Beliefs, culture, proliferation and use of nuclear weapons

Journal of Strategic Studies

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 74-100

  Heuser, Beatrice ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034381888     PISSN: 01402390     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402390008437779     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. Arthur Koestler, Janus: A Summing Up (London: Hutchinson 1978) p.15.
2. R. Jeffrey Smith, 'Clinton Directive Changes Strategy on Nuclear Arms', Washington Post (7 Dec. 1997). The negative security assurances were conditional upon other factors, but threatening to retaliate with nuclear weapons against biological weapons use would constitute a clear departure from the US engagement, as indeed it would for the engagements of Britain and France.
3. For a figure for Dresden, see Der grosse Ploetz: Auszug aus der Geschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, 31st edn. (Würzburg: Verlag Ploetz 1991) pp.876-916; for figures for Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, see Laura Hein and Mark Selden, 'Commemoration and Silence', in idem (eds.), Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age (NY: East Gate Books/M.E. Sharpe 1997) p.4.
4. For a figure for Dresden, see Der grosse Ploetz: Auszug aus der Geschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, 31st edn. (Würzburg: Verlag Ploetz 1991) pp.876-916; for figures for Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, see Laura Hein and Mark Selden, 'Commemoration and Silence', in idem (eds.), Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age (NY: East Gate Books/M.E. Sharpe 1997) p.4.
5. The South African case shows that nuclear proliferation is not an irreversible process, as does the abandonment of chemical weapons by several states who owned stocks at some point.
6. Ken Booth means similar things when he writes about 'strategic culture', but his point of departure is a 'nation', the 'traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements' of which influence the way it will threat or use force, see Ken Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed', in Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.) Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan 1990) p. 121.
7. Kenneth Waltz, Man1 the State and War (NY: Columbia UP 1959).
8. Karl Deutsch and Dieter Senghaas, 'A framework for a theory of war and peace' in A. Lepawsky (ed.) The Search for World Order (NY: Appleton-Century Crofts 1971).
9. Hitler's Secret Book, trans. Salvator Attanasio (NY: Crove Press 1961) p.14f.
10. Erich Ludendorff, Der Totale Krieg (Munich: Ludendorffs Verlag GmbH 1935).
11. This was first developed in the seminal book by Robert J.C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford UP 1954).
12. Morale Division, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale (Washington DC: 1947) contains significant statistics on Japanese motivations for supporting the war effort.
13. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Book VIII Chapter 3.B - my translation from the 19th ed. by Werner Hahlweg (Bonn: Dümmler 1980) p.962.
14. Vladimir Iljich Lenin, 'War and Revolution', in On War, Anny and Science of War (Moscow: Prospekt 1957) p.100.
15. For British, French and FRG official nuclear strategy, perceptions of the Soviet threat and of US reliability, see Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000 (London: Macmillan 1997). For the underlying beliefs in these three countries, see Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG (London: Macmillan 1998).
16. For British, French and FRG official nuclear strategy, perceptions of the Soviet threat and of US reliability, see Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000 (London: Macmillan 1997). For the underlying beliefs in these three countries, see Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG (London: Macmillan 1998).
17. Sir Michael Quinlan, 'Defence planning in a changing world', The World Today (July 1992) p.3.
18. See Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? (note 14) Ch.2.
19. Malcolm Chalmers, '"Bombs Away"? Britain and Nuclear Weapons under New Labour', forthcoming in Security Dialogue.
20. For US concessions since the 1950s, see Marc Trachtenberg, 'La formation du système de défense occidental', in Maurice Vaïsse, Pierre Mélandri and Frédéric Bozo (eds.) La France et l'OTAN. 1949-1996 (Brussels: Complexe 1996) pp. 115-28, and Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1964-1980 (Cambridge: CUP 1983).
21. For US concessions since the 1950s, see Marc Trachtenberg, 'La formation du système de défense occidental', in Maurice Vaïsse, Pierre Mélandri and Frédéric Bozo (eds.) La France et l'OTAN. 1949-1996 (Brussels: Complexe 1996) pp. 115-28, and Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1964-1980 (Cambridge: CUP 1983).
