Five myths about pragmatism, or, against a second pragmatic acquiescence

Political Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 480-508

  MacGilvray, Eric A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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EID: 0034347434     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591700028004003     Document Type: Article

References (109)

1. William James, Pragmatism (1907), in Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 95.
2. These positions are most closely associated with Benjamin Barber and Richard Rorty, respectively. See, for example, Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), and Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
3. These positions are most closely associated with Benjamin Barber and Richard Rorty, respectively. See, for example, Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), and Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
4. W.V.O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism, "in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 20-46. The essay first appeared in Philosophical Review in 1951. Two recent critiques of the notion of a "rediscovered" pragmatic tradition are found in Richard J. Bernstein, "The Resurgence of Pragmatism, "Social Research 59 (1992): 813-40, and Richard A. Posner, "What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?" Southern California Law Review 63 (1990): 1653-70.
5. W.V.O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism, "in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 20-46. The essay first appeared in Philosophical Review in 1951. Two recent critiques of the notion of a "rediscovered" pragmatic tradition are found in Richard J. Bernstein, "The Resurgence of Pragmatism, "Social Research 59 (1992): 813-40, and Richard A. Posner, "What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?" Southern California Law Review 63 (1990): 1653-70.
6. W.V.O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism, "in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 20-46. The essay first appeared in Philosophical Review in 1951. Two recent critiques of the notion of a "rediscovered" pragmatic tradition are found in Richard J. Bernstein, "The Resurgence of Pragmatism, "Social Research 59 (1992): 813-40, and Richard A. Posner, "What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?" Southern California Law Review 63 (1990): 1653-70.
7. W.V.O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism, "in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 20-46. The essay first appeared in Philosophical Review in 1951. Two recent critiques of the notion of a "rediscovered" pragmatic tradition are found in Richard J. Bernstein, "The Resurgence of Pragmatism, "Social Research 59 (1992): 813-40, and Richard A. Posner, "What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?" Southern California Law Review 63 (1990): 1653-70.
8. Lewis Mumford, The Golden Day: A Study in American Literature and Culture (1926; reprint, Boston: Beacon, 1957).
9. Dewey's reply to Mumford is found in "The Pragmatic Acquiescence" (1927), in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-91), 3:145-51. Sidney Hook reports that Dewey vowed "never [to] forgive" Bertrand Russell for his role in propagating a similar view; a rare lapse, as Hook saw it, from his "genuine, constant and sustained, even … somewhat oppressive" goodness. Sidney Hook, "Some Memories of John Dewey, "in Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 106-7, 108. For his part, Russell professed "regret and surprise" at Dewey's hostile reaction, going on to say, "I am accustomed to having my opinions explained… as due to my connection with the British aristocracy, and I am quite willing to suppose that my views, like other men's, are influenced by social environment." A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), 827.
10. Dewey's reply to Mumford is found in "The Pragmatic Acquiescence" (1927), in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-91), 3:145-51. Sidney Hook reports that Dewey vowed "never [to] forgive" Bertrand Russell for his role in propagating a similar view; a rare lapse, as Hook saw it, from his "genuine, constant and sustained, even … somewhat oppressive" goodness. Sidney Hook, "Some Memories of John Dewey, "in Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 106-7, 108. For his part, Russell professed "regret and surprise" at Dewey's hostile reaction, going on to say, "I am accustomed to having my opinions explained… as due to my connection with the British aristocracy, and I am quite willing to suppose that my views, like other men's, are influenced by social environment." A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), 827.
11. Dewey's reply to Mumford is found in "The Pragmatic Acquiescence" (1927), in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981-91), 3:145-51. Sidney Hook reports that Dewey vowed "never [to] forgive" Bertrand Russell for his role in propagating a similar view; a rare lapse, as Hook saw it, from his "genuine, constant and sustained, even … somewhat oppressive" goodness. Sidney Hook, "Some Memories of John Dewey, "in Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 106-7, 108. For his part, Russell professed "regret and surprise" at Dewey's hostile reaction, going on to say, "I am accustomed to having my opinions explained… as due to my connection with the British aristocracy, and I am quite willing to suppose that my views, like other men's, are influenced by social environment." A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), 827.
