Tax competition and income redistribution: An empirical analysis for Switzerland

Public Choice

Volumn 105, Issue 1-2, 2000, Pages 125-164

  Feld, Lars P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034371614     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005158902456     Document Type: Article

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