Structure, agency, and the nicaraguan revolution

Theory and Society

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 187-213

  Ryan, Phil ^a  

^a CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

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EID: 0034340861     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007015218826     Document Type: Article

References (151)

1. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
2. Analogously, Skocpol argues that "Too close a focus on peasants themselves ... cannot allow us to understand peasant-based revolutions." Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 235.
3. Structures are understood here as patterns of relations that are relatively stable and extended across time and space, a definition reflective of the actual structures studied by Skocpol and others, such as "the world capitalist economy" and "the institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society." States and Social Revolutions, 23, 18. Skocpol herself defined structures as "patterned relationships beyond the manipulative control of any single group or individual." Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 200. But this definition seems to make the structural coterminous with the social: which social phenomena are completely under the control of an individual or group? As Hans-Georg Gadamer points out, not even a "genuine conversation" is under the control of either party. Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 1989), 383.
4. Structures are understood here as patterns of relations that are relatively stable and extended across time and space, a definition reflective of the actual structures studied by Skocpol and others, such as "the world capitalist economy" and "the institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society." States and Social Revolutions, 23, 18. Skocpol herself defined structures as "patterned relationships beyond the manipulative control of any single group or individual." Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 200. But this definition seems to make the structural coterminous with the social: which social phenomena are completely under the control of an individual or group? As Hans-Georg Gadamer points out, not even a "genuine conversation" is under the control of either party. Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 1989), 383.
5. Structures are understood here as patterns of relations that are relatively stable and extended across time and space, a definition reflective of the actual structures studied by Skocpol and others, such as "the world capitalist economy" and "the institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society." States and Social Revolutions, 23, 18. Skocpol herself defined structures as "patterned relationships beyond the manipulative control of any single group or individual." Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 200. But this definition seems to make the structural coterminous with the social: which social phenomena are completely under the control of an individual or group? As Hans-Georg Gadamer points out, not even a "genuine conversation" is under the control of either party. Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 1989), 383.
6. Note in particular that an agential account need not be "voluntarist," in the sense of denying the thesis that motives are so "contradictory that their complex interaction produces results that no one intended." Gordon Wood, cited by Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 18. Hannah Arendt's distinction between "action" and "fabrication" is helpful here. Action "corresponds to the human condition of plurality," to the fact that human life is life-among-others. Given this plurality, action is free but not "sovereign": we are "able to begin something new" yet unable "to control or even foretell its consequences." Indeed, "action almost never achieves its purpose." Fabrication, on the other hand, has "a definite beginning and a definite, predictable end." Confusion between the two categories, Arendt suggests, is characteristic of modernity, so it is perhaps unsurprising to find discussions of revolution conflating the thesis of agential causality with that of agential control. The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 7, 235, 184, 143, 300.
7. Note in particular that an agential account need not be "voluntarist," in the sense of denying the thesis that motives are so "contradictory that their complex interaction produces results that no one intended." Gordon Wood, cited by Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 18. Hannah Arendt's distinction between "action" and "fabrication" is helpful here. Action "corresponds to the human condition of plurality," to the fact that human life is life-among-others. Given this plurality, action is free but not "sovereign": we are "able to begin something new" yet unable "to control or even foretell its consequences." Indeed, "action almost never achieves its purpose." Fabrication, on the other hand, has "a definite beginning and a definite, predictable end." Confusion between the two categories, Arendt suggests, is characteristic of modernity, so it is perhaps unsurprising to find discussions of revolution conflating the thesis of agential causality with that of agential control. The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 7, 235, 184, 143, 300.
8. Theodor Geisel (Dr. Seuss), "The 500 Hats of Bartholomew Cubbins," in Six by Seuss (New York: Random House, 1991), 91. This is not to say that history is in fact free of unintelligible events. But, as Kant saw natural science dependent upon the nonempirical postulate of an intelligible unified nature, so the study of history and society seems dependent upon an untestable postulate of intelligibility.