12. Two notable examples of this line of argument are found in Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Knopf, 1962), chap. 14, and Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type (New York: Knopf, 1965), chap. 5. On Dewey's opposition to the war, see Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), chap. 14.
13. Two notable examples of this line of argument are found in Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Knopf, 1962), chap. 14, and Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type (New York: Knopf, 1965), chap. 5. On Dewey's opposition to the war, see Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), chap. 14.
14. Two notable examples of this line of argument are found in Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: Knopf, 1962), chap. 14, and Christopher Lasch, The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The Intellectual as a Social Type (New York: Knopf, 1965), chap. 5. On Dewey's opposition to the war, see Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), chap. 14.
15. The definitive account is Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy.
16. Richard Rorty, "Idealizations, Foundations, and Social Practices, "in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 334.
17. See, for example, Richard J. Bernstein, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Richard Rorty on Liberal Democracy and Philosophy, "Political Theory 15 (1987): quoted at 541.
18. See, for example, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy; Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).
19. See, for example, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy; Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).
20. See, for example, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy; Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).
21. See, for example, Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy; Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).
22. The quoted phrase is the subtitle of James's Pragmatism.
23. Marion Smiley has argued, by contrast, that "political processes, and not scientific inquiry per se, enable Dewey to generate evaluative criteria out of social conflict." "Pragmatic Inquiry and Social Conflict: A Critical Reconstruction of Dewey's Model of Democracy, "Praxis International 9 (1990): 373.
24. See, for example, Ian Shapiro, Political Criticism (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), chaps. 7-9.
25. Richard Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, "in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 175-96.
26. George Santayana, "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics, "in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1939), 247-48. James does not entirely escape censure; "too spontaneous and rare a person to be a good mirror of any general movement, "he is said to be "more representative of America in the past than in the future." (p. 247).
27. Bertrand Russell, "Pragmatism, "in Philosophical Essays (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1910), 110.
28. Russell, "Professor Dewey's 'Essays in Experimental Logic, '" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (1919): 26.
29. Russell, "Pragmatism, "111.
30. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism, "in Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972-1980 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 166.
31. Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 25; "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, "ibid., 198-99.
32. Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 25; "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, "ibid., 198-99.
33. Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy, "Consequences of Pragmatism, xxx.
34. This model is laid out by Peirce in what are now considered to be the founding papers of the pragmatic movement: "The Fixation of Belief" (1877) and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878), in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932-35), 5:223-71.
35. John Dewey, "Pragmatic America" (1922), in John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-1924, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976-83), 13:307.
36. See especially Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), Middle Works, 12:77-201. Peirce makes a similarly unfavorable comparison between the "scientific" viewpoint and that of traditional philosophy in "The Fixation of Belief."
37. This is not to deny that, as an empirical matter, the range of solutions considered will be limited to those with which we have some familiarity, but merely to point out that pragmatism does not require that we give greater normative weight to traditional approaches.
38. Santayana, "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics, "254.
39. Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, 356.
40. Lasch, New Radicalism in America, 14. Lasch offers a more balanced assessment of Dewey and pragmatism in The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (New York: Norton, 1991), esp. chaps. 7-8.
41. Lasch, New Radicalism in America, 14. Lasch offers a more balanced assessment of Dewey and pragmatism in The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (New York: Norton, 1991), esp. chaps. 7-8.
42. Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Rorty, "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, "202.
43. Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Rorty, "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, "202.
44. Alfonso J. Damico, Individuality and Community: The Social and Political Thought of John Dewey (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1978), 56.
