Patterns of electoral corruption in Peru: The April 2000 general election

Crime, Law and Social Change

Volumn 34, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 391-415

  Taylor, Lewis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 0034357433     PISSN: 09254994     EISSN: 15730751     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026585620431     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. Few detailed studies of traditional political practice at the local level exist. Three on the northern highlands are Taylor, L., Bandits and Politics in Peru: Landlord and Peasant Violence in Hualgayoc, 1900-1930, (Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies, 1986) ; and Taylor, L., Society and Politics in Late Nineteenth Century Peru: Contumazá, 1876-1900, (Liverpool: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1990); and Nugent, D., Modernity at the Edge of Empire: State, Individual, and Nation in the Northern Peruvian Andes, 1885-1935 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).
2. Few detailed studies of traditional political practice at the local level exist. Three on the northern highlands are Taylor, L., Bandits and Politics in Peru: Landlord and Peasant Violence in Hualgayoc, 1900-1930, (Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies, 1986) ; and Taylor, L., Society and Politics in Late Nineteenth Century Peru: Contumazá, 1876-1900, (Liverpool: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1990); and Nugent, D., Modernity at the Edge of Empire: State, Individual, and Nation in the Northern Peruvian Andes, 1885-1935 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).
3. Few detailed studies of traditional political practice at the local level exist. Three on the northern highlands are Taylor, L., Bandits and Politics in Peru: Landlord and Peasant Violence in Hualgayoc, 1900-1930, (Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies, 1986) ; and Taylor, L., Society and Politics in Late Nineteenth Century Peru: Contumazá, 1876-1900, (Liverpool: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1990); and Nugent, D., Modernity at the Edge of Empire: State, Individual, and Nation in the Northern Peruvian Andes, 1885-1935 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).
4. For an excellent account of Fujimori’s background as the eldest son of a Japanese immigrant family who arrived in Peru in 1934, and his political trajectory from mathematics lecturer at the National Agrarian University, to rector of the university and “exotic" presidential candidate, see Jochamovitz, L., Cuidadano Fujimori: la construcción de un político (Lima: PEISA, 1994).
5. Montesinos also assisted Fujimori’s campaign by providing polling data undertaken by the security services. On this and the allegations of illegal land deals, see Burt, J., “Facade of Democracy Crumbles in Peru", NACLA Report on the Americas, 1992; xxiv (1), 3-6; and especially, Bowen, S., The Fujimori File, (Lima: Perú Monitor S.A., 2000), chapter 3.
6. Montesinos also assisted Fujimori’s campaign by providing polling data undertaken by the security services. On this and the allegations of illegal land deals, see Burt, J., “Facade of Democracy Crumbles in Peru", NACLA Report on the Americas, 1992; xxiv (1), 3-6; and especially, Bowen, S., The Fujimori File, (Lima: Perú Monitor S.A., 2000), chapter 3.
7. Plan Verde: apreciación de inteligencia, mimeo (Lima, February 1990). The “mission statement" for the group devising the Plan was to: “Evaluate future scenarios so as to select the best option for overthrowing the civilian government, dissolving the executive and legislature, in order that the armed forces as an institution can assume control of the state with the goal of reversing the current political, social and economic situation, whose deterioration threatens to bring down the whole system and the leading institutions of the Republic". They opined that the coup would have the benefit of: “Complete surprise. Planning has taken place with the utmost care and compartimentaje (compartment, i.e. secrecy achieved by dividing one working group from another - LT). The enemy forces do not consider that a coup is possible in the present conjucture". Extracts from this document were published in the weekly magazine Oiga, 647 (12 July 1993) and in the Lima newspaper La República (3 August 1997).
8. Plan Verde: apreciación de inteligencia, mimeo (Lima, February 1990). The “mission statement" for the group devising the Plan was to: “Evaluate future scenarios so as to select the best option for overthrowing the civilian government, dissolving the executive and legislature, in order that the armed forces as an institution can assume control of the state with the goal of reversing the current political, social and economic situation, whose deterioration threatens to bring down the whole system and the leading institutions of the Republic". They opined that the coup would have the benefit of: “Complete surprise. Planning has taken place with the utmost care and compartimentaje (compartment, i.e. secrecy achieved by dividing one working group from another - LT). The enemy forces do not consider that a coup is possible in the present conjucture". Extracts from this document were published in the weekly magazine Oiga, 647 (12 July 1993) and in the Lima newspaper La República (3 August 1997).
