Anti-politics and the spirit of capitalism: Dissidents, monetarists, and the czech transition to capitalism

Theory and Society

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 49-92

  Eyal, Gil ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 0034347203     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007086330378     Document Type: Article

References (125)

1. Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, and Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe (London: Verso, 1998). By “Central Europe,” I mean Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and I distinguish their transitions from what has been the common pattern in “Eastern" Europe, namely Russia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, etc.
2. A good example is the coexistence in Russia of the “oligarchs,” on the one hand, and the barter economy, on the other. See S. Clarke, “Privatization and the Development of Capitalism in Russia,” New Left Review 196 (November-December 1992): 3-27; and Michael Burawoy and Pavel Krotov, “The Soviet Transition from Socialism to Capitalism: Worker Control and Economic Bargaining in the Wood Industry,” American Sociological Review 57 (1992): 16-38.
3. A good example is the coexistence in Russia of the “oligarchs,” on the one hand, and the barter economy, on the other. See S. Clarke, “Privatization and the Development of Capitalism in Russia,” New Left Review 196 (November-December 1992): 3-27; and Michael Burawoy and Pavel Krotov, “The Soviet Transition from Socialism to Capitalism: Worker Control and Economic Bargaining in the Wood Industry,” American Sociological Review 57 (1992): 16-38.
4. Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists 56-62, 128-152.
5. Although this is not to the extent typically suggested in the literature, where the common wisdom has it that the nomenklatura in Poland and Hungary stole state property and turned itself into a new propertied class. See Elemer Hankiss, East European Alternatives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Rudolf L. Tokes, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 340-341; and Jadwiga Stanizskis, “Political Capitalism in Poland,” East European Politics and Societies 5/1 (1991): 127-141. This argument is misguided for the following reasons: a) invariably, the old political nomenklatura in Central Europe was the “loser" of the transformation process. To the extent that former communists benefited from “spontaneous privatization,” they were mostly mid-level managers and technocrats; b) their capacity to do so was directly proportional to the strength of the reformist fraction of the nomenklatura. This explains why Hankiss’s analysis of Hungarian conditions has more merit, but Stanizskis’s much less so; c) undoubtedly the nomenklatura planned to take over state property, but Hankiss and Stanizskis typically fail to take into account their own intervention. Wherever a strong opposition existed during late communism, it acted as a media “watchdog" and blocked spontaneous privatization. Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists, 128-142.
6. Although this is not to the extent typically suggested in the literature, where the common wisdom has it that the nomenklatura in Poland and Hungary stole state property and turned itself into a new propertied class. See Elemer Hankiss, East European Alternatives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Rudolf L. Tokes, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 340-341; and Jadwiga Stanizskis, “Political Capitalism in Poland,” East European Politics and Societies 5/1 (1991): 127-141. This argument is misguided for the following reasons: a) invariably, the old political nomenklatura in Central Europe was the “loser" of the transformation process. To the extent that former communists benefited from “spontaneous privatization,” they were mostly mid-level managers and technocrats; b) their capacity to do so was directly proportional to the strength of the reformist fraction of the nomenklatura. This explains why Hankiss’s analysis of Hungarian conditions has more merit, but Stanizskis’s much less so; c) undoubtedly the nomenklatura planned to take over state property, but Hankiss and Stanizskis typically fail to take into account their own intervention. Wherever a strong opposition existed during late communism, it acted as a media “watchdog" and blocked spontaneous privatization. Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists, 128-142.
7. Although this is not to the extent typically suggested in the literature, where the common wisdom has it that the nomenklatura in Poland and Hungary stole state property and turned itself into a new propertied class. See Elemer Hankiss, East European Alternatives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Rudolf L. Tokes, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 340-341; and Jadwiga Stanizskis, “Political Capitalism in Poland,” East European Politics and Societies 5/1 (1991): 127-141. This argument is misguided for the following reasons: a) invariably, the old political nomenklatura in Central Europe was the “loser" of the transformation process. To the extent that former communists benefited from “spontaneous privatization,” they were mostly mid-level managers and technocrats; b) their capacity to do so was directly proportional to the strength of the reformist fraction of the nomenklatura. This explains why Hankiss’s analysis of Hungarian conditions has more merit, but Stanizskis’s much less so; c) undoubtedly the nomenklatura planned to take over state property, but Hankiss and Stanizskis typically fail to take into account their own intervention. Wherever a strong opposition existed during late communism, it acted as a media “watchdog" and blocked spontaneous privatization. Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists, 128-142.
8. Although this is not to the extent typically suggested in the literature, where the common wisdom has it that the nomenklatura in Poland and Hungary stole state property and turned itself into a new propertied class. See Elemer Hankiss, East European Alternatives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Rudolf L. Tokes, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 340-341; and Jadwiga Stanizskis, “Political Capitalism in Poland,” East European Politics and Societies 5/1 (1991): 127-141. This argument is misguided for the following reasons: a) invariably, the old political nomenklatura in Central Europe was the “loser" of the transformation process. To the extent that former communists benefited from “spontaneous privatization,” they were mostly mid-level managers and technocrats; b) their capacity to do so was directly proportional to the strength of the reformist fraction of the nomenklatura. This explains why Hankiss’s analysis of Hungarian conditions has more merit, but Stanizskis’s much less so; c) undoubtedly the nomenklatura planned to take over state property, but Hankiss and Stanizskis typically fail to take into account their own intervention. Wherever a strong opposition existed during late communism, it acted as a media “watchdog" and blocked spontaneous privatization. Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists, 128-142.