45. Rorty, "Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein, "Political Theory 15 (1987): 573.
46. Robert Westbrook often fails to grasp this distinction, leading him, for example, to find Mumford's criticism of James "less misleading than his criticism of Dewey; insofar as the issue is 'acquiescence' to industrial capitalism, James was a mugwump, Dewey a radical." But Mumford does not discuss James's political views (or, for that matter, Dewey's) at all; he cites rather his "lack of comprehensive ideas" and his "cultural adolescence." Compare Westbrook, "Lewis Mumford, John Dewey, and the 'Pragmatic Acquiescence, '" in Lewis Mumford: Public Intellectual, ed. Thomas and Agatha Hughes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 420, n. 4, and Mumford, Golden Day, 93, 95. Rorty's effort to rebut the charge that his philosophical views provide an "apologia for the status quo" by putting forth an elaborate eight-point "political credo" similarly misses the thrust of the objection. Rorty, "Thugs and Theorists, "565-67, responding to Bernstein's "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back."
47. Robert Westbrook often fails to grasp this distinction, leading him, for example, to find Mumford's criticism of James "less misleading than his criticism of Dewey; insofar as the issue is 'acquiescence' to industrial capitalism, James was a mugwump, Dewey a radical." But Mumford does not discuss James's political views (or, for that matter, Dewey's) at all; he cites rather his "lack of comprehensive ideas" and his "cultural adolescence." Compare Westbrook, "Lewis Mumford, John Dewey, and the 'Pragmatic Acquiescence, '" in Lewis Mumford: Public Intellectual, ed. Thomas and Agatha Hughes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 420, n. 4, and Mumford, Golden Day, 93, 95. Rorty's effort to rebut the charge that his philosophical views provide an "apologia for the status quo" by putting forth an elaborate eight-point "political credo" similarly misses the thrust of the objection. Rorty, "Thugs and Theorists, "565-67, responding to Bernstein's "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back."
48. Robert Westbrook often fails to grasp this distinction, leading him, for example, to find Mumford's criticism of James "less misleading than his criticism of Dewey; insofar as the issue is 'acquiescence' to industrial capitalism, James was a mugwump, Dewey a radical." But Mumford does not discuss James's political views (or, for that matter, Dewey's) at all; he cites rather his "lack of comprehensive ideas" and his "cultural adolescence." Compare Westbrook, "Lewis Mumford, John Dewey, and the 'Pragmatic Acquiescence, '" in Lewis Mumford: Public Intellectual, ed. Thomas and Agatha Hughes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 420, n. 4, and Mumford, Golden Day, 93, 95. Rorty's effort to rebut the charge that his philosophical views provide an "apologia for the status quo" by putting forth an elaborate eight-point "political credo" similarly misses the thrust of the objection. Rorty, "Thugs and Theorists, "565-67, responding to Bernstein's "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back."
49. Robert Westbrook often fails to grasp this distinction, leading him, for example, to find Mumford's criticism of James "less misleading than his criticism of Dewey; insofar as the issue is 'acquiescence' to industrial capitalism, James was a mugwump, Dewey a radical." But Mumford does not discuss James's political views (or, for that matter, Dewey's) at all; he cites rather his "lack of comprehensive ideas" and his "cultural adolescence." Compare Westbrook, "Lewis Mumford, John Dewey, and the 'Pragmatic Acquiescence, '" in Lewis Mumford: Public Intellectual, ed. Thomas and Agatha Hughes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 420, n. 4, and Mumford, Golden Day, 93, 95. Rorty's effort to rebut the charge that his philosophical views provide an "apologia for the status quo" by putting forth an elaborate eight-point "political credo" similarly misses the thrust of the objection. Rorty, "Thugs and Theorists, "565-67, responding to Bernstein's "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back."
50. Thus Peirce's celebrated maxim: "The whole function of thought is to produce habits of action; and … whatever there is connected with a thought, but irrelevant to its purpose, is an accretion to it, but no part of it…. Thus, we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtile it may be; and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice." "How to Make Our Ideas Clear, "256-57.