9. Plan Verde: apreciación de inteligencia, mimeo (Lima, February 1990). The “mission statement" for the group devising the Plan was to: “Evaluate future scenarios so as to select the best option for overthrowing the civilian government, dissolving the executive and legislature, in order that the armed forces as an institution can assume control of the state with the goal of reversing the current political, social and economic situation, whose deterioration threatens to bring down the whole system and the leading institutions of the Republic". They opined that the coup would have the benefit of: “Complete surprise. Planning has taken place with the utmost care and compartimentaje (compartment, i.e. secrecy achieved by dividing one working group from another - LT). The enemy forces do not consider that a coup is possible in the present conjucture". Extracts from this document were published in the weekly magazine Oiga, 647 (12 July 1993) and in the Lima newspaper La República (3 August 1997).
10. The document also contained strong fascist overtones. If Peru was to move forward to a “superior phase" and “transform itself into a modern society in the twenty-first century", the Plan’s authors reasoned, it was a “HISTORICAL NECESSITY" to apply the death penalty to “the nation’s enemies" and commence “hostilities against APRASUBVERSIVES, to cause their definitive eradication". This required a “GESTAPO" style security apparatus. In addition, it was considered that Peru possessed a “surplus population" which needed to be brought under control via a massive sterilisation campaign, targeted at the poor and indigenous groups. Words in capital letters as they appeared in the original document.
11. On the 1995 general election, see Crabtree, J., The 1995 Elections in Peru: End of the Road for the Party System? (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1995), Occasional Papers, No. 12.
12. For additional background information on these trends, see Mauceri, P., State Under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1996); Kay, B., “’Fujipopulism’ and the Liberal State in Peru", Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 1997 (38:4), 55-98; and Crabtree J. and Thomas, J., Fujimori’s Peru: the Political Economy, (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998).
13. For additional background information on these trends, see Mauceri, P., State Under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1996); Kay, B., “’Fujipopulism’ and the Liberal State in Peru", Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 1997 (38:4), 55-98; and Crabtree J. and Thomas, J., Fujimori’s Peru: the Political Economy, (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998).
14. For additional background information on these trends, see Mauceri, P., State Under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1996); Kay, B., “’Fujipopulism’ and the Liberal State in Peru", Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 1997 (38:4), 55-98; and Crabtree J. and Thomas, J., Fujimori’s Peru: the Political Economy, (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998).
15. Doubts about ONPE’s neutrality surfaced with a vengeance in February-March 2000, when Peru’s leading newspaper El Comercio, published details of a scandal involving high-ranking members of the regime and ONPE personnel. Working to the orders of top presidential aide Absalón Vásquez, a team formed by acolytes of Vásquez forged 1, 263, 148 signatures in 27 days in order to officially register a component of the ruling coalition (under Peruvian electoral law newly formed parties have to obtain the signatures of nearly 500, 000 electors). ONPE approved 503, 870 of these signatures, many of which were obviously fraudulent. The head of ONPE in the department of Arequipa played a prominent role in this chicanery, as did a member of ONPE’s technical staff in the Lima office. See El Comercio (Lima), 29 February 2000; 14 March 2000; 22 March 2000; 4 April 2000.
16. La República (Lima), 14 November 1997; and Youngers, C., “Fujimori’s Relentless Pursuit of Re-election", NACLA Report on the American 2000 xxxiii:(4), 6-10.
17. La República (Lima), 14 November 1997; and Youngers, C., “Fujimori’s Relentless Pursuit of Re-election", NACLA Report on the American 2000 xxxiii:(4), 6-10.
