Repertoires of coercion and market culture in nineteenth-century Buenos Aires province

International Review of Social History

Volumn 45, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 409-448

  Salvatore, Ricardo D ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034339758     PISSN: 00208590     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0020859000000237     Document Type: Article

References (129)

1. Even as a "free-labor" society, post-Independence Buenos Aires province was rather peculiar. It did not have anything resembling a "master and servant" law (the conchavo laws being a rather distant relative) and it lacked true experience in guild regulations.
2. I have developed this argument in R. Salvatore, "Modes of Labor Control in Cattle-Ranching Economies: California, Southern Brazil, and Argentina, 1820-1860", Journal of Economic History, 51 (1991), pp. 441-451; and "Autocratic State and Labor Control in the Argentine Pampas: Buenos Aires, 1829-1852", Peasant Studies, 18 (1991), pp. 251-278.
3. I have developed this argument in R. Salvatore, "Modes of Labor Control in Cattle-Ranching Economies: California, Southern Brazil, and Argentina, 1820-1860", Journal of Economic History, 51 (1991), pp. 441-451; and "Autocratic State and Labor Control in the Argentine Pampas: Buenos Aires, 1829-1852", Peasant Studies, 18 (1991), pp. 251-278.
4. On the prevalence of wage labor vis-á-vis slave labor in Buenos Aires province from the late colonial period see Lyman L. Johnson, "The Competition of Slave and Free Labor in Artisanal Production: Buenos Aires, 1770-1815", International Review of Social History, 40 (1995), pp. 409-424; Samuel Amaral, "Rural Production and Labour in Late Colonial Buenos Aires", Journal of Latin American Studies, 19 (1987), pp. 235-278; and Ricardo Salvatore and Jonathan C. Brown, "Trade and Proletarianization in Late Colonial Banda Oriental", Hispanic American Historical Review, 67 (1987), pp. 431-459. Carlos Mayo believes that a free market for rural workers had already emerged in the period 1740-1820: Carlos Mayo, Estancia y sociedad en la pampa, 1740-1820 (Buenos Aires, 1995), ch. 6.
5. On the prevalence of wage labor vis-á-vis slave labor in Buenos Aires province from the late colonial period see Lyman L. Johnson, "The Competition of Slave and Free Labor in Artisanal Production: Buenos Aires, 1770-1815", International Review of Social History, 40 (1995), pp. 409-424; Samuel Amaral, "Rural Production and Labour in Late Colonial Buenos Aires", Journal of Latin American Studies, 19 (1987), pp. 235-278; and Ricardo Salvatore and Jonathan C. Brown, "Trade and Proletarianization in Late Colonial Banda Oriental", Hispanic American Historical Review, 67 (1987), pp. 431-459. Carlos Mayo believes that a free market for rural workers had already emerged in the period 1740-1820: Carlos Mayo, Estancia y sociedad en la pampa, 1740-1820 (Buenos Aires, 1995), ch. 6.
6. On the prevalence of wage labor vis-á-vis slave labor in Buenos Aires province from the late colonial period see Lyman L. Johnson, "The Competition of Slave and Free Labor in Artisanal Production: Buenos Aires, 1770-1815", International Review of Social History, 40 (1995), pp. 409-424; Samuel Amaral, "Rural Production and Labour in Late Colonial Buenos Aires", Journal of Latin American Studies, 19 (1987), pp. 235-278; and Ricardo Salvatore and Jonathan C. Brown, "Trade and Proletarianization in Late Colonial Banda Oriental", Hispanic American Historical Review, 67 (1987), pp. 431-459. Carlos Mayo believes that a free market for rural workers had already emerged in the period 1740-1820: Carlos Mayo, Estancia y sociedad en la pampa, 1740-1820 (Buenos Aires, 1995), ch. 6.
7. On the prevalence of wage labor vis-á-vis slave labor in Buenos Aires province from the late colonial period see Lyman L. Johnson, "The Competition of Slave and Free Labor in Artisanal Production: Buenos Aires, 1770-1815", International Review of Social History, 40 (1995), pp. 409-424; Samuel Amaral, "Rural Production and Labour in Late Colonial Buenos Aires", Journal of Latin American Studies, 19 (1987), pp. 235-278; and Ricardo Salvatore and Jonathan C. Brown, "Trade and Proletarianization in Late Colonial Banda Oriental", Hispanic American Historical Review, 67 (1987), pp. 431-459. Carlos Mayo believes that a free market for rural workers had already emerged in the period 1740-1820: Carlos Mayo, Estancia y sociedad en la pampa, 1740-1820 (Buenos Aires, 1995), ch. 6.
8. An influential interpretation portrays the fate of the popular sectors as the perpetual victims of state and terrateniente coercion. A series of legislative acts criminalizing the activities and condition of the poor (vagrancy laws, passport laws, rural codes, etc.) compounded the private violence exerted by landowners in the domain of their ranches to deprive the poor of property and liberty. In other words, these authors assert that the transition from the colonial to the late nineteenth-century order entailed the persistence of the same level of coercion against the popular sectors. The emergence of market culture brought no amelioration of the levels and range of coercion in society. See, for example, Ricardo Rodríguez Molas, Historia social del gaucho (Buenos Aires, 1968); Richard Slatta, Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier (Lincoln, NB, 1983); Eduardo Ascuy Ameghino and G. Martínez Gougnac, Tierras y ganado en la campaña de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 1989); John Lynch, Argentine Dictator (Oxford, 1981). As we shall see, this interpretation needs substantial revision.
9. An influential interpretation portrays the fate of the popular sectors as the perpetual victims of state and terrateniente coercion. A series of legislative acts criminalizing the activities and condition of the poor (vagrancy laws, passport laws, rural codes, etc.) compounded the private violence exerted by landowners in the domain of their ranches to deprive the poor of property and liberty. In other words, these authors assert that the transition from the colonial to the late nineteenth-century order entailed the persistence of the same level of coercion against the popular sectors. The emergence of market culture brought no amelioration of the levels and range of coercion in society. See, for example, Ricardo Rodríguez Molas, Historia social del gaucho (Buenos Aires, 1968); Richard Slatta, Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier (Lincoln, NB, 1983); Eduardo Ascuy Ameghino and G. Martínez Gougnac, Tierras y ganado en la campaña de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 1989); John Lynch, Argentine Dictator (Oxford, 1981). As we shall see, this interpretation needs substantial revision.