51. Dewey, "The Future of Liberalism" (1935), Later Works, 11:293. Dewey's own radical critique of the social, political, and economic practices of his day is extensively documented in Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy. 35. Dewey, "Philosophy and Civilization" (1927), Later Works, 3:10.
52. Dewey, "The Future of Liberalism" (1935), Later Works, 11:293. Dewey's own radical critique of the social, political, and economic practices of his day is extensively documented in Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy. 35. Dewey, "Philosophy and Civilization" (1927), Later Works, 3:10.
53. Dewey, "The Future of Liberalism" (1935), Later Works, 11:293. Dewey's own radical critique of the social, political, and economic practices of his day is extensively documented in Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy. 35. Dewey, "Philosophy and Civilization" (1927), Later Works, 3:10.
54. Russell, "Pragmatism, "96.
55. Russell, "William James's Conception of Truth, "Philosophical Essays, 129.
56. Benjamin R. Barber, "Foundationalism and Democracy, "in Benhabib, Democracy and Difference, 352. See also his Strong Democracy, esp. chaps. 6-8.
57. Benjamin R. Barber, "Foundationalism and Democracy, "in Benhabib, Democracy and Difference, 352. See also his Strong Democracy, esp. chaps. 6-8.
58. See, for example, Mark Timmons, "Foundationalism and the Structure of Ethical Justification, "Ethics 97 (1987): 595-609. Arthur Ripstein has offered a similar definition of political foundationalism: "Foundationalist political theories attempt to justify political institutions without presupposing any political considerations." However, he goes on to insist that foundations "avoid presuming anything accidental to some particular social setting" and that they "justify institutions in terms that nobody can reject"; conditions that, as I argue below, are adventitious to his original formulation. Ripstein, "Foundationalism in Political Theory, "Philosophy and Public Affairs 16(1987): 115, 116.
59. See, for example, Mark Timmons, "Foundationalism and the Structure of Ethical Justification, "Ethics 97 (1987): 595-609. Arthur Ripstein has offered a similar definition of political foundationalism: "Foundationalist political theories attempt to justify political institutions without presupposing any political considerations." However, he goes on to insist that foundations "avoid presuming anything accidental to some particular social setting" and that they "justify institutions in terms that nobody can reject"; conditions that, as I argue below, are adventitious to his original formulation. Ripstein, "Foundationalism in Political Theory, "Philosophy and Public Affairs 16(1987): 115, 116.
60. For a useful analysis and criticism of this view, see Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism (Cambridge, UK: Blackwell, 1991).
61. In James's words, pragmatism entails "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories, ' supposed necessities; and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts." Pragmatism, 32 (emphasis removed). See also Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action (1929), Later Works, vol. 4.
62. In James's words, pragmatism entails "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories, ' supposed necessities; and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts." Pragmatism, 32 (emphasis removed). See also Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action (1929), Later Works, vol. 4.
63. See, for example, Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1969), and the discussion in Williams, Unnatural Doubts, 22 ff.
64. See, for example, Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1969), and the discussion in Williams, Unnatural Doubts, 22 ff.
65. Peirce, "Fixation of Belief, "233.
66. As if, as Peirce sardonically remarks, "to start an inquiry it was only necessary to utter a question." Ibid., 232.
67. Amy Gutmann has likewise argued that "foundationalism in political philosophy … is the claim that justification must rest upon truths about human nature, human rights, rationality, or politics that are self-evident, rationally incontestable, or axiomatic." "Democracy, Philosophy, and Justification, "in Benhabib, Democracy and Difference, 340.
68. As Williams puts it, paraphrasing Wittgenstein, "a proposition is neither true because it stands fast nor stands fast because it is true"; Unnatural Doubts, 124. Williams is uncertain whether to call this view "foundationalist" or not, because his critique of skepticism requires that he equate foundationalism with what he calls "epistemological realism." See ibid., 114-15, 124, 221-24.
