mathematical physicist, was instrumental in translating the technique from physics to modelling future war. The chief problem on which Monte Carlo was originally elaborated and refined, from 1944-48, was nuclear fission. Physicists wished to track the diffusion of neutrons through plutonium or some other radioactive substance. Neutron behaviour was stochastic; that is to say, an individual particle might randomly recoil from the plutonium nucleus, or be absorbed by it, or cause the nucleus itself to split, thereby releasing more neutrons. Whereas each one of these possibilities had a specific probability at specific temperatures, the actual behaviour of neutrons was random. The only way one could calculate the varying possibilities and ratios of the scattering, fission or fusion of the neutrons en masse was to select a representative sample of some finite quantity of individual particles, and follow their paths. This following, or sampling - which designated the field of experimentation in Monte Carlo simulations - was known as taking a 'random walk', or the 'life history' of individual particles. In the case of hydrogen weapons research, the boundary conditions could not be realistically reproduced in the laboratory. Stanislaw Ulam recalled how the Monte Carlo estimate was understood as a substitute for, or equivalent to, differential equations: We decided to look for ways to find, as it were, homomorphic images of the given physical problem in a mathematical schema which could be represented by a system of fictitious 'particles' treated by an electronic computer . . . S. Ulam, 'John von Neumann, 1903-1957', Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 64, No. 3, Part 2 (May 1958), 1-49, at 34. Since Monte Carlo was employed to address problems that did not yield to analysis, one was compelled to construct one's simulation with good guesses. Herman Kahn remarked: The formulae [for evaluating definite integrals] are a powerful guide to one's intuition in designing useful sampling schemes but can rarely be used in a routine way. They are suggestive and normative rather than explicitly directive. H. Kahn, 'Use of Different Monte Carlo Sampling Techniques', in Herbert Meyer (ed.), Symposium on Monte Carlo Methods (New York: Wiley, 1956), 146-90, at 156. The importance of intuition in model-building came into sharp focus in Kahn's 1956 opus on Monte Carlo, in which he observed: The ability to set up an efficient Monto Carlo problem depends more on the intuition of the computer [the human analyst] than on being able to evaluate the formulae given, and paraphrasing may make the ideas clearer, thus helping to create a sound intuition. H. Kahn, Applications of Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, RM-1237-AEC, 19 April 1954, revised 27 April 1956), 124. Kahn was acutely aware of the determinedly conjectural nature of the Monte Carlo method. In a 1957 paper on Monte Carlo, he emphasized the non-natural reference of the idealized model of Monte Carlo. He opened the subject with the customary identification of Monte Carlo with gambling games, adding that 'The game of chance can be a direct analogue of the problem being studied or it can be an artificial invention': H. Kahn and I. Mann, Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1165, 30 July 1957), 3 (emphasis in original). In a recent essay, Peter Galison has stressed the artificial nature of the Monte Carlo experiment, arguing that Monte Carlo simulations are situated 'in an alternative reality . . . on which "experimentation" [can] be conducted': P. Galison, 'Computer Simulation and the Trading Zone', in Galison and David J. Stump (eds), The Disunity of Science (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 118-57, at 119. In his 1957 paper (op. cit. above), Kahn went to great lengths to delineate the non-natural dimension of importance sampling, declaring: 'The simulation should not be faithful' [10]. On the contrary, importance sampling deliberately biased the frequency towards important, but less probable events. For example, in a problem concerning the vulnerability of military hardware or an airfield to offensive attack, Kahn suggested a Monte Carlo estimate which defined the radius of offensive missile damage, the Circular Probable Error (CEP), as smaller than the actual average: 'Since we are interested here in destruction, if we Monte Carlo from a distribution defined from a smaller CEP than that which obtains in the real world, we will find that more of the interesting processes (hits) happen in the simulated experiments than would happen naturally' [11].
34. A word or two on Monte Carlo sampling. Its extreme flexibility and potential for performing pseudo-experiments on untestable or improbable referents made it very similar in kind to war-gaming. Herman Kahn, originally trained as a mathematical physicist, was instrumental in translating the technique from physics to modelling future war. The chief problem on which Monte Carlo was originally elaborated and refined, from 1944-48, was nuclear fission. Physicists wished to track the diffusion of neutrons through plutonium or some other radioactive substance. Neutron behaviour was stochastic; that is to say, an individual particle might randomly recoil from the plutonium nucleus, or be absorbed by it, or cause the nucleus itself to split, thereby releasing more neutrons. Whereas each one of these possibilities had a specific probability at specific temperatures, the actual behaviour of neutrons was random. The only way one could calculate the varying possibilities and ratios of the scattering, fission or fusion of the neutrons en masse was to select a representative sample of some finite quantity of individual particles, and follow their paths. This following, or sampling - which designated the field of experimentation in Monte Carlo simulations - was known as taking a 'random walk', or the 'life history' of individual particles. In the case of hydrogen weapons research, the boundary conditions could not be realistically reproduced in the laboratory. Stanislaw Ulam recalled how the Monte Carlo estimate was understood as a substitute for, or equivalent to, differential equations: We decided to look for ways to find, as it were, homomorphic images of the given physical problem in a mathematical schema which could be represented by a system of fictitious 'particles' treated by an electronic computer . . . S. Ulam, 'John von Neumann, 1903-1957', Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 64, No. 3, Part 2 (May 1958), 1-49, at 34. Since Monte Carlo was employed to address problems that did not yield to analysis, one was compelled to construct one's simulation with good guesses. Herman Kahn remarked: The formulae [for evaluating definite integrals] are a powerful guide to one's intuition in designing useful sampling schemes but can rarely be used in a routine way. They are suggestive and normative rather than explicitly directive. H. Kahn, 'Use of Different Monte Carlo Sampling Techniques', in Herbert Meyer (ed.), Symposium on Monte Carlo Methods (New York: Wiley, 1956), 146-90, at 156. The importance of intuition in model-building came into sharp focus in Kahn's 1956 opus on Monte Carlo, in which he observed: The ability to set up an efficient Monto Carlo problem depends more on the intuition of the computer [the human analyst] than on being able to evaluate the formulae given, and paraphrasing may make the ideas clearer, thus helping to create a sound intuition. H. Kahn, Applications of Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, RM-1237-AEC, 19 April 1954, revised 27 April 1956), 124. Kahn was acutely aware of the determinedly conjectural nature of the Monte Carlo method. In a 1957 paper on Monte Carlo, he emphasized the non-natural reference of the idealized model of Monte Carlo. He opened the subject with the customary identification of Monte Carlo with gambling games, adding that 'The game of chance can be a direct analogue of the problem being studied or it can be an artificial invention': H. Kahn and I. Mann, Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1165, 30 July 1957), 3 (emphasis in original). In a recent essay, Peter Galison has stressed the artificial nature of the Monte Carlo experiment, arguing that Monte Carlo simulations are situated 'in an alternative reality . . . on which "experimentation" [can] be conducted': P. Galison, 'Computer Simulation and the Trading Zone', in Galison and David J. Stump (eds), The Disunity of Science (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 118-57, at 119. In his 1957 paper (op. cit. above), Kahn went to great lengths to delineate the non-natural dimension of importance sampling, declaring: 'The simulation should not be faithful' [10]. On the contrary, importance sampling deliberately biased the frequency towards important, but less probable events. For example, in a problem concerning the vulnerability of military hardware or an airfield to offensive attack, Kahn suggested a Monte Carlo estimate which defined the radius of offensive missile damage, the Circular Probable Error (CEP), as smaller than the actual average: 'Since we are interested here in destruction, if we Monte Carlo from a distribution defined from a smaller CEP than that which obtains in the real world, we will find that more of the interesting processes (hits) happen in the simulated experiments than would happen naturally' [11].
35. A word or two on Monte Carlo sampling. Its extreme flexibility and potential for performing pseudo-experiments on untestable or improbable referents made it very similar in kind to war-gaming. Herman Kahn, originally trained as a mathematical physicist, was instrumental in translating the technique from physics to modelling future war. The chief problem on which Monte Carlo was originally elaborated and refined, from 1944-48, was nuclear fission. Physicists wished to track the diffusion of neutrons through plutonium or some other radioactive substance. Neutron behaviour was stochastic; that is to say, an individual particle might randomly recoil from the plutonium nucleus, or be absorbed by it, or cause the nucleus itself to split, thereby releasing more neutrons. Whereas each one of these possibilities had a specific probability at specific temperatures, the actual behaviour of neutrons was random. The only way one could calculate the varying possibilities and ratios of the scattering, fission or fusion of the neutrons en masse was to select a representative sample of some finite quantity of individual particles, and follow their paths. This following, or sampling - which designated the field of experimentation in Monte Carlo simulations - was known as taking a 'random walk', or the 'life history' of individual particles. In the case of hydrogen weapons research, the boundary conditions could not be realistically reproduced in the laboratory. Stanislaw Ulam recalled how the Monte Carlo estimate was understood as a substitute for, or equivalent to, differential equations: We decided to look for ways to find, as it were, homomorphic images of the given physical problem in a mathematical schema which could be represented by a system of fictitious 'particles' treated by an electronic computer . . . S. Ulam, 'John von Neumann, 1903-1957', Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 64, No. 3, Part 2 (May 1958), 1-49, at 34. Since Monte Carlo was employed to address problems that did not yield to analysis, one was compelled to construct one's simulation with good guesses. Herman Kahn remarked: The formulae [for evaluating definite integrals] are a powerful guide to one's intuition in designing useful sampling schemes but can rarely be used in a routine way. They are suggestive and normative rather than explicitly directive. H. Kahn, 'Use of Different Monte Carlo Sampling Techniques', in Herbert Meyer (ed.), Symposium on Monte Carlo Methods (New York: Wiley, 1956), 146-90, at 156. The importance of intuition in model-building came into sharp focus in Kahn's 1956 opus on Monte Carlo, in which he observed: The ability to set up an efficient Monto Carlo problem depends more on the intuition of the computer [the human analyst] than on being able to evaluate the formulae given, and paraphrasing may make the ideas clearer, thus helping to create a sound intuition. H. Kahn, Applications of Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, RM-1237-AEC, 19 April 1954, revised 27 April 1956), 124. Kahn was acutely aware of the determinedly conjectural nature of the Monte Carlo method. In a 1957 paper on Monte Carlo, he emphasized the non-natural reference of the idealized model of Monte Carlo. He opened the subject with the customary identification of Monte Carlo with gambling games, adding that 'The game of chance can be a direct analogue of the problem being studied or it can be an artificial invention': H. Kahn and I. Mann, Monte Carlo (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1165, 30 July 1957), 3 (emphasis in original). In a recent essay, Peter Galison has stressed the artificial nature of the Monte Carlo experiment, arguing that Monte Carlo simulations are situated 'in an alternative reality . . . on which "experimentation" [can] be conducted': P. Galison, 'Computer Simulation and the Trading Zone', in Galison and David J. Stump (eds), The Disunity of Science (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 118-57, at 119. In his 1957 paper (op. cit. above), Kahn went to great lengths to delineate the non-natural dimension of importance sampling, declaring: 'The simulation should not be faithful' [10]. On the contrary, importance sampling deliberately biased the frequency towards important, but less probable events. For example, in a problem concerning the vulnerability of military hardware or an airfield to offensive attack, Kahn suggested a Monte Carlo estimate which defined the radius of offensive missile damage, the Circular Probable Error (CEP), as smaller than the actual average: 'Since we are interested here in destruction, if we Monte Carlo from a distribution defined from a smaller CEP than that which obtains in the real world, we will find that more of the interesting processes (hits) happen in the simulated experiments than would happen naturally' [11].
36. Murray Geisler, 'Appraisal of Laboratory Simulation Experiences', Management Science, Vol. 8 (April 1962), 239-45, at 240-41.
37. For a succinct intellectual history of operations research, especially for an account of how it was elaborated by RAND economists, see Philip Mirowski, 'Cyborg Agonistes: Economics Meets Operations Research in Mid-Century', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 29, No. 5 (October 1999), 685-718.
38. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. McDonald, 'JCS Politico-Military Desk Games', in Murray Greyson (ed.), Second War Gaming Symposium Proceedings (Washington, DC: Washington Operations Research Council, 1964), 63-74, at 67.