10. An influential interpretation portrays the fate of the popular sectors as the perpetual victims of state and terrateniente coercion. A series of legislative acts criminalizing the activities and condition of the poor (vagrancy laws, passport laws, rural codes, etc.) compounded the private violence exerted by landowners in the domain of their ranches to deprive the poor of property and liberty. In other words, these authors assert that the transition from the colonial to the late nineteenth-century order entailed the persistence of the same level of coercion against the popular sectors. The emergence of market culture brought no amelioration of the levels and range of coercion in society. See, for example, Ricardo Rodríguez Molas, Historia social del gaucho (Buenos Aires, 1968); Richard Slatta, Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier (Lincoln, NB, 1983); Eduardo Ascuy Ameghino and G. Martínez Gougnac, Tierras y ganado en la campaña de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 1989); John Lynch, Argentine Dictator (Oxford, 1981). As we shall see, this interpretation needs substantial revision.
11. An influential interpretation portrays the fate of the popular sectors as the perpetual victims of state and terrateniente coercion. A series of legislative acts criminalizing the activities and condition of the poor (vagrancy laws, passport laws, rural codes, etc.) compounded the private violence exerted by landowners in the domain of their ranches to deprive the poor of property and liberty. In other words, these authors assert that the transition from the colonial to the late nineteenth-century order entailed the persistence of the same level of coercion against the popular sectors. The emergence of market culture brought no amelioration of the levels and range of coercion in society. See, for example, Ricardo Rodríguez Molas, Historia social del gaucho (Buenos Aires, 1968); Richard Slatta, Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier (Lincoln, NB, 1983); Eduardo Ascuy Ameghino and G. Martínez Gougnac, Tierras y ganado en la campaña de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires, 1989); John Lynch, Argentine Dictator (Oxford, 1981). As we shall see, this interpretation needs substantial revision.
12. Literature has paid more attention to these forms of violence than historians. The popular poem El Gaucho Martín Fierro, published in 1872, dealt with the personal experience of a gaucho subject to the coercive power of justices, military officers, and ranchers.
13. See George Reid Andrews, The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires 1800-1900 (Madison, WI, 1980); Ricardo D. Salvatore, "Reclutamiento militar, disciplinamiento y proletarización en la era de Rosas", Bolet́n del Instituto Ravignani, 5 (1992), pp. 25-47; Susan Socolow, "Los cautivos españoles en las sociedades indígenas", Anuario IEHS, 2 (1987), pp. 99-136; Ricardo Cicerchia, "Vida familiar y prácticas conyugales. Clases populares en la ciudad colonial. Buenos Aires, 1800-1810", Boletín del Instituto Ravignani, 3a serie, no. 2 (1989), pp. 91-109; and Mark D. Szuchman, Order, Family, and Community in Buenos Aires, 1810-1860 (Stanford, CA, 1988).
14. See George Reid Andrews, The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires 1800-1900 (Madison, WI, 1980); Ricardo D. Salvatore, "Reclutamiento militar, disciplinamiento y proletarización en la era de Rosas", Bolet́n del Instituto Ravignani, 5 (1992), pp. 25-47; Susan Socolow, "Los cautivos españoles en las sociedades indígenas", Anuario IEHS, 2 (1987), pp. 99-136; Ricardo Cicerchia, "Vida familiar y prácticas conyugales. Clases populares en la ciudad colonial. Buenos Aires, 1800-1810", Boletín del Instituto Ravignani, 3a serie, no. 2 (1989), pp. 91-109; and Mark D. Szuchman, Order, Family, and Community in Buenos Aires, 1810-1860 (Stanford, CA, 1988).
15. See George Reid Andrews, The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires 1800-1900 (Madison, WI, 1980); Ricardo D. Salvatore, "Reclutamiento militar, disciplinamiento y proletarización en la era de Rosas", Bolet́n del Instituto Ravignani, 5 (1992), pp. 25-47; Susan Socolow, "Los cautivos españoles en las sociedades indígenas", Anuario IEHS, 2 (1987), pp. 99-136; Ricardo Cicerchia, "Vida familiar y prácticas conyugales. Clases populares en la ciudad colonial. Buenos Aires, 1800-1810", Boletín del Instituto Ravignani, 3a serie, no. 2 (1989), pp. 91-109; and Mark D. Szuchman, Order, Family, and Community in Buenos Aires, 1810-1860 (Stanford, CA, 1988).
16. See George Reid Andrews, The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires 1800-1900 (Madison, WI, 1980); Ricardo D. Salvatore, "Reclutamiento militar, disciplinamiento y proletarización en la era de Rosas", Bolet́n del Instituto Ravignani, 5 (1992), pp. 25-47; Susan Socolow, "Los cautivos españoles en las sociedades indígenas", Anuario IEHS, 2 (1987), pp. 99-136; Ricardo Cicerchia, "Vida familiar y prácticas conyugales. Clases populares en la ciudad colonial. Buenos Aires, 1800-1810", Boletín del Instituto Ravignani, 3a serie, no. 2 (1989), pp. 91-109; and Mark D. Szuchman, Order, Family, and Community in Buenos Aires, 1810-1860 (Stanford, CA, 1988).
17. See George Reid Andrews, The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires 1800-1900 (Madison, WI, 1980); Ricardo D. Salvatore, "Reclutamiento militar, disciplinamiento y proletarización en la era de Rosas", Bolet́n del Instituto Ravignani, 5 (1992), pp. 25-47; Susan Socolow, "Los cautivos españoles en las sociedades indígenas", Anuario IEHS, 2 (1987), pp. 99-136; Ricardo Cicerchia, "Vida familiar y prácticas conyugales. Clases populares en la ciudad colonial. Buenos Aires, 1800-1810", Boletín del Instituto Ravignani, 3a serie, no. 2 (1989), pp. 91-109; and Mark D. Szuchman, Order, Family, and Community in Buenos Aires, 1810-1860 (Stanford, CA, 1988).
18. For the concept of "social fields" see Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford, CA, 1980). For a discussion see Craig Calhoum, "Habitus, Field, and Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity", in Craig Calhoum et al. (eds), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (Chicago, IL, 1993), pp. 61-88.