69. As Williams puts it, paraphrasing Wittgenstein, "a proposition is neither true because it stands fast nor stands fast because it is true"; Unnatural Doubts, 124. Williams is uncertain whether to call this view "foundationalist" or not, because his critique of skepticism requires that he equate foundationalism with what he calls "epistemological realism." See ibid., 114-15, 124, 221-24.
70. Randolph Bourne, "Twilight of Idols" (1917), in The War and the Intellectuals: Collected Essays, 1915-1919, ed. Carl Resek (New York: Harper, 1964), 60-61.
71. Bourne, "John Dewey's Philosophy, "New Republic 2 (1915): 154.
72. In fact, a careful reading of Bourne's wartime essays shows that his criticism is directed not at Deweyan philosophy per se but more narrowly at Dewey's contention (later recanted) that American intervention in the First World War was an "intelligent" response to international circumstances. Bourne's central thesis, stated again and again, is that the use of war as a means of intelligent reconstruction is impossible: "War is just that absolute situation which is its own end and its own means." "Conscience and Intelligence in War" (1917), in John Dewey: The Political Writings, ed. Debra Morris and Ian Shapiro (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 200. His diagnosis is not that pragmatism is incapable of projecting ends, as is commonly held, but rather that in wartime all ends are subordinated to those of war itself: war is "precisely the one situation in which [Dewey's] philosophy will no longer work." Ibid., 199, emphasis mine. What is more, Bourne argues that the key to resisting the degenerate logic of war is to "keep [the intellect] supple and pliable, "to avoid the "premature crystallization" of thought ("The War and the Intellectuals, "in Collected Essays, 12, 14) - prescriptions that appeal directly to the pragmatic conception of experimental inquiry. "Vision must constantly outshoot technique" in the building of a democratic society; in wartime, technique literally outshoots vision. The only recourse is to "wait and hope for wisdom when the world becomes pragmatic and flexible again" ("Twilight of Idols, "62; "Conscience and Intelligence in War, "201). Bourne paid a steep professional price for his antiwar sentiments, perhaps in part at Dewey's hands, but to make him a martyr to the antipragmatist cause, as Mumford and others have aimed to do, flies in the face of the facts. On Dewey's involvement in the debates over American intervention, his treatment of Bourne, and his later pacifism, see Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, chaps. 7-8.
73. In fact, a careful reading of Bourne's wartime essays shows that his criticism is directed not at Deweyan philosophy per se but more narrowly at Dewey's contention (later recanted) that American intervention in the First World War was an "intelligent" response to international circumstances. Bourne's central thesis, stated again and again, is that the use of war as a means of intelligent reconstruction is impossible: "War is just that absolute situation which is its own end and its own means." "Conscience and Intelligence in War" (1917), in John Dewey: The Political Writings, ed. Debra Morris and Ian Shapiro (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 200. His diagnosis is not that pragmatism is incapable of projecting ends, as is commonly held, but rather that in wartime all ends are subordinated to those of war itself: war is "precisely the one situation in which [Dewey's] philosophy will no longer work." Ibid., 199, emphasis mine. What is more, Bourne argues that the key to resisting the degenerate logic of war is to "keep [the intellect] supple and pliable, "to avoid the "premature crystallization" of thought ("The War and the Intellectuals, "in Collected Essays, 12, 14) - prescriptions that appeal directly to the pragmatic conception of experimental inquiry. "Vision must constantly outshoot technique" in the building of a democratic society; in wartime, technique literally outshoots vision. The only recourse is to "wait and hope for wisdom when the world becomes pragmatic and flexible again" ("Twilight of Idols, "62; "Conscience and Intelligence in War, "201). Bourne paid a steep professional price for his antiwar sentiments, perhaps in part at Dewey's hands, but to make him a martyr to the antipragmatist cause, as Mumford and others have aimed to do, flies in the face of the facts. On Dewey's involvement in the debates over American intervention, his treatment of Bourne, and his later pacifism, see Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, chaps. 7-8.