39. In a book published in 1969, a State Department official reported having participated in games in the summer of 1955 through to Spring 1957, when he was working with the Middle East Policy Planning Committee: see M. Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969). Working from this tip, the historian Thomas Allen vainly queried the historian's office at the Department of State about a putative 'ultra-secret "games center" ' at the State Department in 1948, but could find no records: T. Allen, War Games (New York: McGraw Hill, 1987), 5.
40. In a book published in 1969, a State Department official reported having participated in games in the summer of 1955 through to Spring 1957, when he was working with the Middle East Policy Planning Committee: see M. Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969). Working from this tip, the historian Thomas Allen vainly queried the historian's office at the Department of State about a putative 'ultra-secret "games center" ' at the State Department in 1948, but could find no records: T. Allen, War Games (New York: McGraw Hill, 1987), 5.
41. Sidney F. Giffin, The Crisis Game: Simulating International Conflict (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 64.
42. Ibid., 65. 'A few political and economic factors were assigned numerical values so that the relative worth of alternative strategies could be assessed quantitatively. . . . This experiment was abandoned when it became clear that the simplification imposed in order to permit quantification made the game of doubtful value for the assessment of political strategies and tactics in the real world':
43. Ibid., 65. 'A few political and economic factors were assigned numerical values so that the relative worth of alternative strategies could be assessed quantitatively. . . . This experiment was abandoned when it became clear that the simplification imposed in order to permit quantification made the game of doubtful value for the assessment of political strategies and tactics in the real world': Herbert Goldhamer and Hans Speier, 'Some Observations on Political Gaming', World Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1 (October 1959), 71-83, at 72-73. Herbert Goldhamer and Hans Speier, 'Some Observations on Political Gaming', World Politics, Vol. 12, No. 1 (October 1959), 71-83, at 72-73.
44. Giffin, op. cit. note 31, 75.
45. For information on the first three games, see Herbert Goldhamer, Toward a Cold War Game (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, D[L]-2603, 22 October 1954); Goldhamer, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division, (First Round) (RAND, D-2850, 12 April 1955); Kecskemeti, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division: May Experiment (Second Round) (RAND, D-2975, 20 June 1955); Ewald Schnitzer, Third Political Exercise: Summary and Documents (RAND, D-3163-RC, 1 September 1955); Goldhamer, The Political Exercise: A Summary of the Social Science Division's Work in Political Gaming, with Special Reference to the Third Exercise, July-August 1955 D-3164-RC (RAND, D-3164-RC, 1 September 1955). See also Social Science Division, Experimental Research on Political Gaming (RAND Corporation, P-1540, 10 November 1958). The participants in the fourth round were: Referee Team: Albert Franklin, Andrew Marshall and Hans Speier; US Team: Joseph Goldsen, Victor Hunt and Jeffrey Kitchen; Soviet Team: Raymond Garthoff, Edward Page, Jr and Robert Tucker; Western European Team: Harvey DeWeerd, Paul Kecskemeti and Nathan Leites; Consultants on Special Problems: Lewis Bohn, Abraham Halpern, Malcolm Hoag, Oleg Hoeffding, Herman Kahn, Arnold Kramish and Charles Wolf, Jr; Special Assistant: Ewald Schnitzer. See Joseph M. Goldsen, The Political Exercise; An Assessment of the Fourth Round (RAND, D-3640-RC, 30 May 1956), 5-6.
46. For information on the first three games, see Herbert Goldhamer, Toward a Cold War Game (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, D[L]-2603, 22 October 1954); Paul Kecskemeti, War Games and Political Games (RAND, D-2849, 15 April 1955); Paul Kecskemeti, War Games and Political Games (RAND, D-2849, 15 April 1955); Kecskemeti, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division: May Experiment (Second Round) (RAND, D-2975, 20 June 1955); Ewald Schnitzer, Third Political Exercise: Summary and Documents (RAND, D-3163-RC, 1 September 1955); Goldhamer, The Political Exercise: A Summary of the Social Science Division's Work in Political Gaming, with Special Reference to the Third Exercise, July-August 1955 D-3164-RC (RAND, D-3164-RC, 1 September 1955). See also Social Science Division, Experimental Research on Political Gaming (RAND Corporation, P-1540, 10 November 1958). The participants in the fourth round were: Referee Team: Albert Franklin, Andrew Marshall and Hans Speier; US Team: Joseph Goldsen, Victor Hunt and Jeffrey Kitchen; Soviet Team: Raymond Garthoff, Edward Page, Jr and Robert Tucker; Western European Team: Harvey DeWeerd, Paul Kecskemeti and Nathan Leites; Consultants on Special Problems: Lewis Bohn, Abraham Halpern, Malcolm Hoag, Oleg Hoeffding, Herman Kahn, Arnold Kramish and Charles Wolf, Jr; Special Assistant: Ewald Schnitzer. See Joseph M. Goldsen, The Political Exercise; An Assessment of the Fourth Round (RAND, D-3640-RC, 30 May 1956), 5-6.
47. For information on the first three games, see Herbert Goldhamer, Toward a Cold War Game (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, D[L]-2603, 22 October 1954); Paul Kecskemeti, War Games and Political Games (RAND, D-2849, 15 April 1955); Goldhamer, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division, (First Round) (RAND, D-2850, 12 April 1955); Goldhamer, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division, (First Round) (RAND, D-2850, 12 April 1955); Ewald Schnitzer, Third Political Exercise: Summary and Documents (RAND, D-3163-RC, 1 September 1955); Goldhamer, The Political Exercise: A Summary of the Social Science Division's Work in Political Gaming, with Special Reference to the Third Exercise, July-August 1955 D-3164-RC (RAND, D-3164-RC, 1 September 1955). See also Social Science Division, Experimental Research on Political Gaming (RAND Corporation, P-1540, 10 November 1958). The participants in the fourth round were: Referee Team: Albert Franklin, Andrew Marshall and Hans Speier; US Team: Joseph Goldsen, Victor Hunt and Jeffrey Kitchen; Soviet Team: Raymond Garthoff, Edward Page, Jr and Robert Tucker; Western European Team: Harvey DeWeerd, Paul Kecskemeti and Nathan Leites; Consultants on Special Problems: Lewis Bohn, Abraham Halpern, Malcolm Hoag, Oleg Hoeffding, Herman Kahn, Arnold Kramish and Charles Wolf, Jr; Special Assistant: Ewald Schnitzer. See Joseph M. Goldsen, The Political Exercise; An Assessment of the Fourth Round (RAND, D-3640-RC, 30 May 1956), 5-6.
48. For information on the first three games, see Herbert Goldhamer, Toward a Cold War Game (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, D[L]-2603, 22 October 1954); Paul Kecskemeti, War Games and Political Games (RAND, D-2849, 15 April 1955); Goldhamer, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division, (First Round) (RAND, D-2850, 12 April 1955); Kecskemeti, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division: May Experiment (Second Round) (RAND, D-2975, 20 June 1955); Kecskemeti, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division: May Experiment (Second Round) (RAND, D-2975, 20 June 1955); Goldhamer, The Political Exercise: A Summary of the Social Science Division's Work in Political Gaming, with Special Reference to the Third Exercise, July-August 1955 D-3164-RC (RAND, D-3164-RC, 1 September 1955). See also Social Science Division, Experimental Research on Political Gaming (RAND Corporation, P-1540, 10 November 1958). The participants in the fourth round were: Referee Team: Albert Franklin, Andrew Marshall and Hans Speier; US Team: Joseph Goldsen, Victor Hunt and Jeffrey Kitchen; Soviet Team: Raymond Garthoff, Edward Page, Jr and Robert Tucker; Western European Team: Harvey DeWeerd, Paul Kecskemeti and Nathan Leites; Consultants on Special Problems: Lewis Bohn, Abraham Halpern, Malcolm Hoag, Oleg Hoeffding, Herman Kahn, Arnold Kramish and Charles Wolf, Jr; Special Assistant: Ewald Schnitzer. See Joseph M. Goldsen, The Political Exercise; An Assessment of the Fourth Round (RAND, D-3640-RC, 30 May 1956), 5-6.
49. For information on the first three games, see Herbert Goldhamer, Toward a Cold War Game (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, D[L]-2603, 22 October 1954); Paul Kecskemeti, War Games and Political Games (RAND, D-2849, 15 April 1955); Goldhamer, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division, (First Round) (RAND, D-2850, 12 April 1955); Kecskemeti, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division: May Experiment (Second Round) (RAND, D-2975, 20 June 1955); Ewald Schnitzer, Third Political Exercise: Summary and Documents (RAND, D-3163-RC, 1 September 1955); Ewald Schnitzer, Third Political Exercise: Summary and Documents (RAND, D-3163-RC, 1 September 1955); See also Social Science Division, Experimental Research on Political Gaming (RAND Corporation, P-1540, 10 November 1958). The participants in the fourth round were: Referee Team: Albert Franklin, Andrew Marshall and Hans Speier; US Team: Joseph Goldsen, Victor Hunt and Jeffrey Kitchen; Soviet Team: Raymond Garthoff, Edward Page, Jr and Robert Tucker; Western European Team: Harvey DeWeerd, Paul Kecskemeti and Nathan Leites; Consultants on Special Problems: Lewis Bohn, Abraham Halpern, Malcolm Hoag, Oleg Hoeffding, Herman Kahn, Arnold Kramish and Charles Wolf, Jr; Special Assistant: Ewald Schnitzer. See Joseph M. Goldsen, The Political Exercise; An Assessment of the Fourth Round (RAND, D-3640-RC, 30 May 1956), 5-6.
50. For information on the first three games, see Herbert Goldhamer, Toward a Cold War Game (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, D[L]-2603, 22 October 1954); Paul Kecskemeti, War Games and Political Games (RAND, D-2849, 15 April 1955); Goldhamer, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division, (First Round) (RAND, D-2850, 12 April 1955); Kecskemeti, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division: May Experiment (Second Round) (RAND, D-2975, 20 June 1955); Ewald Schnitzer, Third Political Exercise: Summary and Documents (RAND, D-3163-RC, 1 September 1955); Goldhamer, The Political Exercise: A Summary of the Social Science Division's Work in Political Gaming, with Special Reference to the Third Exercise, July-August 1955 D-3164-RC (RAND, D-3164-RC, 1 September 1955). Goldhamer, The Political Exercise: A Summary of the Social Science Division's Work in Political Gaming, with Special Reference to the Third Exercise, July-August 1955 D-3164-RC (RAND, D-3164-RC, 1 September 1955). Joseph M. Goldsen, The Political Exercise; An Assessment of the Fourth Round (RAND, D-3640-RC, 30 May 1956), 5-6.
