Self-fulfilling currency crises and central bank independence

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 102, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 605-620

  Bensaid, Bernard ^a   Jeanne, Olivier ^b  

^a Inst d'Etudes Politiques de Lille   (France)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Currency crisis; European monetary system; Self fulfilling speculation; Sunspots; Unemployment

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034362477     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00217     Document Type: Article

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