74. In fact, a careful reading of Bourne's wartime essays shows that his criticism is directed not at Deweyan philosophy per se but more narrowly at Dewey's contention (later recanted) that American intervention in the First World War was an "intelligent" response to international circumstances. Bourne's central thesis, stated again and again, is that the use of war as a means of intelligent reconstruction is impossible: "War is just that absolute situation which is its own end and its own means." "Conscience and Intelligence in War" (1917), in John Dewey: The Political Writings, ed. Debra Morris and Ian Shapiro (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 200. His diagnosis is not that pragmatism is incapable of projecting ends, as is commonly held, but rather that in wartime all ends are subordinated to those of war itself: war is "precisely the one situation in which [Dewey's] philosophy will no longer work." Ibid., 199, emphasis mine. What is more, Bourne argues that the key to resisting the degenerate logic of war is to "keep [the intellect] supple and pliable, "to avoid the "premature crystallization" of thought ("The War and the Intellectuals, "in Collected Essays, 12, 14) - prescriptions that appeal directly to the pragmatic conception of experimental inquiry. "Vision must constantly outshoot technique" in the building of a democratic society; in wartime, technique literally outshoots vision. The only recourse is to "wait and hope for wisdom when the world becomes pragmatic and flexible again" ("Twilight of Idols, "62; "Conscience and Intelligence in War, "201). Bourne paid a steep professional price for his antiwar sentiments, perhaps in part at Dewey's hands, but to make him a martyr to the antipragmatist cause, as Mumford and others have aimed to do, flies in the face of the facts. On Dewey's involvement in the debates over American intervention, his treatment of Bourne, and his later pacifism, see Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, chaps. 7-8.
75. In fact, a careful reading of Bourne's wartime essays shows that his criticism is directed not at Deweyan philosophy per se but more narrowly at Dewey's contention (later recanted) that American intervention in the First World War was an "intelligent" response to international circumstances. Bourne's central thesis, stated again and again, is that the use of war as a means of intelligent reconstruction is impossible: "War is just that absolute situation which is its own end and its own means." "Conscience and Intelligence in War" (1917), in John Dewey: The Political Writings, ed. Debra Morris and Ian Shapiro (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 200. His diagnosis is not that pragmatism is incapable of projecting ends, as is commonly held, but rather that in wartime all ends are subordinated to those of war itself: war is "precisely the one situation in which [Dewey's] philosophy will no longer work." Ibid., 199, emphasis mine. What is more, Bourne argues that the key to resisting the degenerate logic of war is to "keep [the intellect] supple and pliable, "to avoid the "premature crystallization" of thought ("The War and the Intellectuals, "in Collected Essays, 12, 14) - prescriptions that appeal directly to the pragmatic conception of experimental inquiry. "Vision must constantly outshoot technique" in the building of a democratic society; in wartime, technique literally outshoots vision. The only recourse is to "wait and hope for wisdom when the world becomes pragmatic and flexible again" ("Twilight of Idols, "62; "Conscience and Intelligence in War, "201). Bourne paid a steep professional price for his antiwar sentiments, perhaps in part at Dewey's hands, but to make him a martyr to the antipragmatist cause, as Mumford and others have aimed to do, flies in the face of the facts. On Dewey's involvement in the debates over American intervention, his treatment of Bourne, and his later pacifism, see Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, chaps. 7-8.
