Membership, fair play, and political obligation

Political Studies

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 104-117

  Dagger, Richard ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0034145484     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00253     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. Various forms of this argument appear in: R. Dworkin, Law's Empire. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 186-216; M. Gilbert, 'Group membership and political obligation', The Monist, 76 (January 1993), 119-31; M. O. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', The Journal of Philosophy, 91 (July 1994), 333-63; J. Horton, Political Obligation. Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities, 1992, ch. 6; and Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, chs 5 and 6. In 'Citizenship and Political Obligation' (in P. King (ed.), Socialism and the Common Good: New Fabian Essays. London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 259-89), Bhikhu Parekh also makes a case for 'organizational obligations'. In a related essay, however, Parekh claims that the obligation to obey the law is a matter of civil and legal rather than political obligation ('A misconceived discourse on political obligation', Political Studies, 41 (1993), 236-51, p. 239).
2. Various forms of this argument appear in: R. Dworkin, Law's Empire. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 186-216; M. Gilbert, 'Group membership and political obligation', The Monist, 76 (January 1993), 119-31; M. O. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', The Journal of Philosophy, 91 (July 1994), 333-63; J. Horton, Political Obligation. Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities, 1992, ch. 6; and Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, chs 5 and 6. In 'Citizenship and Political Obligation' (in P. King (ed.), Socialism and the Common Good: New Fabian Essays. London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 259-89), Bhikhu Parekh also makes a case for 'organizational obligations'. In a related essay, however, Parekh claims that the obligation to obey the law is a matter of civil and legal rather than political obligation ('A misconceived discourse on political obligation', Political Studies, 41 (1993), 236-51, p. 239).
3. Various forms of this argument appear in: R. Dworkin, Law's Empire. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 186-216; M. Gilbert, 'Group membership and political obligation', The Monist, 76 (January 1993), 119-31; M. O. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', The Journal of Philosophy, 91 (July 1994), 333-63; J. Horton, Political Obligation. Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities, 1992, ch. 6; and Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, chs 5 and 6. In 'Citizenship and Political Obligation' (in P. King (ed.), Socialism and the Common Good: New Fabian Essays. London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 259-89), Bhikhu Parekh also makes a case for 'organizational obligations'. In a related essay, however, Parekh claims that the obligation to obey the law is a matter of civil and legal rather than political obligation ('A misconceived discourse on political obligation', Political Studies, 41 (1993), 236-51, p. 239).
4. Various forms of this argument appear in: R. Dworkin, Law's Empire. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 186-216; M. Gilbert, 'Group membership and political obligation', The Monist, 76 (January 1993), 119-31; M. O. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', The Journal of Philosophy, 91 (July 1994), 333-63; J. Horton, Political Obligation. Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities, 1992, ch. 6; and Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, chs 5 and 6. In 'Citizenship and Political Obligation' (in P. King (ed.), Socialism and the Common Good: New Fabian Essays. London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 259-89), Bhikhu Parekh also makes a case for 'organizational obligations'. In a related essay, however, Parekh claims that the obligation to obey the law is a matter of civil and legal rather than political obligation ('A misconceived discourse on political obligation', Political Studies, 41 (1993), 236-51, p. 239).
5. Various forms of this argument appear in: R. Dworkin, Law's Empire. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 186-216; M. Gilbert, 'Group membership and political obligation', The Monist, 76 (January 1993), 119-31; M. O. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', The Journal of Philosophy, 91 (July 1994), 333-63; J. Horton, Political Obligation. Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities, 1992, ch. 6; and Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, chs 5 and 6. In 'Citizenship and Political Obligation' (in P. King (ed.), Socialism and the Common Good: New Fabian Essays. London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 259-89), Bhikhu Parekh also makes a case for 'organizational obligations'. In a related essay, however, Parekh claims that the obligation to obey the law is a matter of civil and legal rather than political obligation ('A misconceived discourse on political obligation', Political Studies, 41 (1993), 236-51, p. 239).
6. Various forms of this argument appear in: R. Dworkin, Law's Empire. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 186-216; M. Gilbert, 'Group membership and political obligation', The Monist, 76 (January 1993), 119-31; M. O. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', The Journal of Philosophy, 91 (July 1994), 333-63; J. Horton, Political Obligation. Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities, 1992, ch. 6; and Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, chs 5 and 6. In 'Citizenship and Political Obligation' (in P. King (ed.), Socialism and the Common Good: New Fabian Essays. London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 259-89), Bhikhu Parekh also makes a case for 'organizational obligations'. In a related essay, however, Parekh claims that the obligation to obey the law is a matter of civil and legal rather than political obligation ('A misconceived discourse on political obligation', Political Studies, 41 (1993), 236-51, p. 239).
