Performance standards and incentive pay in agency contracts

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 102, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 725-736

  Sherstyuk, Katerina ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII   (United States)

Author keywords

Incentive pay; Moral hazard; Performance standards; Principal agent models

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034362479     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00223     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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