Increasing the efectiveness of hotels' investments: How to avoid throwing good money after bad

Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly

Volumn 41, Issue 6, 2000, Pages 49-55

  Chow, Chee W ^a   Wright, Penny L ^a   Haddad, Kamal H ^a  

^a SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034360805     PISSN: 00108804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/001088040004100607     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. 1 J. Brockner, "The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward Theoretical Progress," Academy of Management Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1992), pp. 39-61.
2. 2 J. Ross and B. Staw, "Organizational Escalation and Exit: Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant," Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 36, No. 4 (August 1993), pp. 701-732.
3. 3 J. Brockner, op. cit.; E. Conlon and M. Leatherwood, "Sunk Costs and Financial Decision Making: Integration and Implications," Advances in Financial Planning and Forecasting, Vol. 3 (1989), pp. 37-61; and D. Ghosh, "Deescalation Strategies: Some Experimental Evidence," Behavioral Research in Accounting, Vol. 9 (1997), pp. 88-112.
4. 3 J. Brockner, op. cit.; E. Conlon and M. Leatherwood, "Sunk Costs and Financial Decision Making: Integration and Implications," Advances in Financial Planning and Forecasting, Vol. 3 (1989), pp. 37-61; and D. Ghosh, "Deescalation Strategies: Some Experimental Evidence," Behavioral Research in Accounting, Vol. 9 (1997), pp. 88-112.
5. 3 J. Brockner, op. cit.; E. Conlon and M. Leatherwood, "Sunk Costs and Financial Decision Making: Integration and Implications," Advances in Financial Planning and Forecasting, Vol. 3 (1989), pp. 37-61; and D. Ghosh, "Deescalation Strategies: Some Experimental Evidence," Behavioral Research in Accounting, Vol. 9 (1997), pp. 88-112.
6. 4 J. Rubin and J. Brockner, "Factors Affecting Entrapment in Waiting Situations: The Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Effect," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 6 (1975), pp. 1054-1063.
7. 5 See: B. Staw, "Knee-deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (June 1976), pp. 27-44; and B. Staw and F. Fox, "Escalation: The Determinants of Commitment to a ChosenCourse of Action," Human Relations, Vol. 30, No. 5 (May 1997), pp. 431-450.
8. 5 See: B. Staw, "Knee-deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a ChosenCourse of Action," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 16, No. 1 (June 1976), pp. 27-44; and B. Staw and F. Fox, "Escalation: The Determinants of Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action," Human Relations, Vol. 30, No. 5 (May 1997), pp. 431-450.
9. 6 F. Fox and B. Staw, "The Trapped Administrator: Effects of Job Insecurity and Policy Resistance Upon Commitment to a Course of Action," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 24, No. 3 (September 1979), pp. 449-471.
10. 7 Ibid.
11. 8 P. Harrison and A. Harrell, "The Impact of Adverse Selection on Managers' Project Evaluation Decisions," Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 36 (1993), pp. 635-643.
12. 9 R. Rutledge and A. Harrell, "Responsibility and Framing of Accounting Information," International Journal of Management, Vol. 10 (1993), pp. 300-313.
13. 10 A. Harrell and P. Harrison, "An Incentive to Shirk, Privately Held Information, and Managers' Project Evaluation Decisions," Accounting Organizations, and Society, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1994), pp. 569-577.
14. 11 B. Staw and J. Ross, "Commitment to a Policy Decision: A Multi-Theoretical Perspective," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 1978), pp. 40-64.
15. 12 E.J. Conlon and H. Garland, "The Role of Project Completion Information in Resource Allocation Decisions," Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 36 (1993), pp. 402-413.
16. 13 G. Whyte, "Diffusion of Responsibility: Effects on the Escalation Tendency," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 76, No. 3 (1991), pp. 408-415.
17. 14 There were some minor differences in some items' relative ratings across managers with different levels of experience (e.g., above or below seven years) or project-related experience. Those results are not reported in part due to the small sample size, and in part because the primary objective of this article is to gain some general insights into the existence of escalation in hotels, rather than individual or hotel characteristics that increase or decrease escalation tendencies.
18. 15 I. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos, Second Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).