7. Various forms of this argument appear in: R. Dworkin, Law's Empire. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 186-216; M. Gilbert, 'Group membership and political obligation', The Monist, 76 (January 1993), 119-31; M. O. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', The Journal of Philosophy, 91 (July 1994), 333-63; J. Horton, Political Obligation. Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities, 1992, ch. 6; and Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, chs 5 and 6. In 'Citizenship and Political Obligation' (in P. King (ed.), Socialism and the Common Good: New Fabian Essays. London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 259-89), Bhikhu Parekh also makes a case for 'organizational obligations'. In a related essay, however, Parekh claims that the obligation to obey the law is a matter of civil and legal rather than political obligation ('A misconceived discourse on political obligation', Political Studies, 41 (1993), 236-51, p. 239).
8. A. J. Simmons, 'Associative political obligations', Ethics, 106 (January 1996), 247-73; C. H. Wellman, 'Associative allegiances and political obligations', Social Theory and Practice, 23 (Summer 1997), 181-204.
9. A. J. Simmons, 'Associative political obligations', Ethics, 106 (January 1996), 247-73; C. H. Wellman, 'Associative allegiances and political obligations', Social Theory and Practice, 23 (Summer 1997), 181-204.
10. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism. New York: Harper and Row, 1970; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.
11. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism. New York: Harper and Row, 1970; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.
12. Charles Taylor refers to 'the obligation to belong' in 'Atomism' but not to an obligation to obey the laws. See Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 197-8 and 206. In Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, Michael Sandel stresses the importance of 'obligations of solidarity' and 'obligations of membership' (esp. pp. 13-17), but without reference to legal or political obligation.
13. Charles Taylor refers to 'the obligation to belong' in 'Atomism' but not to an obligation to obey the laws. See Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 197-8 and 206. In Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, Michael Sandel stresses the importance of 'obligations of solidarity' and 'obligations of membership' (esp. pp. 13-17), but without reference to legal or political obligation.
14. Charles Taylor refers to 'the obligation to belong' in 'Atomism' but not to an obligation to obey the laws. See Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 197-8 and 206. In Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, Michael Sandel stresses the importance of 'obligations of solidarity' and 'obligations of membership' (esp. pp. 13-17), but without reference to legal or political obligation.
15. Gilbert, 'Group membership and political obligation', p. 126. This essay also appears, in slightly different form, in M. Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996, pp. 361-74.
16. Gilbert, 'Group membership and political obligation', p. 126. This essay also appears, in slightly different form, in M. Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996, pp. 361-74.
17. Gilbert, 'Group membership and political obligation', p. 129.
18. Gilbert, Living Together, p. 379.
19. Gilbert, 'Group membership and political obligation', p. 128.
20. For Yael Tamir, identification with a group apparently contains a voluntary element: 'One may have acquired associative membership in a particular social group by birth rather than through voluntary choice, but unless one identifies with this membership, it cannot generate obligations. In this restricted sense, we could approach associative obligations as voluntarily assumed'. Liberal Nationalism, p. 135.
21. Dworkin, Law's Empire, p. 206.
22. Horton, Political Obligation, pp. 150-1; emphasis added.
23. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', p. 347. In a footnote to this passage, Hardimon adds that 'I am assuming that the roles of family member and citizen exhaust the class of noncontractual social roles'.
24. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', p. 347; emphasis added. Dworkin makes the same point in a different way: 'If we arrange familiar fraternal communities along a spectrum ranging from full choice to no choice in membership, political communities fall somewhere in the center. Political obligations are less involuntary than many obligations of family, because political communities do allow people to emigrate, and though the practical value of this choice is often very small the choice itself is important, as we know when we contemplate tyrannies that deny it'. Law's Empire, p. 207; emphasis added.
25. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', p. 347; emphasis added. Dworkin makes the same point in a different way: 'If we arrange familiar fraternal communities along a spectrum ranging from full choice to no choice in membership, political communities fall somewhere in the center. Political obligations are less involuntary than many obligations of family, because political communities do allow people to emigrate, and though the practical value of this choice is often very small the choice itself is important, as we know when we contemplate tyrannies that deny it'. Law's Empire, p. 207; emphasis added.