22. This was only reduced to a double dyad in the mid-1990s, when France's short- and medium-range nuclear missiles were scrapped.
23. Prime Minister Pompidou during the debate in the Assemblée Nationale, quoted in Le Monde, 3 Dec. 1964.
24. arme de non-emploi.
25. Cyril Buffet, 'De Gaulle and the Second Berlin Crisis, or how to use a political weapon', in idem and Leopoldo Nuti (eds.) Dividing the Atom, Special issue of Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali (Autumn 1998).
26. See Beatrice Heuser, 'Dunkirk, Dien Bien Phu and Suez, or why France does not trust allies and has learnt to love the Bomb', in Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (eds.) Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations (Oxford: Berghahn 1998).
27. See Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? (note 14) Ch.3.
28. Michael Stürmer, 'Deutsches Interesse ist es, niemals allein zu stehen', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 July 1988.
29. See Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? (note 14) Ch.4.
30. For such a classic case of total disregard of any beliefs and cultural proclivities, and of speculation deduced from absurdly inapplicable political science theories, see John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5-56.
31. Leopoldo Nuti, '"Me too please": Italy and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1975', Diplomacy and Statecraft 4/1 (March 1993) pp. 114-48.
32. Tor Larsson, 'The Swedish Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Postures', in Buffet and Nuti, Dividing the Atom (note 22); Wilhelm Agrell: Alliansfrihet och atombomber: kontinuitet och förändring i den svenskaförsvarsdoktrinen, 1945-1982 (Stockholm: Liber 1985); Had there been a war… Preparations for the reception of military assistance 1949-1969 (Report by the Commission on Neutrality Policy, Stockholm, 1994, SOU 1994:11).
33. Tor Larsson, 'The Swedish Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Postures', in Buffet and Nuti, Dividing the Atom (note 22); Wilhelm Agrell: Alliansfrihet och atombomber: kontinuitet och förändring i den svenskaförsvarsdoktrinen, 1945-1982 (Stockholm: Liber 1985); Had there been a war… Preparations for the reception of military assistance 1949-1969 (Report by the Commission on Neutrality Policy, Stockholm, 1994, SOU 1994:11).
34. Tor Larsson, 'The Swedish Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Postures', in Buffet and Nuti, Dividing the Atom (note 22); Wilhelm Agrell: Alliansfrihet och atombomber: kontinuitet och förändring i den svenskaförsvarsdoktrinen, 1945-1982 (Stockholm: Liber 1985); Had there been a war… Preparations for the reception of military assistance 1949-1969 (Report by the Commission on Neutrality Policy, Stockholm, 1994, SOU 1994:11).
35. Ingemar Dörfer, 'La Skandinavie ou la défense de la virginité nucléaire', in Pierre Lellouche (ed.) Pacifism et Dissuasion (Paris: IFRI 1993); Ann-Sofie Dahl, 'The Myth of Swedish Neutrality', in Buffet and Heuser, Haunted by History (note 23).
36. Ingemar Dörfer, 'La Skandinavie ou la défense de la virginité nucléaire', in Pierre Lellouche (ed.) Pacifism et Dissuasion (Paris: IFRI 1993); Ann-Sofie Dahl, 'The Myth of Swedish Neutrality', in Buffet and Heuser, Haunted by History (note 23).
37. Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (NY: Meridian 1994).
38. As Lawrence Freedman first called it. See also Seymour Hersh: The Samson Option: Israel, America and the Bomb, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Faber 1993).
39. On the gradual development of this rejection among Western cultures, see Beatrice Heuser, The Bomb: Nuclear Weapons in their Historical, Strategic and Ethical Context (London: Longman's, forthcoming 1999) Ch.4.
40. Cf. Beatrice Heuser, 'Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives', Comparative Strategy 12/4 (Oct.-Dec. 1993) pp.437-57.
