Occupational risks, social insurance and investments in education

Journal of Population Economics

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 425-441

  Anderberg, Dan ^a  

^a HERIOT WATT UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Disability pensions; Education policy; Time consistency

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034350204     PISSN: 09331433     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001480050145     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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