26. For evidence bearing on this intuition, see G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992, Appendix 2; but cf. L. Green, 'Who Believes in Political Obligation?' in J. T. Sanders and J. Narveson (eds) For and Against the State. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996, pp. 1-17.
27. For evidence bearing on this intuition, see G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992, Appendix 2; but cf. L. Green, 'Who Believes in Political Obligation?' in J. T. Sanders and J. Narveson (eds) For and Against the State. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996, pp. 1-17.
28. Horton, Political Obligation, p. 154.
29. Horton, Political Obligation, p. 157.
30. On this point see Wellman, 'Associative allegiances and political obligations', pp. 182-4.
31. See Simmons, 'Associative political obligations', pp. 260 and 272.
32. Horton, Political Obligation, p. 151.
33. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 135; emphasis added.
34. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 137.
35. Dworkin, Law's Empire, p. 204; emphasis added. The four conditions are as follows (pp. 199-200; emphasis in original): 'First, [the members] must regard the group's obligations as special, holding distinctly within the group, rather than as general duties its members owe equally to persons outside it. Second, they must accept that these responsibilities are personal: that they run directly from each member to each other member, not just to the group as a whole in some collective sense ... 'Third, members must see these responsibilities as following from a more general responsibility each has of concern for the well-being of others in the group; ... 'Fourth, members must suppose that the group's practices show not only concern but an equal concern for all members.'
36. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', p. 350. Horton presents a similar argument at pp. 156-7 of Political Obligation.
37. Hardimon, 'Role obligations', p. 350. Horton presents a similar argument at pp. 156-7 of Political Obligation.
38. Dworkin, Law's Empire, p. 200 (emphasis in original).
39. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 101-2.
40. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 102.
41. Even Tamir, when she turns directly to questions of political obligation, seems to insist that one can have a political obligation only to a reasonably just polity: 'The main advantage of the approach presented here is its ability to place normative evaluation within a context. It can explain why most of us assume, and rightly so, that our obligations are not to the state that is the most just of all, but to our own state, as long as it is reasonably just'. Liberal Nationalism, p. 139; emphasis added; (see also p. 134).
42. See esp. R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problems,' Ethics, 92 (July 1982), 616-33; Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation; and, for a more qualified defence, J. Wolff, 'Political obligation, fairness, and independence', Ratio, 8 (April 1995), 87-99. For criticism, see esp. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic, 1974, pp. 90-5; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, ch. 5; M. B. E. Smith, 'Is there a prima facie obligation to obey the law?', Yale Law Journal, 82 (1973), 950-76; and J. Horton, Political Obligation, esp. pp. 89-98. I develop my own position in Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, ch. 5, and in 'Playing fair with punishment'. Ethics, 103 (April 1993), 473-88, where I offer an account of fair play as the justification for legal punishment.
43. See esp. R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problems,' Ethics, 92 (July 1982), 616-33; Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation; and, for a more qualified defence, J. Wolff, 'Political obligation, fairness, and independence', Ratio, 8 (April 1995), 87-99. For criticism, see esp. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic, 1974, pp. 90-5; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, ch. 5; M. B. E. Smith, 'Is there a prima facie obligation to obey the law?', Yale Law Journal, 82 (1973), 950-76; and J. Horton, Political Obligation, esp. pp. 89-98. I develop my own position in Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, ch. 5, and in 'Playing fair with punishment'. Ethics, 103 (April 1993), 473-88, where I offer an account of fair play as the justification for legal punishment.
44. See esp. R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problems,' Ethics, 92 (July 1982), 616-33; Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation; and, for a more qualified defence, J. Wolff, 'Political obligation, fairness, and independence', Ratio, 8 (April 1995), 87-99. For criticism, see esp. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic, 1974, pp. 90-5; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, ch. 5; M. B. E. Smith, 'Is there a prima facie obligation to obey the law?', Yale Law Journal, 82 (1973), 950-76; and J. Horton, Political Obligation, esp. pp. 89-98. I develop my own position in Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, ch. 5, and in 'Playing fair with punishment'. Ethics, 103 (April 1993), 473-88, where I offer an account of fair play as the justification for legal punishment.
45. See esp. R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problems,' Ethics, 92 (July 1982), 616-33; Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation; and, for a more qualified defence, J. Wolff, 'Political obligation, fairness, and independence', Ratio, 8 (April 1995), 87-99. For criticism, see esp. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic, 1974, pp. 90-5; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, ch. 5; M. B. E. Smith, 'Is there a prima facie obligation to obey the law?', Yale Law Journal, 82 (1973), 950-76; and J. Horton, Political Obligation, esp. pp. 89-98. I develop my own position in Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, ch. 5, and in 'Playing fair with punishment'. Ethics, 103 (April 1993), 473-88, where I offer an account of fair play as the justification for legal punishment.