19. For the concept of "social fields" see Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford, CA, 1980). For a discussion see Craig Calhoum, "Habitus, Field, and Capital: The Question of Historical Specificity", in Craig Calhoum et al. (eds), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (Chicago, IL, 1993), pp. 61-88.
20. Perhaps we will never be able to construct a general index of coercion in which the different situations of violence can be contemplated and aggregated with their correct weights, for the incidence and diffusion of certain forms of coercion (against women and children, for example) will remain hidden from our view or their characteristics remain intractable to the statistician.
21. "Classical" accounts of domination and punishment (Durkheim, Weber) tend to consider whole societal "penal systems" or "modes of domination". My interest, on the other hand, is in fragmenting power, domination, and punishment into different fields of power, into different institutional contexts, into menus of concrete means of coercion. See David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society (Chicago, IL, 1990), ch. 2; and Max Weber, Economía y Sociedad (Mexico City, 1944), vol. 2.
22. "Classical" accounts of domination and punishment (Durkheim, Weber) tend to consider whole societal "penal systems" or "modes of domination". My interest, on the other hand, is in fragmenting power, domination, and punishment into different fields of power, into different institutional contexts, into menus of concrete means of coercion. See David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society (Chicago, IL, 1990), ch. 2; and Max Weber, Economía y Sociedad (Mexico City, 1944), vol. 2.
23. See Charles Tilly, "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834", Center for Studies of Social Change, Working Paper no. 141, (New York, 1992); Charles Tilly, "Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain, 1750-1830", in Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds), The Dynamics of Social Movements (Cambridge, MA, 1979); and Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge, MA, 1986). For a discussion of Tilly's concept see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York, 1994). ch. 2. For an application of this construct to collective action in Latin American history, see David Sowell, "Repertoires of Contention in Urban Colombia, 1760s-1940s: An Inquiry into Latin American Social Violence", Journal of Urban History, 24 (1998), pp. 302-336.
24. See Charles Tilly, "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834", Center for Studies of Social Change, Working Paper no. 141, (New York, 1992); Charles Tilly, "Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain, 1750-1830", in Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds), The Dynamics of Social Movements (Cambridge, MA, 1979); and Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge, MA, 1986). For a discussion of Tilly's concept see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York, 1994). ch. 2. For an application of this construct to collective action in Latin American history, see David Sowell, "Repertoires of Contention in Urban Colombia, 1760s-1940s: An Inquiry into Latin American Social Violence", Journal of Urban History, 24 (1998), pp. 302-336.
25. See Charles Tilly, "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834", Center for Studies of Social Change, Working Paper no. 141, (New York, 1992); Charles Tilly, "Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain, 1750-1830", in Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds), The Dynamics of Social Movements (Cambridge, MA, 1979); and Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge, MA, 1986). For a discussion of Tilly's concept see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York, 1994). ch. 2. For an application of this construct to collective action in Latin American history, see David Sowell, "Repertoires of Contention in Urban Colombia, 1760s-1940s: An Inquiry into Latin American Social Violence", Journal of Urban History, 24 (1998), pp. 302-336.
26. See Charles Tilly, "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834", Center for Studies of Social Change, Working Paper no. 141, (New York, 1992); Charles Tilly, "Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain, 1750-1830", in Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds), The Dynamics of Social Movements (Cambridge, MA, 1979); and Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge, MA, 1986). For a discussion of Tilly's concept see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York, 1994). ch. 2. For an application of this construct to collective action in Latin American history, see David Sowell, "Repertoires of Contention in Urban Colombia, 1760s-1940s: An Inquiry into Latin American Social Violence", Journal of Urban History, 24 (1998), pp. 302-336.
27. See Charles Tilly, "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834", Center for Studies of Social Change, Working Paper no. 141, (New York, 1992); Charles Tilly, "Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain, 1750-1830", in Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds), The Dynamics of Social Movements (Cambridge, MA, 1979); and Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge, MA, 1986). For a discussion of Tilly's concept see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York, 1994). ch. 2. For an application of this construct to collective action in Latin American history, see David Sowell, "Repertoires of Contention in Urban Colombia, 1760s-1940s: An Inquiry into Latin American Social Violence", Journal of Urban History, 24 (1998), pp. 302-336.
28. Tilly, The Contentious French, p. 10.
29. I prefer this formulation to Foucault's concept of "technologies of power". A repertoire entails the possibility of choice from among different forms and means of coercion, it need not be attached to a certain power-knowledge configuration, and it does not necessarily assume the effectiveness of coercion. See Michel Fouchart, Discipline and Punish (London, 1977), and Colin Godon (ed.), Power-Knowledge (New York, 1980).
30. I prefer this formulation to Foucault's concept of "technologies of power". A repertoire entails the possibility of choice from among different forms and means of coercion, it need not be attached to a certain power-knowledge configuration, and it does not necessarily assume the effectiveness of coercion. See Michel Fouchart, Discipline and Punish (London, 1977), and Colin Godon (ed.), Power-Knowledge (New York, 1980).
31. For a definition of "subalternity" see Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, MA, 1997); and John Beverley, Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory (Durham, NC, 1999).
32. For a definition of "subalternity" see Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, MA, 1997); and John Beverley, Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory (Durham, NC, 1999).
33. Even slavery, Fogel and Engerman have argued, operates on the basis of certain incentives: Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, Time on the Cross (Boston, MA, 1974). Their critics, on the other hand, deny that slaves were able to exercise choices as producers or consumers. See Paul A. David et al., Reckoning with Slavery (New York, 1976).
34. Even slavery, Fogel and Engerman have argued, operates on the basis of certain incentives: Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, Time on the Cross (Boston, MA, 1974). Their critics, on the other hand, deny that slaves were able to exercise choices as producers or consumers. See Paul A. David et al., Reckoning with Slavery (New York, 1976).
35. Here I am following Douglas North's definition of an institution as a field governed by formal and informal rules. See Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York, 1990).
36. This formulation contrasts with Norbert Elias's thesis of a general decline in the level of violence associated with the gradual "civilizing process". Instead, it sees the process of "civilization" as one that produces cultural difference in ways that simultaneously ameliorate violence against certain social subjects and increase violence against others. The self-control of emotions and the growing sensitivity towards others varies greatly depending on who "the other" is. For a discussion of Elias's views see Garland, Punishment and Modern Society, pp. 215-225.