9. The determining factor being the weakness of the reform fraction of the Czech communist elite. For the consequences of voucher privatization in terms of diffuse ownership, see Kare Dahl Martinsen. “From Impotence to Omnipotence: The State and Economic Transition, 1989-1994,” Bohemia 36 (1995): 330-361; and Peter Kenway and Eva Klvacova, “The Web of Cross-Ownership among Czech Financial Intermediaries,” Europe-Asia Studies 48/5 (1996): 797-809. For an evaluation of the capacity of investment funds to supervise the managers, see Karel Brom and Mitchell Orenstein, “The Privatized Sector in the Czech Republic: Government and Bank Control in a Transitional Economy,” Europe-Asia Studies 46/6 (1994): 893-928; and Josef Kotrba, “Privatization Process in the Czech Republic: Players and Winners,” in Jan Svejnar, editor, The Czech Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995), 159-198.
10. The determining factor being the weakness of the reform fraction of the Czech communist elite. For the consequences of voucher privatization in terms of diffuse ownership, see Kare Dahl Martinsen. “From Impotence to Omnipotence: The State and Economic Transition, 1989-1994,” Bohemia 36 (1995): 330-361; and Peter Kenway and Eva Klvacova, “The Web of Cross-Ownership among Czech Financial Intermediaries,” Europe-Asia Studies 48/5 (1996): 797-809. For an evaluation of the capacity of investment funds to supervise the managers, see Karel Brom and Mitchell Orenstein, “The Privatized Sector in the Czech Republic: Government and Bank Control in a Transitional Economy,” Europe-Asia Studies 46/6 (1994): 893-928; and Josef Kotrba, “Privatization Process in the Czech Republic: Players and Winners,” in Jan Svejnar, editor, The Czech Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995), 159-198.
11. The determining factor being the weakness of the reform fraction of the Czech communist elite. For the consequences of voucher privatization in terms of diffuse ownership, see Kare Dahl Martinsen. “From Impotence to Omnipotence: The State and Economic Transition, 1989-1994,” Bohemia 36 (1995): 330-361; and Peter Kenway and Eva Klvacova, “The Web of Cross-Ownership among Czech Financial Intermediaries,” Europe-Asia Studies 48/5 (1996): 797-809. For an evaluation of the capacity of investment funds to supervise the managers, see Karel Brom and Mitchell Orenstein, “The Privatized Sector in the Czech Republic: Government and Bank Control in a Transitional Economy,” Europe-Asia Studies 46/6 (1994): 893-928; and Josef Kotrba, “Privatization Process in the Czech Republic: Players and Winners,” in Jan Svejnar, editor, The Czech Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995), 159-198.
12. The determining factor being the weakness of the reform fraction of the Czech communist elite. For the consequences of voucher privatization in terms of diffuse ownership, see Kare Dahl Martinsen. “From Impotence to Omnipotence: The State and Economic Transition, 1989-1994,” Bohemia 36 (1995): 330-361; and Peter Kenway and Eva Klvacova, “The Web of Cross-Ownership among Czech Financial Intermediaries,” Europe-Asia Studies 48/5 (1996): 797-809. For an evaluation of the capacity of investment funds to supervise the managers, see Karel Brom and Mitchell Orenstein, “The Privatized Sector in the Czech Republic: Government and Bank Control in a Transitional Economy,” Europe-Asia Studies 46/6 (1994): 893-928; and Josef Kotrba, “Privatization Process in the Czech Republic: Players and Winners,” in Jan Svejnar, editor, The Czech Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe (San Diego: Academic Press, 1995), 159-198.
13. Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (N.Y.: Harcourt-Brace, 1979). This critique of their thesis was formulated by Janina Frentzel-Zagorska and Krzysztof Zagorski, “East European Intellectuals on the Road to Dissent,” Politics and Society 17 (1989): 89-113; and amplified by Michael Kennedy, “The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies and Post-communist Regimes in Hungary and Poland,” Theory and Society 21/1 (1992): 29-76. For Bourdieu’s approach to classes, see Pierre Bourdieu, “The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups,” Theory and Society 14/6 (1985): 723-744. But I do not accept the criticism that Konrad and Szelenyi’s argument applied only to Hungary. The “new class" project played a major role, but also met its end, in the “Prague Spring." Jerome Karabel, “The Revolt of the Intellectuals: The Prague Spring and the Politics of Reform Communism,” Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 18 (1995): 93-143.
14. Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (N.Y.: Harcourt-Brace, 1979). This critique of their thesis was formulated by Janina Frentzel-Zagorska and Krzysztof Zagorski, “East European Intellectuals on the Road to Dissent,” Politics and Society 17 (1989): 89-113; and amplified by Michael Kennedy, “The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies and Post-communist Regimes in Hungary and Poland,” Theory and Society 21/1 (1992): 29-76. For Bourdieu’s approach to classes, see Pierre Bourdieu, “The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups,” Theory and Society 14/6 (1985): 723-744. But I do not accept the criticism that Konrad and Szelenyi’s argument applied only to Hungary. The “new class" project played a major role, but also met its end, in the “Prague Spring." Jerome Karabel, “The Revolt of the Intellectuals: The Prague Spring and the Politics of Reform Communism,” Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 18 (1995): 93-143.
15. Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (N.Y.: Harcourt-Brace, 1979). This critique of their thesis was formulated by Janina Frentzel-Zagorska and Krzysztof Zagorski, “East European Intellectuals on the Road to Dissent,” Politics and Society 17 (1989): 89-113; and amplified by Michael Kennedy, “The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies and Post-communist Regimes in Hungary and Poland,” Theory and Society 21/1 (1992): 29-76. For Bourdieu’s approach to classes, see Pierre Bourdieu, “The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups,” Theory and Society 14/6 (1985): 723-744. But I do not accept the criticism that Konrad and Szelenyi’s argument applied only to Hungary. The “new class" project played a major role, but also met its end, in the “Prague Spring." Jerome Karabel, “The Revolt of the Intellectuals: The Prague Spring and the Politics of Reform Communism,” Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 18 (1995): 93-143.
16. Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (N.Y.: Harcourt-Brace, 1979). This critique of their thesis was formulated by Janina Frentzel-Zagorska and Krzysztof Zagorski, “East European Intellectuals on the Road to Dissent,” Politics and Society 17 (1989): 89-113; and amplified by Michael Kennedy, “The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies and Post-communist Regimes in Hungary and Poland,” Theory and Society 21/1 (1992): 29-76. For Bourdieu’s approach to classes, see Pierre Bourdieu, “The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups,” Theory and Society 14/6 (1985): 723-744. But I do not accept the criticism that Konrad and Szelenyi’s argument applied only to Hungary. The “new class" project played a major role, but also met its end, in the “Prague Spring." Jerome Karabel, “The Revolt of the Intellectuals: The Prague Spring and the Politics of Reform Communism,” Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 18 (1995): 93-143.
17. Gyorgy Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (N.Y.: Harcourt-Brace, 1979). This critique of their thesis was formulated by Janina Frentzel-Zagorska and Krzysztof Zagorski, “East European Intellectuals on the Road to Dissent,” Politics and Society 17 (1989): 89-113; and amplified by Michael Kennedy, “The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies and Post-communist Regimes in Hungary and Poland,” Theory and Society 21/1 (1992): 29-76. For Bourdieu’s approach to classes, see Pierre Bourdieu, “The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups,” Theory and Society 14/6 (1985): 723-744. But I do not accept the criticism that Konrad and Szelenyi’s argument applied only to Hungary. The “new class" project played a major role, but also met its end, in the “Prague Spring." Jerome Karabel, “The Revolt of the Intellectuals: The Prague Spring and the Politics of Reform Communism,” Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 18 (1995): 93-143.
18. I believe the same principles of analysis are applicable also to Hungary and Poland, but with two additional complications: a) unlike Czech dissidents, the Hungarian and Polish oppositions were split between liberals and nationalists; while b) unlike Czech cadres, the Hungarian and Polish communists were split between significant reform and hard-line factions. Why is this a complication? Because reform communists and nationalist dissidents were likely to coalesce around a project of representing the “nation,” and protecting its interests. This coalition co-opted liberal dissidents and non-communist technocrats, and thus gave a nationalist bent to their self-understanding as bildungsbürgertum. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer for Theory and Society. The analytical “purity" of the Czech case was thus the result of an actual “chemical" analysis, a real process of polarization in Czecho-Slovak politics, ending in the breakup of Czechoslovakia. The divisions between nationalists/liberals and reformers/hard-liners were “condensed" into the opposition between Czech and Slovak elites, the latter being composed precisely of nationalist dissidents and reform communists. See Gil Eyal, The Breakup of Czechoslovakia: A Sociological Explanation (Ph.D. Dissertation, Dept. of Sociology, UCLA: 1997).
19. Nikolas Rose, “Governing Advanced Liberal Democracies,” in Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, editors. Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Rationalities of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 37-64.
20. Examples are: Václav Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe - an Inquiry,” Social Research 55/1-2 (1988): 211-260; John Keane, editor, The Power of the Powerless (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Marc Rakovski (pseud. for Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis), Towards an East European Marxism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson, editors, Civic Freedom in Central Europe (London: Macmillan, 1991). We should also include in this list Western cultural entrepreneurs, some of them émigrés, who helped market this concept. See Andrew Arató, “Civil Society Against the State - Poland 1980-1981,” Telos 47 (1981): 23-47; Jean Cohen and Andrew Arató, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1992).
21. Examples are: Václav Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe - an Inquiry,” Social Research 55/1-2 (1988): 211-260; John Keane, editor, The Power of the Powerless (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Marc Rakovski (pseud. for Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis), Towards an East European Marxism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson, editors, Civic Freedom in Central Europe (London: Macmillan, 1991). We should also include in this list Western cultural entrepreneurs, some of them émigrés, who helped market this concept. See Andrew Arató, “Civil Society Against the State - Poland 1980-1981,” Telos 47 (1981): 23-47; Jean Cohen and Andrew Arató, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1992).
22. Examples are: Václav Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe - an Inquiry,” Social Research 55/1-2 (1988): 211-260; John Keane, editor, The Power of the Powerless (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Marc Rakovski (pseud. for Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis), Towards an East European Marxism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson, editors, Civic Freedom in Central Europe (London: Macmillan, 1991). We should also include in this list Western cultural entrepreneurs, some of them émigrés, who helped market this concept. See Andrew Arató, “Civil Society Against the State - Poland 1980-1981,” Telos 47 (1981): 23-47; Jean Cohen and Andrew Arató, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1992).
23. Examples are: Václav Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe - an Inquiry,” Social Research 55/1-2 (1988): 211-260; John Keane, editor, The Power of the Powerless (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Marc Rakovski (pseud. for Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis), Towards an East European Marxism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson, editors, Civic Freedom in Central Europe (London: Macmillan, 1991). We should also include in this list Western cultural entrepreneurs, some of them émigrés, who helped market this concept. See Andrew Arató, “Civil Society Against the State - Poland 1980-1981,” Telos 47 (1981): 23-47; Jean Cohen and Andrew Arató, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1992).
