Interpreting the ADA and civil rights law: Five supreme court rulings

Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 85-93

  Sherwyn, David ^a   Eigen, Zev J ^a   Klausner, Adam A ^a  

^a Department of Management   (United States)

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EID: 0034134560     PISSN: 00108804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0010-8804(00)88888-6     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. 1 42 U.S.C. §1211(8).
2. 2 42 U.S.C. §12102(2).
3. 3 1999 U.S. Lexis 4369, 1 (6/22/99).
4. 4 Id. at 7, 8.
5. 5 The DOT allows licensure of applicants with deficient vision who had three years of recent experience driving a commercial vehicle without a license suspension or revocation, involvement in a reportable accident in which the applicant was cited for a moving violation, conviction for certain driving-related offenses, or citation for certain serious traffic violations. See: Id. at 8.
6. 6 See: Id. at footnote 9.
7. 7 Id. at 18.
8. 8 Id. at 19.
9. 9 Id. at 20.
10. 10 1999 U.S. Lexis 4370 (6/22/99).
11. 11 Id. at 7 (Citing 49 CFR §391.41(b)(6)).
12. 12 See: Sutton v. United Air Lines, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2150 (1999) (Citing 29 CFR §1630.2(j)(3)(i)).
13. 13 Id.
14. 14 Id.
15. 15 Murphy, at 11.
16. 16 The court notes that 49 CFR §390.5 defines a commercial motor vehicle as a vehicle weighing over 10,000 pounds, designed to carry 16 or more passengers, or used in the transportation of hazardous materials. See: Id. at 15.
17. 17 Id. at 16.
18. 18 See: Sutton at 2143.
19. 19 Id. at 2146.
20. 20 Id. at 2147.
21. 21 The court noted that the ADA was intended only to benefit "some 43,000,000 Americans [who] have one or more physical or mental disability" (citing §12101(a)(1)), and that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority," persons "subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society" (citing §12101(a)(7)). See Id. at 2147-48.
22. 22 Id. at 2150.
23. 23 Id.
24. 24 Id. at 2151.
25. 25 Id.
26. 26 Id. at 2150.
27. 27 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.
28. 28 Rev. Stat. §1977, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1981(b)(1).
29. 29 Kolstad, at 20.
30. 30 That exact argument was advanced publicly in November 1999, when an immigrant Thai restaurateur in Miami added a service charge to the checks of African-American parties, but not those of other groups. He subsequently agreed to levy the service charge evenhandedly.
31. 31 Kolstad, at 20.
32. 32 Id.
33. 33 See: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (establishing "where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification," a potential defense to Title VII claims exists for employers). For a discussion of the BFOQ exception, see: Jon P. McConnell, "Bare Trap: The Legal Pitfall of Requiring Scanty Costumes," Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (November 1985), pp. 78-82.
34. 33 See: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (establishing "where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification," a potential defense to Title VII claims exists for employers). For a discussion of the BFOQ exception, see: Jon P. McConnell, "Bare Trap: The Legal Pitfall of Requiring Scanty Costumes," Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (November 1985), pp. 78-82.
35. 34 See: Dothard, Director; Dept. of Public Safety of Alabama, et al. v. Rawlingson, et al. 433 U.S. 321; 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
36. 35 See: David Sherwyn, Bruce Tracey, and Zev Eigen: "In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process," 2 U.PA. J. LAB & EMPL. L. 73, 81-83 (1999), which explains how employers sometimes settle even meritless claims based in part on the fear of large damage awards.
37. 36 Plaintiff's lawyers would, of course, seek to inflate the value of their cases by including costs of defense and attorney fees in negotiations. These figures are relevant once the parties have engaged in litigation and attorneys from both sides have put in significant time.
38. 37 Kolstad, at 35 (citing the Appellate Court's decision 139 F.3d 958, 974 (1998) Tatel, J., dissenting). Apparent good-faith observance of Title VII was not successful for the Miami restaurant Joe's Stone Crabs. See: David Sherwyn, Melenie Lankau, and Zev Eigen, "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Peculiar Discrimination Case of Joe's Stone Crabs," Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 5 (October 1999), pp. 10-17.
39. 37 Kolstad, at 35 (citing the Appellate Court's decision 139 F.3d 958, 974 (1998) Tatel, J., dissenting). Apparent good-faith observance of Title VII was not successful for the Miami restaurant Joe's Stone Crabs. See: David Sherwyn, Melenie Lankau, and Zev Eigen, "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Peculiar Discrimination Case of Joe's Stone Crabs," Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 5 (October 1999), pp. 10-17.
40. 38 Kolstad, at 32.
41. 39 See: Burlington Industries v. Ellerth: 524 U.S. 742; 118 S. Crt. Ct. 2257 (1998); Farnghen v. Boca Raton; and 524 U.S. 775, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
42. 40 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
43. 41 Id. at 1600.
44. 42 Id. at 1603.
45. 43 Id.
46. 44 See: §423(d)(2)(A).
47. 45 42 U.S.C. §12111(9)(B).
48. 46 See: 20 CFR §404.1520(b) (1998).
49. 47 See: §404.1520(c).
50. 48 See: §§404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.
51. 49 See: §404.1520(e).
52. 50 See: §§404.1520(f), 404.1560(c).