9. This by no means commits us to a particular conception of rationality, and certainly not to rationality as defined by neo-classical economics and "rational choice" theories. It can be left to the account of events itself to argue why a particular form of behavior was "reasonable," where this seems necessary.
10. For Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 403.
11. Such an approach, in any case, is hardly "foundational," and seems necessarily to involve: (i) the dogmatic postulate of a particular type of actor; (ii) disregard of structures that influence the development of actors; or (iii) an infinite regress since, as Paul Ricoeur points out, the Adam and Eve story reminds us that "every individual finds evil already there," an insight that applies as well to "language, tools, institutions." The Symbolism of Evil (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 257-258.
12. This does not mean that particular individuals never play a critical role. Merleau-Ponty recounts Trotsky's anecdote: "one day while he and Lenin were working together, he asked Lenin: 'If they shoot us, what will become of the Revolution?' Lenin thought a moment, smiled and said simply: 'Perhaps after all they will not shoot us.'" Humanism and Terror (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 88-89.
13. Plato, Gorgias, ¶ 509.
14. "The Holy Family," in Marx-Engels Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 4: 37.
15. Eric Selbin, Modern Latin American Revolutions (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 29; emphasis added.
16. De la Démocratie en Amérique (Paris: Gallimard, 1961), 2: 124.
17. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1967), 89.
18. To use Habermas's language: Berger and Luckmann fail to see that it is a tremendous communicative achievement to harmonize "action orientations" so as to undo the outcome of "individual decisions not subjectively coordinated." The Theory of Communicative Action II (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 150.
19. Skocpol notes that her original structuralism was aimed against explanations relying upon unproblematic "collective actors - such as 'the proletariat,' or 'the bourgeoisie,' or 'the revolutionary movement.'" Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 325. It is not surprising that Eric Selbin, who seeks to write an avowedly "voluntarist" account of the Nicaraguan revolution, is driven to posit a super-actor: "the people know their wants and needs"; "the people are convinced that they could realize their revolutionary promise and vision without the social revolutionary leadership." Modern Latin American Revolutions, 36, 58. Ironically, this super-actor can achieve results immune to history and agency itself: "Consolidation, once achieved, cannot be overthrown" (ibid., 52) , a rather mystifying position which recalls the Sandinistas' now-poignant claim that "history has no reverse gear." Tomás Borge, El Axioma de la Esperanza (Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 1984), 90.
20. Skocpol notes that her original structuralism was aimed against explanations relying upon unproblematic "collective actors - such as 'the proletariat,' or 'the bourgeoisie,' or 'the revolutionary movement.'" Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 325. It is not surprising that Eric Selbin, who seeks to write an avowedly "voluntarist" account of the Nicaraguan revolution, is driven to posit a super-actor: "the people know their wants and needs"; "the people are convinced that they could realize their revolutionary promise and vision without the social revolutionary leadership." Modern Latin American Revolutions, 36, 58. Ironically, this super-actor can achieve results immune to history and agency itself: "Consolidation, once achieved, cannot be overthrown" (ibid., 52) , a rather mystifying position which recalls the Sandinistas' now-poignant claim that "history has no reverse gear." Tomás Borge, El Axioma de la Esperanza (Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 1984), 90.
21. Skocpol notes that her original structuralism was aimed against explanations relying upon unproblematic "collective actors - such as 'the proletariat,' or 'the bourgeoisie,' or 'the revolutionary movement.'" Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 325. It is not surprising that Eric Selbin, who seeks to write an avowedly "voluntarist" account of the Nicaraguan revolution, is driven to posit a super-actor: "the people know their wants and needs"; "the people are convinced that they could realize their revolutionary promise and vision without the social revolutionary leadership." Modern Latin American Revolutions, 36, 58. Ironically, this super-actor can achieve results immune to history and agency itself: "Consolidation, once achieved, cannot be overthrown" (ibid., 52) , a rather mystifying position which recalls the Sandinistas' now-poignant claim that "history has no reverse gear." Tomás Borge, El Axioma de la Esperanza (Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 1984), 90.