24. Examples are: Václav Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe - an Inquiry,” Social Research 55/1-2 (1988): 211-260; John Keane, editor, The Power of the Powerless (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Marc Rakovski (pseud. for Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis), Towards an East European Marxism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson, editors, Civic Freedom in Central Europe (London: Macmillan, 1991). We should also include in this list Western cultural entrepreneurs, some of them émigrés, who helped market this concept. See Andrew Arató, “Civil Society Against the State - Poland 1980-1981,” Telos 47 (1981): 23-47; Jean Cohen and Andrew Arató, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1992).
25. Examples are: Václav Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe - an Inquiry,” Social Research 55/1-2 (1988): 211-260; John Keane, editor, The Power of the Powerless (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Marc Rakovski (pseud. for Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis), Towards an East European Marxism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson, editors, Civic Freedom in Central Europe (London: Macmillan, 1991). We should also include in this list Western cultural entrepreneurs, some of them émigrés, who helped market this concept. See Andrew Arató, “Civil Society Against the State - Poland 1980-1981,” Telos 47 (1981): 23-47; Jean Cohen and Andrew Arató, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1992).
26. Examples are: Václav Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe - an Inquiry,” Social Research 55/1-2 (1988): 211-260; John Keane, editor, The Power of the Powerless (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Marc Rakovski (pseud. for Gyorgy Bence and Janos Kis), Towards an East European Marxism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978); Gordon Skilling and Paul Wilson, editors, Civic Freedom in Central Europe (London: Macmillan, 1991). We should also include in this list Western cultural entrepreneurs, some of them émigrés, who helped market this concept. See Andrew Arató, “Civil Society Against the State - Poland 1980-1981,” Telos 47 (1981): 23-47; Jean Cohen and Andrew Arató, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1992).
27. Steven M. Fish, “The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World,” EEPS 12, 1 (1998): 31-48.
28. Václav Havel, Summer Meditations (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).
29. Petr Pithart, “Social and Economic Developments in Czechoslovakia in the 1980’s (part I),” East European Reporter 4/1 (Winter 1989-1990): 42-45.
30. Pithart, “Social and Economic Developments.
31. Jiřina Šiklová, “Dilemmas of Transition: A View fom Prague,” Peace Review 4/4 (1992): 24-28.
32. John P. Moran, “The Communist Torturers of Eastern Europe: Prosecute and Punish or Forgive and Forget?" Communist and Post-Communist Studies 27/1 (March 1994): 95-109.
33. Jiřna Šiklová, “Lustration, or the Czech Way of Screening,” East European Constitutional Review 5/1 (Winter 1996): 57-62.
34. Zdeněk Kessler, Czech supreme court judge, and a former dissident, quoted in Martin Komárek, GEN - 100 Čechů Dneška (Prague: Fischer, 1994-1995). My translation (G.E.).
35. Thus, Table 1 defines “dissidents" as those who experienced rapid downward mobility after 1968, or after they signed Charter 77, and could not continue to work in their professions.
36. Vladimír Kusin. From Dubček to Charter 77: A Study of Normalization in Czechoslovakia 1968-1978. (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1978).
37. Quoted in Komárek, GEN. My translation (G.E.).
38. Jan Urban, “The Politics and Power of Humiliation,” in Tim D. Whipple, editor, After the Velvet Revolution: Václav Havel and the New Leaders of Czechoslovakia Speak Out (N.Y.: Freedom House, 1991), 267-304. This analysis obviously owes a great deal to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. See Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). Another element of this habitus, and hence a chapter in the genealogy of dissidence that I am not able to discuss here, is the discourse of “self-criticism." A straight line leads from the problematization of authenticity by communist humanist intellectuals during the 1950s and the 1960s, as they debated the choices they made during Stalinism, and their penchant for moral dissent in later years. See the perceptive account in Marci Shore, “Engineering in the Age of Innocence: A Genealogy of Discourse inside the Czechoslovak Writer’s Union. 1949-1967,” EEPS 12/3 (Fall 1998).
39. Jan Urban, “The Politics and Power of Humiliation,” in Tim D. Whipple, editor, After the Velvet Revolution: Václav Havel and the New Leaders of Czechoslovakia Speak Out (N.Y.: Freedom House, 1991), 267-304. This analysis obviously owes a great deal to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. See Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). Another element of this habitus, and hence a chapter in the genealogy of dissidence that I am not able to discuss here, is the discourse of “self-criticism." A straight line leads from the problematization of authenticity by communist humanist intellectuals during the 1950s and the 1960s, as they debated the choices they made during Stalinism, and their penchant for moral dissent in later years. See the perceptive account in Marci Shore, “Engineering in the Age of Innocence: A Genealogy of Discourse inside the Czechoslovak Writer’s Union. 1949-1967,” EEPS 12/3 (Fall 1998).
40. Jan Urban, “The Politics and Power of Humiliation,” in Tim D. Whipple, editor, After the Velvet Revolution: Václav Havel and the New Leaders of Czechoslovakia Speak Out (N.Y.: Freedom House, 1991), 267-304. This analysis obviously owes a great deal to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. See Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). Another element of this habitus, and hence a chapter in the genealogy of dissidence that I am not able to discuss here, is the discourse of “self-criticism." A straight line leads from the problematization of authenticity by communist humanist intellectuals during the 1950s and the 1960s, as they debated the choices they made during Stalinism, and their penchant for moral dissent in later years. See the perceptive account in Marci Shore, “Engineering in the Age of Innocence: A Genealogy of Discourse inside the Czechoslovak Writer’s Union. 1949-1967,” EEPS 12/3 (Fall 1998).
41. Kessler, in Komárek, GEN. My translation (G.E.).
42. The person discussed is the writer Ivan Klíma. Komárek, GEN. My translation (G.E.).
43. Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton, editors, Technologies of the Self(London: Tavistock, 1988), 16-49.
44. Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self,” Political Theory 21/2 (May 1993): 198-227.
45. Václav Havel, “Politics and Conscience,” in Jan Vladislav, editor, Václav Havel or Living in Truth (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 136-157.
46. Václav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” in Keane, The Power of the Powerless, 23-96.
47. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Travistock, 1972).
48. A similar analysis is offered in Petr Fidelius (pseudonym for Petr Pithart). “The Mirror of Communist Discourse,” in Marketa Goetz-Stankiewicz, editor, Goodbye, Samizdat: Twenty Years of Czechoslovak Underground Writing. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1992), 193-204. For the important role of the phenomenological concept of the “natural world" in dissident discourse, see Zdzislaw Krasnodebski, “Longing for Community - Phenomenological Philosophy of Politics and the Dilemmas of European Culture,” International Sociology 8/3 (1993): 339-353.
49. A similar analysis is offered in Petr Fidelius (pseudonym for Petr Pithart). “The Mirror of Communist Discourse,” in Marketa Goetz-Stankiewicz, editor, Goodbye, Samizdat: Twenty Years of Czechoslovak Underground Writing. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1992), 193-204. For the important role of the phenomenological concept of the “natural world" in dissident discourse, see Zdzislaw Krasnodebski, “Longing for Community - Phenomenological Philosophy of Politics and the Dilemmas of European Culture,” International Sociology 8/3 (1993): 339-353.
50. Thus, even dissidents who criticize Havel’s anti-politics, and suggest a more activist and “political" engagement with the regime, take as their starting point a similar analysis of the false ideological reality created by socialism, and the way it corrupts individuals. See Miroslav Kusy, “Chartism and Real Socialism,” in Keane, The Power of the Powerless, 152-177.
51. Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” 39-40.
52. Havel, “Power of the Powerless,” 57-60. Similarly, the Protestant philosopher Hejdánek rejected the notion that the dissidents constitute an “opposition,” or that they should formulate a politial program to assume power after the fall of Communism. They were apolitical human rights activists, whose role was to challenge the regime’s ideological mystifications. Ladislav Hejdánek, “Prospects for Democracy and Socialism in Eastern Europe,” in Keane, The Power of the Powerless, 141-151.
53. Havel, “Power of the Powerless,” 57-60. Similarly, the Protestant philosopher Hejdánek rejected the notion that the dissidents constitute an “opposition,” or that they should formulate a politial program to assume power after the fall of Communism. They were apolitical human rights activists, whose role was to challenge the regime’s ideological mystifications. Ladislav Hejdánek, “Prospects for Democracy and Socialism in Eastern Europe,” in Keane, The Power of the Powerless, 141-151.
54. Indeed, other dissidents within the “charter 77" movement, notably Vá;clav Benda. have remained suspicious of Havel’s elitist emphasis on “living within the truth,” and considered the values of drobna" prace to be a sufficient basis for resisting the regime. See Benda, “Parallel Polis.
55. Havel, “Power of the Powerless,” 34-35.
56. “It is … becoming evident … that a single, seemingly powerless person who dares to cry out the word of truth and to stand behind it with all his person and all his life, ready to pay a high price, has … greater power … than do thousands of anomymous voters." Havel, “Politics and Conscience,” 156.
57. Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 206-228.
58. Jan Potočka. “Wars of the 20th Century and the 20th Century as War,” Telos 30 (Winter 1976-1977): 116-126. References to Patočka abound in dissident literature. Havel himself refers to Patočka on sacrifice and responsibility in the passage cited above. All the major dissident philosophers - Hejdánek, Bělohradský, Palouš, Kohák - were students of Patočka, and quote him reverently. For a summary of their positions, see Ivan Chvatík, “The Solidarity of the Shaken,” Telos 94 (1993/1994): 163-166.
59. Jan Potočka. “Wars of the 20th Century and the 20th Century as War,” Telos 30 (Winter 1976-1977): 116-126. References to Patočka abound in dissident literature. Havel himself refers to Patočka on sacrifice and responsibility in the passage cited above. All the major dissident philosophers - Hejdánek, Bělohradský, Palouš, Kohák - were students of Patočka, and quote him reverently. For a summary of their positions, see Ivan Chvatík, “The Solidarity of the Shaken,” Telos 94 (1993/1994): 163-166.
60. Patočka, “Wars of the 20th Century,” 125.
61. Hejdánek, “Prospects for Democracy,” 147. This rejection of “programs" is specifically directed against the role of the teleological intellectual. Pastoral power is no longer a claim to class power, in the sense employed by Konrad and Szelenyi.
62. Ladislav Holý, The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 27-33.
63. The following account is based on Bradley F. Abrams, “Morality, Wisdom and Revision: The Czech Opposition in the 1970’s and the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans,” EEPS 9/2 (Spring 1995): 234-255. Among the dissident participants were Pithart, Příhoda, Hejdánek, and Erazim Kohák. The reform communist group included official and unofficial historians such as Milan Hubel, Jaroslav Opat, Radomir Luža, Václav Kural, and Jan Kren.
64. The following quote is from historian Ján Mlynárik, whose essay begun the debate: “The transfer with its consequences taught the national not to respect … the principle of property, a value created over generations. It … taught [the nation] to steal…. The alienation of property in socialist ownership … does not have its source and spring in the origin of socialism, but here in the immense stealing and robbing of German property." One can already sense here how anti-politics will be transformed into civic education for capitalism. Communism was a punishment for the original sin of the expulsion. To overcome it, one will need to confess to the guilt of the expulsion. Only such confession can purify the Czechs and reestablish capitalist values such as respect for private property. It also becomes clearer that one of the reasons why the dissidents began gravitating toward such a role, eventually being converted into neo-liberals by the monetarists, was their struggle in the cultural field against the reform communists.