18. El Comercio, 14 December 1999.
19. Expreso (Lima), 7 April 2000. In an election rally held in Cusco on 2 April 2000, one of Fujimori’s closest civilian advisers (Absalón Vásquez), made a similar point, stating that the president “ought to stay in power for several more periods". El Comercio, 3 April 2000. In an interview for a Japanese newspaper, Fujimori was asked if he would seek a fourth term, to which he replied in the affirmative, given “that no other candidates have the ability to continue what I have begun". Liberación (Lima), 8 April 2000.
20. Expreso (Lima), 7 April 2000. In an election rally held in Cusco on 2 April 2000, one of Fujimori’s closest civilian advisers (Absalón Vásquez), made a similar point, stating that the president “ought to stay in power for several more periods". El Comercio, 3 April 2000. In an interview for a Japanese newspaper, Fujimori was asked if he would seek a fourth term, to which he replied in the affirmative, given “that no other candidates have the ability to continue what I have begun". Liberación (Lima), 8 April 2000.
21. Expreso (Lima), 7 April 2000. In an election rally held in Cusco on 2 April 2000, one of Fujimori’s closest civilian advisers (Absalón Vásquez), made a similar point, stating that the president “ought to stay in power for several more periods". El Comercio, 3 April 2000. In an interview for a Japanese newspaper, Fujimori was asked if he would seek a fourth term, to which he replied in the affirmative, given “that no other candidates have the ability to continue what I have begun". Liberación (Lima), 8 April 2000.
22. El Comercio, 18 January 2000.
23. La República, 9 June 2000. The informant added: “The cover price of fifty cents definitely does not meet the cost of printing, distribution and commission to the sellers". It was also alleged that the SIN financed the production of one million t-shirts bearing the Perú 2000 logo, which were distributed widely in shanty towns and the countryside.
24. This dependent situation can also result in sexual harassment. One young woman who formed part of PRONAA’s literacy brigade in the department of Cajamarca not only received unwelcome attentions from her boss, she was dismissed after refusing to serve pro-Fujimori propaganda to the women she was employed to teach. Following these events, a complaint was made to the local branch of the Defensoría del Pueblo (ombudsmans office), which is currently being investigated. Personal communication by a member of the Defensoría del Pueblo, Cajamarca, 17 April 2000. Use of PRONAA’s influence with the poor contained another gender dimension. Prominent female politicians on the official Perú 2000 congressional list, such as Martha Chávez and Luz Salgado, toured the comedores populares relaying the message that in addition to voting for Fujimori, women organised in these groups should cast their preferential ballot for their “sisters", so as to enhance the representation of women in parliament. Personal communication, employee of the Defensoría del Pueblo, Lima, 28 April 2000.
25. Personal communication, PRONAA employee, Cajamarca, 15 April 2000. Frequently the purchasing agreement between PRONAA and producers was not honoured once the election was over. For this scenario in Cusco, see La República, 19 June 2000.
26. See the testimony of Carlos Rojas, ex-employee of PRONAMACHCS in the department of Puno, La República, 9 June 2000.
27. Instituto de Defensa Legal, Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones (Lima: June 2000), 13.
28. On Sunday 16 January 2000 the author was drinking in a bar located in a small rural pueblo outside the city of Cajamarca in Peru’s northern highlands. By coincidence the man who for much of the 1990s had been the fujimorista prefect of the department entered and we started up a conversation. He admitted freely that he and his campaign team had been out “tying up the peasant vote" through a judicious mixture of threats and gift giving. Another tactic commonly employed by government officials, occurred on 29 January 2000, when an opposition presidential candidate (Alberto Andrade of the Somos Perú alliance) held a meeting in Cajamarca’s main square. That day the ex-prefect, the subprefect and their associates organised the distribution of tin sheets for roofs, exercise books for schoolchildren and other goodies to rural people in the surrounding area, so reducing attendance at Andrade’s rally.
29. Instituto de Defensa Legal, Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 13. Presumably each “Support Committee" would contain ten members.
