A reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists

Economic Theory

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-22

  Chari, V V ^a,b   Jones, Larry E ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Complementary monopoly; Externalities; Free rider problem; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034338743     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050324     Document Type: Article

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