The Khartoum conference and Egyptian policy after the 1967 war: A reexamination

Middle East Journal

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 63-80

  Meital, Yoram ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034365802     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (104)

1. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 344.
2. William Quandt, Decade of Decisions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 65.
3. 'Abd al-'Azim Ramadan, Tahtim al-aliha [The Destruction of the Gods] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1986), p. 394.
4. Adeed Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 52-53. Almost the same arguments were also raised by the Egyptian foreign minister. See: Mahmud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East, (London: Quarter Books, 1981), p. 56.
5. Adeed Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 52-53. Almost the same arguments were also raised by the Egyptian foreign minister. See: Mahmud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East, (London: Quarter Books, 1981), p. 56.
6. Golda Meir, My Life (Jerusalem: Steimatzky, 1975), p. 309. A similar interpretation was offered by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. See: Ha'aretz, (Tel Aviv) 4 September 1967.
7. Golda Meir, My Life (Jerusalem: Steimatzky, 1975), p. 309. A similar interpretation was offered by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. See: Ha'aretz, (Tel Aviv) 4 September 1967.
8. Moshe Dayan, Avney Derekh [Milestone] (Tel Aviv. Edanim, 1976), p. 512.
9. State of Israel "Report of the Prime Minister on the Political and Security Situation," Divrey Haknesset [Knesset Protocols], Vol. 50, 13 November, 1967, pp. 120-122. In an additional political debate in the Knesset, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban expressed himself in a similar fashion. Divrey Haknesset, 5 December 1967, p. 326.
10. State of Israel "Report of the Prime Minister on the Political and Security Situation," Divrey Haknesset [Knesset Protocols], Vol. 50, 13 November, 1967, pp. 120-122. In an additional political debate in the Knesset, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban expressed himself in a similar fashion. Divrey Haknesset, 5 December 1967, p. 326.
11. Ahmad Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan [Democracy in the Balance] (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1973).
12. 'Abd al-Majid Farid, Min Mahadir 'Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir al-'Arabiyya Wa al-Duwaliyya, 1967-1970 [Minutes from 'Abd al-Nasir's Arab and International Meetings, 1967-1970] (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-abhath al-'Arabiyya, 1985).
13. Shafiq al-Hawt, 'Ishruna 'Aman fi Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, 1964-1984 (Twenty Years in the PLO 1964-1984) (Beirut: Dar al-Istiqal, 1986).
14. John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Khalid Ikram, Egyptian Economic Management in a Period of Transition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
15. John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Khalid Ikram, Egyptian Economic Management in a Period of Transition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
16. Yoram Meital, Egypt's Struggle for Peace (Gainesville, FL.: University Press of Florida, 1997), pp. 11-19.
17. Rif'at Sayyid-Ahmad, Thawrat al-General Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir [General Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's Revolution] (Cairo: Dar al-Huda, 1992).
18. al-Ahram, 4 August 1967.
19. 'Atif al-Sayyid, Min Sina' ila Kamb Dayfid, 1967-1979 [From Sinai to Camp David] (Cairo: Dar al-'Atwa, 1987), pp. 3-7. In his editorials Haykal called on the Egyptian public to act in accordance with a realistic reading of the situation, rather than out of emotion: al-Ahram, 4 August 1967: 22 September 1967.
20. 'Atif al-Sayyid, Min Sina' ila Kamb Dayfid, 1967-1979 [From Sinai to Camp David] (Cairo: Dar al-'Atwa, 1987), pp. 3-7. In his editorials Haykal called on the Egyptian public to act in accordance with a realistic reading of the situation, rather than out of emotion: al-Ahram, 4 August 1967: 22 September 1967.
21. Sa'd al-Din al-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (London: Third World Centre, 1980), p. 61.
22. Salah al-Din al-Hadidi, Shahid 'ala Harb 67 [A Witness to the '67 war] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1974). See also: Tawfiq al-Hakim, 'Awdat al-wa'y [The Return of Consciousness] (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1974); Wajih Abu Dhikri, Madhbahat al-abriya' [Massacre of the Innocents] (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1988). An indirect hint of this mood may also be found in 'Abd al-Nasir's request to the people to place their trust in the armed forces. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968 ['Abd al-Nasir's Documents, 1967-1968] (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1973), 23 July 1968, p. 496.