51. For information on the first three games, see Herbert Goldhamer, Toward a Cold War Game (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, D[L]-2603, 22 October 1954); Paul Kecskemeti, War Games and Political Games (RAND, D-2849, 15 April 1955); Goldhamer, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division, (First Round) (RAND, D-2850, 12 April 1955); Kecskemeti, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division: May Experiment (Second Round) (RAND, D-2975, 20 June 1955); Ewald Schnitzer, Third Political Exercise: Summary and Documents (RAND, D-3163-RC, 1 September 1955); Goldhamer, The Political Exercise: A Summary of the Social Science Division's Work in Political Gaming, with Special Reference to the Third Exercise, July-August 1955 D-3164-RC (RAND, D-3164-RC, 1 September 1955). See also Social Science Division, Experimental Research on Political Gaming (RAND Corporation, P-1540, 10 November 1958). The participants in the fourth round were: Referee Team: Albert Franklin, Andrew Marshall and Hans Speier; US Team: Joseph Goldsen, Victor Hunt and Jeffrey Kitchen; Soviet Team: Raymond Garthoff, Edward Page, Jr and Robert Tucker; Western European Team: Harvey DeWeerd, Paul Kecskemeti and Nathan Leites; Consultants on Special Problems: Lewis Bohn, Abraham Halpern, Malcolm Hoag, Oleg Hoeffding, Herman Kahn, Arnold Kramish and Charles Wolf, Jr; Special Assistant: Ewald Schnitzer. See See also Social Science Division, Experimental Research on Political Gaming (RAND Corporation, P-1540, 10 November 1958). The participants in the fourth round were: Referee Team: Albert Franklin, Andrew Marshall and Hans Speier; US Team: Joseph Goldsen, Victor Hunt and Jeffrey Kitchen; Soviet Team: Raymond Garthoff, Edward Page, Jr and Robert Tucker; Western European Team: Harvey DeWeerd, Paul Kecskemeti and Nathan Leites; Consultants on Special Problems: Lewis Bohn, Abraham Halpern, Malcolm Hoag, Oleg Hoeffding, Herman Kahn, Arnold Kramish and Charles Wolf, Jr; Special Assistant: Ewald Schnitzer. See Joseph M. Goldsen, The Political Exercise; An Assessment of the Fourth Round (RAND, D-3640-RC, 30 May 1956), 5-6. See also Ewald Schnitzer, Fourth RAND Political Exercise: Summary and Documents D-3639-RC (RAND, D-3639-RC, 25 May 1956). 5-6
52. For information on the first three games, see Herbert Goldhamer, Toward a Cold War Game (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, D[L]-2603, 22 October 1954); Paul Kecskemeti, War Games and Political Games (RAND, D-2849, 15 April 1955); Goldhamer, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division, (First Round) (RAND, D-2850, 12 April 1955); Kecskemeti, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division: May Experiment (Second Round) (RAND, D-2975, 20 June 1955); Ewald Schnitzer, Third Political Exercise: Summary and Documents (RAND, D-3163-RC, 1 September 1955); Goldhamer, The Political Exercise: A Summary of the Social Science Division's Work in Political Gaming, with Special Reference to the Third Exercise, July-August 1955 D-3164-RC (RAND, D-3164-RC, 1 September 1955). See also Social Science Division, Experimental Research on Political Gaming (RAND Corporation, P-1540, 10 November 1958). The participants in the fourth round were: Referee Team: Albert Franklin, Andrew Marshall and Hans Speier; US Team: Joseph Goldsen, Victor Hunt and Jeffrey Kitchen; Soviet Team: Raymond Garthoff, Edward Page, Jr and Robert Tucker; Western European Team: Harvey DeWeerd, Paul Kecskemeti and Nathan Leites; Consultants on Special Problems: Lewis Bohn, Abraham Halpern, Malcolm Hoag, Oleg Hoeffding, Herman Kahn, Arnold Kramish and Charles Wolf, Jr; Special Assistant: Ewald Schnitzer. See Joseph M. Goldsen, The Political Exercise; An Assessment of the Fourth Round (RAND, D-3640-RC, 30 May 1956), 5-6.
53. Quotations in this paragraph from ibid., 1-3. See also Ewald Schnitzer, Fourth RAND Political Exercise: Summary and Documents D-3639-RC (RAND, D-3639-RC, 25 May 1956). See also Ewald Schnitzer, Fourth RAND Political Exercise: Summary and Documents D-3639-RC (RAND, D-3639-RC, 25 May 1956).
54. Quotations in this paragraph from ibid., 1-3. See also Ewald Schnitzer, Fourth RAND Political Exercise: Summary and Documents D-3639-RC (RAND, D-3639-RC, 25 May 1956). See also Ewald Schnitzer, Fourth RAND Political Exercise: Summary and Documents D-3639-RC (RAND, D-3639-RC, 25 May 1956).
55. The Fourth Round was notable for incorporating non-RAND personnel into its team. Harold Hoskins, Director of the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, and Albert Franklin, Dean of the Foreign Service Institute's School of International Studies, were apprised of the previous political exercises and invited to participate. Dean Franklin, as well as senior State Department officers Edward Page and Jeffrey Kitchen were added to the group. In 1955, as a sign of the burgeoning interest in gaming in different sectors of the defense nexus, Hoskins had published an article suggesting the utility of 'political, economic and strategic "game exercises" ' for policy planning: see H. Hoskins, 'The New FSI Training Program', Foreign Service Journal (November 1955), cited in Goldsen, op. cit. note 34, 4.
56. The four quotations in this paragraph are in ibid., 32, 33, 35 and 58.
57. Ibid., 54.
58. Goldhamer & Speier, op. cit. note 32, 79.
59. Quotations from Goldsen, op. cit. note 34, 36, 38.
60. Goldhamer & Speier, op. cit. note 32, 80.
61. See Harold Guetzkow, 'A Use of Simulation in the Study of Inter-Nation Relations', Behavioral Science, Vol. 4, No. 3 (July 1959), reprinted in Shubik (ed.), op cit. note 15, 273-82.
62. See Arnold Hausrath, Venture Simulation in War, Business, and Politics (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 230-31.
63. Lincoln Bloomfield, 'Reflections on Gaming', Orbis, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Winter 1984), 783-90, at 784. 45. see also Bloomfield, 'Political Gaming', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol. 86, No. 9 (September 1960), 57-64. The game scenario concerned a crisis resulting from the death of the Polish Prime Minister one year into the future. Players simulated the UN Security Council and a General Assembly session.
64. Lincoln Bloomfield, 'Reflections on Gaming', Orbis, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Winter 1984), 783-90, at 784. 45. Lincoln Bloomfield and Norman Padelford, 'Teaching Note: Three Experiments in Political Gaming', American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 1959), 1105-13, at 1105 (emphasis in original); see also Bloomfield, 'Political Gaming', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol. 86, No. 9 (September 1960), 57-64. The game scenario concerned a crisis resulting from the death of the Polish Prime Minister one year into the future. Players simulated the UN Security Council and a General Assembly session. see also Bloomfield, 'Political Gaming', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol. 86, No. 9 (September 1960), 57-64. The game scenario concerned a crisis resulting from the death of the Polish Prime Minister one year into the future. Players simulated the UN Security Council and a General Assembly session.
65. Lincoln Bloomfield, 'Reflections on Gaming', Orbis, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Winter 1984), 783-90, at 784. 45. Lincoln Bloomfield and Norman Padelford, 'Teaching Note: Three Experiments in Political Gaming', American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 1959), 1105-13, at 1105 (emphasis in original); see also Bloomfield, 'Political Gaming', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol. 86, No. 9 (September 1960), 57-64. The game scenario concerned a crisis resulting from the death of the Polish Prime Minister one year into the future. Players simulated the UN Security Council and a General Assembly session. see also Bloomfield, 'Political Gaming', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol. 86, No. 9 (September 1960), 57-64. The game scenario concerned a crisis resulting from the death of the Polish Prime Minister one year into the future. Players simulated the UN Security Council and a General Assembly session.
66. For details on these student games, see Bloomfield & Padelford, op. cit. note 45, 1107.
67. Quotations in this paragraph from ibid., 1113, 1115.
68. Lincoln Bloomfield and Barton Whaley, 'The Political-Military Exercise: A Progress Report', Orbis, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter 1965), 854-69, at 855.
69. According to William Jones of the RAND Corporation, a participant in the JCS games, 'The initial purpose of the Pentagon games, which involved senior officials like the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense, was to improve interagency communication between the new defense intellectuals ('Whiz Kids') in Washington and the older professional military staffs': letter from Jones to Robert Mandel (26 February 1975), cited in Mandel, 'Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making During Crises', World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July 1977), 610-25, at 613.
70. The Berlin games were played over two weekends: the first, code-named 'NATO Planning Conference', took place at Camp David, MD, 8-11 September; the second game, code-named 'ISA [International Security Affairs] Conference', took place at the Military Assistance Institute in Arlington, VA, 29 September-1 October: Kaplan, op. cit. note 12, 302. Researchers can examine Berlin Game records in the National Security Files in the archives of the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Columbia Point, Boston, MA 02125-3398. Many of the same records are included in a document collection, The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962, published by the National Security Archive on microfiche in 1992: National Security Archive, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037, USA.
71. T. Schelling, personal correspondence with author (10 December 1998). For an extensive discussion of the Berlin Games, see transcript, 'Interview with Thomas Schelling' (20 May 1992), Nuclear History Program, Berlin Crisis Oral History Project, Center for International Security Studies at Maryland, School of Public Affairs, Van Munching Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA.
72. The players included DeWitt Armstrong, McGeorge Bundy, Alain Enthoven, Carl Kaysen, Henry Kissinger, Robert Komer, John McNaughton, Walt Rostow, Henry Rowen and Seymour Weiss. Kennedy and his brother did not attend. In an endnote, Kaplan (op. cit. note 12, 418) gives the following archival references for the Schelling Berlin games: material derived from Documents on NATO Planning Conference, 8-11 September 1961 (FOIA/DoD): Memo to Participants in NATO Planning Conference and attached scenario documents, 6 September 1961 (National Security File, Box 82, Germany-Berlin-General, 9/9/61); Memo to Participants in ISA Conference (29 September-1 October), 27 September 1961 (National Security File, Box 83, Germany-Berlin-Vol. 5 [Partial]); and 'ISA Conference Tentative Time Schedule' and 'Brief Scenarios'.
73. C. Kaysen, personal correspondence with author (24 December 1998).
74. Allen, op. cit. note 30, 221-22.
75. Kaysen (letter, op. cit. note 53) flatly scoffed at the idea: 'I never heard of the tabletop model about which you speak; and I doubt that it existed'. Schelling (letter, op. cit. note 51) sceptically suggested that the use of navy miniatures could be illustrative, but were hardly 'gamed' during the Crisis; rather, 'I can imagine a table-top display of ships, etc., to help a president visualize the state of affairs in a crisis . . .'. Apropos of the Cuban Missile Crisis, he commented: The only thing I ever heard about gaming during the Cuban crisis was a remark somebody reported to me. I think it was in the office of John McNaughton, then assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Somebody was reported to have said, 'This crisis sure demonstrates how realistic Schelling's games are', and somebody responded, 'No, Schilling's games demonstrate how unrealistic this Cuban crisis is'.
76. The System Research Laboratory experiments were designated as Casey, which took place between February and June 1952, involving 28 college students as crew members for a total of 175 hours; Cowboy, which took place in January and February 1953, involving 39 officers and airmen from air defense units, for a total of 182 hours; Cobra, which took place in January and February 1954, involving 40 officers and airmen for a total of 182 hours; and Cogwheel, involving 33 officers and airmen in June 1954 for a total of 56 hours. See William Biel, Description of the Air-Defense Experiments: I. The Physical and Cultural Environments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-661, 17 October 1955), 2-3.
77. Quotations from John Kennedy, 'The Uses and Limitations of Mathematical Models, Game Theory, and Systems Analysis in Planning and Problem Solution', in John Flanagan (ed.), Current Trends in Psychology in the World Emergency (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1952), 97-116, at 97, 98 and 113.
78. Robert Chapman and John Kennedy, The Background and Implications of the Systems Research Laboratory Studies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-740, 21 September 1955), 1. Chapman and Milton G. Weiner, The History, Purpose and Script of Cogwheel (RAND, P-1105, 24 June 1957).
79. Robert Chapman and John Kennedy, The Background and Implications of the Systems Research Laboratory Studies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-740, 21 September 1955), 1. Also see Chapman, Simulation in RAND's System Research Laboratory (RAND, P-1074, 30 April 1957); Chapman and Milton G. Weiner, The History, Purpose and Script of Cogwheel (RAND, P-1105, 24 June 1957). Chapman and Milton G. Weiner, The History, Purpose and Script of Cogwheel (RAND, P-1105, 24 June 1957).
80. Robert Chapman and John Kennedy, The Background and Implications of the Systems Research Laboratory Studies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-740, 21 September 1955), 1. Also see Chapman, Simulation in RAND's System Research Laboratory (RAND, P-1074, 30 April 1957); Chapman and Milton G. Weiner, The History, Purpose and Script of Cogwheel (RAND, P-1105, 24 June 1957). Chapman and Milton G. Weiner, The History, Purpose and Script of Cogwheel (RAND, P-1105, 24 June 1957).
81. Quotations from R.M. Rauner and W.A. Steger, Game-Simulation and Long-Range Planning (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-2355, 22 June 1961), 25, 17-18 and 25. Such play, they admitted, could hardly be understood to fall within the bounds of scientific method: 'We acknowledge that these experiences are not of the type that most of us would call "scientific" in the sense that they form a body of precepts or principles that have a demonstrable reliability or regularity' [25].
82. Claude Baum, The System Builders (Santa Monica, CA: Systems Development Corporation, 1981), 17-18. Baum added: 'Its only departure from realism was the inability to . . . erase from the scope tracks representing aircraft that had been shot down . . .'.