65. Erazim Kohák, quoted in Abrams, “Morality, Wisdom and Revision,” 251.
66. Václav Benda, “The Parallel Polis,” in Skilling and Wilson, Civic Freedom, 35-41.
67. Benda, “Parallel Polis.
68. Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, editors. The Foucault Effect (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87-104.
69. Václav Havel, “Article 202,” in John Miller and Kristen Miller, editors. Chronicles from Prague (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1994), 1-16. Similarly, Benda characterized the methods of the communist regime as consciously haphazard and arbitrary: “… the rule is that there are no fixed rules: the uncertainty of persecution increases the feeling of danger and creates suspicion, spite and suspense." Václav Benda, “The Rule of no Fixed Rules,” East European Reporter 2/2 (1986): 15-17.
70. Václav Havel, “Article 202,” in John Miller and Kristen Miller, editors. Chronicles from Prague (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1994), 1-16. Similarly, Benda characterized the methods of the communist regime as consciously haphazard and arbitrary: “… the rule is that there are no fixed rules: the uncertainty of persecution increases the feeling of danger and creates suspicion, spite and suspense." Václav Benda, “The Rule of no Fixed Rules,” East European Reporter 2/2 (1986): 15-17.
71. Pithart, “Social and Economic Developments." This was what Ivan Klima called “the conspiracy of real materialists." See his My Merry Mornings (London: Readers International, 1985).
72. Jiří Dientsbier, “Response to Václav Benda’s The Parallel Polis,” in Skilling and Wilson, Civic Freedom, 57-59.
73. In this respect, the dissidents’ version of civil society correspond quite closely to the neo-liberal rationality of government. See Graham Burchell, “Liberal Government - Old and New,” in Barry, Osborne, and Rose, Foucault and Political Reason, 19-36.
74. Based on information from Pavel Kosátik, editor, Kdo je Kdo, 1991/92. Česka Republika. (Praha: Kdo je Kdo, 1991).
75. Interview with Klaus in Komárek, GEN. My translation (G.E.); “Creating a Capitalist Czechoslovakia: An Interview with Václav Klaus,” in Whipple, After the Velvet Revolution, 149-156. The weak ties between reform communists and internally exiled professionals set the Czech case apart from both the Slovak and Hungarian cases, and go a long way toward explaining the differences in their policies after 1989. Tokes. Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution; Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Reform Efforts in the Czech and Slovak Communist Parties and their Successors, 1988-1993,” EEPS 12/3 (Fall 1998).
76. Interview with Klaus in Komárek, GEN. My translation (G.E.); “Creating a Capitalist Czechoslovakia: An Interview with Václav Klaus,” in Whipple, After the Velvet Revolution, 149-156. The weak ties between reform communists and internally exiled professionals set the Czech case apart from both the Slovak and Hungarian cases, and go a long way toward explaining the differences in their policies after 1989. Tokes. Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution; Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Reform Efforts in the Czech and Slovak Communist Parties and their Successors, 1988-1993,” EEPS 12/3 (Fall 1998).
77. Interview with Klaus in Komárek, GEN. My translation (G.E.); “Creating a Capitalist Czechoslovakia: An Interview with Václav Klaus,” in Whipple, After the Velvet Revolution, 149-156. The weak ties between reform communists and internally exiled professionals set the Czech case apart from both the Slovak and Hungarian cases, and go a long way toward explaining the differences in their policies after 1989. Tokes. Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution; Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Reform Efforts in the Czech and Slovak Communist Parties and their Successors, 1988-1993,” EEPS 12/3 (Fall 1998).
78. Interview with Klaus in Komárek, GEN. My translation (G.E.); “Creating a Capitalist Czechoslovakia: An Interview with Václav Klaus,” in Whipple, After the Velvet Revolution, 149-156. The weak ties between reform communists and internally exiled professionals set the Czech case apart from both the Slovak and Hungarian cases, and go a long way toward explaining the differences in their policies after 1989. Tokes. Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution; Anna Grzymala-Busse, “Reform Efforts in the Czech and Slovak Communist Parties and their Successors, 1988-1993,” EEPS 12/3 (Fall 1998).
79. The expression is Salzmann’s, in Komárek, GEN. My translation (G.E.).
80. Václav Klaus, “Socialist Economies, Economic Reforms and Economists: Reflections of a Czechoslovak Economist,” Communist Economies 1/1 (1989): 89-96.
81. The most characteristic recommendations are: 1) to control inflation even at the price of unemployment; 2) to conduct a tight-fisted fiscal policy bound by “rule of steady growth in the money stock"; 3) to opt for fixed policy rules over discretionary powers; and 4) to establish flexible exchange rates, and open up to international competition. See Jeffery A. Frieden, “Capital Politics: Creditors and the International Political Economy,” in his and David A. Lake, editors. International Political Economy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 296-312; and Gregory N. Mankiw, “A Quick Refresher Course in Macroeconomics,” Journal of Economic Literature XXVIII (December 1990): 1645-1660.
82. The most characteristic recommendations are: 1) to control inflation even at the price of unemployment; 2) to conduct a tight-fisted fiscal policy bound by “rule of steady growth in the money stock"; 3) to opt for fixed policy rules over discretionary powers; and 4) to establish flexible exchange rates, and open up to international competition. See Jeffery A. Frieden, “Capital Politics: Creditors and the International Political Economy,” in his and David A. Lake, editors. International Political Economy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 296-312; and Gregory N. Mankiw, “A Quick Refresher Course in Macroeconomics,” Journal of Economic Literature XXVIII (December 1990): 1645-1660.
