The operational code of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis: A comparison of public and private rhetoric

Political Psychology

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 545-558

  Gregory Marfleet, B ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Content analysis; Cuban missile crisis; ExCom transcripts; John F. Kennedy; Operational code

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034258340     PISSN: 0162895X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0162-895x.00203     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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