30. For example, two months before polling day, a Carter Center report highlighted unequal media access, media bias, the hounding of opposition candidates and domestic election observers, the (mis)use of state resources for electoral advantage and a lack of transparency in electoral administration, as features of the campaign that needed to be addressed if the election was to “meet international standards". See, The Carter Center, “Statement of the NDI/Carter Center February 2000 Pre-Election Delegation to Peru", mimeo, Lima, 11 February 2000.
31. Poll results published in El Comercio, 18 January 2000, 21 March 2000, and 24 March 2000. The 2 April findings remained confidential due to Peruvian electoral law, which prohibits the publication of data on voting intentions during the week leading up to election day. All figures come from the Apoyo agency.
32. La República, 12 April 2000.
33. Instituto de Defensa Legal, Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 30.
34. Instituto de Defensa Legal, Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 31-32.
35. Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 25, 27, 30.
36. La República, 10 April 2000.
37. Reports were made from points throughout Peru that while voting was in progress, army officers took down the names, addresses and details from identification documents of electors and individuals involved in administering the poll. Although illegal, given the power of local commandeers this seemingly innocuous practice would have been sufficient to intimidate many rural voters. See Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 26-27.
38. La República, 22 June 2000. The respected head of the Instituto de Defensa Legal, an organisation established to defend human rights that monitored the April 2000 election campaign, noted that: “in all those zones once under a state of emergency, where the armed forces have a presence, Fujimori has won with 94% and Toledo has 3%. This is interesting. ". La República, 23 April 2000. An example of the pressure local army officers can put on rural voters comes from the high-altitude provinces of Cusco, where military personnel occupied the polling stations, nominated who should take on the responsibility for conducting the ballot (usually lieutenant governors who backed Fujimori), and allowed voting to go ahead without secret polling booths. See Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 26, 29-32.
39. La República, 22 June 2000. The respected head of the Instituto de Defensa Legal, an organisation established to defend human rights that monitored the April 2000 election campaign, noted that: “in all those zones once under a state of emergency, where the armed forces have a presence, Fujimori has won with 94% and Toledo has 3%. This is interesting. ". La República, 23 April 2000. An example of the pressure local army officers can put on rural voters comes from the high-altitude provinces of Cusco, where military personnel occupied the polling stations, nominated who should take on the responsibility for conducting the ballot (usually lieutenant governors who backed Fujimori), and allowed voting to go ahead without secret polling booths. See Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 26, 29-32.
40. La República, 22 June 2000. The respected head of the Instituto de Defensa Legal, an organisation established to defend human rights that monitored the April 2000 election campaign, noted that: “in all those zones once under a state of emergency, where the armed forces have a presence, Fujimori has won with 94% and Toledo has 3%. This is interesting. ". La República, 23 April 2000. An example of the pressure local army officers can put on rural voters comes from the high-altitude provinces of Cusco, where military personnel occupied the polling stations, nominated who should take on the responsibility for conducting the ballot (usually lieutenant governors who backed Fujimori), and allowed voting to go ahead without secret polling booths. See Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 26, 29-32.
41. Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones. On election day a friend of the author in Cajamarca happened to be sat in his pick-up truck waiting for his wife to finish voting at a nearby polling station. A group of campesinos approached and asked him: “¿Ud. es el caballero del señor gobierno quien está pagando diez soles par voto?" ("Are you the gentleman from the president who is buying votes at 10 soles?"). Ten soles is the equivalent of £2.00.
42. Personal communication, member of Transparencia, Lima, 28 April 2000. Also see, Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 27.
43. Personal communication by a member of Transparencia, Cajamarca, 25 April 2000.
44. The CNN reporter happened to be in Cajamarca on vacation. On this scandal, also see La República, 16 April 2000.
45. La República, 10 April 2000. The need to have personeros or independent observers present to witness the count becomes imperative due to a quirk of Peruvian electoral law. If the number of ballots cast at a particular voting table happens to exceed the number of citizens who have actually voted, but does not amount to more than the quota of electors assigned to that mesa, then the poll is declared “valid", i.e. legally nothing is untoward if a mesa with 180 electors on the register has recorded 100 voters who have signed their names in the appropriate fashion, but 150 votes are encountered when counting takes place. Such a bizarre situation has led to the phrase “acta mata voto" ("the voting return overrides the vote"). This anomaly is important considering that the ONPE printed two million extra ballot papers, many of whom were in the hands of Perú 2000 campaign workers.
