California's experience with direct democracy

Parliamentary Affairs

Volumn 53, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 644-656

  Bowler, Shaun ^a   Donovan, Todd ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034287830     PISSN: 00312290     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pa/53.4.644     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. 1 See S. Bowler and T. Donovan, 'Popular Control of Referendum Agendas: Implications for Democratic Outcomes and Minority Rights' in M. Mendelsohn and A. Parkin (eds), Maturity or Malaise? The Growing Use of Referendums Across Liberal-Democratic Societies, St Martin's Press, forthcoming.
2. 2 D. Magleby, 'Direct Legislation in the American States' in D. Butler and A. Ranney (eds), Referendums Around the World, AEI Press, 1994.
3. 3 As an example, see P. Schrag, Paradise Lost: California's Experience, America's Future, New Press, 1998.
4. 4 The following discussion is largely taken from C. Price and C. Bell, California Government Today: Politics of Reform, 5e, Harcourt, 1995, p. 95; for more detailed discussion see California Ballot Initiative Process, produced by the Secretary of State's office see http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ elections.htm.
5. 4 The following discussion is largely taken from C. Price and C. Bell, California Government Today: Politics of Reform, 5e, Harcourt, 1995, p. 95; for more detailed discussion see California Ballot Initiative Process, produced by the Secretary of State's office see http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ elections.htm.
6. 5 The actual price varies quite a lot and depends, in part, on how much money the campaign has and also how close the 150 day deadline is to passing: payment typically rises towards the end of the period.
7. 6 The Secretary of State's website, www.ss.ca.gov, has examples of recent ballot pamphlets and texts of the laws.
8. 7 For detail on variation in rules for use across states see D. Magleby, Direct Legislation, Johns Hopkins UP, 1984. See also C. Tolbert, T. Donovan and D. Lowenstien, 'Election Law and Rules for Using Initiatives' in S. Bowler, T. Donovan and C. Tolbert (eds), Citizens as Legislators, Ohio State UP, 1998. See especially the Initiative and Referendum institute website http://www.iandrinstitute.org/.
9. 7 For detail on variation in rules for use across states see D. Magleby, Direct Legislation, Johns Hopkins UP, 1984. See also C. Tolbert, T. Donovan and D. Lowenstien, 'Election Law and Rules for Using Initiatives' in S. Bowler, T. Donovan and C. Tolbert (eds), Citizens as Legislators, Ohio State UP, 1998. See especially the Initiative and Referendum institute website http://www.iandrinstitute.org/.
10. 8 J. Citrin, 'Who's the Boss: Direct Democracy and Popular Control in California' in S. Craig (ed.), Broken Contract: Changing Relations Between Americans and their Government, Westview Press, 1996. C. Tolbert, 'Changing Rules for State Legislators: Direct Democracy and Governance Policies in Bowler, Donovan and Tolbert (eds), loc. cit.
11. 8 J. Citrin, 'Who's the Boss: Direct Democracy and Popular Control in California' in S. Craig (ed.), Broken Contract: Changing Relations Between Americans and their Government, Westview Press, 1996. C. Tolbert, 'Changing Rules for State Legislators: Direct Democracy and Governance Policies in Bowler, Donovan and Tolbert (eds), loc. cit.
12. 9 See D. Smith. Tax Crusaders and the Politics of Direct Democracy, Routledge, 1998.
13. 10 The relationship of the courts to the results of the initiative process is a topic of increasing interest. See K.P. Miller, 'The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search for Standards', paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 1999; or C.B. Holman and R. Stern, 'Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts', Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 1998/31; and subsequent comments in the same journal by: R.L. Hansen, 'Judging the Judges on Initiatives: A Comment on Holman and Stern'; M. Vitello and A.J. Glendon, 'Article III Judges and the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges Hopelessly Elitist?'; S.J. Kuehl, 'Either Way You Get Sausages: One Legislator's View of the Initiative Process'.
14. 10 The relationship of the courts to the results of the initiative process is a topic of increasing interest. See K.P. Miller, 'The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search for Standards', paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 1999; or C.B. Holman and R. Stern, 'Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts', Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 1998/31; and subsequent comments in the same journal by: R.L. Hansen, 'Judging the Judges on Initiatives: A Comment on Holman and Stern'; M. Vitello and A.J. Glendon, 'Article III Judges and the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges Hopelessly Elitist?'; S.J. Kuehl, 'Either Way You Get Sausages: One Legislator's View of the Initiative Process'.
15. 10 The relationship of the courts to the results of the initiative process is a topic of increasing interest. See K.P. Miller, 'The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search for Standards', paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 1999; or C.B. Holman and R. Stern, 'Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts', Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 1998/31; and subsequent comments in the same journal by: R.L. Hansen, 'Judging the Judges on Initiatives: A Comment on Holman and Stern'; M. Vitello and A.J. Glendon, 'Article III Judges and the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges Hopelessly Elitist?'; S.J. Kuehl, 'Either Way You Get Sausages: One Legislator's View of the Initiative Process'.