83. Mitchell Orenstein, “The Political Success of Neo-Liberalism in the Czech Republic,” CERGE-EI Working Paper Series 68 (June 1994); Peter Rutland, “Thatcherism, Czech Style: Transition to Capitalism in the Czech Republic,” Telos 94 (Winter 1992-1993): 103-124.
84. Mitchell Orenstein, “The Political Success of Neo-Liberalism in the Czech Republic,” CERGE-EI Working Paper Series 68 (June 1994); Peter Rutland, “Thatcherism, Czech Style: Transition to Capitalism in the Czech Republic,” Telos 94 (Winter 1992-1993): 103-124.
85. The focus on “practical rationality" or techne is one of Foucault’s major contributions to sociological theory. See “Questions of Method" in Baynes et al., editors, After Philosophy - End or Transformation? (MIT Press, 1987), 73-94.
86. Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, “Governing Economic Life,” Economy and Society 19/1 (February 1990): 1-31. For all the monetarist emphasis on freedom, their overwhelming concern is governing. Their question is how to “establish a … system that is stable and at the same time free from irresponsible government tinkering, and their answer is that “control over money can be a potent tool for controlling and shaping the economy." Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 38-39.
87. Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, “Governing Economic Life,” Economy and Society 19/1 (February 1990): 1-31. For all the monetarist emphasis on freedom, their overwhelming concern is governing. Their question is how to “establish a … system that is stable and at the same time free from irresponsible government tinkering, and their answer is that “control over money can be a potent tool for controlling and shaping the economy." Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 38-39.
88. Foucault, “Governmentality.
89. Burchell, “Liberal Government.
90. Bruno Latour, Science in Action (London: Open University Press, 1987).
91. Tomaš Ježek and Otakar Turek, “The Role of the Economic Center,” Czechoslovak Economic Digest 2/1989: 3-12. Akos Rona-Tas, The Czech New Wave: The Third Wave of Privatization and the Role of the State in the Czech Republic (unpublished manuscript, Department of Sociology: UCSD, 1996).
92. Tomaš Ježek and Otakar Turek, “The Role of the Economic Center,” Czechoslovak Economic Digest 2/1989: 3-12. Akos Rona-Tas, The Czech New Wave: The Third Wave of Privatization and the Role of the State in the Czech Republic (unpublished manuscript, Department of Sociology: UCSD, 1996).
93. Václav Klaus and Dušan Tříska, “The Economic Center: The Restructuring and Equilibrium,” Czechoslovak Economic Digest 1/1989: 34-56; Niels Thygesen, “Milton Friedman,” in Henry W. Spiegel and Warren J. Samuels, editors. Contemporary Economists in Perspective (London, JAI Press, 1984), 229, 240-243; Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 54, 79; Mankiw, “A Quick Refresher Course,” 1650.
94. Václav Klaus and Dušan Tříska, “The Economic Center: The Restructuring and Equilibrium,” Czechoslovak Economic Digest 1/1989: 34-56; Niels Thygesen, “Milton Friedman,” in Henry W. Spiegel and Warren J. Samuels, editors. Contemporary Economists in Perspective (London, JAI Press, 1984), 229, 240-243; Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 54, 79; Mankiw, “A Quick Refresher Course,” 1650.
95. Václav Klaus and Dušan Tříska, “The Economic Center: The Restructuring and Equilibrium,” Czechoslovak Economic Digest 1/1989: 34-56; Niels Thygesen, “Milton Friedman,” in Henry W. Spiegel and Warren J. Samuels, editors. Contemporary Economists in Perspective (London, JAI Press, 1984), 229, 240-243; Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 54, 79; Mankiw, “A Quick Refresher Course,” 1650.
96. Václav Klaus and Dušan Tříska, “The Economic Center: The Restructuring and Equilibrium,” Czechoslovak Economic Digest 1/1989: 34-56; Niels Thygesen, “Milton Friedman,” in Henry W. Spiegel and Warren J. Samuels, editors. Contemporary Economists in Perspective (London, JAI Press, 1984), 229, 240-243; Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 54, 79; Mankiw, “A Quick Refresher Course,” 1650.
97. This was Robert Lucas’s analysis. See Mankiw, “A Quick Refresher Course.
98. Jan Svejnar, “Introduction and Overview,” in Svejnar, The Czech Republic, 7-8.
99. Rutland, “Neo-liberalism"; Burawoy and Krotov, “The Soviet Transition." Moreover, during the early period of transition, bankruptcies are not yet the unerring selector of efficiency they would be once monetarization has been completed. Ježek and Turek, “The Role of Economic Center,” 10.
100. Rutland, “Neo-liberalism"; Burawoy and Krotov, “The Soviet Transition." Moreover, during the early period of transition, bankruptcies are not yet the unerring selector of efficiency they would be once monetarization has been completed. Ježek and Turek, “The Role of Economic Center,” 10.
101. Rutland, “Neo-liberalism"; Burawoy and Krotov, “The Soviet Transition." Moreover, during the early period of transition, bankruptcies are not yet the unerring selector of efficiency they would be once monetarization has been completed. Ježek and Turek, “The Role of Economic Center,” 10.
102. Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
103. Thygesen, “Milton Friedman,” 227-228; Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,” in Burchell et al., The Foucault Effect, 1-51. As an example, Gordon mentions Gary Becker’s suggestion to treat legal order as “supply of law-abiding behavior,” allowing one to calculate “the quantity of crimes which it is worth a society’s while to tolerate.
