The good manager - A moral manager?

Journal of Business Ethics

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 247-254

  Sundman, Per ^a  

^a UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034287793     PISSN: 01674544     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1006229606707     Document Type: Article

References (53)

1. Stark, Andrew, 'What's the Matter with Business Ethics', Harvard Business Review (May-June, 1993), p. 43.
2. Ibid.
3. Stark, Andrew, 'What's the Matter with Business Ethics', p. 38.
4. Lippke, Richard L., Radical Business Ethics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1995), p. 11.
5. Lippke, Richard L., Radical Business Ethics, p. 15.
6. Ibid.
7. Cf. Davies, Peter W. F., 'Business Philosophy. Searching for an authentic role', in Peter W. F. Davies (ed.), Current Issues in Business Ethics (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 22 f.
8. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence. Cooperation and Integrity in Business (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 7 ff.
9. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics and the Good Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 5, 10. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 105 .
10. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics and the Good Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 5, 10. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 105 .
11. Cf. Davies, Peter W. F., 'Business Philosophy', p. 23.
12. Brytting, Tomas, Företagsetik (Malmö: Liber, 1998), pp. 46-48. Robert C. Solomon's book Ethics and Excellence is here taken as an interesting example of a contemporary way of arguing for the harmony between virtues such as honesty and the effectivity of a contemporary business organization.
13. Brytting, Tomas, Företagsetik (Malmö: Liber, 1998), pp. 46-48. Robert C. Solomon's book Ethics and Excellence is here taken as an interesting example of a contemporary way of arguing for the harmony between virtues such as honesty and the effectivity of a contemporary business organization.
14. Stark, Andrew, 'What's the Matter with Business Ethics', p. 43.
15. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 101.
16. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 101.
17. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 104. Solomon writes: 'That is why the idea of business as a practice is absolutely central to this approach: it views business as a human institution in service to humans and not as a marvelous machine or in terms of the mysterious "magic" of the market.' (My italics). I believe that business seen as having an emphasis on the service to humans does not fit a limited notion of trade for profit which (among others) Aristotle presumably saw as devoid of virtue.
18. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 104. Solomon writes: 'That is why the idea of business as a practice is absolutely central to this approach: it views business as a human institution in service to humans and not as a marvelous machine or in terms of the mysterious "magic" of the market.' (My italics). I believe that business seen as having an emphasis on the service to humans does not fit a limited notion of trade for profit which (among others) Aristotle presumably saw as devoid of virtue.
19. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 107.
20. Ibid.
21. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, pp. 160 f. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 107.
22. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, pp. 160 f. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 107.
23. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, pp. 161 f. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, pp. 115 f, 155. Solomon, Robert C., The New World of Business Ethics and Free Enterprise in the Global 1990s (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994), pp. 38-40. I believe that the congeniality of using MacIntyre for explicating the virtue approach of business ethics is made explicit by Robert C. Solomon on these pages. Just like MacIntyre he illustrates what a practice is with the help of a game. However, as I intend to show, I believe MacIntyre makes more out of this since he relates his illustration to the distinction between internal and external goods (otherwise turning to MacIntyre would, of course, not have been a justified move). Solomon writes: 'In business ethics, it is often profitable to compare business with a game. Games are also practices. Baseball, for instance, is a practice.' And on page 39; 'Business, like baseball, is defined by its rules.'
24. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, pp. 161 f. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, pp. 115 f, 155. Solomon, Robert C., The New World of Business Ethics and Free Enterprise in the Global 1990s (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994), pp. 38-40. I believe that the congeniality of using MacIntyre for explicating the virtue approach of business ethics is made explicit by Robert C. Solomon on these pages. Just like MacIntyre he illustrates what a practice is with the help of a game. However, as I intend to show, I believe MacIntyre makes more out of this since he relates his illustration to the distinction between internal and external goods (otherwise turning to MacIntyre would, of course, not have been a justified move). Solomon writes: 'In business ethics, it is often profitable to compare business with a game. Games are also practices. Baseball, for instance, is a practice.' And on page 39; 'Business, like baseball, is defined by its rules.'
25. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, pp. 161 f. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, pp. 115 f, 155. Solomon, Robert C., The New World of Business Ethics and Free Enterprise in the Global 1990s (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994), pp. 38-40. I believe that the congeniality of using MacIntyre for explicating the virtue approach of business ethics is made explicit by Robert C. Solomon on these pages. Just like MacIntyre he illustrates what a practice is with the help of a game. However, as I intend to show, I believe MacIntyre makes more out of this since he relates his illustration to the distinction between internal and external goods (otherwise turning to MacIntyre would, of course, not have been a justified move). Solomon writes: 'In business ethics, it is often profitable to compare business with a game. Games are also practices. Baseball, for instance, is a practice.' And on page 39; 'Business, like baseball, is defined by its rules.'
26. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, pp. 161 f. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, pp. 115 f, 155. Solomon, Robert C., The New World of Business Ethics and Free Enterprise in the Global 1990s (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1994), pp. 38-40. I believe that the congeniality of using MacIntyre for explicating the virtue approach of business ethics is made explicit by Robert C. Solomon on these pages. Just like MacIntyre he illustrates what a practice is with the help of a game. However, as I intend to show, I believe MacIntyre makes more out of this since he relates his illustration to the distinction between internal and external goods (otherwise turning to MacIntyre would, of course, not have been a justified move). Solomon writes: 'In business ethics, it is often profitable to compare business with a game. Games are also practices. Baseball, for instance, is a practice.' And on page 39; 'Business, like baseball, is defined by its rules.'
27. MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue a Study in Moral Theory, second edition, (London: Duckworth, 1985), p. 191. MacIntyre writes: 'A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.'
28. MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue a Study in Moral Theory, second edition, (London: Duckworth, 1985), p. 191. MacIntyre writes: 'A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.'
29. Cf. MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue, pp. 188 f. See also Sundman, Per, Human Rights, Justification, and Christian Ethics, (in Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala Studies in Social Ethics 18, Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1996), pp. 18-22, for further discussion of the notion of a practice and internal values and/or goods.
30. Cf. MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue, pp. 188 f. See also Sundman, Per, Human Rights, Justification, and Christian Ethics, (in Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala Studies in Social Ethics 18, Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1996), pp. 18-22, for further discussion of the notion of a practice and internal values and/or goods.
31. MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue, p. 188.
32. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 81.
33. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, pp. 121, 123.
34. Ibid.
35. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 123.
36. Cf. Davies, Peter W. F., 'Business Philosophy', p. 23.
37. Cf. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, p. 160. Hartman's text seems coherent with the mentioned way of justifying business activity. He writes: 'Whether it is good to play a role is, as Aristotle suggests, a function of the goodness of the institution of which the role is a part.'
38. Cf. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, p. 160. Hartman's text seems coherent with the mentioned way of justifying business activity. He writes: 'Whether it is good to play a role is, as Aristotle suggests, a function of the goodness of the institution of which the role is a part.'
39. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 124. Solomon writes: 'Productivity and serving the public and taking care of one's own employees are neither mere means or an afterthought of business but rather its very essence.'
40. Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence, p. 124. Solomon writes: 'Productivity and serving the public and taking care of one's own employees are neither mere means or an afterthought of business but rather its very essence.'
41. See MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue, p. 139, for a discussion of how the notion of success once was connected to virtues.
42. Cf. MacIntyre Alasdair, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988), pp. 74, 107 ff.
43. Cf. Solomon, Robert C., The New World of Business, p. 40.
44. See Barnard, Chester I., The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 217, for a comprehensive discussion of the functions of the executive which, according to my judgment, is relevant for discussions of what we can expect from good managers. Bernard's ideas are definitively at odds with the practice approach!
45. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, p. 166. Hartman writes: 'The difficult thing is to decide what counts as an unwarped value, what is true as opposed to false happiness, which desires are good and which not That in turn, requires making some sense of the notion of the kind of well-being that is appropriate to an autonomous person.' (my italics) Solomon, Robert C Ethics and Excellence, p. 107.
46. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, p. 166. Hartman writes: 'The difficult thing is to decide what counts as an unwarped value, what is true as opposed to false happiness, which desires are good and which not That in turn, requires making some sense of the notion of the kind of well-being that is appropriate to an autonomous person.' (my italics) Solomon, Robert C Ethics and Excellence, p. 107.
47. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, p. 166. Hartman writes: 'The difficult thing is to decide what counts as an unwarped value, what is true as opposed to false happiness, which desires are good and which not That in turn, requires making some sense of the notion of the kind of well-being that is appropriate to an autonomous person.' (my italics) Solomon, Robert C Ethics and Excellence, p. 107.
48. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, p. 168.
49. Ibid.
50. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, p. 167. In outlining the Aristotelian conception of happiness, which Hartman also introduces as his own, he writes: ". . . Aristotle suggests that we can understand true happiness in large part by asking ourselves what characterizes a good community - that is, one that creates the conditions for a life that is appropriate to human nature (italics mine)."
51. Hartman, Edwin, Organizational Ethics, p. 167. In outlining the Aristotelian conception of happiness, which Hartman also introduces as his own, he writes: ". . . Aristotle suggests that we can understand true happiness in large part by asking ourselves what characterizes a good community - that is, one that creates the conditions for a life that is appropriate to human nature (italics mine)."
52. Cf MacIntyre, Alasdair, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 147. MacIntyre writes (about the Thomist which he himself claims represents the relatively speaking most superior philosophical position): 'Where Nietzsche saw the individual as a fiction, as part of a mistaken psychology which conceals from view the will to power, the Thomist can elaborate out of materials provided in the Summa an account of the will to power as an intellectual fiction disguising the corruption of the will. The activity of unmasking is itself to be understood from the Thomist standpoint as a mask for pride.' My simple question is, what would pride be if not misdirected desires? MacIntyre writes about desires we ought not to have as beings without sin, i.e. perfected beings. I therefor think that I am justified in assuming a coherence between an example of MacIntyre's later writings and perfectionism. Thus, on the point of perfectionism it is quite possible to interpret the practice approach as not diverging from its perhaps most important inspirational source.
53. Cf MacIntyre, Alasdair, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 147. MacIntyre writes (about the Thomist which he himself claims represents the relatively speaking most superior philosophical position): 'Where Nietzsche saw the individual as a fiction, as part of a mistaken psychology which conceals from view the will to power, the Thomist can elaborate out of materials provided in the Summa an account of the will to power as an intellectual fiction disguising the corruption of the will. The activity of unmasking is itself to be understood from the Thomist standpoint as a mask for pride.' My simple question is, what would pride be if not misdirected desires? MacIntyre writes about desires we ought not to have as beings without sin, i.e. perfected beings. I therefor think that I am justified in assuming a coherence between an example of MacIntyre's later writings and perfectionism. Thus, on the point of perfectionism it is quite possible to interpret the practice approach as not diverging from its perhaps most important inspirational source.