83. Biel, op. cit. note 56, 4.
84. Robert Chapman, John Kennedy, Allen Newell and William Biel, 'The System Research Laboratory's Air Defense Experiments', Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 3 (April 1959), 250-69, at 258. These researchers admitted: 'Our problem was to maintain the credibility of the environment'. There were a few mishaps in maintaining the realism of the experiment. For example: When a plane designed to fly at 125 miles an hour streaked across the direction center's area at over 1000 miles an hour (the computer dropped a sign in its calculations), we found it necessary to fabricate the story of a test missile out of control. We felt that to admit a computational error would shatter the illusion by giving 'official' recognition to the artificial situation. [259]
85. Robert Chapman, Description of the Air-Defense Experiments: III. Data Collection and Processing (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-658, 17 October 1955), 4.
86. Researchers' quotations from Chapman et al., op. cit. note 62, 264 and 251.
87. One should remember that in this period so much of the new-fangled weapons gadgetry, especially the computers, mystified nearly everybody. For example, a news item that noted the installation of the damage computer at the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator, exclaimed: 'With miles of wire and thousands of tubes, the new installation at the Naval War College is an electronic engineer's dream - big, complicated and extraordinary': 'Fabulous "War Game" Ready', Naval Aviation News (January 1959), 16-17, at 16.
88. For RAND research specifically on human factors, see Herbert Goldhamer, Human Factors in Systems Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RM-388, 15 April 1950); W.W. Haythorn, Human Factors in Systems Research (RAND, P-2337, 7 June 1961). W.W. Haythorn, Human Factors in Systems Research (RAND, P-2337, 7 June 1961). N. Wiener, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge, MA: The Technology Press of MIT, 1949).
89. For RAND research specifically on human factors, see Herbert Goldhamer, Human Factors in Systems Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RM-388, 15 April 1950); W.W. Haythorn, Human Factors in Systems Research (RAND, P-2337, 7 June 1961). W.W. Haythorn, Human Factors in Systems Research (RAND, P-2337, 7 June 1961). N. Wiener, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge, MA: The Technology Press of MIT, 1949).
90. Quotations from Gilbert Krulee, 'Information Theory and Man-Machine Systems', Journal of the Operations Research Society, Vol. 2, No. 3 (August 1954), 320-28, at 320, 327 and 328. Earlier, Norbert Wiener had put messages controlling the inputs and outputs of a communication system at the centre of his cybernetic theory: see N. Wiener, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge, MA: The Technology Press of MIT, 1949). N. Wiener, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge, MA: The Technology Press of MIT, 1949).
91. Quotations from Gilbert Krulee, 'Information Theory and Man-Machine Systems', Journal of the Operations Research Society, Vol. 2, No. 3 (August 1954), 320-28, at 320, 327 and 328. Earlier, Norbert Wiener had put messages controlling the inputs and outputs of a communication system at the centre of his cybernetic theory: see N. Wiener, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge, MA: The Technology Press of MIT, 1949). N. Wiener, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge, MA: The Technology Press of MIT, 1949).
92. R. Chapman, with assistance from W. Biel, J. Kennedy and A. Newell, The Systems Research Laboratory and its Program (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RM-890, 7 January 1952), 20.
93. Norbert Wiener famously likened machines (as well as man-machine systems) to biological organisms. It is my thesis that the operation of the living individual and the operation of some of the newer communication machines are precisely parallel. Both of them have sensory receptors as one stage in their cycle of operation: that is, in both of them there exists a special apparatus for collecting information from the outer world at low energy levels, and for making it available in the operation of the individual and the machine. . . . The information is then turned into a new form available for the further stages of performance. In both the animal and the machine this performance is made to be effective on the outer world. In both of them, their performed action on the outer world, and not merely their intended action, is reported back to the central regulatory apparatus. N. Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings; Cybernetics and Society (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 15.
94. Chapman et al., op. cit. note 62, 267.
95. Chapman, op. cit. note 68, 21.
96. Chapman & Kennedy, op. cit. note 58, 2. It is worth noting that the SRL's intensive laboratory efforts in training air defense crews were so successful that when the RAND division spun off into a separate non-profit company, the System Development Corporation (SDC) in 1956, in addition to providing analogue training programmes to the Air Force, the personnel of the SDC directed their experience with the partly manual continental air defense system to help create the next generation of the air defense, the more fully automated, computerized SAGE system: see Baum, op. cit. note 60, Chapter 2.
97. Chapman & Kennedy, op. cit. note 58, 3.
98. Allen Newell, Description of the Air-Defense Experiments; II. The Task Environment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-659, 17 October 1955), 2.
99. Chapman et al., op. cit. note 62, 252 (emphasis in original).
100. Chapman, op. cit. note 63, 2.
101. Chapman et al., op. cit. note 62, 262.
102. Chapman & Kennedy, op. cit. note 58, 7.
103. Chapman et al., op. cit. note 62, 251.
104. Chapman & Kennedy, op. cit. note 58, 8.
105. Wiener, op. cit. note 69, 69-71.
106. Chapman et al., op. cit. note 62, 259.
107. Chapman & Kennedy, op. cit. note 58, 10.
108. Ibid., 14.
109. Chapman et al., op. cit. note 62, 267.
110. Baum, op. cit. note 60, 17-19.
111. See T.C. Rowan, Simulation in Air Force System Training (Santa Monica, CA: Systems Development Corporation, SP-6, 30 April 1957); W.R. Goodwin, 'The Systems Development Corporation and Systems Training', American Psychologist, Vol. 12, No. 8 (August 1957), 524-28.
112. See T.C. Rowan, Simulation in Air Force System Training (Santa Monica, CA: Systems Development Corporation, SP-6, 30 April 1957); W.R. Goodwin, 'The Systems Development Corporation and Systems Training', American Psychologist, Vol. 12, No. 8 (August 1957), 524-28.
113. For example, Milton Weiner remarked: Although it is possible to make many inferences from tests, simulated exercises, and field studies, we must approach the application of these results to actual warfare with some caution. The non-combat conditions are always different, and we have no acceptable and precise way of relating them to combat. M.G. Weiner, 'An Introduction to War Games', in Pierre Rosenstiehl and Alain Ghouila-Houri (eds), Les Choix Économiques: Décisions Séquentielles et Simulation (Paris: Dunod, 1960), 256-79, at 275. This sort of anxious query finds a counterpart in doubt about the nature of the correspondence between the data from missile testing and extrapolations to missile performance under combat conditions, as explored by Donald MacKenzie. For example, MacKenzie quotes from testimony before the Armed Services Committee of the US House of Representatives in 1961: Who knows whether an intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead will actually work? Each of the constituent elements . . . has not been tested under circumstances which would be attendant upon the firing of such a missile in anger. MacKenzie, op. cit. note 14, 340-68, at 342.
114. For example, Milton Weiner remarked: Although it is possible to make many inferences from tests, simulated exercises, and field studies, we must approach the application of these results to actual warfare with some caution. The non-combat conditions are always different, and we have no acceptable and precise way of relating them to combat. M.G. Weiner, 'An Introduction to War Games', in Pierre Rosenstiehl and Alain Ghouila-Houri (eds), Les Choix Économiques: Décisions Séquentielles et Simulation (Paris: Dunod, 1960), 256-79, at 275. This sort of anxious query finds a counterpart in doubt about the nature of the correspondence between the data from missile testing and extrapolations to missile performance under combat conditions, as explored by Donald MacKenzie. For example, MacKenzie quotes from testimony before the Armed Services Committee of the US House of Representatives in 1961: Who knows whether an intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead will actually work? Each of the constituent elements . . . has not been tested under circumstances which would be attendant upon the firing of such a missile in anger. MacKenzie, op. cit. note 14, 340-68, at 342.
115. The late Jiri Nehnevajsa, long employed as a consultant for the Federal Civil Defense Administration, compressed the essential problem for civil defense research into the first two points of this scheme. The last item in this list derives from Herman Kahn's attention to uncertainty in his memorandum on systems analysis. See Jiri Nehnevajsa, Civil Defense and Society (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Army, OCD-OS-62-267, July 1964); Kahn & Mann, op. cit. note 1.
116. Olaf Helmer, The Systematic Use of Expert Judgment in Operations Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-2795, September 1963), cited in E.S. Quade, 'Methods and Procedures', in Quade (ed.), Analysis of Military Decisions (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1964), 149-78, at 150. cited in E.S. Quade, 'Methods and Procedures', in Quade (ed.), Analysis of Military Decisions (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1964), 149-78, at 150.
117. Olaf Helmer, The Systematic Use of Expert Judgment in Operations Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-2795, September 1963), cited in E.S. Quade, 'Methods and Procedures', in Quade (ed.), Analysis of Military Decisions (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1964), 149-78, at 150. cited in E.S. Quade, 'Methods and Procedures', in Quade (ed.), Analysis of Military Decisions (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1964), 149-78, at 150.
118. Ibid., 153.
119. Thus Robert Dorfman affirmed: Operations research is not a subject-matter field but an approach or method . . . It is by no means clearer just what the method is other than that it is scientific (like all respectable methods), because operations analysts are typically resourceful and ingenious men who tackle their problems with no holds barred. R. Dorfman, 'Operations Research', The American Economic Review, Vol. 50, No. 4 (September 1960), 575-623, at 575. Similarly, C. West Churchman allowed: It seems oddly premature to speak of what 'operations researchers do' or 'try to do', when the recent beginnings of operations research explicitly refused to accept the historical precedent of any field and the last decade has introduced so many different methods, all claiming to be 'cases' of operations research. C.W. Churchman, 'Decision and Value Theory', in Ackoff (ed.), op. cit. note 5, 35-64, at 44. C.W. Churchman, 'Decision and Value Theory', in Ackoff (ed.), op. cit. note 5, 35-64, at 44.
120. Thus Robert Dorfman affirmed: Operations research is not a subject-matter field but an approach or method . . . It is by no means clearer just what the method is other than that it is scientific (like all respectable methods), because operations analysts are typically resourceful and ingenious men who tackle their problems with no holds barred. R. Dorfman, 'Operations Research', The American Economic Review, Vol. 50, No. 4 (September 1960), 575-623, at 575. Similarly, C. West Churchman allowed: It seems oddly premature to speak of what 'operations researchers do' or 'try to do', when the recent beginnings of operations research explicitly refused to accept the historical precedent of any field and the last decade has introduced so many different methods, all claiming to be 'cases' of operations research. C.W. Churchman, 'Decision and Value Theory', in Ackoff (ed.), op. cit. note 5, 35-64, at 44. C.W. Churchman, 'Decision and Value Theory', in Ackoff (ed.), op. cit. note 5, 35-64, at 44.
121. Norman Dalkey, Simulation of Military Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-3400, January 1967), 14. Moreover, comprehending the game-problem was just as taxing to the analytic intelligence as formulating it in the first place: 'In many instances phenomena are understood rather well in the small . . . but the over-all effect of the interaction of a complex set of such phenomena is not easy to grasp. This is particularly the situation where new, possibly non-existent, weapons are concerned and where no operational experience exists'
122. Norman Dalkey, Simulation of Military Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-3400, January 1967), 14. Moreover, comprehending the game-problem was just as taxing to the analytic intelligence as formulating it in the first place: 'In many instances phenomena are understood rather well in the small . . . but the over-all effect of the interaction of a complex set of such phenomena is not easy to grasp. This is particularly the situation where new, possibly non-existent, weapons are concerned and where no operational experience exists' (ibid., 1).
123. Olaf Helmer, Strategic Gaming (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1902, 10 February 1960), 1.
124. Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 184.
125. Quotation from W. McCarty Little, 'The Strategic Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute (December 1912), cited in Francis McHugh, Fundamentals of Wargaming (Newport, RI: United States Naval War College, 3rd edn, March 1966), Chapter 1, 25. cited in Francis McHugh, Fundamentals of Wargaming (Newport, RI: United States Naval War College, 3rd edn, March 1966), Chapter 1, 25.
126. Quotation from W. McCarty Little, 'The Strategic Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute (December 1912), cited in Francis McHugh, Fundamentals of Wargaming (Newport, RI: United States Naval War College, 3rd edn, March 1966), Chapter 1, 25. cited in Francis McHugh, Fundamentals of Wargaming (Newport, RI: United States Naval War College, 3rd edn, March 1966), Chapter 1, 25.
127. 'My initial work on gaming, however, began under government auspices, and I confess to some embarrassment when Millikan, Walt Rostow, and I outlined our plans to Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter and CIA Director Allen Dulles . . . Herter was more foresighted than I, enthusiastically offering the services of Policy Planning Staff members for all subsequent MIT games - provided that he did not have to tell Congress the State Department was "playing games" ': Bloomfield, op. cit. note 44, 784.