22. Skocpol notes that her original structuralism was aimed against explanations relying upon unproblematic "collective actors - such as 'the proletariat,' or 'the bourgeoisie,' or 'the revolutionary movement.'" Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 325. It is not surprising that Eric Selbin, who seeks to write an avowedly "voluntarist" account of the Nicaraguan revolution, is driven to posit a super-actor: "the people know their wants and needs"; "the people are convinced that they could realize their revolutionary promise and vision without the social revolutionary leadership." Modern Latin American Revolutions, 36, 58. Ironically, this super-actor can achieve results immune to history and agency itself: "Consolidation, once achieved, cannot be overthrown" (ibid., 52) , a rather mystifying position which recalls the Sandinistas' now-poignant claim that "history has no reverse gear." Tomás Borge, El Axioma de la Esperanza (Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 1984), 90.
23. "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," in Walter Kaufmann, editor, The Portable Nietzsche (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 251. Berger and Luckmann recognize this (The Social Construction of Reality, 27), but when they come to discuss reification they suffer the same "forgetfulness" that they attribute to reifiers.
24. "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," in Walter Kaufmann, editor, The Portable Nietzsche (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 251. Berger and Luckmann recognize this (The Social Construction of Reality, 27), but when they come to discuss reification they suffer the same "forgetfulness" that they attribute to reifiers.
25. This point requires clarifications: (i) one should not assume that "enduring" and "accepting" are always fully conscious decisiors; (ii) we need not assume a dichotomy between those who endure and those who accept: the distinction is one of degree; (iii) the "capacity to influence the structure" must be understood in light of Arendt's action-fabrication distinction: the powerful agent who "accepts" a structure may do so in part because action to char ge it will always yield uncertain results.
26. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 45. This insight is at least as old as Pascal. Pensées (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 1972), ¶ 99.
27. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 45. This insight is at least as old as Pascal. Pensées (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 1972), ¶ 99.
28. Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1965).
29. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action II, 400.
30. John Foran, "The Causes of Latin American Social Revolutions," in Volker Bornschier and Peter Lengyel, editors, Conflicts and New Departures in World Society (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 211; Robert Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed & Fail," Polity 16/3 (1984): 438; Theda Skocpol and Jeff Goodwin. "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," in Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 268; Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 269.
31. John Foran, "The Causes of Latin American Social Revolutions," in Volker Bornschier and Peter Lengyel, editors, Conflicts and New Departures in World Society (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 211; Robert Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed & Fail," Polity 16/3 (1984): 438; Theda Skocpol and Jeff Goodwin. "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," in Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 268; Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 269.
32. John Foran, "The Causes of Latin American Social Revolutions," in Volker Bornschier and Peter Lengyel, editors, Conflicts and New Departures in World Society (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 211; Robert Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed & Fail," Polity 16/3 (1984): 438; Theda Skocpol and Jeff Goodwin. "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," in Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 268; Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 269.
33. John Foran, "The Causes of Latin American Social Revolutions," in Volker Bornschier and Peter Lengyel, editors, Conflicts and New Departures in World Society (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 211; Robert Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed & Fail," Polity 16/3 (1984): 438; Theda Skocpol and Jeff Goodwin. "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," in Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 268; Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 269.
34. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 7, 263.
35. Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 180. See also James Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus (London: Verso, 1988), 228.
36. Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 180. See also James Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus (London: Verso, 1988), 228.
