International aid to the former Soviet States: Agent of change or guardian of the status quo?

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 47, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 34-44

  Cooley, Alexander ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034215731     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2000.11655892     Document Type: Article

References (85)

1. There are some notable exceptions. On strategies for promoting democracy, see Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996). On technical assistance, see Raymond J. Struyk, Making Aid Work: Lessons from Successful Technical Cooperation in the Former Soviet Bloc (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1997); Nancy Lubin and Monica Ware, Aid to the Former Soviet Union: When Less Is More (New York: JNA Associates, 1996). See also Janine Wedel's provocative anthropological study, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989-1998 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
2. There are some notable exceptions. On strategies for promoting democracy, see Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996). On technical assistance, see Raymond J. Struyk, Making Aid Work: Lessons from Successful Technical Cooperation in the Former Soviet Bloc (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1997); Nancy Lubin and Monica Ware, Aid to the Former Soviet Union: When Less Is More (New York: JNA Associates, 1996). See also Janine Wedel's provocative anthropological study, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989-1998 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
3. There are some notable exceptions. On strategies for promoting democracy, see Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996). On technical assistance, see Raymond J. Struyk, Making Aid Work: Lessons from Successful Technical Cooperation in the Former Soviet Bloc (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1997); Nancy Lubin and Monica Ware, Aid to the Former Soviet Union: When Less Is More (New York: JNA Associates, 1996). See also Janine Wedel's provocative anthropological study, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989-1998 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
4. There are some notable exceptions. On strategies for promoting democracy, see Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996). On technical assistance, see Raymond J. Struyk, Making Aid Work: Lessons from Successful Technical Cooperation in the Former Soviet Bloc (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1997); Nancy Lubin and Monica Ware, Aid to the Former Soviet Union: When Less Is More (New York: JNA Associates, 1996). See also Janine Wedel's provocative anthropological study, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989-1998 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
5. The literature on economic transitions is vast. Classic works include Jeffrey Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994); Anders Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995); and Padma Desai, ed., Going Global: Transition from Plan to Market in World Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). For good surveys published by international lenders, see the World Bank's World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 1996);
6. The literature on economic transitions is vast. Classic works include Jeffrey Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994); Anders Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995); and Padma Desai, ed., Going Global: Transition from Plan to Market in World Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). For good surveys published by international lenders, see the World Bank's World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 1996);
7. The literature on economic transitions is vast. Classic works include Jeffrey Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994); Anders Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995); and Padma Desai, ed., Going Global: Transition from Plan to Market in World Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). For good surveys published by international lenders, see the World Bank's World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 1996);
8. The literature on economic transitions is vast. Classic works include Jeffrey Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994); Anders Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995); and Padma Desai, ed., Going Global: Transition from Plan to Market in World Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). For good surveys published by international lenders, see the World Bank's World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 1996);
9. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 1999 (London: EBRD, 1999).
10. Jeffrey Sachs, "Western Financial Assistance and Russia's Reforms," in Making Markets: Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet States, ed. Shafiqul Islam and Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).
11. Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 5; Kendall W. Stiles, Negotiating Debt: The IMF Lending Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Robin Broad, Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); John Williamson, ed., IMF Conditionality (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1983).
12. Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 5; Kendall W. Stiles, Negotiating Debt: The IMF Lending Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Robin Broad, Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); John Williamson, ed., IMF Conditionality (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1983).
13. Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 5; Kendall W. Stiles, Negotiating Debt: The IMF Lending Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Robin Broad, Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); John Williamson, ed., IMF Conditionality (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1983).
14. Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 5; Kendall W. Stiles, Negotiating Debt: The IMF Lending Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Robin Broad, Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); John Williamson, ed., IMF Conditionality (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1983).
15. Of course, the reasons for the FSU states' current economic stagnation are complex and in no way should be attributed solely to the practices of international donors and financial institutions. See Joseph Stiglitz, "Whither Reform: Ten Years of the Transition" (paper prepared for the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, April 28-30, 1999); Clifford Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September/October 1998): 53-77.
16. Of course, the reasons for the FSU states' current economic stagnation are complex and in no way should be attributed solely to the practices of international donors and financial institutions. See Joseph Stiglitz, "Whither Reform: Ten Years of the Transition" (paper prepared for the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, April 28-30, 1999); Clifford Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September/October 1998): 53-77.