16. 10 The relationship of the courts to the results of the initiative process is a topic of increasing interest. See K.P. Miller, 'The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search for Standards', paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 1999; or C.B. Holman and R. Stern, 'Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts', Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 1998/31; and subsequent comments in the same journal by: R.L. Hansen, 'Judging the Judges on Initiatives: A Comment on Holman and Stern'; M. Vitello and A.J. Glendon, 'Article III Judges and the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges Hopelessly Elitist?'; S.J. Kuehl, 'Either Way You Get Sausages: One Legislator's View of the Initiative Process'.
17. 10 The relationship of the courts to the results of the initiative process is a topic of increasing interest. See K.P. Miller, 'The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search for Standards', paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 1999; or C.B. Holman and R. Stern, 'Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts', Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 1998/31; and subsequent comments in the same journal by: R.L. Hansen, 'Judging the Judges on Initiatives: A Comment on Holman and Stern'; M. Vitello and A.J. Glendon, 'Article III Judges and the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges Hopelessly Elitist?'; S.J. Kuehl, 'Either Way You Get Sausages: One Legislator's View of the Initiative Process'.
18. 11 Supra, n. 3.
19. 12 For a review of these critiques using historical sources, see S. Bowler and T. Donovan, Demanding Choices: Opinion, Voting and Direct Democracy, Michigan UP, 1998.
20. 13 The California Secretary of States web site shows the actual text of the proposed laws. As can be seen, these proposals can be lengthy, complex and unclear Vote98.ss.ca.gov/VoterGuide/home.htm.
21. 14 Each major party presidential candidate that accepts federal matching campaign funds must limiting their post-nomination campaign spending to $75 million. See S. Wayne, The Road to the White House, Bedford's St Martin's, 2000, p. 36. However, unregulated 'soft-money' and independent expenditures allow for far more spending in presidential elections.
22. 15 Supra, n. 12,and esp. A. Lupia: 'Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections', American Political Science Review, 1994/88; and 'Busy Voters. Agenda Control and the Power of Information', American Political Science Review 1992/86. Further evidence of cue taking can be found in J. Karp, 'The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative Campaigns' in Bowler, Donovan and Tolbert, ibid., n. 7. Similar results are seen in the Euro-referenda literature.
23. 15 Supra, n. 12,and esp. A. Lupia: 'Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections', American Political Science Review, 1994/88; and 'Busy Voters. Agenda Control and the Power of Information', American Political Science Review 1992/86. Further evidence of cue taking can be found in J. Karp, 'The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative Campaigns' in Bowler, Donovan and Tolbert, ibid., n. 7. Similar results are seen in the Euro-referenda literature.
24. 15 Supra, n. 12,and esp. A. Lupia: 'Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections', American Political Science Review, 1994/88; and 'Busy Voters. Agenda Control and the Power of Information', American Political Science Review 1992/86. Further evidence of cue taking can be found in J. Karp, 'The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative Campaigns' in Bowler, Donovan and Tolbert, ibid., n. 7. Similar results are seen in the Euro-referenda literature.
25. 16 Survey respondents in Washington state and California claim the publicly provided ballot pamphlet is the single most important information source used in deciding how to vote. Supra, n. 12, p. 57.
26. 17 S. Bowler, T. Donovan, J. Peel and M. Neiman, 'Elite Attitudes about Direct Democracy'. Paper presented at the Western Political Science Association Meeting, Seattle WA. 1999.
27. 18 Usually judicial review occurs after the election. At the time of writing, however, a rare court decision removed a proposition from the ballot prior to election. The proposition (Prop 24) intended to remove redistricting powers from the legislature and also reduce the pay of legislators. Including the latter clause, plainly designed to increase voter support, was held to violate the 'single subject' rule. Proponents complained that the proposal had cost over $2 million simply to qualify for the ballot, Los Angles Times, 14.12.99.
28. 19 Although not all of these writers were discussing initiatives as used in California, see generally C. Pateman. Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge UP, 1970; B. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, California UP, 1984.
29. 19 Although not all of these writers were discussing initiatives as used in California, see generally C. Pateman. Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge UP, 1970; B. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, California UP, 1984.
30. 20 See E. Gerber, ' "Reforming the California Initiative Process" - A Proposal to Increase Flexibility and Legislative Accountability in B. Cain and R. Noll (eds), Constitutional Reform in California, IGS Press, 1995.
31. 21 E. Gerber, A. Lupia, M. McCubbins and D.R. Kiewiet, Taking the Initiative, Pearson Publishing, 2000, provides an account of the fractured process of the implementation of citizen initiated laws suggesting that full compliance is rare.
32. 22 See esp. E. Gerber, The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation, Princeton UP, 1999; also supra, n. 7.