37. By toleration of punishment or violence I mean something akin to what Barrington Moore calls "moral grievance" or "sense of injustice". A given society tolerates certain forms of punishment or certain types of violence until they reach a certain threshold. Their members accept a certain "implicit social contract" until some of the terms of this contract are ostensibly violated. Barrington Moore, La injusticia: bases sociales de la obediencia y la rebelión, translated by Sara Sefchovich (Mexico City, 1989).
38. In the same fashion, women are defined as being endowed with extra doses of passion, desire, and moral ambivalence, and consequently with less reason and foresight. Hence, the punishments and correctives designed for women tend to be significantly different from those designed for men: the seclusion of women, for example, takes place in religious institutions, while men are confined in penitentiaries.
39. For the passage between hidden and open resistance see James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven, CT [etc.], 1990). See also, Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge, MA, 1970).
40. For the passage between hidden and open resistance see James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven, CT [etc.], 1990). See also, Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Cambridge, MA, 1970).
41. In such a case, a movement from a more coercive to a less coercive point would be analogous to a movement from coercion to contract, and if various social fields demonstrated the same type of movement society as a whole could be said to be experiencing a transition from coercion to contract.
42. See Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance.
43. Though opponents of Rosas claimed there were thousands of these assassinations, the historian Ernesto Quiroga Micheo claims the Mazorca carried out about eighty murders during the period 1833-1852. The remaining political assassinations were carried out by army officers and a police chief; Ernesto Quiroga Micheo, "Los mazorqueros. Gente decente o asesinos?", Todo es Historia, 308 (March 1993), pp. 38-55.
44. Conceived as a "Holy War" against an illegitimate group of rebels, the civil war had to be carried to the end, at all costs, by all good federales. Otherwise, the federalist republic, threatened by a group of "anarchists" allied with foreign powers, could be destroyed. These powerful reasons were used to justify the violence directed against the unitarios, the forced recruitment for the army, the requisition of provisions, and confiscations, etc.
45. On 3 October 1841, six unitarios were publicly executed (shot by a firing squad) in Tucumán on the orders of General Oribe. Marco Avellaneda, accused of having assassinated Governor Alejandro Heredia, received an exemplary punishment: his head was cut off and exposed in the public square (in a pica) for fifteen days; Adolfo Saldías, Historia de la Confederación Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 253-254.
46. Being engaged in a "Holy War", many of the military leadership (unitarios and federales) argued that this punitive violence was a just retribution, the only remedy to political anarchy.
47. Prudencio Arnold, an officer who commanded various campaigns against Indian tribes during the Rosas period, wrote: "The Indian is a barbarian and a savage; but the Christian is no less [barbaric and savage] [...]. How can one not expect retaliations when our destacamentos [military expeditions] take away the products of the malón [Indian invasion], burn their toldos, kill their men and their old women, peal away pieces of their skin to make hobbles that later hang from the [Christians'] horses' necks during their festivals?"; Prudencio Arnold, Un soldado argentino (Buenos Aires, 1970), p. 103. For a comprehensive view of uncristiano relations during the post-Independence period see Martha Becchis, "Inter-Ethnic Relations during the Period of Nation-State Formation in Chile and Argentina: From Sovereign to Ethnic" (Ph.D., New School for Social Research, New York City, 1983); and Carlos Martínez Sarasola, Nuestros paisanos los indios (Buenos Aires, 1992).
48. Prudencio Arnold, an officer who commanded various campaigns against Indian tribes during the Rosas period, wrote: "The Indian is a barbarian and a savage; but the Christian is no less [barbaric and savage] [...]. How can one not expect retaliations when our destacamentos [military expeditions] take away the products of the malón [Indian invasion], burn their toldos, kill their men and their old women, peal away pieces of their skin to make hobbles that later hang from the [Christians'] horses' necks during their festivals?"; Prudencio Arnold, Un soldado argentino (Buenos Aires, 1970), p. 103. For a comprehensive view of uncristiano relations during the post-Independence period see Martha Becchis, "Inter-Ethnic Relations during the Period of Nation-State Formation in Chile and Argentina: From Sovereign to Ethnic" (Ph.D., New School for Social Research, New York City, 1983); and Carlos Martínez Sarasola, Nuestros paisanos los indios (Buenos Aires, 1992).
49. Prudencio Arnold, an officer who commanded various campaigns against Indian tribes during the Rosas period, wrote: "The Indian is a barbarian and a savage; but the Christian is no less [barbaric and savage] [...]. How can one not expect retaliations when our destacamentos [military expeditions] take away the products of the malón [Indian invasion], burn their toldos, kill their men and their old women, peal away pieces of their skin to make hobbles that later hang from the [Christians'] horses' necks during their festivals?"; Prudencio Arnold, Un soldado argentino (Buenos Aires, 1970), p. 103. For a comprehensive view of uncristiano relations during the post-Independence period see Martha Becchis, "Inter-Ethnic Relations during the Period of Nation-State Formation in Chile and Argentina: From Sovereign to Ethnic" (Ph.D., New School for Social Research, New York City, 1983); and Carlos Martínez Sarasola, Nuestros paisanos los indios (Buenos Aires, 1992).
50. Federales justified these executions in terms of the need to exterminate their political and military foes (unitarios), whom they considered "a race" of "anarchists", deserving no consideration and possessing no rights. Federalist colonel Mariano Maza wrote from Catamarca: "Again, the savage unitarios wanted to take our Restorer from us. As now it is necessary not to give away any advantages, I am ordering the execution of all the savages I had as prisoners, among them Luis Momerola, who served in Lavalle's artillery. Tiburcio Olmos had also been given 'the passport'. My friend, knife and bullets with this race! If today I had had a thousand prisoners I would have 'dispatched' the thousand." Quoted by Saldías, Historia de la Confederación vol. 2, p. 255. The other side, the unitarios, showed no less cruelty and violence. With the assuredness of religious conviction, General Lamadrid wanted to burn in the hoguera all montoneros found in Cuyo (in 1838). "We need to finish with these heads if we want tranquility to be restored"; Ibid., p. 256.
