Rethinking bio-chemical dangers

Orbis

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 207-219

  Sokolski, Henry ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034148369     PISSN: 00304387     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (36)

1. 1 In fact, there is a vaccine for anthrax. If diagnosed early, anthrax victims can be treated with antibiotics for several weeks to keep the anthrax from taking over and to allow the vaccine to kick in. See Donald A. Henderson, "Dangerous Fictions About Bioterrorism," Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1999. Dr. Henderson, a public health physician and director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, points out that the critical period "would extend far longer than the seven days portrayed" along with the "window of opportunity for carrying out life-saving medical interventions beyond a week." Nightline's story, however, ended at day seven, "implying - incorrectly - that no further interventions would be useful." As Dr. Henderson notes, one of the largest anthrax outbreaks in recent history took place in Sverdlovsk, Russia, in 1979, and some infections occurred as early as two days after the anthrax's release and some as late as 47 days later.
2. In fact, there is a vaccine for anthrax. If diagnosed early, anthrax victims can be treated with antibiotics for several weeks to keep the anthrax from taking over and to allow the vaccine to kick in. Nov. 8, 1999. Dr. Henderson, a public health physician and director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, points out that the critical period "would extend far longer than the seven days portrayed" along with the "window of opportunity for carrying out life-saving medical interventions beyond a week." Nightline's story, however, ended at day seven, "implying - incorrectly - that no further interventions would be useful." As Dr. Henderson notes, one of the largest anthrax outbreaks in recent history took place in Sverdlovsk, Russia, in 1979, and some infections occurred as early as two days after the anthrax's release and some as late as 47 days later.
3. 2 See William S. Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New World," Washington Post, July 26, 1999. For an earliersimilar view, see William S. Cohen, "In the Age of Terror Weapons," Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1997.
4. 2 See William S. Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New World," Washington Post, July 26, 1999. For an earlier similar view, see William S. Cohen, "In the Age of Terror Weapons," Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1997.
5. 3 See Richard Preston, The Cobra Event (New York: Random House, 1997) and the author's own review of his book (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ts/book-reviews), in which he explains, "The story of the bioterror event in New York City is fiction. But a lot of the background is totally real. The disease, which involves self-cannibalism, is real, though in reality it is not contagious."
6. 4 See Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/Aug. 1999, pp. 46-52; David Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 1999, p. 59; and Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Elicit Use of Biological Agentsin the Twentieth Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research, July 1999).
7. 4 See Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/Aug.1999, pp. 46-52; David Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 1999, p. 59; and Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Elicit Use of Biological Agentsin the Twentieth Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research, July 1999).
8. 4 See Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/Aug.1999, pp. 46-52; David Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," National Security StudiesQuarterly, Summer 1999, p. 59; and Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Elicit Use of Biological Agents in the Twentieth Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research, July 1999).
9. 5 For one of the only quantitative analyses of the relationships among press coverage, terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, and the threat perceptions of the U.S. government and public, see Martha Crenshaw, "Threat Perception in Democracies: 'WMD' Terrorism in the U.S. Policy Debate," presented before the 22nd Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, Amsterdam, July 18-21, 1999.
10. 6 See, e.g., Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 261-336; and Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow, Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of aNational Policy (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project, Oct. 1998), pp. 6-10.
11. 6 See, e.g., Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles Heel:Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 261-336; and Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch, and Philip D. Zelikow, Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project, Oct. 1998), pp. 6-10.
12. 7 See Brian Chow et al., Air Force Operations in a Chemical and Biological Environment, DB-189/1-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998), pp. 12-37.
13. 8 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Aug. 1993), pp. 52-56.
14. 9 For more complete reviews of this historical data, see John and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999, pp. 46-48; and Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," pp.52-55.
15. 9 For more complete reviews of this historical data, see John and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999, pp. 46-48; and Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," pp. 52-55.
16. 10 Biological agents are inhaled. Protection against them is a face mask. Chemical agents, on the other hand, can enter the body through the skin as well. As such, a suit covering the entire body must be donned as protection. Inoculations and vaccines are also available for a variety of agents. However, given the inability to anticipate what agent might be used, protective gear is the first and main line of defense.