46. On the night before polling day, two individuals were detained by police nearby the Ceres market area in the Ate-Vitarte district of Lima. They happened to be in possession of 1, 707 ballot papers with crosses already marked against the government’s Perú 2000 symbol. Preferential votes had also been “cast". On election day morning in the same locality, observers from Transparencia also discovered actas that had been filled in and “signed" by members presiding over a number of voting tables, along with a pile of blank ballot papers. It materialised that the “culprits" were ONPE personnel, whose pick-up truck was quickly surrounded by angry voters when word spread what they had been up to. El Comercio, 11 April 2000; La República, 11 April 2000. A pre-election day scandal broke as a result of an investigation mounted by the magazine Caretas, who interviewed a man who claimed that in a house located on the southern outskirts of Lima, 25 people were working throughout the day filling out duplicate voting returns on official ONPE forms. The informant alleged that the plan was to switch up to 30, 000 actas with the objective of presenting Fujimori with a victory by a narrow margin in the first round. Those involved had also been given instructions as to the preferential votes that should be inserted. The ballot boxes stuffed with false votes and rogue actas, he stated, were to be switched in provincial ONPE offices, prioritising those parts of the country where few independent observers or party representatives supervised the count. See Caretas, 1613 (7 April 2000).
47. On the night before polling day, two individuals were detained by police nearby the Ceres market area in the Ate-Vitarte district of Lima. They happened to be in possession of 1, 707 ballot papers with crosses already marked against the government’s Perú 2000 symbol. Preferential votes had also been “cast". On election day morning in the same locality, observers from Transparencia also discovered actas that had been filled in and “signed" by members presiding over a number of voting tables, along with a pile of blank ballot papers. It materialised that the “culprits" were ONPE personnel, whose pick-up truck was quickly surrounded by angry voters when word spread what they had been up to. El Comercio, 11 April 2000; La República, 11 April 2000. A pre-election day scandal broke as a result of an investigation mounted by the magazine Caretas, who interviewed a man who claimed that in a house located on the southern outskirts of Lima, 25 people were working throughout the day filling out duplicate voting returns on official ONPE forms. The informant alleged that the plan was to switch up to 30, 000 actas with the objective of presenting Fujimori with a victory by a narrow margin in the first round. Those involved had also been given instructions as to the preferential votes that should be inserted. The ballot boxes stuffed with false votes and rogue actas, he stated, were to be switched in provincial ONPE offices, prioritising those parts of the country where few independent observers or party representatives supervised the count. See Caretas, 1613 (7 April 2000).
48. On the night before polling day, two individuals were detained by police nearby the Ceres market area in the Ate-Vitarte district of Lima. They happened to be in possession of 1, 707 ballot papers with crosses already marked against the government’s Perú 2000 symbol. Preferential votes had also been “cast". On election day morning in the same locality, observers from Transparencia also discovered actas that had been filled in and “signed" by members presiding over a number of voting tables, along with a pile of blank ballot papers. It materialised that the “culprits" were ONPE personnel, whose pick-up truck was quickly surrounded by angry voters when word spread what they had been up to. El Comercio, 11 April 2000; La República, 11 April 2000. A pre-election day scandal broke as a result of an investigation mounted by the magazine Caretas, who interviewed a man who claimed that in a house located on the southern outskirts of Lima, 25 people were working throughout the day filling out duplicate voting returns on official ONPE forms. The informant alleged that the plan was to switch up to 30, 000 actas with the objective of presenting Fujimori with a victory by a narrow margin in the first round. Those involved had also been given instructions as to the preferential votes that should be inserted. The ballot boxes stuffed with false votes and rogue actas, he stated, were to be switched in provincial ONPE offices, prioritising those parts of the country where few independent observers or party representatives supervised the count. See Caretas, 1613 (7 April 2000).
