Teaming up and out? Getting durable cooperation in a collegial organization

European Sociological Review

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 245-266

  Lazega, Emmanuel ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034340670     PISSN: 02667215     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/esr/16.3.245     Document Type: Review

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