23. Salah al-Din al-Hadidi, Shahid 'ala Harb 67 [A Witness to the '67 war] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1974). See also: Tawfiq al-Hakim, 'Awdat al-wa'y [The Return of Consciousness] (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1974); Wajih Abu Dhikri, Madhbahat al-abriya' [Massacre of the Innocents] (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1988). An indirect hint of this mood may also be found in 'Abd al-Nasir's request to the people to place their trust in the armed forces. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968 ['Abd al-Nasir's Documents, 1967-1968] (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1973), 23 July 1968, p. 496.
24. Salah al-Din al-Hadidi, Shahid 'ala Harb 67 [A Witness to the '67 war] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1974). See also: Tawfiq al-Hakim, 'Awdat al-wa'y [The Return of Consciousness] (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1974); Wajih Abu Dhikri, Madhbahat al-abriya' [Massacre of the Innocents] (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1988). An indirect hint of this mood may also be found in 'Abd al-Nasir's request to the people to place their trust in the armed forces. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968 ['Abd al-Nasir's Documents, 1967-1968] (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1973), 23 July 1968, p. 496.
25. Salah al-Din al-Hadidi, Shahid 'ala Harb 67 [A Witness to the '67 war] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1974). See also: Tawfiq al-Hakim, 'Awdat al-wa'y [The Return of Consciousness] (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1974); Wajih Abu Dhikri, Madhbahat al-abriya' [Massacre of the Innocents] (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1988). An indirect hint of this mood may also be found in 'Abd al-Nasir's request to the people to place their trust in the armed forces. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968 ['Abd al-Nasir's Documents, 1967-1968] (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1973), 23 July 1968, p. 496.
26. Sayyid Mar'i, Awraq Siyasiyya [Political Papers] (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1979), Vol. 2, pp. 515-516; P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation (New York: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 256; Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 78; Officials, led by 'Abd al-Nasir, declared that one of the major reasons for the defeat was the fact that the army, headed by 'Amr, was "a state within a state" which for many years had not been subject to political control. See article by Haykal in al-Ahram, 21 June 1968; and similarly Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 32-34. For a description of the relationship between 'Abd al-Nasir and 'Amr as "a confrontation of dinosaurs" that prevailed from the mid-1950s to the death of 'Amr, in circumstances that have not been clarified, see Jamal Hamad, al-Hukuma al-Khafiyya fi 'Ahd 'Abd al-Nasir [The Secret Government during 'Abd al-Nasirs era] (Cairo: al-Zahra, 1986).
27. Sayyid Mar'i, Awraq Siyasiyya [Political Papers] (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1979), Vol. 2, pp. 515-516; P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation (New York: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 256; Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 78; Officials, led by 'Abd al-Nasir, declared that one of the major reasons for the defeat was the fact that the army, headed by 'Amr, was "a state within a state" which for many years had not been subject to political control. See article by Haykal in al-Ahram, 21 June 1968; and similarly Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 32-34. For a description of the relationship between 'Abd al-Nasir and 'Amr as "a confrontation of dinosaurs" that prevailed from the mid-1950s to the death of 'Amr, in circumstances that have not been clarified, see Jamal Hamad, al-Hukuma al-Khafiyya fi 'Ahd 'Abd al-Nasir [The Secret Government during 'Abd al-Nasirs era] (Cairo: al-Zahra, 1986).
28. Sayyid Mar'i, Awraq Siyasiyya [Political Papers] (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1979), Vol. 2, pp. 515-516; P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation (New York: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 256; Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 78; Officials, led by 'Abd al-Nasir, declared that one of the major reasons for the defeat was the fact that the army, headed by 'Amr, was "a state within a state" which for many years had not been subject to political control. See article by Haykal in al-Ahram, 21 June 1968; and similarly Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 32-34. For a description of the relationship between 'Abd al-Nasir and 'Amr as "a confrontation of dinosaurs" that prevailed from the mid-1950s to the death of 'Amr, in circumstances that have not been clarified, see Jamal Hamad, al-Hukuma al-Khafiyya fi 'Ahd 'Abd al-Nasir [The Secret Government during 'Abd al-Nasirs era] (Cairo: al-Zahra, 1986).
