Keeping them honest: Public and elite perceptions of ethical conduct among Australian legislators

Political Studies

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 22-37

  McAllister, Ian ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034146138     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00248     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. F. F. Ridley and A. Doig (eds), Sleaze: Politicians, Private Interests and Public Reaction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
2. 2 See, for example, E. Chaples and B. Page, 'The New South Wales Independent Commission against Corruption' in M. Laffin and M. Painter (eds), Reform and Reversal: Lessons from the Coalition Government in New South Wales, 1988-95. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995; A. Hede, S. Prasser and M. Neyland (eds), Keeping them Honest: Democratic Reform in Queensland Politics. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1995.
3. See, for example, E. Chaples and B. Page, 'The New South Wales Independent Commission against Corruption' in M. Laffin and M. Painter (eds), Reform and Reversal: Lessons from the Coalition Government in New South Wales, 1988-95. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995; A. Hede, S. Prasser and M. Neyland (eds), Keeping them Honest: Democratic Reform in Queensland Politics. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1995.
4. The 1996 Australian Election Study (AES) voters' survey was a nationally representative post-election self-completion survey of voters in the March 1996 federal election, with names drawn randomly from the electoral register. The total number of cases was 1,788, representing a response rate of 61.5%. The survey of election candidates was conducted in parallel with the voters' survey, and was also based on a self-completion questionnaire. It was conducted among all major party candidates standing in the election, resulting in 427 cases representing a response rate of 63.5%. The results presented here are restricted to the 105 election candidates who succeeded in gaining election to the federal parliament.
5. P. R. Abramson, Political Attitudes in America. San Francisco: Freeman, 1983.
6. R. J. Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Chatham NJ: Chatham House, 1996.
7. 6 R. Mortimore, 'Public Perceptions of Sleaze in Britain' in Ridley and Doig, Sleaze: Politicians, Private Interests and Public Reaction; K. Newton, 'Social and Political Trust' in Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, Table 10.
8. R. Mortimore, 'Public Perceptions of Sleaze in Britain' in Ridley and Doig, Sleaze: Politicians, Private Interests and Public Reaction; K. Newton, 'Social and Political Trust' in Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, Table 10.
9. D. Fuchs, G. Guidorossi and P. Svensson, 'Support for the Democratic System' in H.-D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs (eds), Citizens and the State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
10. John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 170.
11. The major example occurred in the Tatton constituency, where allegations of impropriety had been levelled against the sitting Conservative, Neil Hamilton. The Conservative constituency association endorsed Hamilton as their candidate in the election, apparently against the wishes of the national party. In an unprecedented move, the two other parties, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, did not nominate candidates to oppose Hamilton, putting their support behind an independent candidate and ex-BBC war journalist, Martin Bell. Bell won the seat with a 24.7% swing against Hamilton. See D. M. Farrell, I. McAllister and D. T. Studlar, 'Sex, Money and Politics: Sleaze and Conservative Incumbency in the 1997 British Election' in D. Denver et al. (eds), British Elections and Parties Review, 1998. London: Frank Cass, 1998.
12. 10 J. G. Peters and S. Welch, 'The effects of charges of corruption on voting behaviour in congressional elections', American Political Science Review, 74 (1980), 697-708; S. Welch and J. R. Hibbing, 'The effects of charges of corruption on voting behaviour in congressional elections, 1982-1990', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 226-39.
13. J. G. Peters and S. Welch, 'The effects of charges of corruption on voting behaviour in congressional elections', American Political Science Review, 74 (1980), 697-708; S. Welch and J. R. Hibbing, 'The effects of charges of corruption on voting behaviour in congressional elections, 1982-1990', Journal of Politics, 59 (1997), 226-39.
14. G. C. Jacobson and M. A. Dimock, 'Checking Out: The Effects of Bank Overdrafts on the 1992 House Elections', American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), 601-24; C. Stewart, 'Let's go fly a kite: correlates of involvement in the House Bank Scandal', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 521-36.
15. G. C. Jacobson and M. A. Dimock, 'Checking Out: The Effects of Bank Overdrafts on the 1992 House Elections', American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), 601-24; C. Stewart, 'Let's go fly a kite: correlates of involvement in the House Bank Scandal', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 521-36.
16. Uhr, Deliberative Democracy, p. 172.
17. H. Evans (ed.), Odgers' Australian Senate Practice, 1998, 8th ed. at http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/ html/httoc.htm
18. A. Doig and J. Wilson, 'Untangling the Threads' in Ridley and Doig, Sleaze.
19. R. Williams, 'America' in Ridley and Doig, Sleaze.
20. C. Fay, 'France' in Ridley and Doig, Sleaze.
21. D. Oliver, 'Regulating the conduct of MPs: the British experience of combating corruption', Political Studies, 45 (1997), 539-58.
22. Indeed, in Britain the courts are precluded from adjudicating by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, 1689, as well as by Parliament's own privileged laws. I am grateful to one of the reviewers of this article for drawing my attention to this point.
23. L. M. Barlin, House of Representatives Practice, 1997, 3rd ed. at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/pubs/ practice/ index.htm, p. 163.
24. Evans, Odgers' Australian Senate Practice, p. 477.
25. Uhr, Deliberative Democracy, p. 174.
26. Barlin, House of Representatives Practice, p. 166.
27. A. Heidenheimer, 'Perspectives on the Perspective on Corruption' in A. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston and V. T. Levine (eds), Political Corruption: a Handbook. New Brunswick NJ: Transaction, 1989.
28. M. Jackson and R. Smith, 'Inside moves and outside views: an Australian case study of elite and public perceptions of political corruption', Governance, 9 (1996), p. 26.
29. S. White, R. Rose and I. McAllister, How Russia Votes. Chatham NJ: Chatham House, 1997.