37. Obras (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1985), 1: 167.
38. Humberto Ortega, "Análisis de Coyuntura y Algunas Tareas Planteadas," in Sobre la Insurrección (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1981), 38, 40. In drawing on Ortega's work in this section, am I not simply relying upon a self-serving account, a practice for which I will criticize Wickham-Crowley below? There are no doubt elements of this in Ortega's Sobre la Insurrección compilation, yet the work also has certain persuasive features: much of the book was written before 1979, and the suspicion that earlier texts were re-worked to suit the political needs of the post-1979 situation is contradicted by many elements that diverge from the post-1979 "line." Further, the view that the work is an element of revolutionary myth-making is undermined by its publication outside of Nicaragua, and its limited distribution within the country.
39. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 265.
40. The "Prolonged Popular War" faction warned that Ortega's "insurrectional" strategy would lead to "a simple change in national capitalist personalities within the government machinery which, by its economic and political essence, would always be a tool of imperialist domination." Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America, 31 October 1977. After 1979, various Sandinista leaders noted that the 1974 Christmas raid, the 1977 offensive, and the 1978 seizure of the National Palace were all responses to conjunctures that threatened a political liberalization that would yield "Somozism without Somoza." Pilar Arias, Nicaragua: Revolución (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1980), 106, 163, 128: Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 72.
41. The "Prolonged Popular War" faction warned that Ortega's "insurrectional" strategy would lead to "a simple change in national capitalist personalities within the government machinery which, by its economic and political essence, would always be a tool of imperialist domination." Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America, 31 October 1977. After 1979, various Sandinista leaders noted that the 1974 Christmas raid, the 1977 offensive, and the 1978 seizure of the National Palace were all responses to conjunctures that threatened a political liberalization that would yield "Somozism without Somoza." Pilar Arias, Nicaragua: Revolución (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1980), 106, 163, 128: Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 72.
42. The "Prolonged Popular War" faction warned that Ortega's "insurrectional" strategy would lead to "a simple change in national capitalist personalities within the government machinery which, by its economic and political essence, would always be a tool of imperialist domination." Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America, 31 October 1977. After 1979, various Sandinista leaders noted that the 1974 Christmas raid, the 1977 offensive, and the 1978 seizure of the National Palace were all responses to conjunctures that threatened a political liberalization that would yield "Somozism without Somoza." Pilar Arias, Nicaragua: Revolución (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1980), 106, 163, 128: Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 72.
43. Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family (New York: Random House, 1985), 40-42.
44. Ortega, "Análisis de Coyuntura," 40.
45. Los Doce, "First Manifesto (1977)," in Robert Leiken and Barry Rubin, editors, The Central American Crisis Reader (New York: Summit Books, 1987), 172-173.
46. Arias, Nicaragua: Revolución, 147.
47. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 58.
48. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 59; Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1989), 148.
49. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 59; Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1989), 148.
50. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 74. Carter official Robert Pastor would later comment that the FAO was "fragile" in part because "Sergio Ramírez was playing a double role, trying to lead the group and undermine it simultaneously." Condemned to Repetition, 102.
51. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 74. Carter official Robert Pastor would later comment that the FAO was "fragile" in part because "Sergio Ramírez was playing a double role, trying to lead the group and undermine it simultaneously." Condemned to Repetition, 102.
52. Sandinista-turned-contra Arturo Cruz, Jr. would later comment that they leaned heavily on the image of Pastora in order "to win over the Americans," "even though at the time we all disliked him." Memoirs of a Counter-Revolutionary (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 75.
53. Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, "Speech on Unity (1977)," in Leiken and Rubin, editors, The Central American Crisis Reader, 175.
54. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America, 2 October 1978. This perception on the part of the Church hierarchy made it possible for them to accept the legitimacy of the final insurrection, an unprecedented position in Latin American Catholicism. Conferencia Episcopal de Nicaragua, "Mensaje al Pueblo Nicaraguense" (Managua: Unpublished, 2 June 1979).
55. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America, 2 October 1978. This perception on the part of the Church hierarchy made it possible for them to accept the legitimacy of the final insurrection, an unprecedented position in Latin American Catholicism. Conferencia Episcopal de Nicaragua, "Mensaje al Pueblo Nicaraguense" (Managua: Unpublished, 2 June 1979).
56. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 50.
57. States and Urban-Based Revolutions (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 14.
58. Lake, Somoza Falling, 116. Throughout the Sandinistas' final insurrection of June-July 1979, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski was pushing for military intervention, be it uni-or multi-lateral. Ibid., 220, 226.
59. Lake, Somoza Falling, 116. Throughout the Sandinistas' final insurrection of June-July 1979, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski was pushing for military intervention, be it uni-or multi-lateral. Ibid., 220, 226.
60. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 78.
61. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 70. One sees here the many sides of the "card game" in which the FSLN was engaged. The leadership had little trust in Pastora. In using him as an "ambassador" for tre movement, the FSLN ran the risk that Pastora would install himself in power with foreign support, which he apparently tried to do. Ibid., 105. Even on the day the Sandinista forces arrived in Managua, Pastora and his commanders debated whether they should hold on to their weapons and "ask the other comandantes to negotiate." Lawrence and Ralph Pezzullo, At the Fall of Somoza (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsbugh Press, 1993), 235.
62. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 70. One sees here the many sides of the "card game" in which the FSLN was engaged. The leadership had little trust in Pastora. In using him as an "ambassador" for tre movement, the FSLN ran the risk that Pastora would install himself in power with foreign support, which he apparently tried to do. Ibid., 105. Even on the day the Sandinista forces arrived in Managua, Pastora and his commanders debated whether they should hold on to their weapons and "ask the other comandantes to negotiate." Lawrence and Ralph Pezzullo, At the Fall of Somoza (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsbugh Press, 1993), 235.
63. Pastor comments that Los Dace's "investment" in cultivating contacts within the Andean Pact "paid off handsomely" when the group declared the FSLN legitimate combatants. Condemned to Repetition, 138.
64. States and Urban-Based Revolutions, 9.
65. Ibid., 9.
66. Ibid., 44.
67. Ibid., 42.
68. Ibid., 44.
69. States and Social Revolutions, 17.
70. The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 186-187.
71. States and Urban-Based Revolutions, 44-45.
72. Even the Sandinista economic planners worked on this basis. Ministerio de Planificación, Programa de Reactivación Económica en Beneficio del Pueblo (Managua: MIPLAN, 1980), 17.
73. Farhi is not the only observer to commit this error. Keith Griffin refers to "a decline of the economy into a depression in the early 1970s and a sharp fall in average incomes," basing his argument on the decline of real per capita GDP over the 1965 to 1980 period. "Observations on Economic Policy in Post-Revolution Nicaragua," Review of Radical Political Economics 20/2-3 (1988): 260, 264.
74. But real per capita GDP rose 22 percent in the 1965-1977 period. Banco Central de Nicaragua, Indicadores Económicos (Managua: BCN, 1979), 2, 19. It then dropped 37 percent in 1978-1979, during the insurrectionary period.
75. Banco Central de Nicaragua, Indicadores Económicos, 16.
76. Banco Central de Nicaragua, Informe Anual (Managua: BCN, various years).
77. Enrique Iglesias, "La Evolución Económica de America Latina en 1982," Comercio Exterior 33 (1983): 162-185.
78. Phil Ryan, The Fall and Rise of the Market in Sandinista Nicaragua (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 258.
79. Banco Central de Nicaragua, Indicadores Económicos, 19.
80. Ibid. Farhi suggests a pattern of "negative growth" in investment. In the last decade of the Somoza era, investment declined in just two years: 1972 and 1975. Inventory fluctuations accounted for 70 percent of the decline in 1972, and 83 percent in 1975. Calculations based on ibid.