29. Sayyid Mar'i, Awraq Siyasiyya [Political Papers] (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1979), Vol. 2, pp. 515-516; P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation (New York: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 256; Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 78; Officials, led by 'Abd al-Nasir, declared that one of the major reasons for the defeat was the fact that the army, headed by 'Amr, was "a state within a state" which for many years had not been subject to political control. See article by Haykal in al-Ahram, 21 June 1968; and similarly Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 32-34. For a description of the relationship between 'Abd al-Nasir and 'Amr as "a confrontation of dinosaurs" that prevailed from the mid-1950s to the death of 'Amr, in circumstances that have not been clarified, see Jamal Hamad, al-Hukuma al-Khafiyya fi 'Ahd 'Abd al-Nasir [The Secret Government during 'Abd al-Nasirs era] (Cairo: al-Zahra, 1986).
30. Sayyid Mar'i, Awraq Siyasiyya [Political Papers] (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1979), Vol. 2, pp. 515-516; P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation (New York: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 256; Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 78; Officials, led by 'Abd al-Nasir, declared that one of the major reasons for the defeat was the fact that the army, headed by 'Amr, was "a state within a state" which for many years had not been subject to political control. See article by Haykal in al-Ahram, 21 June 1968; and similarly Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 32-34. For a description of the relationship between 'Abd al-Nasir and 'Amr as "a confrontation of dinosaurs" that prevailed from the mid-1950s to the death of 'Amr, in circumstances that have not been clarified, see Jamal Hamad, al-Hukuma al-Khafiyya fi 'Ahd 'Abd al-Nasir [The Secret Government during 'Abd al-Nasirs era] (Cairo: al-Zahra, 1986).
31. Sayyid Mar'i, Awraq Siyasiyya [Political Papers] (Cairo: al-Maktab al-Misri al-Hadith, 1979), Vol. 2, pp. 515-516; P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and his Generation (New York: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 256; Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 78; Officials, led by 'Abd al-Nasir, declared that one of the major reasons for the defeat was the fact that the army, headed by 'Amr, was "a state within a state" which for many years had not been subject to political control. See article by Haykal in al-Ahram, 21 June 1968; and similarly Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 32-34. For a description of the relationship between 'Abd al-Nasir and 'Amr as "a confrontation of dinosaurs" that prevailed from the mid-1950s to the death of 'Amr, in circumstances that have not been clarified, see Jamal Hamad, al-Hukuma al-Khafiyya fi 'Ahd 'Abd al-Nasir [The Secret Government during 'Abd al-Nasirs era] (Cairo: al-Zahra, 1986).
32. Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Haper and Row, 1978), pp. 179-180. Similarly, Tawfiq al-Hakim noted: "'Abd al-Nasir died three years after the defeat. It is difficult to understand how he was able to live during those years." 'Awdat al-Wa'y, p. 75.
33. Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Haper and Row, 1978), pp. 179-180. Similarly, Tawfiq al-Hakim noted: "'Abd al-Nasir died three years after the defeat. It is difficult to understand how he was able to live during those years." 'Awdat al-Wa'y, p. 75.
34. Mar'i, Awraq Siyasiyya, Vol. II, p. 520. A similar description was provided by 'Abd al-Nasir's private secretary. See: 'Abd al-Majid Fand, Min Mahadir 'Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir al-'Arabiyya wa al-Duwaliyya, 1967-1970 [Minutes from 'Abd al-Nasir's Arab and International Meetings, 1967-1970] (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Abhath al-'Arabiyya, 1985), p. 25.
35. Mar'i, Awraq Siyasiyya, Vol. II, p. 520. A similar description was provided by 'Abd al-Nasir's private secretary. See: 'Abd al-Majid Farid, Min Mahadir 'Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir al-'Arabiyya wa al-Duwaliyya, 1967-1970 [Minutes from 'Abd al-Nasir's Arab and International Meetings, 1967-1970] (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Abhath al-'Arabiyya, 1985), p. 25.
36. Shimon Shamir, Mitsrayim Behanhaghat Sadat (Egypt Under Sadat) (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1978) p.249 endnote #6. For English translation see Meital, Egypt's Struggle for Peace, pp. 22-23.