41. Heuser, The Bomb (note 33) Ch.2.
42. Reasons for this can be constructed around vested institutional interest not only for separate sections of the air force, but also for other sections of the armed forces, such as the navy, see e.g. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (NY: Simon & Schuster 1983) p.235 on the fluctuations of US Navy support for city-targeting with nuclear weapons as functions of whether or not the US Navy had such weapons at its disposal.
43. The armed forces of the Weimar Republic, which did not support the values of that Republic, have been called 'a state within a state', see Francil L. Carstens, The Reichswehr in Politics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1966).
44. Kaplan, Wizards (note 36) p.134.
45. Tami Davis Biddle, 'British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive', Journal of Strategic Studies 18/1 (March 1995) pp.91-144; W. Hays Parks: '"Precision" and "Area" Bombing: Who did Which, and When?' ibid. pp. 145-74.
46. Tami Davis Biddle, 'British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive', Journal of Strategic Studies 18/1 (March 1995) pp.91-144; W. Hays Parks: '"Precision" and "Area" Bombing: Who did Which, and When?' ibid. pp. 145-74.
47. It is worth remembering in this context that in the view of many experts from Thomas Schelling to Michael MccGwire, it was only incredibly good luck which prevented the East-West nuclear deterrence relationship from blowing up into nuclear catastrophe on several occasions. See Thomas Schelling, 'Nuclear Deterrence: The Case of Many Near-Catastrophes?', Dept. of War Studies Annual Lecture, 1994, unpublished MS; Michael MccGwire, 'Nuclear Weapons Revisited: Is there a future for nuclear weapons?', International Affairs 70/2 (April 1994) pp.211-28. Milton Leitenberg, however, argues that mutual restraint led to the suppression of a very large number of small crises, each of which could have triggered nuclear responses, 'Nuclear Weapons and 50 Years of International Political History: Risks, dangers, threats, crises, proposals and consideration of use', unpublished MS (1997).
48. It is worth remembering in this context that in the view of many experts from Thomas Schelling to Michael MccGwire, it was only incredibly good luck which prevented the East-West nuclear deterrence relationship from blowing up into nuclear catastrophe on several occasions. See Thomas Schelling, 'Nuclear Deterrence: The Case of Many Near-Catastrophes?', Dept. of War Studies Annual Lecture, 1994, unpublished MS; Michael MccGwire, 'Nuclear Weapons Revisited: Is there a future for nuclear weapons?', International Affairs 70/2 (April 1994) pp.211-28. Milton Leitenberg, however, argues that mutual restraint led to the suppression of a very large number of small crises, each of which could have triggered nuclear responses, 'Nuclear Weapons and 50 Years of International Political History: Risks, dangers, threats, crises, proposals and consideration of use', unpublished MS (1997).
49. It is worth remembering in this context that in the view of many experts from Thomas Schelling to Michael MccGwire, it was only incredibly good luck which prevented the East-West nuclear deterrence relationship from blowing up into nuclear catastrophe on several occasions. See Thomas Schelling, 'Nuclear Deterrence: The Case of Many Near-Catastrophes?', Dept. of War Studies Annual Lecture, 1994, unpublished MS; Michael MccGwire, 'Nuclear Weapons Revisited: Is there a future for nuclear weapons?', International Affairs 70/2 (April 1994) pp.211-28. Milton Leitenberg, however, argues that mutual restraint led to the suppression of a very large number of small crises, each of which could have triggered nuclear responses, 'Nuclear Weapons and 50 Years of International Political History: Risks, dangers, threats, crises, proposals and consideration of use', unpublished MS (1997).
50. Martin van Creveld, On Future War (London: Brassey's 1991).
51. For example, there has been much speculation and few convincing conclusions about South African planning for the use of the nuclear arsenal acquired there.
52. For an excellent collection of articles, which follow precisely this route, see Nuti and Cyril Buffet, Dividing the Atom (note 22).