Logical deficiencies in spatial models: A constructive critique

Public Choice

Volumn 105, Issue 3-4, 2000, Pages 273-289

  Milyo, Jeffrey ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034356290     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005203611524     Document Type: Article

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