37. Shimon Shamir, Mitsrayim Behanhaghat Sadat (Egypt Under Sadat) (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1978) p.249 endnote #6. For English translation see Meital, Egypt's Struggle for Peace, pp. 22-23.
38. In October 1968, Israel's cabinet ministers decided (by a vote of four to three) to cancel the initiative of 19 June 1967. Yossi Beilin, Mehiro shel Ihud [The Price of Unity] (Tel Aviv: Revivim, 1985), p. 49.
39. During the 1967 war, relations between Egypt and the United States deteriorated, and on 9 June, Egypt announced it was cutting diplomatic and economic ties with the US. Egypt accused the United States of a conspiracy with Israel that caused the outbreak of war. Egypt declared that the note from US President Johnson to 'Abd al-Nasir (23 May 1967) was part of a plot to prevent the Egyptian army from attacking first. See: Haykal, in: al-Ahram, 23 June 1967. Egypt also blamed the United States for armed intervention in the fighting itself. One of the expressions of this claim was a telephone conversation between President 'Abd al-Nasir and King Husayn of Jordan (8 June 1967), which was recorded by Israeli intelligence and released to the press the following day. For the content of the recording, see: Yosef Argman, Zeh haya Sodi Beyoter [It was Top Secret] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1990), p. 244. At the same time, relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union were strengthening, reflected in the growing dependence of Egypt on Soviet military aid, including the physical presence of Soviet armed forces on Egyptian territory. Despite this situation, Egypt and the United States kept lines of communication open, and held periodic contacts from the defeat to the death of 'Abd al-Nasir. See: Ahmad Hamrush, Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu [The story of the 23 July revolution] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1983), Vol. V, pp. 288-289, 342-343.
40. During the 1967 war, relations between Egypt and the United States deteriorated, and on 9 June, Egypt announced it was cutting diplomatic and economic ties with the US. Egypt accused the United States of a conspiracy with Israel that caused the outbreak of war. Egypt declared that the note from US President Johnson to 'Abd al-Nasir (23 May 1967) was part of a plot to prevent the Egyptian army from attacking first. See: Haykal, in: al-Ahram, 23 June 1967. Egypt also blamed the United States for armed intervention in the fighting itself. One of the expressions of this claim was a telephone conversation between President 'Abd al-Nasir and King Husayn of Jordan (8 June 1967), which was recorded by Israeli intelligence and released to the press the following day. For the content of the recording, see: Yosef Argman, Zeh haya Sodi Beyoter [It was Top Secret] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1990), p. 244. At the same time, relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union were strengthening, reflected in the growing dependence of Egypt on Soviet military aid, including the physical presence of Soviet armed forces on Egyptian territory. Despite this situation, Egypt and the United States kept lines of communication open, and held periodic contacts from the defeat to the death of 'Abd al-Nasir. See: Ahmad Hamrush, Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu [The story of the 23 July revolution] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1983), Vol. V, pp. 288-289, 342-343.
41. During the 1967 war, relations between Egypt and the United States deteriorated, and on 9 June, Egypt announced it was cutting diplomatic and economic ties with the US. Egypt accused the United States of a conspiracy with Israel that caused the outbreak of war. Egypt declared that the note from US President Johnson to 'Abd al-Nasir (23 May 1967) was part of a plot to prevent the Egyptian army from attacking first. See: Haykal, in: al-Ahram, 23 June 1967. Egypt also blamed the United States for armed intervention in the fighting itself. One of the expressions of this claim was a telephone conversation between President 'Abd al-Nasir and King Husayn of Jordan (8 June 1967), which was recorded by Israeli intelligence and released to the press the following day. For the content of the recording, see: Yosef Argman, Zeh haya Sodi Beyoter [It was Top Secret] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1990), p. 244. At the same time, relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union were strengthening, reflected in the growing dependence of Egypt on Soviet military aid, including the physical presence of Soviet armed forces on Egyptian territory. Despite this situation, Egypt and the United States kept lines of communication open, and held periodic contacts from the defeat to the death of 'Abd al-Nasir. See: Ahmad Hamrush, Qissat Thawrat 23 Yulyu [The story of the 23 July revolution] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1983), Vol. V, pp. 288-289, 342-343.