104. Thygesen, “Milton Friedman,” 227-228; Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,” in Burchell et al., The Foucault Effect, 1-51. As an example, Gordon mentions Gary Becker’s suggestion to treat legal order as “supply of law-abiding behavior,” allowing one to calculate “the quantity of crimes which it is worth a society’s while to tolerate.
105. “Freedom is a tenable objective only for responsible individuals. We do not believe in freedom for madmen or children. The necessity of drawing a line between responsible individuals and others is inescapable, yet it means that … [paternalist government] is inescapable for those whom we designate as not responsible." Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 33.
106. This is true of neo-classical economic theories such as “Rational Expectations" theory. Mankiw, “A Quick Refresher Course,” 1649; Rudy van Zijp and Hans Visser, “Mathematical Formalization and the Damain of Economics,” in Jack Birner and Rudy van Zijp, editors, Hayek, Co-ordination and Evolution (London: Routledge, 1994), 64-93.
107. This is true of neo-classical economic theories such as “Rational Expectations" theory. Mankiw, “A Quick Refresher Course,” 1649; Rudy van Zijp and Hans Visser, “Mathematical Formalization and the Damain of Economics,” in Jack Birner and Rudy van Zijp, editors, Hayek, Co-ordination and Evolution (London: Routledge, 1994), 64-93.
108. On the distinction between disciplinary technologies that correct individuals, and actuarial technologies that seek to minimize risk, see Robert Castel, “From Dangerousness to Risk,” in Burchell et al., The Foucault Effect, 281-298; Jonathan Simon, “The Emergence of a Risk Society: Insurance, Law and the State,” Socialist Review 95 (1987), 61-89; and “The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices,” Law and Society Review 22 (1988), 722-800.
109. On the distinction between disciplinary technologies that correct individuals, and actuarial technologies that seek to minimize risk, see Robert Castel, “From Dangerousness to Risk,” in Burchell et al., The Foucault Effect, 281-298; Jonathan Simon, “The Emergence of a Risk Society: Insurance, Law and the State,” Socialist Review 95 (1987), 61-89; and “The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices,” Law and Society Review 22 (1988), 722-800.
110. On the distinction between disciplinary technologies that correct individuals, and actuarial technologies that seek to minimize risk, see Robert Castel, “From Dangerousness to Risk,” in Burchell et al., The Foucault Effect, 281-298; Jonathan Simon, “The Emergence of a Risk Society: Insurance, Law and the State,” Socialist Review 95 (1987), 61-89; and “The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices,” Law and Society Review 22 (1988), 722-800.
111. Thus, I do not follow the arguments of Castel or Simon that neo-liberalism signifies a transition from disciplinary society to a risk-based one. Instead, I suggest we think of it as a political rationality that combines disciplinary, actuarial, and pastoral techniques. For a similar position, see Pat O’Malley, “Risk and Responsibility,” in Barry et al. Foucault and Political Reason, 189-207.
112. Klaus and Třiska, “The Economic Center,” 41.
113. Václav Klaus, quoted in Holý, The Little Czech.
114. Or even civility: “Anyone who has been in the west can testify that willingness, regard for others, and respect for their needs are quite common there. This is not in spite of but because of the fact that the market has
115. “An economy with an irrational price structure behaves irrationally, and no one can really be sure of what will help or harm it the most." Klaus, “Creating a Capitalist Czechoslovakia.
116. Pithart, “Social and Economic Developments.
117. Ježek and Turek, “The Role of the Economic Center,” 11; Radek Laštovička, Anton Marcinčin, and Michal Mejstřik, “Corporate Governance and Share Prices in Voucher Privatized Companies,” in Svejnar, The Czech Republic, 199-209.
118. Ježek and Turek, “The Role of the Economic Center,” 11; Radek Laštovička, Anton Marcinčin, and Michal Mejstřik, “Corporate Governance and Share Prices in Voucher Privatized Companies,” in Svejnar, The Czech Republic, 199-209.
119. Ježek and Turek, “The Role of the Economic Center,” 5.
120. This is because there was no strong reform faction to organize the negotiations, which were arranged by two of Havel’s personal friends. Accordingly, and unlike Hungary and Poland, the opposition delegation was composed almost only of dissidents. Klaus, however, was already present in the first two meetings. See the papers by Calda, Osiatynski, and Sajo in Jon Elster, editor, The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 21-98, 135-177.
121. “It is because his specific capital is a pure fiduciary value which depends on representation, opinion, beliefs, fides, that the man of politics [sic], like the man of honor, is especially vulnerable to suspicions, malicious misrepresentations and scandal, in short, to everything that threatens belief and trust, by bringing to light the hidden and secret acts and remarks of the present or the past." Pierre Bourdieu, “Political Representation: Elements for a Theory of the Political Field,” in his Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 191-192.
122. Eyal, The Breakup of Czechoslovakia. Valtr Komárek, the Czech reform Communist, considered by the Slovaks “a cornerstone of their long-term perspective,” only joined the roundtable negotiations during the eighth and ninth rounds, under Slovak pressure and against the wishes of the dissidents. Elster, The Roundtable Talks, 147, 155, 173.
123. Eyal, The Breakup of Czechoslovakia. Valtr Komárek, the Czech reform Communist, considered by the Slovaks “a cornerstone of their long-term perspective,” only joined the roundtable negotiations during the eighth and ninth rounds, under Slovak pressure and against the wishes of the dissidents. Elster, The Roundtable Talks, 147, 155, 173.
124. Kennedy, “The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies"; Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (N.Y.: The Seabury Press. 1979).
125. Kennedy, “The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies"; Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (N.Y.: The Seabury Press. 1979).