17. Indeed, the recent embezzlement scandals and reports of IMF loans finding their way to offshore bank accounts only lend support to my argument. However, there are serious political arguments for continuing assistance to Russia that perhaps do not apply to smaller states like Moldova and Kyrgyzstan.
18. Classic analyses of the Soviet economic system are given by Paul Gregory and Robert Stuart, Soviet and Post-Soviet Economic Structure and Performance, 5th ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1994); Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System (Boston: Alien & Unwin, 1986).
19. Classic analyses of the Soviet economic system are given by Paul Gregory and Robert Stuart, Soviet and Post-Soviet Economic Structure and Performance, 5th ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1994); Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System (Boston: Alien & Unwin, 1986).
20. See Alena Ledeneva, Russia's Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
21. Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Privatizing Russia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), chaps. 2-3.
22. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between formal and informal institutions in the communist and post-communist eras, see Martin Raiser, "Informal Institutions, Social Capital and Economic Transition: Reflections on a Neglected Dimension," Working Paper 25 (London: EBRD, August 1997) (www.ebrd.com/english/region/workingp/index.htm).
23. On the dynamics of kinship and nepotistic social ties in the Soviet Central Asian states, see Nancy Lubin, Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise (London: Macmillan, 1984).
24. On the political significance of these transfers, see Barnett Rubin, "Tajikistan: From Soviet Republic to Russian-Uzbek Protectorate," in Central Asia and the World, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994).
25. Sergei Poliakov, Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia, ed. Martha Brill Olcott (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992).
26. James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
27. The IMF has a number of different lending facilities for the post-Soviet states. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Fund created the Systematic Transformation Facility (STF) as a new facility specifically designed to aid the reform process in the former Soviet region. The quota of Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) drawing rights is calculated based upon the economy's economic size and is the standard conditional loan associated with structural adjustment. See Gertrude Schroeder, "The Economic Transformation Process in the Post-Soviet States: The Role of Outside Actors," in The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Karen Dawisha (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 243-76.
28. For a useful overview of the IMF's involvement in Russia, see Nigel Gould-Davies and Ngaire Woods, "Russia and the IMF," International Affairs 75, no. 1 (1999): 1-21. 17. See Peter Evans, "Transnational Linkages and the Economic Role of the State," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
29. For a useful overview of the IMF's involvement in Russia, see Nigel Gould-Davies and Ngaire Woods, "Russia and the IMF," International Affairs 75, no. 1 (1999): 1-21. 17. See Peter Evans, "Transnational Linkages and the Economic Role of the State," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
30. For specific details of credit releases and obligations on the part of the recipients, see www.imf.org.
31. Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, "The Politics of Property Rights," American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 867-81; Thrain Eggertson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); idem, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981).
32. Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, "The Politics of Property Rights," American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 867-81; Thrain Eggertson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); idem, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981).
33. Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, "The Politics of Property Rights," American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 867-81; Thrain Eggertson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); idem, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981).
34. Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, "The Politics of Property Rights," American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 867-81; Thrain Eggertson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); idem, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981).
35. Accounts of why conditionality programs have failed in Africa include Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Fredoline O. Anunobi, The Implications of Conditionality: The International Monetary Fund and Africa (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992); Dharam P. Ghai, ed., The IMF and the South: The Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1991).
36. Accounts of why conditionality programs have failed in Africa include Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Fredoline O. Anunobi, The Implications of Conditionality: The International Monetary Fund and Africa (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992); Dharam P. Ghai, ed., The IMF and the South: The Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1991).
37. Accounts of why conditionality programs have failed in Africa include Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Fredoline O. Anunobi, The Implications of Conditionality: The International Monetary Fund and Africa (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992); Dharam P. Ghai, ed., The IMF and the South: The Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1991).
38. International Monetary Fund, Georgia: Recent Economic Developments and Selected Issues (Washington, DC: IMF, 1998), p. 43.
39. Ibid., p. 44.
40. "Georgia: Tax Revenues Fall Short Because of Corruption," Interfax [Moscow] (June 23, 1997), translated in World News Connection,
41. Daily Report: Central Eurasia [hereinafter WNC:SOV] (June 23, 1997). "IMF Approves Augmentation and Extension of Georgia's ESAF Loan," International Monetary Fund press release No. 99/34, July 23,1999 (www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1999/PR9934.HTM).
42. Daily Report: Central Eurasia [hereinafter WNC:SOV] (June 23, 1997). "IMF Approves Augmentation and Extension of Georgia's ESAF Loan," International Monetary Fund press release No. 99/34, July 23,1999 (www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1999/PR9934.HTM).
43. International Monetary Fund, Armenia: Recent Economic Developments (Washington, DC: IMF, 1998), pp. 18-19.
44. International Monetary Fund, Moldova: Recent Economic Developments (Washington, DC: IMF, 1998), p. 14.
45. International Monetary Fund, Kyrgyz Republic: Recent Economic Developments (Washington, DC: IMF, 1998), p. 14. VAT areas that were granted subsequent exemptions included organized gambling, financial services, and selected agricultural producers. The more politically motivated amendments for exemptions from the income tax include income derived from the extraction of precious metals, inheritances, interest income, and "income from the sale of apartments, houses, cars, jewelry, and artwork" (ibid., pp. 83, 87).
46. International Monetary Fund, Kyrgyz Republic: Recent Economic Developments (Washington, DC: IMF, 1998), p. 14. VAT areas that were granted subsequent exemptions included organized gambling, financial services, and selected agricultural producers. The more politically motivated amendments for exemptions from the income tax include income derived from the extraction of precious metals, inheritances, interest income, and "income from the sale of apartments, houses, cars, jewelry, and artwork" (ibid., pp. 83, 87).
47. International Monetary Fund, Georgia, p. 14.
48. Terry M. Moe, "The New Economics of Organization," American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 4 (November 1984): 756.
49. An excellent overview of agency problems in hierarchies is provided by Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
50. For studies that apply principal-agent modeling to issues of economic control in the former Soviet Union, see Randall W. Stone, Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Steven Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
51. For studies that apply principal-agent modeling to issues of economic control in the former Soviet Union, see Randall W. Stone, Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Steven Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
52. See North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance; Eggertson, Economic Behavior and Institutions.
53. Vladimir Treml and Michael Alexeev, "The Growth of the Second Economy in the Soviet Union and Its Impact on the System," in The Postcommunist Economic Transformation: Essays in Honor of Gregory Grossman, ed. Robert W. Campbell (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); and Gregory Grossman, "The 'Second Economy' of the USSR," Problems of Communism 26, no. 5 (September/October 1977): 25-40. For discussion of Central Asian patterns of corruption, see Boris Rumer, Soviet Central Asia: "A Tragic Experiment" (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), chap. 8.
54. Vladimir Treml and Michael Alexeev, "The Growth of the Second Economy in the Soviet Union and Its Impact on the System," in The Postcommunist Economic Transformation: Essays in Honor of Gregory Grossman, ed. Robert W. Campbell (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); and Gregory Grossman, "The 'Second Economy' of the USSR," Problems of Communism 26, no. 5 (September/October 1977): 25-40. For discussion of Central Asian patterns of corruption, see Boris Rumer, Soviet Central Asia: "A Tragic Experiment" (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), chap. 8.
55. Vladimir Treml and Michael Alexeev, "The Growth of the Second Economy in the Soviet Union and Its Impact on the System," in The Postcommunist Economic Transformation: Essays in Honor of Gregory Grossman, ed. Robert W. Campbell (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); and Gregory Grossman, "The 'Second Economy' of the USSR," Problems of Communism 26, no. 5 (September/October 1977): 25-40. For discussion of Central Asian patterns of corruption, see Boris Rumer, Soviet Central Asia: "A Tragic Experiment" (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), chap. 8.
56. "Foreign assistance to Kyrgyzstan," Central Asian Post 14 (April 13, 1998); "'Hot' Atmosphere Expected in Parliament Upper-House Session," Slovo Kyrgyzstana, in WNC:SOV (May 15, 1998).
57. "Foreign assistance to Kyrgyzstan," Central Asian Post 14 (April 13, 1998); "'Hot' Atmosphere Expected in Parliament Upper-House Session," Slovo Kyrgyzstana, in WNC:SOV (May 15, 1998).
58. "Armenia: Armenia Court Stops Investigation of 'Chinese Credit' Case," Erevan Noian Tapan, in WNC:SOV (July 9, 1998).
59. See "Communist Leader Wants 'Drastic Change' of Reform Course," Chisinau Infotag, in WNC:SOV (March 17, 1998); and "Moldovan Parliament Reportedly Facing Corruption Scandal," ITAR-TASS World Service WNC:SOV (July 1, 1998).
60. See "Communist Leader Wants 'Drastic Change' of Reform Course," Chisinau Infotag, in WNC:SOV (March 17, 1998); and "Moldovan Parliament Reportedly Facing Corruption Scandal," ITAR-TASS World Service WNC:SOV (July 1, 1998).
61. See Jeffry Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
62. Ishan Kapur and Emmanuel van der Mensbrugghe, "External Borrowing by the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union: Developments and Policy Issues," IMF Working Paper WP/97/72-EA (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997), p. 22.
63. "Out of the Shadows," Central European (September 1997): 8.
64. Kapur and Van der Mensbrugghe, "External Borrowing."
65. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). See also North's development of the theory of the predatory state in Structure and Change.
66. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). See also North's development of the theory of the predatory state in Structure and Change.
67. Robert Bates and Da-Hsiang Lien, "A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government," Politics and Society 14, no. 1 (1995): 53.
68. See Steven Heydemann, "Taxation Without Representation: Authoritarianism and Economic Liberalization in Syria," in Rules and Rights in the Middle East, ed. Ellis Goldberg, Resat Kasaba, and Joel Migdal (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993).
69. On this point and the role of large corporate subcontractors, see Nancy Lubin, "U.S. Assistance to the Newly Independent States," in The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Karen Dawisha (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998); Lubin and Ware, Aid to the Former Soviet Union.
70. For discussion and application of multiple-principals problems, see Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Terry M. Moe, "An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional Dominance," Legislative Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (1987): 475-520.
71. For discussion and application of multiple-principals problems, see Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Terry M. Moe, "An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional Dominance," Legislative Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (1987): 475-520.
72. For more detailed accounts of this problem and the technical assistance sector in general, see Alexander Cooley, "Depending Fortunes: Aid, Oil, and the Formation of the Post-Soviet, Post-Colonial States" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1999), chap. 4.
73. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report on the Parliamentary Election in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek: OSCE, February 5, 1995), p. 11.
74. Ian Pryde, "Kyrgyzstan's Slow Progress to Reform," World Today (June 1995): 116.
75. Ibid.
76. Ian Bremmer, "Help Wanted for Armenia," Christian Science Monitor (February 25, 1998): 20. On this point, also see Nora Dudwick, "Political Transformations in Postcommunist Armenia: Images and Realities," in Conflict, Cleavages, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
77. Ian Bremmer, "Help Wanted for Armenia," Christian Science Monitor (February 25, 1998): 20. On this point, also see Nora Dudwick, "Political Transformations in Postcommunist Armenia: Images and Realities," in Conflict, Cleavages, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
78. Bremmer, "Help Wanted for Armenia."
79. Of course, certain democracy-promotion projects are more successful than others. See Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance. 53. Recent popular works include Michael Maren, The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity (New York: Free Press, 1997); Catherine Caufield, Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations (New York: Henry Holt, 1996); Robert E. Klitgaard, Tropical Gangsters (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
80. Of course, certain democracy-promotion projects are more successful than others. See Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance. 53. Recent popular works include Michael Maren, The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity (New York: Free Press, 1997); Catherine Caufield, Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations (New York: Henry Holt, 1996); Robert E. Klitgaard, Tropical Gangsters (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
81. Of course, certain democracy-promotion projects are more successful than others. See Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance. 53. Recent popular works include Michael Maren, The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity (New York: Free Press, 1997); Catherine Caufield, Masters of Illusion: The World Bank and the Poverty of Nations (New York: Henry Holt, 1996); Robert E. Klitgaard, Tropical Gangsters (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
82. David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Post-Socialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 6.
83. Peter Evans, "The State as the Problem and as Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change," in The Politics of Economic Adjustment, ed. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 176-77.
84. Charles Lipson, "The International Organization of Third World Debt," International Organization 35, no. 4 (1981): 603-31.
85. Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy. Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 47, no. 4, July/August 2000, pp. 45-58.