42. "United States Policy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15-June 10, 1967", Memo, pp. 151-155, in Declassified Documents Quarterly (1984).
43. US Department of State, The Quest for Peace. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984) p. 3. In his speech, Johnson rejected "a return to the situation prevailing on 4 June", using the term "situation" in an abstract sense and without going into detail. The Quest for Peace. A previous and similar use of the term may be found in the following declaration by the Prime Minister of Israel, Levi Eshkol, in the Knesset (12 June 1967) that Israel is not prepared "to return to the situation that existed one week ago. The situation will not return to what it was then." State of Israel, Divrey Haknesset, Vol. 49, p. 2330. For the complete text of the president's five principles, see: US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59 (October 1968), pp. 347-349.
44. US Department of State, The Quest for Peace. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984) p. 3. In his speech, Johnson rejected "a return to the situation prevailing on 4 June", using the term "situation" in an abstract sense and without going into detail. The Quest for Peace. A previous and similar use of the term may be found in the following declaration by the Prime Minister of Israel, Levi Eshkol, in the Knesset (12 June 1967) that Israel is not prepared "to return to the situation that existed one week ago. The situation will not return to what it was then." State of Israel, Divrey Haknesset, Vol. 49, p. 2330. For the complete text of the president's five principles, see: US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59 (October 1968), pp. 347-349.
45. US Department of State, The Quest for Peace. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984) p. 3. In his speech, Johnson rejected "a return to the situation prevailing on 4 June", using the term "situation" in an abstract sense and without going into detail. The Quest for Peace. A previous and similar use of the term may be found in the following declaration by the Prime Minister of Israel, Levi Eshkol, in the Knesset (12 June 1967) that Israel is not prepared "to return to the situation that existed one week ago. The situation will not return to what it was then." State of Israel, Divrey Haknesset, Vol. 49, p. 2330. For the complete text of the president's five principles, see: US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59 (October 1968), pp. 347-349.
46. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968, 9 June 1967, p. 227.
47. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968, 4 March 1968, pp. 340-342; 14 September 1968, p. 510. Muhammad Fawzi, Harb al-Thalath Sanawat, 1967-1970 [The Three Years War, 1967-1970] (Damascus: Talas, 1986), p. 199.
48. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968, 4 March 1968, pp. 340-342; 14 September 1968, p. 510. Muhammad Fawzi, Harb al-Thalath Sanawat, 1967-1970 [The Three Years War, 1967-1970] (Damascus: Talas, 1986), p. 199.
49. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968, 4 March 1968, pp. 340-342; 14 September 1968, p. 510. Muhammad Fawzi, Harb al-Thalath Sanawat, 1967-1970 [The Three Years War, 1967-1970] (Damascus: Talas, 1986), p. 199.
50. University Publications of America, The Lyndon Johnson National Security Files: The Middle East, 1963-1969, 2 January 1968, PMI/B-6.
51. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968, 23 July 1967, pp. 249-250, and similarly 3 March 1969, p. 323.
52. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968, 23 July 1967, pp. 249-250, and similarly 3 March 1969, p. 323.
53. 'Abd al-Nasir frequently pointed out the logic of a course of action that combined the use of political and military means. See his speech to the Palestinian National Council, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968, 1 February 1969, p. 51; and similarly, in an interview with The New York Times, 26 February 1969.
54. 'Abd al-Nasir frequently pointed out the logic of a course of action that combined the use of political and military means. See his speech to the Palestinian National Council, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968, 1 February 1969, p. 51; and similarly, in an interview with The New York Times, 26 February 1969.
55. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abdal-Nasir, 1967-1968, 4 December 1968, p. 591; and similarly 23 November 1967, p. 292; 2 February 1969, p. 58; 30 March 1969, p. 102; 12 May 1970, pp. 380, 394.
56. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abdal-Nasir, 1967-1968, 4 December 1968, p. 591; and similarly 23 November 1967, p. 292; 2 February 1969, p. 58; 30 March 1969, p. 102; 12 May 1970, pp. 380, 394.
57. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abdal-Nasir, 1967-1968, 4 December 1968, p. 591; and similarly 23 November 1967, p. 292; 2 February 1969, p. 58; 30 March 1969, p. 102; 12 May 1970, pp. 380, 394.
58. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abdal-Nasir, 1967-1968, 4 December 1968, p. 591; and similarly 23 November 1967, p. 292; 2 February 1969, p. 58; 30 March 1969, p. 102; 12 May 1970, pp. 380, 394.
59. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abdal-Nasir, 1967-1968, 4 December 1968, p. 591; and similarly 23 November 1967, p. 292; 2 February 1969, p. 58; 30 March 1969, p. 102; 12 May 1970, pp. 380, 394.
60. Israel Lior, "Hayom Tifrots Milhamah" ["Today a War Will Break Out"] (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1987), pp. 242-243.
61. Davar, (Tel Aviv) 7 October 1982.
62. For excerpts from the 'Abd al-Nasir-Husayn talks, see: Fawzi. Harb al-Thalath Sanawat, pp. 191-192.
63. Fawzi, Harb al-Thalath Sanawat, pp. 191-192 For a similar version, see Riad, The Struggle for Peace, p. 46.
64. Fawzi, Harb al-Thalath Sanawat, pp. 191-192 For a similar version, see Riad, The Struggle for Peace, p. 46.
65. For sections of the protocol of the conference session, see Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 48.
66. Soviet Prime Minister Alexi Kosygin pointed out to the Presidents of Iraq and Algeria that the Arabs were mistaken if they believed that a supply of planes and armaments could alone resolve the crisis with Israel. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 55.
67. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima 'at 'Abd al-Nasir, pp. 62-66. In this context, Haykal described the mission of the Iraqi and Algerian Presidents in Moscow as "a miserable visit." Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (London: Collins, 1978), p. 188.
68. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima 'at 'Abd al-Nasir, pp. 62-66. In this context, Haykal described the mission of the Iraqi and Algerian Presidents in Moscow as "a miserable visit." Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (London: Collins, 1978), p. 188.
69. Fand, Min Mahadir 'Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, pp. 79-80.
70. Al-Ahram, (Cairo) 24 July 1967. For the joint announcement and Sudan's proposal, see Nashral al-Watha'iq, July-December 1967, p. 59. For the text of the seven concluding decisions of the conference, see: Ahmad Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan [Democracy in the Balance] (Beirut:Dar al-Nahar, 1973), 131.
71. Al-Ahram, (Cairo) 24 July 1967. For the joint announcement and Sudan's proposal, see Nashral al-Watha'iq, July-December 1967, p. 59. For the text of the seven concluding decisions of the conference, see: Ahmad Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan [Democracy in the Balance] (Beirut:Dar al-Nahar, 1973), 131.
72. Al-Ahram, (Cairo) 24 July 1967. For the joint announcement and Sudan's proposal, see Nashral al-Watha'iq, July-December 1967, p. 59. For the text of the seven concluding decisions of the conference, see: Ahmad Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan [Democracy in the Balance] (Beirut:Dar al-Nahar, 1973), 131.
73. After years of political upheavals, a group of officers dismissed the monarchy of the Imam. (26 September 1962), declared their regime a republic and asked Egypt for assistance. The Imam built up his forces with the support of the Saudis. Following its defeat in the 1967 war, Egypt accepted Saudi Arabia's conditions for ending the war. For background, see Saeed Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988).
74. For background, see Saeed Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970; Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
75. For background, see Saeed Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970; Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
76. On the four sections of the agenda, see Al-Ahram, 28 August 1967. On the closed sessions of the conference, an important account is given by Sudan's Prime Minister: Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan, Ch. 10. Another important source are the protocols published by the private secretary of 'Abd al-Nasir. See: Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir. A similar description may be found in: Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 50-56. Another eye-witness account containing sections of the protocols from the Khartoum discussions was provided by a junior member of the Palestinian delegation. See: Shafiq al-Hawt, 'Ishruna 'Aman fi Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, 1964-1984.
77. On the four sections of the agenda, see Al-Ahram, 28 August 1967. On the closed sessions of the conference, an important account is given by Sudan's Prime Minister: Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan, Ch. 10. Another important source are the protocols published by the private secretary of 'Abd al-Nasir. See: Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir. A similar description may be found in: Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 50-56. Another eye-witness account containing sections of the protocols from the Khartoum discussions was provided by a junior member of the Palestinian delegation. See: Shafiq al-Hawt, 'Ishruna 'Aman fi Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, 1964-1984.