128. Allen, op. cit. note 30, 30.
129. L. Bloomfield, personal correspondence with author (9 December 1998).
130. Three examples: (1) 'Thus we define operational gaming as the serious use of playing as a primary device to formulate a game, to solve a game, or to impart something of the solution of a game': Clayton Thomas and Walter Deemer, Jr, 'The Role of Operational Gaming in Operations Research', Operations Research, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February 1957), 1-27, at 6. (2) 'Without firing a shot or spilling a drop of blood, they ["a small group of military and scientific experts"] test concepts for future warfare - five, ten or more years hence - by "playing" in a very serious way, a large war game': Rogers, op. cit. note 7, 33. (3) 'Finally the game is closed and the teams start to play in earnest. They take on all the deadly purpose of a division war room in a real situation': Major Edgar F. Musgrove, 'No Game', The Marine Corps Gazette (August 1965), 53-56, at 56.
131. Three examples: (1) 'Thus we define operational gaming as the serious use of playing as a primary device to formulate a game, to solve a game, or to impart something of the solution of a game': Clayton Thomas and Walter Deemer, Jr, 'The Role of Operational Gaming in Operations Research', Operations Research, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February 1957), 1-27, at 6. (2) 'Without firing a shot or spilling a drop of blood, they ["a small group of military and scientific experts"] test concepts for future warfare - five, ten or more years hence - by "playing" in a very serious way, a large war game': Rogers, op. cit. note 7, 33. (3) 'Finally the game is closed and the teams start to play in earnest. They take on all the deadly purpose of a division war room in a real situation': Major Edgar F. Musgrove, 'No Game', The Marine Corps Gazette (August 1965), 53-56, at 56.
132. Three examples: (1) 'Thus we define operational gaming as the serious use of playing as a primary device to formulate a game, to solve a game, or to impart something of the solution of a game': Clayton Thomas and Walter Deemer, Jr, 'The Role of Operational Gaming in Operations Research', Operations Research, Vol. 5, No. 1 (February 1957), 1-27, at 6. (2) 'Without firing a shot or spilling a drop of blood, they ["a small group of military and scientific experts"] test concepts for future warfare - five, ten or more years hence - by "playing" in a very serious way, a large war game': Rogers, op. cit. note 7, 33. (3) 'Finally the game is closed and the teams start to play in earnest. They take on all the deadly purpose of a division war room in a real situation': Major Edgar F. Musgrove, 'No Game', The Marine Corps Gazette (August 1965), 53-56, at 56.
133. Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 62.
134. Lincoln Bloomfield and Cornelius Gearin, 'Games Foreign Policy Experts Play: The Political Exercise Comes of Age', Orbis, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Winter 1973), 1008-31, at 1027.
135. R.D. Arnold, 'Rules Preparation and Pre-Game Activities', in John Overholt (ed.), First War Gaming Symposium Proceedings, 30 November 1961 (Washington, DC: Washington Operations Research Council, February 1962), 16-34, at 17.
136. Bloomfield & Gearin, op. cit. note 102, 1012.
137. Chapman (1957), op. cit. note 58, 3.
138. Bloomfield & Gearin, op. cit. note 102, 1025.
139. McDonald, op. cit. note 29, 65.
140. Martin Shubik, 'Gaming: Theory and Practice, Past and Future', Simulation & Games, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 1989), 184-89, at 189.
141. Thomas & Deemer, op. cit. note 100, 6 (emphasis in original).
142. Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 58.
143. Bloomfield & Gearin, op. cit. note 102, 1012-13.
144. Clark Abt, 'War Gaming', International Science and Technology (August 1964), 29-37, at 29-31.
145. Robert Specht, 'War Games', in Max Davies and Michel Verhulst (eds), Operational Research in Practice (London: Pergamon, 1958), 144-53, at 149.
146. For a sample of group sociology from this period, see: R.F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1950); D.G. Hays and R.R. Bush, 'A Study of Group Action', American Sociological Review, Vol. 19, No. 6 (December 1954), 693-701; A.P. Hare, E.F. Borgatta and R.F. Bales (eds), Small Groups (NewYork: Knopf, 1955). For RAND work on creativity, see A. Newell, J.C. Shaw and H.A Simon, The Processes of Creative Thinking (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1320, 28 January 1959) and N. Jordan, Decisionmaking under Uncertainty and Problem Solving: A Gestalt Theoretical Viewpoint (RAND, P-2156, 1 December 1960).
147. For a sample of group sociology from this period, see: R.F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1950); Harold Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership, and Men (Pittsburgh, PA:, Carnegie Press, 1951); Harold Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership, and Men (Pittsburgh, PA:, Carnegie Press, 1951); A.P. Hare, E.F. Borgatta and R.F. Bales (eds), Small Groups (NewYork: Knopf, 1955). For RAND work on creativity, see A. Newell, J.C. Shaw and H.A Simon, The Processes of Creative Thinking (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1320, 28 January 1959) and N. Jordan, Decisionmaking under Uncertainty and Problem Solving: A Gestalt Theoretical Viewpoint (RAND, P-2156, 1 December 1960).
148. For a sample of group sociology from this period, see: R.F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1950); Harold Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership, and Men (Pittsburgh, PA:, Carnegie Press, 1951); D.G. Hays and R.R. Bush, 'A Study of Group Action', American Sociological Review, Vol. 19, No. 6 (December 1954), 693-701; D.G. Hays and R.R. Bush, 'A Study of Group Action', American Sociological Review, Vol. 19, No. 6 (December 1954), 693-701; For RAND work on creativity, see A. Newell, J.C. Shaw and H.A Simon, The Processes of Creative Thinking (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1320, 28 January 1959) and N. Jordan, Decisionmaking under Uncertainty and Problem Solving: A Gestalt Theoretical Viewpoint (RAND, P-2156, 1 December 1960).
149. For a sample of group sociology from this period, see: R.F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1950); Harold Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership, and Men (Pittsburgh, PA:, Carnegie Press, 1951); D.G. Hays and R.R. Bush, 'A Study of Group Action', American Sociological Review, Vol. 19, No. 6 (December 1954), 693-701; A.P. Hare, E.F. Borgatta and R.F. Bales (eds), Small Groups (NewYork: Knopf, 1955). A.P. Hare, E.F. Borgatta and R.F. Bales (eds), Small Groups (NewYork: Knopf, 1955). and N. Jordan, Decisionmaking under Uncertainty and Problem Solving: A Gestalt Theoretical Viewpoint (RAND, P-2156, 1 December 1960).
150. For a sample of group sociology from this period, see: R.F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1950); Harold Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership, and Men (Pittsburgh, PA:, Carnegie Press, 1951); D.G. Hays and R.R. Bush, 'A Study of Group Action', American Sociological Review, Vol. 19, No. 6 (December 1954), 693-701; A.P. Hare, E.F. Borgatta and R.F. Bales (eds), Small Groups (NewYork: Knopf, 1955). For RAND work on creativity, see A. Newell, J.C. Shaw and H.A Simon, The Processes of Creative Thinking (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1320, 28 January 1959) For RAND work on creativity, see A. Newell, J.C. Shaw and H.A Simon, The Processes of Creative Thinking (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1320, 28 January 1959)
151. For a sample of group sociology from this period, see: R.F. Bales, Interaction Process Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1950); Harold Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership, and Men (Pittsburgh, PA:, Carnegie Press, 1951); D.G. Hays and R.R. Bush, 'A Study of Group Action', American Sociological Review, Vol. 19, No. 6 (December 1954), 693-701; A.P. Hare, E.F. Borgatta and R.F. Bales (eds), Small Groups (NewYork: Knopf, 1955). For RAND work on creativity, see A. Newell, J.C. Shaw and H.A Simon, The Processes of Creative Thinking (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1320, 28 January 1959) and N. Jordan, Decisionmaking under Uncertainty and Problem Solving: A Gestalt Theoretical Viewpoint (RAND, P-2156, 1 December 1960). and N. Jordan, Decisionmaking under Uncertainty and Problem Solving: A Gestalt Theoretical Viewpoint (RAND, P-2156, 1 December 1960).
152. 'National Support for Behavioral Science', Behavioral Science, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July 1958), 217-27, at 220-23.
153. 'Modern techniques of cooperation in industry, science, and warfare emphasize a greater reliance upon small groups of men functioning semi-autonomously and integrated into larger operations only through complex and sometimes vulnerable communication systems. For a small group to be efficient, each member must contribute the particular technical and social skills expected of him. Basic research on group functioning will almost certainly yield important general principles for group assembly, training, and management, because a number of the technical tools and concepts needed for this effort are now available' (ibid., 221).
154. Alexander Mood, War Gaming as a Technique of Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, P-899, 3 September 1954), 7.
155. T. Brown and E. Paxson, A Retrospective Look at Some Strategy and Force Evaluation Games (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-1619-PR, September 1975), 5. Also see: Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 271; E.W. Paxson, War Gaming (RAND, 3489-PR, February 1963), 29; Martin Shubik, On the Scope of Gaming (RAND, P-4608, March 1971), 9-10. Herman Kahn recommended that in addition to playing war games, group cohesion could be fostered by collectively inventing game scenarios H. Kahn, Report to the MITRE Corporation, LY-2-8320 (31 October 1961), 7: MITRE Archives (Corporate Archives, MITRE Corporation, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730, USA).
156. T. Brown and E. Paxson, A Retrospective Look at Some Strategy and Force Evaluation Games (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-1619-PR, September 1975), 5. Also see: Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 271; E.W. Paxson, War Gaming (RAND, 3489-PR, February 1963), 29; Martin Shubik, On the Scope of Gaming (RAND, P-4608, March 1971), 9-10. Herman Kahn recommended that in addition to playing war games, group cohesion could be fostered by collectively inventing game scenarios H. Kahn, Report to the MITRE Corporation, LY-2-8320 (31 October 1961), 7: MITRE Archives (Corporate Archives, MITRE Corporation, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730, USA).
157. T. Brown and E. Paxson, A Retrospective Look at Some Strategy and Force Evaluation Games (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-1619-PR, September 1975), 5. Also see: Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 271; E.W. Paxson, War Gaming (RAND, 3489-PR, February 1963), 29; Martin Shubik, On the Scope of Gaming (RAND, P-4608, March 1971), 9-10. Herman Kahn recommended that in addition to playing war games, group cohesion could be fostered by collectively inventing game scenarios H. Kahn, Report to the MITRE Corporation, LY-2-8320 (31 October 1961), 7: MITRE Archives (Corporate Archives, MITRE Corporation, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730, USA).
158. T. Brown and E. Paxson, A Retrospective Look at Some Strategy and Force Evaluation Games (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-1619-PR, September 1975), 5. Also see: Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 271; E.W. Paxson, War Gaming (RAND, 3489-PR, February 1963), 29; Martin Shubik, On the Scope of Gaming (RAND, P-4608, March 1971), 9-10. Herman Kahn recommended that in addition to playing war games, group cohesion could be fostered by collectively inventing game scenarios H. Kahn, Report to the MITRE Corporation, LY-2-8320 (31 October 1961), 7: MITRE Archives (Corporate Archives, MITRE Corporation, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730, USA).
159. T. Brown and E. Paxson, A Retrospective Look at Some Strategy and Force Evaluation Games (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-1619-PR, September 1975), 5. Also see: Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 271; E.W. Paxson, War Gaming (RAND, 3489-PR, February 1963), 29; Martin Shubik, On the Scope of Gaming (RAND, P-4608, March 1971), 9-10. Herman Kahn recommended that in addition to playing war games, group cohesion could be fostered by collectively inventing game scenarios H. Kahn, Report to the MITRE Corporation, LY-2-8320 (31 October 1961), 7: MITRE Archives (Corporate Archives, MITRE Corporation, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730, USA).
160. See, for example: Colonel Paul S. Deems, 'War Gaming and Exercises', Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. 8 (Winter 1956-57), 98-126, at 124; Thomas & Deemer, op. cit. note 100, 20; Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann, War Gaming (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1167, 30 July 1957), 5.
161. See, for example: Colonel Paul S. Deems, 'War Gaming and Exercises', Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. 8 (Winter 1956-57), 98-126, at 124; Thomas & Deemer, op. cit. note 100, 20; Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann, War Gaming (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1167, 30 July 1957), 5.
162. See, for example: Colonel Paul S. Deems, 'War Gaming and Exercises', Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. 8 (Winter 1956-57), 98-126, at 124; Thomas & Deemer, op. cit. note 100, 20; Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann, War Gaming (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-1167, 30 July 1957), 5.
163. Richard Barringer and Barton Whaley, 'The MIT Political-Military Gaming Experience', Orbis, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 1965), 437-58, at 444.
164. Bloomfield & Gearin, op. cit. note 102, 1029 (emphasis in original).
165. Barringer & Whaley, op. cit. note 120, 449. The willingness to enter into the game-world was not unique to the community of professional diplomatic and defense analysts exploring political-military crises. The players of the American Management Association's 'Business Decision Game' exhibited the same concentrated attention. The authors of a 1958 article introducing the technique to the readers of Fortune magazine observed: The involvement of the players has been evident. They do accept the illusion [of the game-world] and as executive teams work seriously, competitively, and sometimes even emotionally. They put in long hours on their own initiative, many of them working through recreation hours and in the evenings. John McDonald and Franc Ricciardi, 'The Business Decision Game', Fortune, Vol. 57, No. 3 (March 1958), 140-42, 208-14, at 214 (emphasis in original).
166. Barringer & Whaley, op. cit. note 120, 449. The willingness to enter into the game-world was not unique to the community of professional diplomatic and defense analysts exploring political-military crises. The players of the American Management Association's 'Business Decision Game' exhibited the same concentrated attention. The authors of a 1958 article introducing the technique to the readers of Fortune magazine observed: The involvement of the players has been evident. They do accept the illusion [of the game-world] and as executive teams work seriously, competitively, and sometimes even emotionally. They put in long hours on their own initiative, many of them working through recreation hours and in the evenings. John McDonald and Franc Ricciardi, 'The Business Decision Game', Fortune, Vol. 57, No. 3 (March 1958), 140-42, 208-14, at 214 (emphasis in original).
167. Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63.
168. 'In its capacity to exert controlled stresses upon various isolated subjects [i.e. topics, not persons] and concepts, this particular technique generally affords the individual participant the unanticipated and vivid insights that arise from increased consciousness and awareness. Often, these insights will form the bases of new and lasting interests and concerns, testifying to the intensity of the live experience': Barringer & Whaley, op. cit. note 120, 456.
169. 'Just about the only practical way for the potential user of gaming to learn enough about the subject to be able to judge its utility is to expose himself to some gaming activity, that is, to go through the motions of constructing a game, of playing it, and of applying the outcome to the real world. This brief paper, of course, cannot replace this kind of experience': Helmer, op. cit, note 94, 1.
170. Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 61.
171. Abt, op. cit. note 112, 29.
172. See Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 270-71; W.L. Archer, 'The Techniques of Modern War Gaming', Canadian Army Journal (Fall 1961), 15-25, at 23; Colonel Alfred DeQuoy, 'Operational War Gaming', Armor, Vol. 72 (September-October 1963), 34-40, at 35; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 22; Bloomfield & Whaley, op. cit. note 48, 866.
173. See Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 270-71; W.L. Archer, 'The Techniques of Modern War Gaming', Canadian Army Journal (Fall 1961), 15-25, at 23; Colonel Alfred DeQuoy, 'Operational War Gaming', Armor, Vol. 72 (September-October 1963), 34-40, at 35; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 22; Bloomfield & Whaley, op. cit. note 48, 866.
174. See Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 270-71; W.L. Archer, 'The Techniques of Modern War Gaming', Canadian Army Journal (Fall 1961), 15-25, at 23; Colonel Alfred DeQuoy, 'Operational War Gaming', Armor, Vol. 72 (September-October 1963), 34-40, at 35; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 22; Bloomfield & Whaley, op. cit. note 48, 866.
175. See Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 270-71; W.L. Archer, 'The Techniques of Modern War Gaming', Canadian Army Journal (Fall 1961), 15-25, at 23; Colonel Alfred DeQuoy, 'Operational War Gaming', Armor, Vol. 72 (September-October 1963), 34-40, at 35; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 22; Bloomfield & Whaley, op. cit. note 48, 866.
176. See Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 270-71; W.L. Archer, 'The Techniques of Modern War Gaming', Canadian Army Journal (Fall 1961), 15-25, at 23; Colonel Alfred DeQuoy, 'Operational War Gaming', Armor, Vol. 72 (September-October 1963), 34-40, at 35; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 22; Bloomfield & Whaley, op. cit. note 48, 866.
177. Deems, op. cit. note 119, 126.
178. Dalkey, op. cit. note 93, 2. The thesis, simulation as substitute for future experience, was a cornerstone of gaming apologetics. For example, in his series introducing the technique to the readers of Army, Theodore Sterne wrote: War games provide, however, experiences of wars that have not occurred, and create synthetic history from which, by subsequent study, general 'lessons' may sometimes be discovered. A game that simulates war with inadequate, even if imperfect, realism permits intellectual experiments to be performed with military units of types that may not yet exist; it permits ground to be covered that history cannot traverse; it exposes for study imagined events, outcomes, and other features. T. Sterne, 'War Games: Validity and Interpretation', Army, Vol. 16, No. 4 (April 1966), 64-68, at 66. Also see McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 25; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 9, 20, 21; Rauner & Steger, op. cit. note 59, 21. Rauner & Steger, op. cit. note 59, 21.
179. Dalkey, op. cit. note 93, 2. The thesis, simulation as substitute for future experience, was a cornerstone of gaming apologetics. For example, in his series introducing the technique to the readers of Army, Theodore Sterne wrote: War games provide, however, experiences of wars that have not occurred, and create synthetic history from which, by subsequent study, general 'lessons' may sometimes be discovered. A game that simulates war with inadequate, even if imperfect, realism permits intellectual experiments to be performed with military units of types that may not yet exist; it permits ground to be covered that history cannot traverse; it exposes for study imagined events, outcomes, and other features. T. Sterne, 'War Games: Validity and Interpretation', Army, Vol. 16, No. 4 (April 1966), 64-68, at 66. Also see McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 25; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 9, 20, 21; Rauner & Steger, op. cit. note 59, 21. Rauner & Steger, op. cit. note 59, 21.
180. Dalkey, op. cit. note 93, 2. The thesis, simulation as substitute for future experience, was a cornerstone of gaming apologetics. For example, in his series introducing the technique to the readers of Army, Theodore Sterne wrote: War games provide, however, experiences of wars that have not occurred, and create synthetic history from which, by subsequent study, general 'lessons' may sometimes be discovered. A game that simulates war with inadequate, even if imperfect, realism permits intellectual experiments to be performed with military units of types that may not yet exist; it permits ground to be covered that history cannot traverse; it exposes for study imagined events, outcomes, and other features. T. Sterne, 'War Games: Validity and Interpretation', Army, Vol. 16, No. 4 (April 1966), 64-68, at 66. Also see McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 25; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 9, 20, 21; Rauner & Steger, op. cit. note 59, 21. Rauner & Steger, op. cit. note 59, 21.
181. Dalkey, op. cit. note 93, 2. The thesis, simulation as substitute for future experience, was a cornerstone of gaming apologetics. For example, in his series introducing the technique to the readers of Army, Theodore Sterne wrote: War games provide, however, experiences of wars that have not occurred, and create synthetic history from which, by subsequent study, general 'lessons' may sometimes be discovered. A game that simulates war with inadequate, even if imperfect, realism permits intellectual experiments to be performed with military units of types that may not yet exist; it permits ground to be covered that history cannot traverse; it exposes for study imagined events, outcomes, and other features. T. Sterne, 'War Games: Validity and Interpretation', Army, Vol. 16, No. 4 (April 1966), 64-68, at 66. Also see McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 25; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 9, 20, 21; Rauner & Steger, op. cit. note 59, 21. Rauner & Steger, op. cit. note 59, 21.
182. Dalkey, op. cit. note 93, 2. The thesis, simulation as substitute for future experience, was a cornerstone of gaming apologetics. For example, in his series introducing the technique to the readers of Army, Theodore Sterne wrote: War games provide, however, experiences of wars that have not occurred, and create synthetic history from which, by subsequent study, general 'lessons' may sometimes be discovered. A game that simulates war with inadequate, even if imperfect, realism permits intellectual experiments to be performed with military units of types that may not yet exist; it permits ground to be covered that history cannot traverse; it exposes for study imagined events, outcomes, and other features. T. Sterne, 'War Games: Validity and Interpretation', Army, Vol. 16, No. 4 (April 1966), 64-68, at 66. Also see McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 25; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 9, 20, 21; Rauner & Steger, op. cit. note 59, 21. Rauner & Steger, op. cit. note 59, 21.
183. Morgenthaler, op. cit. note 5, 374.
184. Oscar Helmer and T.A. Brown, SAFE: A Strategy-and-Force-Evaluation Game (U) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RM-3287-PR, October 1962), iii.
185. See, for example: Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 29; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 10-11; Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 68; Garry Brewer and Martin Shubik, The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 12-13, 91. Garry Brewer and Martin Shubik, The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 12-13, 91.
186. See, for example: Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 29; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 10-11; Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 68; Garry Brewer and Martin Shubik, The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 12-13, 91. Garry Brewer and Martin Shubik, The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 12-13, 91.
187. See, for example: Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 29; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 10-11; Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 68; Garry Brewer and Martin Shubik, The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 12-13, 91. Garry Brewer and Martin Shubik, The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 12-13, 91.
188. See, for example: Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 29; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 10-11; Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 68; Garry Brewer and Martin Shubik, The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 12-13, 91. Garry Brewer and Martin Shubik, The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 12-13, 91.
189. Barringer & Whaley, op. cit. note 120, 451.
190. Arnold, op. cit. note 103, 21. The point was reiterated by others: see, for example, McDonald, op. cit. note 29, 72, and Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 66-67. and Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 66-67.
191. Arnold, op. cit. note 103, 21. The point was reiterated by others: see, for example, McDonald, op. cit. note 29, 72, and Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 66-67. and Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 66-67.
192. Arnold, op. cit. note 103, 21. The point was reiterated by others: see, for example, McDonald, op. cit. note 29, 72, and Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 66-67. and Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 66-67.
193. Arnold, op. cit. note 103, 21. The point was reiterated by others: see, for example, McDonald, op. cit. note 29, 72, and Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 66-67. and Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 66-67.
194. Discussion Panel, in Greyson (ed.), op. cit. note 29, 129-60, at 139 (emphases in original).
195. For example, Captain James T. Cockrill wrote: Obviously, neither the model nor the computer can perform acts of insight or imagination; such must be performed by men in the design of the model . . . While the hazards involved in analysis by gaming are such that it cannot be construed that the results will provide irrefutable conclusions, the gaming process will certainly provide better insight into the problem . . . J. Cockrill, 'The Validity of War Game Analysis', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol. 92, No. 1 (January 1966), 45-53, at 51, 53. Also see: Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67; McHugh, op. cit. note 96, 1-26; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 22.
196. For example, Captain James T. Cockrill wrote: Obviously, neither the model nor the computer can perform acts of insight or imagination; such must be performed by men in the design of the model . . . While the hazards involved in analysis by gaming are such that it cannot be construed that the results will provide irrefutable conclusions, the gaming process will certainly provide better insight into the problem . . . J. Cockrill, 'The Validity of War Game Analysis', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol. 92, No. 1 (January 1966), 45-53, at 51, 53. Also see: Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67; McHugh, op. cit. note 96, 1-26; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 22.
197. For example, Captain James T. Cockrill wrote: Obviously, neither the
198. For example, Captain James T. Cockrill wrote: Obviously, neither the model nor the computer can perform acts of insight or imagination; such must be performed by men in the design of the model . . . While the hazards involved in analysis by gaming are such that it cannot be construed that the results will provide irrefutable conclusions, the gaming process will certainly provide better insight into the problem . . . J. Cockrill, 'The Validity of War Game Analysis', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol. 92, No. 1 (January 1966), 45-53, at 51, 53. Also see: Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67; McHugh, op. cit. note 96, 1-26; Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 22.
199. Behavioral Sciences Subpanel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, 'Strengthening the Behavioral Sciences', Behavioral Science, Vol. 7, No. 3 (July 1962), 275-88, at 282.
200. Archer, op. cit. note 128, 23.
201. Clayton Thomas, 'Military Gaming', in Ackoff (ed.), op. cit. note 5, 421-65, at 440. George Morganthaler (op. cit. note 5, 373) George Morganthaler (op. cit. note 5, 373) echoed the idea in an essay published in the same volume: 'Some simulations have led to ... the realization of simple but hidden truths concerning the nature of the operation'.