76. In fact, a careful reading of Bourne's wartime essays shows that his criticism is directed not at Deweyan philosophy per se but more narrowly at Dewey's contention (later recanted) that American intervention in the First World War was an "intelligent" response to international circumstances. Bourne's central thesis, stated again and again, is that the use of war as a means of intelligent reconstruction is impossible: "War is just that absolute situation which is its own end and its own means." "Conscience and Intelligence in War" (1917), in John Dewey: The Political Writings, ed. Debra Morris and Ian Shapiro (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 200. His diagnosis is not that pragmatism is incapable of projecting ends, as is commonly held, but rather that in wartime all ends are subordinated to those of war itself: war is "precisely the one situation in which [Dewey's] philosophy will no longer work." Ibid., 199, emphasis mine. What is more, Bourne argues that the key to resisting the degenerate logic of war is to "keep [the intellect] supple and pliable, "to avoid the "premature crystallization" of thought ("The War and the Intellectuals, "in Collected Essays, 12, 14) - prescriptions that appeal directly to the pragmatic conception of experimental inquiry. "Vision must constantly outshoot technique" in the building of a democratic society; in wartime, technique literally outshoots vision. The only recourse is to "wait and hope for wisdom when the world becomes pragmatic and flexible again" ("Twilight of Idols, "62; "Conscience and Intelligence in War, "201). Bourne paid a steep professional price for his antiwar sentiments, perhaps in part at Dewey's hands, but to make him a martyr to the antipragmatist cause, as Mumford and others have aimed to do, flies in the face of the facts. On Dewey's involvement in the debates over American intervention, his treatment of Bourne, and his later pacifism, see Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, chaps. 7-8.
77. In fact, a careful reading of Bourne's wartime essays shows that his criticism is directed not at Deweyan philosophy per se but more narrowly at Dewey's contention (later recanted) that American intervention in the First World War was an "intelligent" response to international circumstances. Bourne's central thesis, stated again and again, is that the use of war as a means of intelligent reconstruction is impossible: "War is just that absolute situation which is its own end and its own means." "Conscience and Intelligence in War" (1917), in John Dewey: The Political Writings, ed. Debra Morris and Ian Shapiro (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 200. His diagnosis is not that pragmatism is incapable of projecting ends, as is commonly held, but rather that in wartime all ends are subordinated to those of war itself: war is "precisely the one situation in which [Dewey's] philosophy will no longer work." Ibid., 199, emphasis mine. What is more, Bourne argues that the key to resisting the degenerate logic of war is to "keep [the intellect] supple and pliable, "to avoid the "premature crystallization" of thought ("The War and the Intellectuals, "in Collected Essays, 12, 14) - prescriptions that appeal directly to the pragmatic conception of experimental inquiry. "Vision must constantly outshoot technique" in the building of a democratic society; in wartime, technique literally outshoots vision. The only recourse is to "wait and hope for wisdom when the world becomes pragmatic and flexible again" ("Twilight of Idols, "62; "Conscience and Intelligence in War, "201). Bourne paid a steep professional price for his antiwar sentiments, perhaps in part at Dewey's hands, but to make him a martyr to the antipragmatist cause, as Mumford and others have aimed to do, flies in the face of the facts. On Dewey's involvement in the debates over American intervention, his treatment of Bourne, and his later pacifism, see Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, chaps. 7-8.
78. Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence, 465.
79. Posner, "What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?" 1659, 1670. For a critique of Posner's view of pragmatism, see Jack Knight and James Johnson, "Political Consequences of Pragmatism, "Political Theory 24 (1996): 68-96.
80. Posner, "What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?" 1659, 1670. For a critique of Posner's view of pragmatism, see Jack Knight and James Johnson, "Political Consequences of Pragmatism, "Political Theory 24 (1996): 68-96.
81. See, among many possible examples, Peirce, "Fixation of Belief'; James, Pragmatism, chap. 2; Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy. 53. James, Pragmatism, 32, 137.
82. See, among many possible examples, Peirce, "Fixation of Belief'; James, Pragmatism, chap. 2; Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy. 53. James, Pragmatism, 32, 137.
83. See, among many possible examples, Peirce, "Fixation of Belief'; James, Pragmatism, chap. 2; Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy. 53. James, Pragmatism, 32, 137.
84. See, among many possible examples, Peirce, "Fixation of Belief'; James, Pragmatism, chap. 2; Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy. 53. James, Pragmatism, 32, 137.