51. Federales justified these executions in terms of the need to exterminate their political and military foes (unitarios), whom they considered "a race" of "anarchists", deserving no consideration and possessing no rights. Federalist colonel Mariano Maza wrote from Catamarca: "Again, the savage unitarios wanted to take our Restorer from us. As now it is necessary not to give away any advantages, I am ordering the execution of all the savages I had as prisoners, among them Luis Momerola, who served in Lavalle's artillery. Tiburcio Olmos had also been given 'the passport'. My friend, knife and bullets with this race! If today I had had a thousand prisoners I would have 'dispatched' the thousand." Quoted by Saldías, Historia de la Confederación vol. 2, p. 255. The other side, the unitarios, showed no less cruelty and violence. With the assuredness of religious conviction, General Lamadrid wanted to burn in the hoguera all montoneros found in Cuyo (in 1838). "We need to finish with these heads if we want tranquility to be restored"; Ibid., p. 256.
52. To an extent, these were social and political rural mobilizations, destined to repair damage done by the unitarios.
53. These terms varied from one to fourteen years, the most common sentence for theft or homicide being four years.
54. Over time, the separate black regiments that had fought in the revolutions for independence merged with other regiments, and by the 1840s there was no single all-black regiment. This was part of a process of social leveling that benefited Afro-Argentines during post-Independence. See Andrews, The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires, pp. 60-64.
55. I have discussed this in "The Reasons of Deserters", a paper presented at the Program of Agrarian Studies, Yale University, February 1994.
56. I have discussed this in "El mercado de trabajo en la campaña bonaerense (1820-1860). Ocho nferencias a partir de fuentes militares", in Marta Bonaudo and Jorge F. Sábato (eds), La problemática agraria. Nuevas aproximaciones (Buenos Aires, 1993), vol. 1.
57. Osvaldo Barreneche, "Criminal Justice and State Formation in Early Nineteenth Century Buenos Aires, Argentina" (mimeograph).
58. Supporters of the regime justified Rosas's resort to swift justice during this period of "anarchy". Rosas, said the author of "Cartas sobre la América del Sur", an article in defense of the regime published in La Gaceta Mercantil, January 1844, uses less cruel punishments than European governments. The quick resolution of cases, omitting certain requirements of due process, was justified due to the "ruin of all authority and law" prior to the Rosas administration. Quoted by Jorge Myers, Orden y Virtud. El discurso republicano en el régimen rosista (Buenos Aires, 1995), pp. 232-234.
59. See Ricardo D. Salvatore, "The Crimes of Poor 'Paysanos' in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Buenos Aires Province", in C. Aguirre and R. Buffington (eds), Reconstructing Criminality in Latin America (Durham, NC, 2000).
60. The public interest generated by this trial is captured by Silvia Mazzuchi and Héctor Sambuceti, "Santos Pérez: Alegato y ejecución", Todo es Historia, 308 (March 1993), pp. 26-36. A fictionalized account of the execution and the grotesque responses of the public can be found in Eduardo Gutierrez, Juan Manuel de Rosas. Los dramas del terror (Buenos Aires, 1944), pp. 180-197. Though much less frequent, public executions also extended to common murderers and, occasionally, to deserters.
61. The public interest generated by this trial is captured by Silvia Mazzuchi and Héctor Sambuceti, "Santos Pérez: Alegato y ejecución", Todo es Historia, 308 (March 1993), pp. 26-36. A fictionalized account of the execution and the grotesque responses of the public can be found in Eduardo Gutierrez, Juan Manuel de Rosas. Los dramas del terror (Buenos Aires, 1944), pp. 180-197. Though much less frequent, public executions also extended to common murderers and, occasionally, to deserters.
62. For a description of judicial torture and other forms of judicial violence during the colonial period, see Ricardo Rodríguez Molas, "Torturas, suplicios y otras violencias", Todo es Historia, 192 (May 1983), pp. 8-44.
63. I have dealt with this issue in "El Imperio de la Ley: Delito, estado y sociedad en la era rosista", Delito y Sociedad. Revista de Ciencias sociales, 3:4-5 (1993-1994), pp. 93-118. For a description of the functions of justices of the peace see Benito Díaz, Juzgados de paz de campaña de la provincia de Buenos Aires (1821-1854) (La Plata, 1959). In addition, local justices and policemen had to cooperate with the politics of the Federation, identifying and arresting political opponents.
64. I have dealt with this issue in "El Imperio de la Ley: Delito, estado y sociedad en la era rosista", Delito y Sociedad. Revista de Ciencias sociales, 3:4-5 (1993-1994), pp. 93-118. For a description of the functions of justices of the peace see Benito Díaz, Juzgados de paz de campaña de la provincia de Buenos Aires (1821-1854) (La Plata, 1959). In addition, local justices and policemen had to cooperate with the politics of the Federation, identifying and arresting political opponents.
65. This was not new to the Rosas period. In colonial times, large ranchers gave special responsibilities to slaves, appointing them foremen over mestizo peons. For an account of the occupational mobility of black peons, see Carlos A. Mayo, "De esclavo a empresario", Todo es Historia, 335 (June 1995), pp. 26-36. For the functioning of a large estancia complex, that of the Anchorenas, see Jonathan C. Brown, A Socioeconomic History of Argentina, 1776-1860 (Cambridge, 1979), ch. 8.
66. This was not new to the Rosas period. In colonial times, large ranchers gave special responsibilities to slaves, appointing them foremen over mestizo peons. For an account of the occupational mobility of black peons, see Carlos A. Mayo, "De esclavo a empresario", Todo es Historia, 335 (June 1995), pp. 26-36. For the functioning of a large estancia complex, that of the Anchorenas, see Jonathan C. Brown, A Socioeconomic History of Argentina, 1776-1860 (Cambridge, 1979), ch. 8.
67. Recent studies have seriously questioned the conventional wisdom of the great power of estancieros. Their influence on government policies and their concentration of economic resources were less important than previously thought. And, until the late nineteenth century, they failed to act with either the cohesion or purpose that characterizes a social class. See Carlos A. Mayo, "Landed but not Powerful: The Colonial Estancieros of Buenos Aires (1750-1810)", Hispanic American Historical Review, 71 (1991), pp. 761-779; Salvatore, "Autocratic State and Labor Control", pp. 251-278; and Tulio Halperín Donghi, "Clase terrateniente y poder político en Buenos Aires (1820-1830)", Cuadernos de Historia Regional, 5:15 (1992), pp. 11-45. For an overview of the literature see Raúl Fradkin, "La historia agraria y los estudios de establecimientos productivos en Hispanoamérica colonial: una mirada desde el Río de la Plata", in R.O. Fradkin (ed.), La Historia agraria del Río de la Plata Colonial. Los establecimientos productivos (Buenos Aires, 1993), vol. 1, pp. 7-44.