30. C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 42.
31. G. A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965; S. Verba, N. H. Nie and J.-O. Kim, Participation and Political Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
32. G. A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965; S. Verba, N. H. Nie and J.-O. Kim, Participation and Political Equality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
33. 28 H. Eckstein, 'A culturalist theory of political change', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 789-804; R. Inglehart, 'The renaissance of political culture', American Political Science Review, 82 ( 1988), 1203-30.
34. H. Eckstein, 'A culturalist theory of political change', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 789-804; R. Inglehart, 'The renaissance of political culture', American Political Science Review, 82 ( 1988), 1203-30.
35. Period of residence is not available for immigrants.
36. W. R. Neuman, The Paradox of Mass Politics. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.
37. Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, p. 187.
38. T. Glaser and C. Salmon, Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent. New York, Guilford, 1991.
39. A more effective test of the hypothesis would be to test general media exposure, not just during the course of the election campaign, but this broader measure was not available in the survey.
40. The pool from which the political elite is selected is a narrow and socially skewed group, being predominantly higher educated, male, and drawn from professions such as journalism, teaching and the law. See I. McAllister and C. Boldiston, 'The changing social and attitudinal composition of Australian party elites', Australian Journal of Political Science, 28 (1994), 42-65. International research suggests that social background does not shape political views concerning specific issues, or about the operation of the system; see, for example, D. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers' in G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson and M. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1985; M. M. Czudnowski, 'Political Recruitment' in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1985. Australian research confirms this: see I. McAllister, 'Party voters, candidates and political attitudes: testing three explanations for mass-elite differences', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 24 (1991), 237-68. For these reasons, social background is not examined here.
41. The pool from which the political elite is selected is a narrow and socially skewed group, being predominantly higher educated, male, and drawn from professions such as journalism, teaching and the law. See I. McAllister and C. Boldiston, 'The changing social and attitudinal composition of Australian party elites', Australian Journal of Political Science, 28 (1994), 42-65. International research suggests that social background does not shape political views concerning specific issues, or about the operation of the system; see, for example, D. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers' in G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson and M. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1985; M. M. Czudnowski, 'Political Recruitment' in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1985. Australian research confirms this: see I. McAllister, 'Party voters, candidates and political attitudes: testing three explanations for mass-elite differences', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 24 (1991), 237-68. For these reasons, social background is not examined here.
42. The pool from which the political elite is selected is a narrow and socially skewed group, being predominantly higher educated, male, and drawn from professions such as journalism, teaching and the law. See I. McAllister and C. Boldiston, 'The changing social and attitudinal composition of Australian party elites', Australian Journal of Political Science, 28 (1994), 42-65. International research suggests that social background does not shape political views concerning specific issues, or about the operation of the system; see, for example, D. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers' in G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson and M. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1985; M. M. Czudnowski, 'Political Recruitment' in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1985. Australian research confirms this: see I. McAllister, 'Party voters, candidates and political attitudes: testing three explanations for mass-elite differences', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 24 (1991), 237-68. For these reasons, social background is not examined here.
43. The pool from which the political elite is selected is a narrow and socially skewed group, being predominantly higher educated, male, and drawn from professions such as journalism, teaching and the law. See I. McAllister and C. Boldiston, 'The changing social and attitudinal composition of Australian party elites', Australian Journal of Political Science, 28 (1994), 42-65. International research suggests that social background does not shape political views concerning specific issues, or about the operation of the system; see, for example, D. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers' in G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson and M. Jewell (eds), Handbook of Legislative Research. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1985; M. M. Czudnowski, 'Political Recruitment' in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1985. Australian research confirms this: see I. McAllister, 'Party voters, candidates and political attitudes: testing three explanations for mass-elite differences', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 24 (1991), 237-68. For these reasons, social background is not examined here.
44. R. D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976.
45. D. R. Searing, Westminster's World: Understanding Political Roles. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994.
46. D. Jaensch, Power Politics: Australia's Party System. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989.
47. D. M. Farrell and I. McAllister, 'Legislative recruitment to upper houses: the Australian Senate and the House of Representatives compared', Journal of Legislative Studies, 1 (1995), 243-63.
48. For Senate candidates and members, this measures their length of residence within the state or territory they nominated for.
49. C. Sharman, 'Politics in the States' in B. Galligan, I. McAllister and J. Ravenhill (eds), New Developments in Australian Politics. Melbourne: Macmillan, 1998, p. 49.
50. H. McCloskey, 'Consensus and ideology in American politics,' American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), p. 74.