17. 11 See Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part I, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, pp. 15-103; and Rapoport,"Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," pp. 56-58.
18. 11 See Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, PartI, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, pp. 15-103; and Rapoport, "Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse," pp. 56-58.
19. 12 On these points, see Tucker and Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," p. 51; and Chow et al., Air Force Operations,pp. 27-37.
20. 12 On these points, see Tucker and Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," p. 51; and Chow et al., Air Force Operations, pp. 27-37.
21. 13 See Vernon Loeb and Steven Perlstein, "U.S. Puts Borders on High Alert," Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1999.
22. 14 See "Mirzayanov, Fedorov Detail Russian CW Production," from Novoye Vremya, Oct. 27, 1992; and"Mirzayanov, Fedorov Article on CW 'War Against Environment,'" from Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Oct. 24, 1992, bothin Joint Publication Research Service, Commonwealth of Independent States (JPRS-TAC-92-033), Nov. 14, 1992,pp. 44-60. See also Vil Mirzayanov, "Free to Develop Chemical Weapons," Wall Street Journal, May 25, 1994.
23. 14 See "Mirzayanov, Fedorov Detail Russian CW Production," from Novoye Vremya, Oct. 27, 1992; and "Mirzayanov, Fedorov Article on CW 'War Against Environment,'" from Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Oct. 24, 1992, bothin Joint Publication Research Service, Commonwealth of Independent States (JPRS-TAC-92-033), Nov. 14, 1992,pp. 44-60. See also Vil Mirzayanov, "Free to Develop Chemical Weapons," Wall Street Journal, May 25, 1994.
24. 14 See "Mirzayanov, Fedorov Detail Russian CW Production," from Novoye Vremya, Oct. 27, 1992; and"Mirzayanov, Fedorov Article on CW 'War Against Environment,'" from Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Oct. 24, 1992, both in Joint Publication Research Service, Commonwealth of Independent States (JPRS-TAC-92-033), Nov. 14, 1992, pp. 44-60. See also Vil Mirzayanov, "Free to Develop Chemical Weapons," Wall Street Journal, May 25, 1994.
25. 14 See "Mirzayanov, Fedorov Detail Russian CW Production," from Novoye Vremya, Oct. 27, 1992; and"Mirzayanov, Fedorov Article on CW 'War Against Environment,'" from Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Oct. 24, 1992, both in Joint Publication Research Service, Commonwealth of Independent States (JPRS-TAC-92-033), Nov. 14, 1992, pp. 44-60. See also Vil Mirzayanov, "Free to Develop Chemical Weapons," Wall Street Journal, May 25, 1994.
26. 15 See Center for Security Policy, "Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program," Decision Brief no. 97-D19, Feb. 4, 1997; Vil S. Mirzayanov, "Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider's View,"in Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects, Amy E. Smithson et al., report no. 17(Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, Oct. 1995), pp. 23-26; and Igor Khripunov and Derek Averre,"Russia's CBW Closet Poses Ongoing Threat," Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1999, pp. 20-23.
27. 15 See Center for Security Policy, "Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program," Decision Brief no. 97-D19,Feb. 4, 1997; Vil S. Mirzayanov, "Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider's View," in Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects, Amy E. Smithson et al., report no. 17 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, Oct. 1995), pp. 23-26; and Igor Khripunov and Derek Averre,"Russia's CBW Closet Poses Ongoing Threat," Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1999, pp. 20-23.
28. 15 See Center for Security Policy, "Russia's Covert Chemical Weapons Program," Decision Brief no. 97-D19,Feb. 4, 1997; Vil S. Mirzayanov, "Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider's View,"in Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects, Amy E. Smithson et al., report no. 17(Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, Oct. 1995), pp. 23-26; and Igor Khripunov and Derek Averre, "Russia's CBW Closet Poses Ongoing Threat," Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1999, pp. 20-23.
29. 16 See Khripunov and Averre, "Russia's CBW Closet."
30. 17 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-115 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Dec. 1993), pp. 116-17.
31. 18 There is good reason to believe that the obstacles to weaponizing bioregulators may fall in the next five to ten years. For a projection of what biotechnology has in store regarding agent development, see House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, "Assessing the Threat of Bioterrorism," testimony of Dr. Raymond Zilinskas, senior scientist at the Center for Nonproliferation Research at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Oct. 20, 1999 (http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/zilin.htm).
32. 19 See Chuck McCutcheon, "'Homeland Defense': Mobilizing Against Terrorism," Congressional Quarterly Weekly, Mar. 6, 1999, pp. 522.
33. 20 See Ron Laurenzo, "Front Line Is Weak Link in Homeland Defense," Defense Week, Mar. 15, 1999, p. 1.
34. 21 See Laurenzo, "Front Line."
35. 22 Of the $10 billion the federal government will spend combating terrorism next year, something less than 2 percent is earmarked for public health surveillance and reporting. See Zilinskas, "Assessing the Threat."
36. 23 See The First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess the Domestic Response Capabilities of the Government for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Dec. 15, 1999, available online from RAND (http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel).