Inconvertible paper money, inflation and economie performance in early nineteenth century Argentina

Journal of Latin American Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 333-359

  Irigoin, Maria Alejandra ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE MAR DEL PLATA   (Argentina)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC HISTORY; INFLATION; NINETEENTH CENTURY; RURAL ECONOMY;

ARGENTINA;

EID: 0034128386     PISSN: 0022216X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022216X00005769     Document Type: Article

References (99)

1. S. Haber (ed), Hom Latin America Fell Behind. Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, ifoo-iyij. (Stanford, 1997) In particular see 'Introduction. Economic " Growth and Latin American Economic Historiography.' pp. 1-33.
2. For an account of Latin American economic history in terms of the divergence during the twentieth century, see V. Bulmcr Thomas, Tel Economic History of Latin America since Independence (Cambridge 1994) esp p. 411.
3. J. Coatsworth, 'Economic and Institutional Trajectories in Nineteenth Century Latin America' in J. Coatsworth and A. Taylor (eds), Latin America and the World Economy since iJoo (Cambridge MA, 1999) pp. 23-54.
4. For a general assessment see S. Engerman and K. Sokoloff 'Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies. A View from Economic Historians of the United States' in Haber, How Latin America pp. 261-304.
5. E. Tandcter, Coacciôn j mtrcado. La Mintria fie la Plata en el Potosi colonial. 16)2-1826 (Buenos Aires, 1992) chap. 5.
6. Britain returned to the Gold Standard in 1821. The United States progressively moved into it from 1834, although silver was also maintained as legal tender until 1900. Paper
7. standards varied and were not yet fully comparable given the bank of issues' systems. For the US monetary and banking system before the Civil War see J. Attack and P. Pasell, A New Economic View of American History from Colonial Times to 1)40 (New York, 1994) pp. 82-4.
8. The alternative use of a 'bi-monetary' in the domestic and the export economy was noted for a later period by J. Williams in Argentine International Trade under Inconvertible Paper Money, 1880-1914 (New York, 1969), A. Ford, El Patron oro: 1880-1)14. Inglaterra y Argentina (Buenos Aires (1969) See in particular A. Fishlow, 'Market Forces of Group Interests: Inconvertible Currency in pre- 1914 Latin America" (mimeo 1987) and R. Cortes Conde, Dinero, deudaj crisis: evolution fiscal y monetaria en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1989).
9. Other processed goods such as salted meat and tallow increased the proportion up to 90 per cent in the 18405. T. Halperïn Donghi, 'La expansion ganadera en la campana de Buenos Aires' in T. Halperin Donghi and T. Di Telia, Los fragmentas del poder (Buenos Aires, 1969) p. 28. During the 18505 the share of wool rose to a fifth of the total value of exports.
10. For the evolution of colonial estanciasznd hides, exports from the 17705 to 18505 see S. Amaral, 'Rural Production and Labour in Late Colonial Buenos Aires ', Journal of Latin American Studies (JLAS hereafter) 19, 2 (1987) pp. 231-278.
11. For annual volumes from 1710 to 1870 see S. Amaral, The Rise of Capitalism on the Pampas. The Estancias of Buenos Aires, 1785-1850 (Cambridge, 1998). Appendix C table C.i p. 318.
12. According to Sabato wool was rather exceptional. H. Sabato, 'Wool Trade and Commercial Networks in Buenos Aires, 18405 to 18805" JLAS 15,1(1983) pp. 49-81.
13. See the seminal papers by T. Halperin Donghi, 'La expansion ganadera.,.' and 'La expansion de la frontera de Buenos Aires (1910-1852)' in M. G. Zapiola (ed), El regimen oligârquico. Materiales para el tsttidso de la realidad argentina (Buenos Aires, 1975). More recently S. Amaral, The Rise of Capitalism.