81. Ibid., 72.
82. At this point, the reader will have concluded that either Farhi or the present author has got things horribly wrong. The problem lies in Farhi's exclusive reliance for her interpretation of the economic situation upon George Black's Triumph of the People (London: Zed Press, 1981), 66-68. Black, for his part, offers almost no sources for his claims. Neither Black nor Farhi appear to have examined economic data in any systematic way, which would have helped guard against anecdotal argument, and neither has compared the Nicaraguan situation with that in other Latin American countries, which would have put the "crisis" in perspective.
83. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC: Santiago, various years). Real GDP would drop a further 26 percent in 1979.
84. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America, 22 September 1978.
85. Such a claim is made by National Directorate member Victor Tirado, who stated that the FSLN did not "wait for the economic crisis to appear in order thereafter to carry on its political and military actions, but rather through steady military activity, through our political impact, we also created conditions to intensify the crisis in the economic sphere." Joint Publications Research Service, Latin America Report, no. 73112 (30 March 1979), 121.
86. Humberto Ortega, "Nicaragua: La Estrategia de la Victoria," in Sobre la Insurrección, 69.
87. Carlos Núñez, Joaquin Cuadra, and William Ramírez, "Nicaragua: Donde se Aprendió Luchando," in Marta Harnacker, editor, Pueblos en Armas (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1985), 58, 62.
88. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 49.
89. Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua, 154.
90. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 8.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., 231, 306.
93. Ibid., 209-210.
94. Ibid., 232.
95. Ibid., 303.
96. Ibid., 304.
97. States and Social Revolutions, 38.
98. Ibid., 39.
99. Few would accept, for example, the claim that a national passion for baseball is a necessary condition for successful revolution in Latin America, even though simple comparison offers strong support for the claim.
100. Indeed, given the frequency with which Mill is cited in these matters, it is sobering to read his warning that the Methods of Agreement and of Differences are not applicable to "the phenomena of politics and history." Cited in Charles Tilly, "Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology," Comparative Social Research 16 (1997): 44.
101. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 241.
102. Obras, 1: 163.
103. Arias, Nicaragua: Revolución, 177, 186-187.
104. Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus, 257.
105. Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela granted a "$100,000 monthly stipend for arms and supplies." Everingham, Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua, 133. Omar Torrijos is said to have allowed Cuban weapons to pass through Panama headed for FSLN camps in Costa Rica. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 80. Wickham-Crowley includes the U.S. stance as one of five variables affecting the probability of a successful revolution (Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 323), but omits regional factors, thus missing an essential dimension of the Sandinista revolution, both before and after 1979.
106. Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela granted a "$100,000 monthly stipend for arms and supplies." Everingham, Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua, 133. Omar Torrijos is said to have allowed Cuban weapons to pass through Panama headed for FSLN camps in Costa Rica. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 80. Wickham-Crowley includes the U.S. stance as one of five variables affecting the probability of a successful revolution (Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 323), but omits regional factors, thus missing an essential dimension of the Sandinista revolution, both before and after 1979.
107. Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela granted a "$100,000 monthly stipend for arms and supplies." Everingham, Revolution and the Multiclass Coalition in Nicaragua, 133. Omar Torrijos is said to have allowed Cuban weapons to pass through Panama headed for FSLN camps in Costa Rica. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 80. Wickham-Crowley includes the U.S. stance as one of five variables affecting the probability of a successful revolution (Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 323), but omits regional factors, thus missing an essential dimension of the Sandinista revolution, both before and after 1979.
108. Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 97. One symptom of FSLN strength on the eve of the insurrectionary period: the October 1977 "offensive" was to consist of four simultaneous attacks around the country, with just twenty-five fighters each. Of the twenty-nine fighters in the key attack on San Carlos, only sixteen had any military training. All but six of the attackers were armed only with sporting rifles. José Valdivia Hidalgo, "Décimo Aniversario de un 13 Histórico," El Nuevo Diario, 10 October 1987.
109. Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 97. One symptom of FSLN strength on the eve of the insurrectionary period: the October 1977 "offensive" was to consist of four simultaneous attacks around the country, with just twenty-five fighters each. Of the twenty-nine fighters in the key attack on San Carlos, only sixteen had any military training. All but six of the attackers were armed only with sporting rifles. José Valdivia Hidalgo, "Décimo Aniversario de un 13 Histórico," El Nuevo Diario, 10 October 1987.
110. Arias, Nicaragua: Revolución, 172.
111. Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family, 28.
112. Arias, Nicaragua: Revolución, 46, 47, 69.
113. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America , 8.
114. Ibid., 209; emphasis added.
115. "Cotton and Revolution in Nicaragua," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Evelyne Huber Stephens, editors, States Versus Markets in the World-System (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985), 106-109.
116. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 209.
117. To Lead as Equals (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 296.
118. "When they prayed that Christ free them from 'the yoke,' the campesinos understood that emancipation must be the fruit of their own labor"; "the campesinos had declared war, not on individual enemies, but on the agrarian elite." Ibid., 277, 279.
119. Ibid., 275, 288.
120. Ibid., 359. In any event, acceptance of Gould's argument weakens one of Wickham-Crowley's structural theses, since Chinandega is outside the squatter zones he has identified. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 233.
121. Ibid., 359. In any event, acceptance of Gould's argument weakens one of Wickham-Crowley's structural theses, since Chinandega is outside the squatter zones he has identified. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 233.
122. Perfiles de la Revolución Sandinista (Havana: Casa da las Américas, 1984), 176, 182.
123. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 397. James Dunkerley sees Black as "generally starry-eyed." Power in the Isthmus, 263. Black is anxious to portray the Nicaraguan revolution as a vanguard-led worker peasant affair, and does not let mere facts blunt his narrative coherence. Thus, his section on Pancasán notes that "[mjany peasants deserted or had to be dismissed, and a number even turned informers. The urban or student cadre by contrast had greater staying power." "Pancasán 1967: The Peasants Take Up Arms," Triumph of the People, 80-82.
124. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 397. James Dunkerley sees Black as "generally starry-eyed." Power in the Isthmus, 263. Black is anxious to portray the Nicaraguan revolution as a vanguard-led worker peasant affair, and does not let mere facts blunt his narrative coherence. Thus, his section on Pancasán notes that "[mjany peasants deserted or had to be dismissed, and a number even turned informers. The urban or student cadre by contrast had greater staying power." "Pancasán 1967: The Peasants Take Up Arms," Triumph of the People, 80-82.
125. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 397. James Dunkerley sees Black as "generally starry-eyed." Power in the Isthmus, 263. Black is anxious to portray the Nicaraguan revolution as a vanguard-led worker peasant affair, and does not let mere facts blunt his narrative coherence. Thus, his section on Pancasán notes that "[mjany peasants deserted or had to be dismissed, and a number even turned informers. The urban or student cadre by contrast had greater staying power." "Pancasán 1967: The Peasants Take Up Arms," Triumph of the People, 80-82.
126. Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory (London: Sharpe, 1991), 133.
127. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 209; Barricada 5 March 1984.
128. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 209; Barricada 5 March 1984.
129. Truth and Method, 370.
130. Ryan, The Fall and Rise of the Market in Sandinista Nicaragua.
131. Perhaps this explains why the book that comes closest to writing the FSLN out of the picture entirely, Shirley Christian's Nicaragua: A Revolution in the Family, was distributed free by the United States Information Service at a Managua book fair in 1987.
132. Ryan, The Fall and Rise of the Market, 75.
133. A rule of thumb of Biblical hermeneutics states that one should lend more credence to passages that do not conform to the author's general outlook and interests. Edward Schillebeeckx, Jesus: An Experiment in Christology (New York: Vintage, 1981), 91. Accordingly, we should pay particular attention to Cabezas's lament over the 1977 desertion of his "last two peasants," which left him "all alone once again." Arias, Nicaragua: Revolución, 142. "All alone," on the eve of the insurrectionary period.
