Multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 126, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 152-165

  Vetschera, Rudolf ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; DECISION THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

MULTI CRITERIA AGENCY MODELS;

OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

EID: 0034301512     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00286-6     Document Type: Article

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