68. Recent studies have seriously questioned the conventional wisdom of the great power of estancieros. Their influence on government policies and their concentration of economic resources were less important than previously thought. And, until the late nineteenth century, they failed to act with either the cohesion or purpose that characterizes a social class. See Carlos A. Mayo, "Landed but not Powerful: The Colonial Estancieros of Buenos Aires (1750-1810)", Hispanic American Historical Review, 71 (1991), pp. 761-779; Salvatore, "Autocratic State and Labor Control", pp. 251-278; and Tulio Halperín Donghi, "Clase terrateniente y poder político en Buenos Aires (1820-1830)", Cuadernos de Historia Regional, 5:15 (1992), pp. 11-45. For an overview of the literature see Raúl Fradkin, "La historia agraria y los estudios de establecimientos productivos en Hispanoamérica colonial: una mirada desde el Río de la Plata", in R.O. Fradkin (ed.), La Historia agraria del Río de la Plata Colonial. Los establecimientos productivos (Buenos Aires, 1993), vol. 1, pp. 7-44.
69. Recent studies have seriously questioned the conventional wisdom of the great power of estancieros. Their influence on government policies and their concentration of economic resources were less important than previously thought. And, until the late nineteenth century, they failed to act with either the cohesion or purpose that characterizes a social class. See Carlos A. Mayo, "Landed but not Powerful: The Colonial Estancieros of Buenos Aires (1750-1810)", Hispanic American Historical Review, 71 (1991), pp. 761-779; Salvatore, "Autocratic State and Labor Control", pp. 251-278; and Tulio Halperín Donghi, "Clase terrateniente y poder político en Buenos Aires (1820-1830)", Cuadernos de Historia Regional, 5:15 (1992), pp. 11-45. For an overview of the literature see Raúl Fradkin, "La historia agraria y los estudios de establecimientos productivos en Hispanoamérica colonial: una mirada desde el Río de la Plata", in R.O. Fradkin (ed.), La Historia agraria del Río de la Plata Colonial. Los establecimientos productivos (Buenos Aires, 1993), vol. 1, pp. 7-44.
70. Recent studies have seriously questioned the conventional wisdom of the great power of estancieros. Their influence on government policies and their concentration of economic resources were less important than previously thought. And, until the late nineteenth century, they failed to act with either the cohesion or purpose that characterizes a social class. See Carlos A. Mayo, "Landed but not Powerful: The Colonial Estancieros of Buenos Aires (1750-1810)", Hispanic American Historical Review, 71 (1991), pp. 761-779; Salvatore, "Autocratic State and Labor Control", pp. 251-278; and Tulio Halperín Donghi, "Clase terrateniente y poder político en Buenos Aires (1820-1830)", Cuadernos de Historia Regional, 5:15 (1992), pp. 11-45. For an overview of the literature see Raúl Fradkin, "La historia agraria y los estudios de establecimientos productivos en Hispanoamérica colonial: una mirada desde el Río de la Plata", in R.O. Fradkin (ed.), La Historia agraria del Río de la Plata Colonial. Los establecimientos productivos (Buenos Aires, 1993), vol. 1, pp. 7-44.
71. Assured that the police would not bother to arrest them for breach of contract, peons moved from one district to another in search of family, entertainment, or better opportunities. Many were simply escaping military conscription.
72. Slatta, Gauhos and the Vanishing Frontier, pp. 32-33, especially Table 1.
73. Reluctantly, ranchers accepted the logic of the market. See Salvatore, "Autocratic State and Labor Control", esp. pp. 262-267.
74. See Jonathan C. Brown, "Revival of the Rural Economy and Society in Buenos Aires", in Mark D. Szuchman and Jonathan C. Brown (eds), Revolution and Restoration: The Rearrangement of Power in Argentina, 1776-1860 (Lincoln, NB, 1994), esp. pp. 255-264.
75. This I call the "fear-protection thesis". See, for example, Lynch, Argentine Dictator, Rodríguez Molas, Historia social del gaucho; Andrés Carretero, La propiedad de la tierra en la época de Rosas (Buenos Aires, 1972); and Gastón Gori, Vagos y mal entretenidos (Santa Fé, NM, 1951).
76. This I call the "fear-protection thesis". See, for example, Lynch, Argentine Dictator, Rodríguez Molas, Historia social del gaucho; Andrés Carretero, La propiedad de la tierra en la época de Rosas (Buenos Aires, 1972); and Gastón Gori, Vagos y mal entretenidos (Santa Fé, NM, 1951).
77. This I call the "fear-protection thesis". See, for example, Lynch, Argentine Dictator, Rodríguez Molas, Historia social del gaucho; Andrés Carretero, La propiedad de la tierra en la época de Rosas (Buenos Aires, 1972); and Gastón Gori, Vagos y mal entretenidos (Santa Fé, NM, 1951).
78. Some of them were later arrested in other districts for not carrying the papeleta de conchavo (work certificate), but such arrests were relatively rare.
79. See M. Goldberg and S. Mallo, "La población africana en Buenos Aires y su campaña. Formas de vida y subsistencia (1750-1850)", Temas de Africa y Asia, 2 (1993), pp. 64-65.
80. We know that on late-colonial estancias slaves were locked up at night; no such practice was found in the Rosas period, mainly because good black cowboys were so scarce and useful that they were treated as free men. See Salvatore and Brown, "Trade and Proletarianization in Late Colonial Banda Oriental". Some inventories of ranches show the existence of grillos (shackles), which were most probably used to retain the few remaining slaves.
81. It is known that Rosas tried to impose a rigid disciplinary code (workers had to deliver their weapons to the foremen, had to pay fines for not carrying lassoos and bolas to work, and received floggings for minor violations) on the ranches he managed before being governor (c. 1820-1828). A traditional account of this version can be found in Manuel Gálvez, Vida de Don Juan Manuel de Rosas, in Biografias Completas (Buenos Aires, 1961), vol. 2, esp. pp. 43-45.