49. See the interview with Stein in Caretas, 1614 (14 April 2000).
50. Defensoría del Pueblo, Elecciones 2000: informe de supervisión de la Defensoría del Pueblo (Lima 2000), 79-80, 92. In the department of Piura observers from the Defensoría encountered 119 unsealed envelopes filled with voting returns, many actas did not have the necessary hologram and in 27 cases the results had been altered.
51. El Comercio, 11 April 2000; La República, 11 April 2000.
52. El Comercio, 11 April 2000; La República, 11 April 2000.
53. According to the newspaper Liberación (15 April 2000; 16 April 2000), vote “inflation" stood at 20% for the department of Abancay, 17% for Arequipa, 22% in Ica, 21.5% in Cajamarca, 17% in Huancayo and a massive 22.5% in Huánuco.
54. When Vargas reported these illegal activities to her superiors, she was told: “What’s the matter with you? Your job is to keep quiet, deny everything and cover up these irregularities". See the interview with Jenny Vargas in El Comercio, 19 April 2000.
55. Instituto de Defensa Legal, Chachapoyas 2000: para la historia de un fraude - un caso paradigmático, mimeo, Lima, May 2000. Also see the interview with Jenny Vargas, El Comercio, 19 April 2000.
56. Instituto de Defensa Legal, Chachapoyas 2000: para la historia de un fraude - un caso paradigmático, mimeo, Lima, May 2000. Also see the interview with Jenny Vargas, El Comercio, 19 April 2000.
57. El Comercio, 13 April 2000.
58. La República, 16 June 2000, 19 June 2000. In the Chiclayo case, the individuals concerned claimed that it was their supervisors who were altering votes.
59. Caretas, 1620 (26 May 2000).
60. Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 5.
61. According to a report in Liberación (9 April 2000), informants from within the military stated that the SIN had a parallel computing system already mounted to undertake an “electronic fraud". For its part, Transparencia declared that a web page sited in Australia had been established for the same end. La República, 10 April 2000.
62. According to a report in Liberación (9 April 2000), informants from within the military stated that the SIN had a parallel computing system already mounted to undertake an “electronic fraud". For its part, Transparencia declared that a web page sited in Australia had been established for the same end. La República, 10 April 2000.
63. Caretas, 1615 (20 April 2000); Liberación, 11 April 2000. When confronted, the individuals involved claimed they were feeding information into the Perú 2000 data base.
64. Caretas, 1615 (20 April 2000); Liberación, 11 April 2000. When confronted, the individuals involved claimed they were feeding information into the Perú 2000 data base.
65. Caretas 1611 (24 March 2000); Caretas 1621 (2 June 2000). In 1997 La Rosa’s colleague, Mariela Berreto, was dismembered and died in the most cruel fashion at the hands of the “Death Squad". It was also claimed that the intelligence services had penetrated the computing system of Transparencia and were doctoring its data. La República, 10 April 2000.
66. Caretas 1611 (24 March 2000); Caretas 1621 (2 June 2000). In 1997 La Rosa’s colleague, Mariela Berreto, was dismembered and died in the most cruel fashion at the hands of the “Death Squad". It was also claimed that the intelligence services had penetrated the computing system of Transparencia and were doctoring its data. La República, 10 April 2000.
67. Caretas 1611 (24 March 2000); Caretas 1621 (2 June 2000). In 1997 La Rosa’s colleague, Mariela Berreto, was dismembered and died in the most cruel fashion at the hands of the “Death Squad". It was also claimed that the intelligence services had penetrated the computing system of Transparencia and were doctoring its data. La República, 10 April 2000.
68. Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 5. According to a poll published in El Comercio (26 April 2000), 56.8% of electors felt a fraud had been committed. Two-thirds of middle class voters held this view, while among the poor the figure fell to 45.9%. No less than 71% stated that “radical changes need to take place in ONPE to guarantee a fair ballot".
69. Las elecciones Frankenstein: 830 razones, 5. According to a poll published in El Comercio (26 April 2000), 56.8% of electors felt a fraud had been committed. Two-thirds of middle class voters held this view, while among the poor the figure fell to 45.9%. No less than 71% stated that “radical changes need to take place in ONPE to guarantee a fair ballot".