202. Clayton Thomas, 'Military Gaming', in Ackoff (ed.), op. cit. note 5, 421-65, at 440. George Morganthaler (op. cit. note 5, 373) George Morganthaler (op. cit. note 5, 373) echoed the idea in an essay published in the same volume: 'Some simulations have led to ... the realization of simple but hidden truths concerning the nature of the operation'.
203. Tapp Taves, 'Navy Games', in Greyson (ed.), op. cit. note 29, 55-61, at 58.
204. Thomas & Deemer, op. cit. note 100, 25.
205. Taves, op. cit. note 142, 57.
206. Morganthaler, op. cit. note 5, 406.
207. Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 15.
208. Barringer & Whaley, op. cit. note 120, 451. Deborah Dowling also observes simulators' discourse about the emergence of intuition in the course of their work: A sense of direct manipulation encourages simulators to develop a 'feel' for their mathematical models . . . by developing a practical intuition for how they work. Because the simulation is presented as an experimental target, the researcher can interact with it as if it were a 'real' target, drawing on the physical skills of recognition and reaction. The quick generation of data through simulation allows scientists to patch ideas together, to explore possibilities, to build up a broad base of experiences, and thus to develop a more intuitive . . . understanding of a mathematical model. D. Dowling, 'Experimenting on Theories', Science in Context, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1999), 261-73, at 269.
209. Barringer & Whaley, op. cit. note 120, 451. Deborah Dowling also observes simulators' discourse about the emergence of intuition in the course of their work: A sense of direct manipulation encourages simulators to develop a 'feel' for their mathematical models . . . by developing a practical intuition for how they work. Because the simulation is presented as an experimental target, the researcher can interact with it as if it were a 'real' target, drawing on the physical skills of recognition and reaction. The quick generation of data through simulation allows scientists to patch ideas together, to explore possibilities, to build up a broad base of experiences, and thus to develop a more intuitive . . . understanding of a mathematical model. D. Dowling, 'Experimenting on Theories', Science in Context, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1999), 261-73, at 269.
210. The term 'synthetic history' was employed frequently. For example, RAND analyst Edwin Paxson wrote: With suitable record-keeping discipline, these games accumulate detailed histories of air, ground, and sea operations and logistics and other events. These can be viewed as synthetic war histories and examined for lessons (or mistakes). Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25. Also Sterne (op. cit. note 130, 64): 'War games create synthetic history composed of imagined events', and McHugh (op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 25): 'When, as in atomic warfare, there are no precedents, no historical examples to furnish guidelines, war gaming creates its own history of artificial wars'. See also Meals, op. cit. note 14, 255, and Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, xvi. Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999). Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999).
211. The term 'synthetic history' was employed frequently. For example, RAND analyst Edwin Paxson wrote: With suitable record-keeping discipline, these games accumulate detailed histories of air, ground, and sea operations and logistics and other events. These can be viewed as synthetic war histories and examined for lessons (or mistakes). Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25. Also Sterne (op. cit. note 130, 64): 'War games create synthetic history composed of imagined events', and McHugh (op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 25): 'When, as in atomic warfare, there are no precedents, no historical examples to furnish guidelines, war gaming creates its own history of artificial wars'. See also Meals, op. cit. note 14, 255, and Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, xvi. Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999). Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999).
212. The term 'synthetic history' was employed frequently. For example, RAND analyst Edwin Paxson wrote: With suitable record-keeping discipline, these games accumulate detailed histories of air, ground, and sea operations and logistics and other events. These can be viewed as synthetic war histories and examined for lessons (or mistakes). Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25. Also Sterne (op. cit. note 130, 64): 'War games create synthetic history composed of imagined events', and McHugh (op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 25): 'When, as in atomic warfare, there are no precedents, no historical examples to furnish guidelines, war gaming creates its own history of artificial wars'. See also Meals, op. cit. note 14, 255, and Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, xvi. Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999). Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999).
213. The term 'synthetic history' was employed frequently. For example, RAND analyst Edwin Paxson wrote: With suitable record-keeping discipline, these games accumulate detailed histories of air, ground, and sea operations and logistics and other events. These can be viewed as synthetic war histories and examined for lessons (or mistakes). Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25. Also Sterne (op. cit. note 130, 64): 'War games create synthetic history composed of imagined events', and McHugh (op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 25): 'When, as in atomic warfare, there are no precedents, no historical examples to furnish guidelines, war gaming creates its own history of artificial wars'. See also Meals, op. cit. note 14, 255, and Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, xvi. Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999). Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999).
214. The term 'synthetic history' was employed frequently. For example, RAND analyst Edwin Paxson wrote: With suitable record-keeping discipline, these games accumulate detailed histories of air, ground, and sea operations and logistics and other events. These can be viewed as synthetic war histories and examined for lessons (or mistakes). Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25. Also Sterne (op. cit. note 130, 64): 'War games create synthetic history composed of imagined events', and McHugh (op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 25): 'When, as in atomic warfare, there are no precedents, no historical examples to furnish guidelines, war gaming creates its own history of artificial wars'. See also Meals, op. cit. note 14, 255, and Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, xvi. Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999). Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999).
215. The term 'synthetic history' was employed frequently. For example, RAND analyst Edwin Paxson wrote: With suitable record-keeping discipline, these games accumulate detailed histories of air, ground, and sea operations and logistics and other events. These can be viewed as synthetic war histories and examined for lessons (or mistakes). Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25. Also Sterne (op. cit. note 130, 64): 'War games create synthetic history composed of imagined events', and McHugh (op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 25): 'When, as in atomic warfare, there are no precedents, no historical examples to furnish guidelines, war gaming creates its own history of artificial wars'. See also Meals, op. cit. note 14, 255, and Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, xvi. Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999). Adding a Hegelian nuance to the proceedings, at one time gaming even acquired a daily newspaper called Weltbild, composed each evening by Bloomfield and his colleagues at MIT during a game in 1958. Like Schéhérazade forestalling the cataclysm each night with the embroidery of complications, the Weltbild 'present[ed] to the players at the beginning of each day the hypothetical events which had taken place overnight and would seriously affect their plans for the day': Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 63. More recently, the game-newspaper has been supplanted by a CNN-like telecast produced for military training simulations by the Pentagon's Global News Network (GNN): Roger Smith, personal correspondence with author (6 June 1999).
216. Kahn, op. cit. note 22, A1, 12.
217. Kahn (ed.), op. cit. note 21, 77-78.
218. Perla, op. cit. note 95, 18. On the other hand, H. Averch and M.M. Lavin argued that given their likeness, scenarios also partook of the analytic deficits of narrative historiography: Unfortunately, scenarios suffer from many of the defects of historical analysis. The scenario writer constructs the behavior of adversaries in a crisis without many of the constraints that operate on decision makers in a crisis. . . . In other words, both the scenario writer and the historian attack crisis studies from the outside, looking in. H. Averch and M.M. Lavin, Simulation of Decision-Making in Crises: Three Manual Gaming Experiments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RM-4202-PR, August 1964), 3. H. Averch and M.M. Lavin, Simulation of Decision-Making in Crises: Three Manual Gaming Experiments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RM-4202-PR, August 1964), 3.
219. Perla, op. cit. note 95, 18. On the other hand, H. Averch and M.M. Lavin argued that given their likeness, scenarios also partook of the analytic deficits of narrative historiography: Unfortunately, scenarios suffer from many of the defects of historical analysis. The scenario writer constructs the behavior of adversaries in a crisis without many of the constraints that operate on decision makers in a crisis. . . . In other words, both the scenario writer and the historian attack crisis studies from the outside, looking in. H. Averch and M.M. Lavin, Simulation of Decision-Making in Crises: Three Manual Gaming Experiments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RM-4202-PR, August 1964), 3. H. Averch and M.M. Lavin, Simulation of Decision-Making in Crises: Three Manual Gaming Experiments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RM-4202-PR, August 1964), 3.
220. Mood, op. cit., note 117, 1.
221. Rauner & Steger, op. cit. note 59, 18.
222. '[Scenarios] help to illuminate the interaction of psychological, social, political, and military factors, including the influence of individual political personalities . . . and they do so in a form which permits the comprehension of many interacting elements at once': Kahn (ed.), op. cit. note 21, 78.
223. Thomas, op. cit. note 141, 439-40.
224. Thornton Page recognized the orientation towards the totality in operations research: The major point in this discussion is that operations research is, by its very nature, the application of all forms of human knowledge to the solution of a whole problem. In this it differs from many of the other scientific disciplines; its tools and techniques are very diverse. Anything 'goes' in an operations research study as long as it leads to better understanding of the problem. T. Page, 'A Survey of Operations Research Tools and Techniques', in Flagle et al. (eds), op. cit. note 11, 119-39, at 120 (emphases in original).
225. Submarines and Arctic bases were important reference points for the design of large-occupancy fallout shelters; the latter were conceived to be microcosms of urban society. See John Rohrer, 'Implications for Fallout Shelter Living From Studies of Submarine Habitability and Adjustment to Polar Isolation', in George Baker and Rohrer (eds), Symposium on Human Problems in the Utilization of Fallout Shelters, Disaster Study No. 12 (Washington, DC: Disaster Research Group, National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council, 1960), 21-30.
226. One article on the potential for automating and computerizing complex technical systems used the analogy of the totality afforded by a model railroad, 'set up in the basement of a house. The system is on line in real time; the operator sees everything, knows everything, runs everything. With the help of computers, railroad managers could control 50,000-mile systems with the same quasi-omniscience exercised by the model railroader': Gilbert Burck, ' "On Line" in "Real Time" ', Fortune, Vol. 69, No. 4 (April 1964), 141-45, 246-52, at 248.
227. In 1954, for example, Mood (op. cit. note 117, 9) wrote: 'Most games now in existence need further development and refinement before they can be said to represent reality well enough to provide a basis for decisions. And until that time comes, one cannot be certain of what the games will accomplish'. Also see: Archer, op. cit. note 128, 18-19; Taves, op. cit. note 142, 59; Abt, op. cit. note 112, 37.
228. In 1954, for example, Mood (op. cit. note 117, 9) wrote: 'Most games now in existence need further development and refinement before they can be said to represent reality well enough to provide a basis for decisions. And until that time comes, one cannot be certain of what the games will accomplish'. Also see: Archer, op. cit. note 128, 18-19; Taves, op. cit. note 142, 59; Abt, op. cit. note 112, 37.
229. In 1954, for example, Mood (op. cit. note 117, 9) wrote: 'Most games now in existence need further development and refinement before they can be said to represent reality well enough to provide a basis for decisions. And until that time comes, one cannot be certain of what the games will accomplish'. Also see: Archer, op. cit. note 128, 18-19; Taves, op. cit. note 142, 59; Abt, op. cit. note 112, 37.
230. In 1954, for example, Mood (op. cit. note 117, 9) wrote: 'Most games now in existence need further development and refinement before they can be said to represent reality well enough to provide a basis for decisions. And until that time comes, one cannot be certain of what the games will accomplish'. Also see: Archer, op. cit. note 128, 18-19; Taves, op. cit. note 142, 59; Abt, op. cit. note 112, 37.
231. Cited in McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 3, 15, footnote.
232. Specht, op. cit. note 113, 146.
233. Churchman, op. cit. note 92, 59. The following year, Walter Deemer repeated the refrain: 'The search for an elusive and seemingly very desirable attribute called "realism" continues to preoccupy many of us': W. Deemer, Jr, 'A Summing Up', in Greyson (ed.), op. cit. note 29, 171-74, at 173.
234. Churchman, op. cit. note 92, 59. The following year, Walter Deemer repeated the refrain: 'The search for an elusive and seemingly very desirable attribute called "realism" continues to preoccupy many of us': W. Deemer, Jr, 'A Summing Up', in Greyson (ed.), op. cit. note 29, 171-74, at 173.
235. 'The question of how much context a given problem requires appears to be largely a matter of judgement': Mood, op. cit. note 117, 2-3. Several pages later, he added: 'The construction of a game involves judgement at every turn: in the scope of the game, the level of detail, the content of the rules, the adequacy of its representations of reality, the opinion of players as to what are good strategies': ibid., 6.
236. 'The question of how much context a given problem requires appears to be largely a matter of judgement': Mood, op. cit. note 117, 2-3. Several pages later, he added: 'The construction of a game involves judgement at every turn: in the scope of the game, the level of detail, the content of the rules, the adequacy of its representations of reality, the opinion of players as to what are good strategies': ibid., 6.
