Negotiation in the commons: Incorporating field and experimental evidence into a theory of local collective action

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 156, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 661-683

  Carpenter, Jeffrey P ^a  

^a MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034341954     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (41)

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