A competing risks model of supreme court vacancies, 1789-1992

Political Behavior

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 145-166

  Zorn, Christopher J W ^a   Van Winkle, Steven R ^b  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034344693     PISSN: 01909320     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1006667601289     Document Type: Article

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