237. Thomas, op. cit. note 141, 426.
238. Ibid., 460.
239. Thomas & Deemer, op. cit. note 100, 20-21.
240. For example, E.W. Girard declared: '[War games] can generate distributions of outcomes of play of specific situations, and they can function as pseudo-experiments, producing data for analysis after the plays are completed': E.W. Girard, 'Reports, Presentation of Results, and Analysis', in Overholt (ed.), op. cit. note 103, 75-83, at 77. Theodore Sterne was even more emphatic in likening games to experiments: 'A war game [is] no more nor less than a laboratory experiment in which the entire effort is designed to elicit facts for analysis': Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67. For a contemporary discussion of the intermediate status of computer simulation between experiment and theory, see: Dowling, op. cit. note 147; Sergio Sismondo, 'Models, Simulations, and Their Objects', Science in Context, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1999), 247-60; and Martina Merz, 'Multiplex and Unfolding: Computer Simulation in Particle Physics', ibid., 293-316. and Martina Merz, 'Multiplex and Unfolding: Computer Simulation in Particle Physics', ibid., 293-316.
241. For example, E.W. Girard declared: '[War games] can generate distributions of outcomes of play of specific situations, and they can function as pseudo-experiments, producing data for analysis after the plays are completed': E.W. Girard, 'Reports, Presentation of Results, and Analysis', in Overholt (ed.), op. cit. note 103, 75-83, at 77. Theodore Sterne was even more emphatic in likening games to experiments: 'A war game [is] no more nor less than a laboratory experiment in which the entire effort is designed to elicit facts for analysis': Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67. For a contemporary discussion of the intermediate status of computer simulation between experiment and theory, see: Dowling, op. cit. note 147; Sergio Sismondo, 'Models, Simulations, and Their Objects', Science in Context, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1999), 247-60; and Martina Merz, 'Multiplex and Unfolding: Computer Simulation in Particle Physics', ibid., 293-316. and Martina Merz, 'Multiplex and Unfolding: Computer Simulation in Particle Physics', ibid., 293-316.
242. For example, E.W. Girard declared: '[War games] can generate distributions of outcomes of play of specific situations, and they can function as pseudo-experiments, producing data for analysis after the plays are completed': E.W. Girard, 'Reports, Presentation of Results, and Analysis', in Overholt (ed.), op. cit. note 103, 75-83, at 77. Theodore Sterne was even more emphatic in likening games to experiments: 'A war game [is] no more nor less than a laboratory experiment in which the entire effort is designed to elicit facts for analysis': Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67. For a contemporary discussion of the intermediate status of computer simulation between experiment and theory, see: Dowling, op. cit. note 147; Sergio Sismondo, 'Models, Simulations, and Their Objects', Science in Context, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1999), 247-60; and Martina Merz, 'Multiplex and Unfolding: Computer Simulation in Particle Physics', ibid., 293-316. and Martina Merz, 'Multiplex and Unfolding: Computer Simulation in Particle Physics', ibid., 293-316.
243. For example, E.W. Girard declared: '[War games] can generate distributions of outcomes of play of specific situations, and they can function as pseudo-experiments, producing data for analysis after the plays are completed': E.W. Girard, 'Reports, Presentation of Results, and Analysis', in Overholt (ed.), op. cit. note 103, 75-83, at 77. Theodore Sterne was even more emphatic in likening games to experiments: 'A war game [is] no more nor less than a laboratory experiment in which the entire effort is designed to elicit facts for analysis': Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67. For a contemporary discussion of the intermediate status of computer simulation between experiment and theory, see: Dowling, op. cit. note 147; Sergio Sismondo, 'Models, Simulations, and Their Objects', Science in Context, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1999), 247-60; and Martina Merz, 'Multiplex and Unfolding: Computer Simulation in Particle Physics', ibid., 293-316. and Martina Merz, 'Multiplex and Unfolding: Computer Simulation in Particle Physics', ibid., 293-316.
244. Thomas & Deemer, op. cit. note 100, 21.
245. Archer, op. cit. note 128, 18.
246. See Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 30-33.
247. Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67. Donald Meals lamented the fact that 'Now, operational data, as necessary as ever, are most difficult to obtain. The first significant change [since the WWII inception of Operations Research] is the virtual disappearance of realistic data':
248. Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67. Donald Meals lamented the fact that 'Now, operational data, as necessary as ever, are most difficult to obtain. The first significant change [since the WWII inception of Operations Research] is the virtual disappearance of realistic data': Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 279; Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25; Taves, op. cit. note 142, 61; Abt, op. cit. note 112, 31; McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 34.
249. Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67. Donald Meals lamented the fact that 'Now, operational data, as necessary as ever, are most difficult to obtain. The first significant change [since the WWII inception of Operations Research] is the virtual disappearance of realistic data': Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 279; Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25; Taves, op. cit. note 142, 61; Abt, op. cit. note 112, 31; McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 34.
250. Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67. Donald Meals lamented the fact that 'Now, operational data, as necessary as ever, are most difficult to obtain. The first significant change [since the WWII inception of Operations Research] is the virtual disappearance of realistic data': Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 279; Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25; Taves, op. cit. note 142, 61; Abt, op. cit. note 112, 31; McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 34.
251. Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67. Donald Meals lamented the fact that 'Now, operational data, as necessary as ever, are most difficult to obtain. The first significant change [since the WWII inception of Operations Research] is the virtual disappearance of realistic data': Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 279; Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25; Taves, op. cit. note 142, 61; Abt, op. cit. note 112, 31; McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 34.
252. Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67. Donald Meals lamented the fact that 'Now, operational data, as necessary as ever, are most difficult to obtain. The first significant change [since the WWII inception of Operations Research] is the virtual disappearance of realistic data': Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 279; Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25; Taves, op. cit. note 142, 61; Abt, op. cit. note 112, 31; McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 34.
253. Sterne, op. cit. note 130, 67. Donald Meals lamented the fact that 'Now, operational data, as necessary as ever, are most difficult to obtain. The first significant change [since the WWII inception of Operations Research] is the virtual disappearance of realistic data': Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Meals, op. cit. note 148, 253. Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 279; Paxson, op. cit. note 118, 25; Taves, op. cit. note 142, 61; Abt, op. cit. note 112, 31; McHugh, op. cit. note 96, Chapter 1, 34.
254. Hausrath, op. cit. note 43, 71.
255. Archer, op. cit. note 128, 20, 24. Archer's question as to whether the game-players played against the game design rather than against their opponents finds parallels in MacKenzie's review of the controversy in the 1980s about the nature of the correspondence between data sets derived from test conditions, and the missiles' untestable, real-world performance: 'Whether testing was sufficiently like use to allow inferences to flow was also the central issue in the more recent controversy over whether missile accuracies were facts about missiles or artifacts of the processes of testing them': MacKenzie, op. cit. note 14, 347.
256. Archer, op. cit. note 128, 20, 24. Archer's question as to whether the game-players played against the game design rather than against their opponents finds parallels in MacKenzie's review of the controversy in the 1980s about the nature of the correspondence between data sets derived from test conditions, and the missiles' untestable, real-world performance: 'Whether testing was sufficiently like use to allow inferences to flow was also the central issue in the more recent controversy over whether missile accuracies were facts about missiles or artifacts of the processes of testing them': MacKenzie, op. cit. note 14, 347.
257. Abt, op. cit. note 112, 37.
258. Throwing game assessment back to the political leadership, Norman Dalkey remarked: 'The standard approach in simulations of general war has been to single out certain indices - damage to value targets on each side and forces remaining - and present these to the decision maker, who in effect "makes up his feelings" about them': N.C. Dalkey, Central Nuclear War Games (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-3437, September 1966), 3.
259. This Symposium is cited in note 137, above. In the following text, quotations and relevant passages from the Symposium are referenced by bracketed page numbers.
260. Senior members of the military recoiled from computer-aided analysis. 'Many of us may intuitively distrust any assistance by a machine in making decisions . . .': Commander John Davis, Jr and Dr John A. Tiedeman, 'The Navy War Games Program', Proceedings of the US Naval Institute,Vol. 86, No. 6 (June 1960), 61-67, at 67.
261. For a chronicle of its diffusion through the military services and corporate community in the 1950s and early 1960s, see Appendix A in my forthcoming book.
262. Robert Davis, 'Arms Control Simulation: The Search for an Acceptable Method', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7, No. 3 (December 1962), Special Issue: Weapons Management in World Politics, Proceedings of the International Arms Control Symposium, 684AC-696AC, at 688AC, 695AC.
263. Robert Davis, 'Arms Control Simulation: The Search for an Acceptable Method', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7, No. 3 (December 1962), Special Issue: Weapons Management in World Politics, Proceedings of the International Arms Control Symposium, 684AC-696AC, at 688AC, 695AC.
264. Bloomfield & Whaley, op. cit. note 120, 862. Also see: Davis & Tiedeman, op. cit. note 177, 67; E.S. Maloney, 'Modern War Gaming: State of the Art', Marine Corps Gazette (November 1960), 10-12, at 12; McDonald, op. cit. note 29, 65-67; Cockrill, op. cit. note 138, 49 and 53.
265. Bloomfield & Whaley, op. cit. note 120, 862. Also see: Davis & Tiedeman, op. cit. note 177, 67; E.S. Maloney, 'Modern War Gaming: State of the Art', Marine Corps Gazette (November 1960), 10-12, at 12; McDonald, op. cit. note 29, 65-67; Cockrill, op. cit. note 138, 49 and 53.
266. Bloomfield & Whaley, op. cit. note 120, 862. Also see: Davis & Tiedeman, op. cit. note 177, 67; E.S. Maloney, 'Modern War Gaming: State of the Art', Marine Corps Gazette (November 1960), 10-12, at 12; McDonald, op. cit. note 29, 65-67; Cockrill, op. cit. note 138, 49 and 53.
267. Bloomfield & Whaley, op. cit. note 120, 862. Also see: Davis & Tiedeman, op. cit. note 177, 67; E.S. Maloney, 'Modern War Gaming: State of the Art', Marine Corps Gazette (November 1960), 10-12, at 12; McDonald, op. cit. note 29, 65-67; Cockrill, op. cit. note 138, 49 and 53.
268. Bloomfield & Whaley, op. cit. note 120, 862. Also see: Davis & Tiedeman, op. cit. note 177, 67; E.S. Maloney, 'Modern War Gaming: State of the Art', Marine Corps Gazette (November 1960), 10-12, at 12; McDonald, op. cit. note 29, 65-67; Cockrill, op. cit. note 138, 49 and 53.
269. Weiner, op. cit. note 88, 275.
270. Archer, op. cit. note 128, 21.
271. See, for example, Cockrill, op. cit. note 138, 47.
272. Bloomfield (1960), op. cit. note 45, 61.
273. All quotations in this paragraph are from Bloomfield & Gearin, op. cit. note 102, at (in order) 1029, 1027, 1025, 1026, 1026-27 and 1030. They add (ibid., 1029): We were also influenced by injunctions on the part of fellow social scientists critical of earlier exercises, notably Professor Harold Guetzkow, that we must connect the PE with the ongoing body of social science theory. PEs, we were told, should be designed to take specific account of cognate theoretical constructs such as those found in game theory, small-group dynamics and behavior, cultural anthropology and social psychology, international relations and foreign policy theory (if the latter can be said to exist) and other forms of simulations and games.
274. R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957), 37.
275. T. Schelling, 'Experimental Games and Bargaining Theory', World Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1 (October 1961), 47-68, at 55.
276. John Prados, Pentagon Games: Wargames and the American Military (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 25.
277. Wiener, op. cit. note 69, 141.
278. Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann, Ten Common Pitfalls (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RM-193 7, 17 July 1957), 18.
279. Biaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A.J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin Books, 1966), 150.
280. The contemporary philosopher of science Eric Winsberg has enumerated the conditions necessary for accepting the results of computer simulation: It depends on the confidence we have in the various ad hoc models we use - confidence we derive from laboratory and observational experience. It depends on our ability to calibrate models against empirical results. And finally it depends on the confidence we have in our tacit abilities as observers to make judgements about the degree of resemblance between different classes of images - often abilities acquired in the role of skilled experimenters and observers, as well as in the role of skilled simulators. E. Winsberg, 'Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation', Science in Context, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1999), 275-92, at 290.