85. Charles Taylor has shown that explanatory frameworks inevitably "secrete a certain value position": "The framework gives us as it were the geography of the range of phenomena in question, it tells us how they can vary, what are the major dimensions of variation. But since we are dealing with matters which are of great importance to human beings, a given map will have, as it were, its own built-in value slope. That is to say, a given dimension of variation will usually determine for itself how we are to judge of good and bad, because of its relation to obvious human wants and needs." "Neutrality in Political Science, "in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 73. Taylor does not link this idea to foundationalism, as I have here.
86. This is of course a central theme in Dewey's political thought; see, for example, The Public and Its Problems (1927), Later Works, 2:235-372.
87. Thus Peirce: "Scientific investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in the way of settling opinion. These afford the explanation of my not doubting the method or the hypothesis which it supposes; and not having any doubt, nor believing that anybody else whom I could influence has, it would be the merest babble for me to say more about it. If there be anybody with a living doubt upon the subject, let him consider it." "Fixation of Belief, "244.
88. I begin to address these issues in my "Experience as Experiment: Some Consequences of Pragmatism for Democratic Theory, "American Journal of Political Science 43 (1999): 542-65.
89. It follows that there are no de jure barriers to participation in scientific discourse. The fact that there are nearly insurmountable de facto barriers reflects, as I have suggested, the trade-off (necessary in principle but in need of justification in its particulars) between the ideal of openness and the need to define a manageable field of inquiry.
90. Walter Lippmann's Public Opinion (1922; reprint, New York: Free Press, 1965) is an elegant attempt to argue otherwise.
91. See Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 402 ff. Dewey's most significant engagement with logical positivism, in the person of A. J. Ayer, came in his Theory of Valuation (1939), Later Works, 13:189-251. Ironically, this highly critical assessment was originally published as a contribution to Otto Neurath's positivist flagship, the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.
92. See Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 402 ff. Dewey's most significant engagement with logical positivism, in the person of A. J. Ayer, came in his Theory of Valuation (1939), Later Works, 13:189-251. Ironically, this highly critical assessment was originally published as a contribution to Otto Neurath's positivist flagship, the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.
93. See Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, 402 ff. Dewey's most significant engagement with logical positivism, in the person of A. J. Ayer, came in his Theory of Valuation (1939), Later Works, 13:189-251. Ironically, this highly critical assessment was originally published as a contribution to Otto Neurath's positivist flagship, the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.
94. Hans Reichenbach, "Dewey's Theory of Science, "in Schilpp and Hahn, The Philosophy of John Dewey, 181-82.
95. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 317-18.
96. Ibid., 298, 360.
97. The paradigmatic example of this "sociological" approach to the study of scientific inquiry is Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (1962; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), though it is somewhat unclear whether he is willing to endorse some of the more radical implications that have been drawn from it.
98. For a theoretical reconstruction of scientific inquiry that is broadly consonant with this view, see Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, "in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 91-195.
99. This is the central claim of Dewey's Theory of Valuation. See also Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, chap. 6.
100. This is the central claim of Dewey's Theory of Valuation. See also Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, chap. 6.
101. See my "Experience as Experiment, "and for an historical account, see Edward A. Purcell Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973).
102. See my "Experience as Experiment, "and for an historical account, see Edward A. Purcell Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973).
103. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 317, and "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, "199.
104. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 317, and "Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, "199.
105. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
106. Each of these dualisms plays an important role in pt. 3 of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
107. Hilary Putnam defines "metaphysical realism" as that position which "view[s] the aim of science simply as trying to get our notional world to 'match' the world in itself." Reason, Truth and History, 134.
108. As Dewey puts it, "How shall we read what we call reality … so that we may essay our deepest political and social problems with a conviction that they are to a reasonable extent sanctioned and sustained by the nature of things?" "Philosophy and Democracy" (1919), Middle Works, 11:48.
109. See, for example, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), lecture 1.