82. John Lynch repeats this version to the letter; see Lynch, Argentine Dictator, pp. 114, 122, 124.
83. The estancia's limited power to coerce laborers was based in part on its separation from political power. Ranches competed with the state for scarce resources (labor, cattle, horses), and could not ensure the state a sound financial base (most state revenue came from import and export duties).
84. Salvatore, "Modes of Labor Control in Cattle-Ranching Economies".
85. In 1828 Rosas told rancher Anchorena that a "multitude" of Indians were living on the ranch. He failed to mention how many of them were actually doing work for the ranch. Rosas to J.J. Anchorena, Cerrillos, 13 June 1828, AGN VII-16-4-7, no. 1364.
86. In the end, of the thousands of "braves" who resided for months on Rosas's lands, less than thirty took jobs as ranch hands. Some of them, with new Christian names and new clothes, remained with Rosas for years.
87. Elsewhere, I have discussed the difficulties ranchers faced when confronted with the task of reconstructing labor relations in the post-Independence period. In Corrientes, the Robertsons used a charismatic and violent capataz, Mr Campbell, to keep peons in check, while their credit worked miracles in buying up the local production of hides, tallow, and hair. The experience lasted only a couple of years and was later abandoned. Ricardo D. Salvatore, "The Breakdown of Social Discipline in the Banda Oriental and the Littoral, 1790-1820", in Szuchman and Brown, Revolution and Restoration, pp. 74-102.
88. John Brabazon, Andanzas de un irlandés en el campo porteño (1845-1864) (Buenos Aires, 1981), pp. 176-177.
89. The wool economy, on the other hand, brought more women into "productive" activities. Ranchers who refused to allow women to do such tasks as shearing, milking, and wool cleaning ran the risk of jeopardizing production.
90. See Johnson, "Competition of Slave and Free Labor", and Eduardo Saguier, "La naturaleza estipendiaria de la esclavitud urbana colonial. El caso del Río de la Plata en el siglo XVII", Revista Paraguaya de Sociología, 26:74 (1989), pp. 45-54.
91. See Johnson, "Competition of Slave and Free Labor", and Eduardo Saguier, "La naturaleza estipendiaria de la esclavitud urbana colonial. El caso del Río de la Plata en el siglo XVII", Revista Paraguaya de Sociología, 26:74 (1989), pp. 45-54.
92. The law obliged slaves to provide a daily payment to their masters. Johnson, "Competition of Slave and Free Labor", p. 416.
93. "For thousands of slaves in late colonial Buenos Aires, slavery meant weekly or, less commonly, monthly, cash payments paid to the owners." Ibid., p. 418.
94. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, nearly eighty per cent of all slaves in the city of Buenos Aires were domestic servants, the remaining twenty per cent worked in artisan shops or on nearby farms. Ibid., p. 411.
95. At age twenty (males) or sixteen (females), these children were to gain their freedom. Meanwhile they would provide services to their masters in exchange for education and food, and after reaching the age of fifteen (males) or fourteen (females) they would be paid a wage by their masters.
96. Other slaves were simply confiscated from Spanish masters and transferred to the army. Marta Goldberg and Laura Jany, "Algunos problemas referentes a la situación del esclavo en el Río de la Plata", in Cuarto Congreso Internacional de Historia de América (Buenos Aires, 1968), vol. 6, pp. 61-75.
97. If the rates of manumission were the same as in the late colonial period, the number of slaves remaining by 1853 (the year the constitution abolished slavery) must have been very few. The process had started in the late colonial period, when 1.5 per cent of the total slave population were manumitted each year. Lyman L. Johnson, "Manumission in Colonial Buenos Aires, 1776-1810", Hispanic American Historical Review, 59 (1979), pp. 258-279. The total population of blacks and mulattos in Buenos Aires city increased only slightly from 1810 to 1822 and remained stationary from 1822 to 1836. This stagnation might reflect the transfers of blacks and mulattos from city to countryside, which ran parallel to the process of gradual emancipation. See Marta Goldberg, "La población negra y mulata de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1810-1840", Desarrollo Económico, 16:61 (April-June 1976), p. 88.
98. If the rates of manumission were the same as in the late colonial period, the number of slaves remaining by 1853 (the year the constitution abolished slavery) must have been very few. The process had started in the late colonial period, when 1.5 per cent of the total slave population were manumitted each year. Lyman L. Johnson, "Manumission in Colonial Buenos Aires, 1776-1810", Hispanic American Historical Review, 59 (1979), pp. 258-279. The total population of blacks and mulattos in Buenos Aires city increased only slightly from 1810 to 1822 and remained stationary from 1822 to 1836. This stagnation might reflect the transfers of blacks and mulattos from city to countryside, which ran parallel to the process of gradual emancipation. See Marta Goldberg, "La población negra y mulata de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1810-1840", Desarrollo Económico, 16:61 (April-June 1976), p. 88.
99. Owners of libertos managed to extend their "patronage" over young slaves and, despite the prohibition of the slave trade, slaves caught from foreign vessels found their way on to the local slave market. See Liliana Crespi, "Negros apresados en operaciones de corso durante la guerra con el Brasil (1825-1828)", Temas de Africa y Asia, 2 (1993), pp. 109-124.
100. In the country, slaves could pass for free men, and colored men could "whiten" themselves. Once they had acquired property and social connections, it was difficult to subject them again to bondage. See Goldberg, "La población negra y mulata".
101. The proportion of mulattos was greater in the areas of older colonization, while the proportion of blacks was larger in areas of recent colonization. This is interpreted by Goldberg as clear evidence that "whitening" was a strategy for gaining freedom among slaves transported to the countryside.
102. Some slaves went to court seeking the fulfillment of "promises of freedom" made by their masters. See Silvia Mallo, "La libertad en el discurso del Estado, de amos y esclaves, 1780-1830", Revista de Historia de América, 112 (1991), pp. 121-146.
103. The transition towards paid labor was the most important change regarding female servants.
104. As a result of these increased tensions, many morenas and pardas were sent to jail "for correction" on charges of theft, insolence, or insulting behavior. Theft seems to have been the single most common cause of arrest of female servants. Driven by the urge to "dress up" in order to gain respectability, or simply in need of money to help family and lovers, many female servants felt entitled to appropriate their masters' money or clothes.