78. On the four sections of the agenda, see Al-Ahram, 28 August 1967. On the closed sessions of the conference, an important account is given by Sudan's Prime Minister: Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan, Ch. 10. Another important source are the protocols published by the private secretary of 'Abd al-Nasir. See: Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir. A similar description may be found in: Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 50-56. Another eye-witness account containing sections of the protocols from the Khartoum discussions was provided by a junior member of the Palestinian delegation. See: Shafiq al-Hawt, 'Ishruna 'Aman fi Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, 1964-1984.
79. On the four sections of the agenda, see Al-Ahram, 28 August 1967. On the closed sessions of the conference, an important account is given by Sudan's Prime Minister: Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan, Ch. 10. Another important source are the protocols published by the private secretary of 'Abd al-Nasir. See: Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir. A similar description may be found in: Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 50-56. Another eye-witness account containing sections of the protocols from the Khartoum discussions was provided by a junior member of the Palestinian delegation. See: Shafiq al-Hawt, 'Ishruna 'Aman fi Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, 1964-1984.
80. On the four sections of the agenda, see Al-Ahram, 28 August 1967. On the closed sessions of the conference, an important account is given by Sudan's Prime Minister: Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan, Ch. 10. Another important source are the protocols published by the private secretary of 'Abd al-Nasir. See: Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir. A similar description may be found in: Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 50-56. Another eye-witness account containing sections of the protocols from the Khartoum discussions was provided by a junior member of the Palestinian delegation. See: Shafiq al-Hawt, 'Ishruna 'Aman fi Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, 1964-1984.
81. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 90. For the official Arabic text of the Khartoum Conference resolutions, see UAR, Nashrat al-Watha'iq [Publication of Documents] (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1968), 1 September 1967, p. 63. There are several translations into English. The closest to the Arabic text may be found in: Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), Vol. 3, p. 788, Later, the donor countries began to request that Egypt and Jordan present ongoing reports detailing the use of the funds. Such a demand was presented by the representative of Saudi Arabia at the annual meeting of the Council of the Arab League, which took place in September 1968. Subsequently, the donor countries, in order to guarantee that the aid was being used solely for the purchase of armaments, demanded that the payments be transferred directly to the banks involved in the arms deals. The disagreements reached a peak at the Arab summit conference in Rabat (December 1969). For a description of the changes in the positions of the contributing countries during the Rabat conference, see: Salah al-'Aqad, Al-Sadat wa Kamb Dayfid [Sadat and Camp David] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1984), p. 31.
82. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 90. For the official Arabic text of the Khartoum Conference resolutions, see UAR, Nashrat al-Watha'iq [Publication of Documents] (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1968), 1 September 1967, p. 63. There are several translations into English. The closest to the Arabic text may be found in: Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), Vol. 3, p. 788, Later, the donor countries began to request that Egypt and Jordan present ongoing reports detailing the use of the funds. Such a demand was presented by the representative of Saudi Arabia at the annual meeting of the Council of the Arab League, which took place in September 1968. Subsequently, the donor countries, in order to guarantee that the aid was being used solely for the purchase of armaments, demanded that the payments be transferred directly to the banks involved in the arms deals. The disagreements reached a peak at the Arab summit conference in Rabat (December 1969). For a description of the changes in the positions of the contributing countries during the Rabat conference, see: Salah al-'Aqad, Al-Sadat wa Kamb Dayfid [Sadat and Camp David] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1984), p. 31.
83. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 90. For the official Arabic text of the Khartoum Conference resolutions, see UAR, Nashrat al-Watha'iq [Publication of Documents] (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1968), 1 September 1967, p. 63. There are several translations into English. The closest to the Arabic text may be found in: Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), Vol. 3, p. 788, Later, the donor countries began to request that Egypt and Jordan present ongoing reports detailing the use of the funds. Such a demand was presented by the representative of Saudi Arabia at the annual meeting of the Council of the Arab League, which took place in September 1968. Subsequently, the donor countries, in order to guarantee that the aid was being used solely for the purchase of armaments, demanded that the payments be transferred directly to the banks involved in the arms deals. The disagreements reached a peak at the Arab summit conference in Rabat (December 1969). For a description of the changes in the positions of the contributing countries during the Rabat conference, see: Salah al-'Aqad, Al-Sadat wa Kamb Dayfid [Sadat and Camp David] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1984), p. 31.
84. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 90. For the official Arabic text of the Khartoum Conference resolutions, see UAR, Nashrat al-Watha'iq [Publication of Documents] (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1968), 1 September 1967, p. 63. There are several translations into English. The closest to the Arabic text may be found in: Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), Vol. 3, p. 788, Later, the donor countries began to request that Egypt and Jordan present ongoing reports detailing the use of the funds. Such a demand was presented by the representative of Saudi Arabia at the annual meeting of the Council of the Arab League, which took place in September 1968. Subsequently, the donor countries, in order to guarantee that the aid was being used solely for the purchase of armaments, demanded that the payments be transferred directly to the banks involved in the arms deals. The disagreements reached a peak at the Arab summit conference in Rabat (December 1969). For a description of the changes in the positions of the contributing countries during the Rabat conference, see: Salah al-'Aqad, Al-Sadat wa Kamb Dayfid [Sadat and Camp David] (Cairo: Madbuli, 1984), p. 31.
85. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 92. Similar descriptions of the words of 'Abd al-Nasir are also found in: Ahmad Shuqayri, Al-Hazima al-Kubra [The Great Defeat] (Beirut: Dar al-'Awda, 1973), p. 216. See also: Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 54-55.
86. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 92. Similar descriptions of the words of 'Abd al-Nasir are also found in: Ahmad Shuqayri, Al-Hazima al-Kubra [The Great Defeat] (Beirut: Dar al-'Awda, 1973), p. 216. See also: Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 54-55.
87. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 92. Similar descriptions of the words of 'Abd al-Nasir are also found in: Ahmad Shuqayri, Al-Hazima al-Kubra [The Great Defeat] (Beirut: Dar al-'Awda, 1973), p. 216. See also: Riad, The Struggle for Peace, pp. 54-55.
88. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 93.
89. Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan, p. 143.
90. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima 'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 93. Against the background of Saudi Arabia's support for the Egyptian position, the President of Egypt proposed that the Saudi King present to the Americans the Arab stance as resolved in the Khartoum Conference. See Riad: The Struggle for Peace, p. 55.
91. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima 'at 'Abd al-Nasir, p. 93. Against the background of Saudi Arabia's support for the Egyptian position, the President of Egypt proposed that the Saudi King present to the Americans the Arab stance as resolved in the Khartoum Conference. See Riad: The Struggle for Peace, p. 55.
92. Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan, p. 143.
93. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, pp. 99-100. According to Shuqayri, on the eve of the political discussion in Khartoum, he met with the President of Egypt, who told him: "My policy in this conference is that we should accomplish what is posible." Shuqayri, Al-Hazima al-Kubra, p. 201.
94. Farid, Min Mahadir Ijtima'at 'Abd al-Nasir, pp. 99-100. According to Shuqayri, on the eve of the political discussion in Khartoum, he met with the President of Egypt, who told him: "My policy in this conference is that we should accomplish what is posible." Shuqayri, Al-Hazima al-Kubra, p. 201.
95. See: UAR, Nashrat al-Watha'iq, p. 63; Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 3, p. 788.
96. See: UAR, Nashrat al-Watha'iq, p. 63; Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 3, p. 788.
97. Shuqayri, Al-Hazima al-Kubra, p. 136.
98. Mahjub, Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Mizan, pp. 143-147.
99. United Arab Republic, Watha'iq 'Abd al-Nasir, 1967-1968, 23 July 1968, p. 494.
100. UAR, Nashrat al-Watha'iq, p. 63; Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 3, p. 788.
101. UAR, Nashrat al-Watha'iq, p. 63; Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Vol. 3, p. 788.
102. Shuqayri, Al-Hazima al-Kubra, p. 136.
103. Shuqayri, Al-Hazima al-Kubra, p. 138.
104. "United Arab Republic: Internal situation", Memo, 2 January 1968, in: University Publications of America, The Lyndon Johnson National Security Files: The Middle East, 1963-1969, PMI/B-6.