On a wing and a prayer? Exploring the human components of technological failure

Systems Research and Behavioral Science

Volumn 17, Issue 6, 2000, Pages 543-559

  Smith, Denis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Crisis management; Kegworth air crash; Organizational resilience; Sense making

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034311354     PISSN: 10927026     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/1099-1743(200011/12)17:6<543::AID-SRES339>3.0.CO;2-4     Document Type: Article

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