46. See esp. R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problems,' Ethics, 92 (July 1982), 616-33; Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation; and, for a more qualified defence, J. Wolff, 'Political obligation, fairness, and independence', Ratio, 8 (April 1995), 87-99. For criticism, see esp. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic, 1974, pp. 90-5; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, ch. 5; M. B. E. Smith, 'Is there a prima facie obligation to obey the law?', Yale Law Journal, 82 (1973), 950-76; and J. Horton, Political Obligation, esp. pp. 89-98. I develop my own position in Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, ch. 5, and in 'Playing fair with punishment'. Ethics, 103 (April 1993), 473-88, where I offer an account of fair play as the justification for legal punishment.
47. See esp. R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problems,' Ethics, 92 (July 1982), 616-33; Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation; and, for a more qualified defence, J. Wolff, 'Political obligation, fairness, and independence', Ratio, 8 (April 1995), 87-99. For criticism, see esp. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic, 1974, pp. 90-5; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, ch. 5; M. B. E. Smith, 'Is there a prima facie obligation to obey the law?', Yale Law Journal, 82 (1973), 950-76; and J. Horton, Political Obligation, esp. pp. 89-98. I develop my own position in Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, ch. 5, and in 'Playing fair with punishment'. Ethics, 103 (April 1993), 473-88, where I offer an account of fair play as the justification for legal punishment.
48. See esp. R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problems,' Ethics, 92 (July 1982), 616-33; Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation; and, for a more qualified defence, J. Wolff, 'Political obligation, fairness, and independence', Ratio, 8 (April 1995), 87-99. For criticism, see esp. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic, 1974, pp. 90-5; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, ch. 5; M. B. E. Smith, 'Is there a prima facie obligation to obey the law?', Yale Law Journal, 82 (1973), 950-76; and J. Horton, Political Obligation, esp. pp. 89-98. I develop my own position in Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, ch. 5, and in 'Playing fair with punishment'. Ethics, 103 (April 1993), 473-88, where I offer an account of fair play as the justification for legal punishment.
49. See esp. R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problems,' Ethics, 92 (July 1982), 616-33; Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation; and, for a more qualified defence, J. Wolff, 'Political obligation, fairness, and independence', Ratio, 8 (April 1995), 87-99. For criticism, see esp. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic, 1974, pp. 90-5; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, ch. 5; M. B. E. Smith, 'Is there a prima facie obligation to obey the law?', Yale Law Journal, 82 (1973), 950-76; and J. Horton, Political Obligation, esp. pp. 89-98. I develop my own position in Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, ch. 5, and in 'Playing fair with punishment'. Ethics, 103 (April 1993), 473-88, where I offer an account of fair play as the justification for legal punishment.
50. See esp. R. Arneson, 'The principle of fairness and free-rider problems,' Ethics, 92 (July 1982), 616-33; Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation; and, for a more qualified defence, J. Wolff, 'Political obligation, fairness, and independence', Ratio, 8 (April 1995), 87-99. For criticism, see esp. R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic, 1974, pp. 90-5; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, ch. 5; M. B. E. Smith, 'Is there a prima facie obligation to obey the law?', Yale Law Journal, 82 (1973), 950-76; and J. Horton, Political Obligation, esp. pp. 89-98. I develop my own position in Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, ch. 5, and in 'Playing fair with punishment'. Ethics, 103 (April 1993), 473-88, where I offer an account of fair play as the justification for legal punishment.
51. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 103.
52. I develop the argument that people may grow into an obligation to obey the law in Civic Virtues, esp. pp. 76-8. For an explanation of the 'quasi-contractual' nature of the fair play argument, see D. Miller, On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 60-2.
53. On this point, note the defence of 'the social contribution thesis' in A. Gewirth, The Community of Rights. Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996, esp. §3.4.
54. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 115-6; emphasis added.
55. For the mutually reinforcing nature of 'obligations of citizenship' and 'obligations of nationality', see Miller, On Nationality, esp. pp. 70-3.
56. For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay, I am grateful to Daniel McDermott, David Miller, and my colleagues in the ASUMPL Reading Group, especially Jack Crittenden and Jeffrie Murphy. John Horton deserves special thanks for his generous and thoughtful response to my criticism of his views.