134. A rule of thumb of Biblical hermeneutics states that one should lend more credence to passages that do not conform to the author's general outlook and interests. Edward Schillebeeckx, Jesus: An Experiment in Christology (New York: Vintage, 1981), 91. Accordingly, we should pay particular attention to Cabezas's lament over the 1977 desertion of his "last two peasants," which left him "all alone once again." Arias, Nicaragua: Revolución, 142. "All alone," on the eve of the insurrectionary period.
135. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 209.
136. There is also a nuance in the "crucible" metaphor that has escaped commentators. Wickham-Crowley cites Black as his source for the phrase. Ibid., 232, 387.
137. Black in turn credits Ruiz. Triumph of the People, 83.
138. But what did Ruiz mean? "Our dominant origin was petty-bourgeois, student, and the montaña was a crucible .... Carlos Fonseca was obsessed with improving cadre in the most difficult circumstances." "La montaña era como un crisol donde se forjaban los mejores cuadros," Nicaráuac, no. 1 (1980), 8.
139. The montaña, for Ruiz, was the crucible, less of the revolution than of revolutionary cadre, who might pursue their revolutionary tasks in the montaña or elsewhere. Thus, Carlos Fonseca recommended that work among the urban "student masses" only be entrusted to cadre who had been "proletarianized" by time in the montaña. Obras, 1: 165-166.
140. In 1980 the FSLN's National Directorate named one member from each of the three factions to a commission charged with producing an official history. La Prensa 18 June 1980. In July, Humberto Ortega promised that the history would be issued "in the near future." Arias. Nicaragua: Revolución 11. It never saw the light of day.
141. In 1980 the FSLN's National Directorate named one member from each of the three factions to a commission charged with producing an official history. La Prensa 18 June 1980. In July, Humberto Ortega promised that the history would be issued "in the near future." Arias. Nicaragua: Revolución 11. It never saw the light of day.
142. In the same way, Charles Tilly warns of the danger of "taking historically-constructed memories of events ... as grounds for their comparative study." "Means and Ends of Comparison in Macrosociology," 46. Apart from the general fact that the student of social phenomena is always dealing with an already-interpreted reality, the student of revolution in particular must make allowances for quite conscious efforts to construct history for political ends.
143. States and Social Revolutions, 291.
144. The actors on the stage of history are "fools," declared Kant. "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, But it Does Not Apply in Practice,'" in Hans Reiss, editor, Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 88. This, adds Hannah Arendt, "has always been the secret assumption of the philosophers of history." The Life of the Mind: Thinking (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1978), 96. Can academic observers of revolution be certain of their immunity from this "secret assumption," which is as self-serving as the pronouncements of Comrade Rumblebuffin and his acolytes?
145. The actors on the stage of history are "fools," declared Kant. "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, But it Does Not Apply in Practice,'" in Hans Reiss, editor, Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 88. This, adds Hannah Arendt, "has always been the secret assumption of the philosophers of history." The Life of the Mind: Thinking (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1978), 96. Can academic observers of revolution be certain of their immunity from this "secret assumption," which is as self-serving as the pronouncements of Comrade Rumblebuffin and his acolytes?
146. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 8.
147. This is not to imply that internal deliberations are always marked by sincere communication. But, as I have argued elsewhere, the capacity to act of a revolutionary group is not consistent with complete deception. Ryan, The Fall and Rise of the Market, 18.
148. One will appreciate here the need to focus on internal deliberations. Publicly, there will be no limit to bombastic triumphalism: "there are no such things as difficulties for Communists." Mao TseTung, Selected Readings from the Works of Mao TseTung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 162.
149. A reviewer of this piece pointed out that, at least since the Russian Revolution, revolutionary parties are themselves a structure that the revolutionary must take into account.
150. Truth and Method, 294.
151. See Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action I (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 108f.