105. In the countryside, female captives freed from the Indian toldos were sometimes reduced to servitude under the custom of crianza. In practice, these servants were treated worse than slaves, being subject to punishments and abuse. Juan Méndez Avellaneda, "Entonces la Mujer", Todo es Historia, 286 (April 1991), pp. 50-51.
106. During the colonial period, the household was the central locus of patriarchal authority. Here the man of the household dominated his family and servants, most of them chattel slaves. He used both legal and extralegal coercion to maintain the deference and obedience of wife, children and servants. In relation to slaves, the household head had various means of coercion he could use: confinement, corporal punishment, food privation, and sale (to separate the slave from his or her family). In relation to female relatives (wife and daughters), similar mechanisms were available: corporal punishment, clothing and food privation, and house confinement. In extreme cases, could use convent cloisters to discipline a rebellious daughter or an unfaithful wife.
107. With the help of an escribiente, they narrated in detail the violence of their husbands, hoping to impress male judges - claims of sword beatings during pregnancy certainly made an impression.
108. Ricardo Cicerchia, "Familia: la historia de una idea. Los desórdenes domésticos de la plebe urbana porteña, 1776-1850", in Catalina Wainerman (ed.), Vivir en familia (Buenos Aires, 1994), pp. 49-72.
109. Elite judges, horrified by the violence perpetrated against women, often sided with the victim.
110. Lyman L. Johnson find this situation characteristic of the late eighteenth century, when Bourbon reforms accelerated the pace of economic growth and the growth in labor demand exceeded the growth in labor supply. See Johnson, "Competition of Slave and Free Labor".
111. Limitations of space prevent us from discussing these other social fields. For domestic female servants the transition from slavery to paid labor meant not only an expansion in their freedom of movement, but also greater contention within the household regarding questions of working hour, rest, and personal treatment.
112. Flores was later rearrested, for Saavedra sent another of his sons in pursuit. "Manuel Flores (or Manuel González), filiación", Ranchos, 30 November 1850, AGN X 29-11-4.
113. This was the case with Andres Illescay, an ex-slave who had voluntarily joined the New Regiment of Blandengues at Bahía Blanca in 1833. Receiving a sizeable monetary advance ($100 for each enganche), Illescay renewed his commitment to the regiment every year. In October 1843, while fighting in a campaign near Azul (in the south of the province), he deserted his regiment and moved to Juan Fernández's ranch in search of refuge. In spite of his condition, Fernández's mayordomo hired him. He was to drive cattle from the ranch to a meat-salting plant (saladero) near Bahía Blanca. He worked in this job for a total of ten months. One day, being sent to Magdalena with a herd, he was arrested for desertion. The rancher's "protection" apparently did not extended very far. "Andrés Illescay, filiación", Bahía Blanca, 6 August 1844, AGN X 26-5-3.
114. "Thomas Carr, filiación",Lobos, 4 December 1850, AGN X 43-7-7.
115. "Martín Garay, filiación", Las Flores, 1 June 1846, AGN X 21-2-4.
116. "Criminal contra Juan Carpintero por haber forzado a una mujer casada", AHPBA, Juzgado del Crimen, 34-5-98-1 (1831).
117. The words of the victim and those of her eight-year-old niece carried, in the appreciation of the judges, the same weight as Carpintero's words. And the evidence (the blooded knife and pillow, and the sumario made in the previous case) weighed in favor of the victims' arguments.
118. Carlos Mayo, "Amistades ilícitas: Las relaciones
119. José Mateo, "Migrar y volver a migrar. Los campesinos agricultores de la frontera bonaerense a principios del siglo XIX", in J.C. Garavaglia and J.L. Moreno (eds), Población, sociedad, familia y migraciones en el espacio rioplatense. Siglos XVIII y XIX (Buenos Aires, 1993), pp. 123-148.
120. The same situation was reported in the province of Córdoba in 1813. The leva had the effect of making men disappear, making it almost impossible for agricultural districts to harvest the grain. Horacio J. Pianetto, La situación social de la campaña de Córdoba durante el período de la revolución, 1810-1814 (Córdoba, 1968), pp. 45-48.
121. J.M. Beruti, Memorias Curiosas, quoted in Tulio Halperin Donghi. Guerra y finanzas en los orígenes del Estado argentino (1791-1850) (Buenos Aires, 1982), pp. 158-159.
122. J.M. Beruti, Memorias Curiosas, quoted in Tulio Halperin Donghi. Guerra y finanzas en los orígenes del Estado argentino (1791-1850) (Buenos Aires, 1982), pp. 158-159.
123. After 1828 governments seemed to have learned this lesson. Though they did not abandon forced drafts, they made more restricted use of them, combining levado soldiers with others hired for a wage, the so-called enganchados.
124. Comandante Militar de Patagones to Ministro de Guera Bartolomé Mitre, Patagones, 6 October 1856, AGN X 19-6-1.
125. The transfer of slaves into the labor market, as suppliers of labor services, did not force down the wages for free laborers. The growth of labor demand was so rapid that wages continued to rise.
126. As S. Gayol has pointed out for the period 1870-1890, efforts to modernize the police force were hindered by a chronic shortage of laborers. Due to high wages in other occupations, the police were unable to retain their best men. During the harvest season, the depletion of men acquired catastrophic proportions. The size of the effective force was always smaller than the number of posts available, and the quality of men lower than desired. High rates of labor turnover made the instruction and disciplining of policemen an illusory goal. An illiterate force, with little knowledge of the streets they patrolled - and often without knowledge of the weapons they used -could hardly guarantee public order on the streets. Sandra Gayol, "Entre lo descable y lo posible. Perfil de la Policía de Buenos Aires en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX", Estudios Sociales (Santa Fé), 5, 10 (1996), pp. 127-131.
127. We are assuming here that both the government and the military are subject to the same low degree of institutionalization, that officers and functionaries do not pay much attention to institutional rules.
128. The exposure of the bodies of unitarios on the streets seemed to have caused alarm among the elite of the city, but not so much among the population at large, the mass of people supporting the federalists.
129. The story of the execution of Camila O'Gorman and her fiance, the priest Ladislao Gutierrez, made evident this difference in society's toleration of violence. The dictator was surprised by the strong opposition the execution awakened, as if the moral chord of society had been touched.