14. T. Halperin Donghi, 'La Expansion Ganadera' pp. 34-5. J. C. Brown, A. Socioeconomic History of Argentina, 1776-1860 (New York, 1979) pp. 154-5;
15. 'Extant accounts books reveal that the income exceeded expenditures among the larger ranches and farms by fifteen to 20 per cent in good years, but certainly not each year'. Idem, 'Revival of the Rural Economy and Society in Buenos Aires in M. D. Szuchamn and J. C. Brown, Revolution and Restoration. The Rearrangement of Power in Argentina, 1776-1860 (Lincoln NE, 1994) fn. 27 p. 249.
16. Nevertheless Amaral quoted figures in constant prices for 1831 and estimated the rate as 18 per cent. See 'Rural Production...' p. 276.
17. J. C. Brown, 'A Nineteenth Century Argentine Cattle Empire', Agricultural History 52,1(1976) pp. 162, 176.
18. Figures for farmers and ranchers respectively: 5785 to 9856. The former represent 15 per cent of the total adult male population (42,816),-which is the lowest estimate possible since figures do not include 20,313 day-labourers (47 per cent). It is reasonable
19. to expect at least half of them to be engaged in farming. The estimate includes neither female nor child labour that certainly participated in farming. Own estimates from Registre Estadistico Estado de Buenos Aires (REBA hereafter) (1854) Table 10.
20. See J. C. Garavaglia and J. Gelman, 'Rural History of the Rio de la Plata, 1600-1850', Latin-American Research Review, 30-31 (1995) pp. 75-105.
21. J. C. Garavaglia, 'Economic Growth and Regional Differentiation. The River Plate Region at the end of the Eighteenth Century" Hispanic American Historical Revient (HAHR hereafter) 65, i (1985) pp. 76-79.
22. Wheat yields were (on average) between 9.5 to one in 1895-99 and n.6 in 1905-09. Still the 1800-505 yields were far larger than the US and Canada by the turn of the century. \V. P. Rutter, Wheat Growing in Canada, the United States and the Argentine (London, 1911) p. 125.
23. In 185 5 local authorities estimated the average yields in Chivilcoy to be 25 to one. The extraordinary yield that year of 5 5 was recorded for trigo de pan o Colorado in Junin. In REBA I (185 5) p. lo and pp. 105-6. Similar figures for different types of wheat (23-24 for Marietta wheat, 20-22 for trigo de pan and 28-30 for Blanco and Candeal) were estimated in Mercedes. REBA II (1855) pp. 35-7. By i86os yield was 25-30 for wheat and 70-80 for barley in San Nicolas. Th. Hutchinson, The Parana with incidents of the Paraguayan War and South American Recollections from iS6:-iS68. (London, 1868) p. 136.
24. M. Burgin, Economic Aspects of Argentine Federalism, iS20-i8}2 (New York, 1971) pp. 31-2 and 256-58. J. C. Garavaglia, 'Economic Growth' p. 79. For others, even 'the psychology and habits of the Argentines of the littoral were also powerful deterrents to farming', J. Scobie, Revolution on the Pampas a Social History of Argentine Wbeat, iffo-ioro. (Austin, 1967) p. 12.
25. J. Mariluz Urquijo, 'Protecciôn y librecambio durante el perfodo 1820-1835' ßoletin de la Academia Nacionalde la Historia, 34 (1964) pp. 697-717 and J. C. Nicolau, Industria argentinaj aduana, iS)j-iS}) (Buenos Aires, 1975) pp. 45-49 esp. chap II, 'La Industria Portena'.
26. J. Lynch, Argentine Dictator, Juan Manuel de Rosas (Oxford, 1981) pp. 130, 144.
27. Burgin found that 'Loanable capital was chronically scarce in Buenos Aires in spite of Rosas' inflationary policies ', Economic Aspects, p. 266. For current discount rates see ibid. fn. 41 ; Halperin Donghi repeated the notion in 'La expansion ganadera" pp. 36-7. In the late 18405 the rate for bill discounts in paper pesos was about 18-24 per cent per annum, and a monthly one per cent was charged when borrowing in gold; for estates and urban properties [the rate] was around 6-9 per cent. William MacCann, Two Thousand Miles' Riot Through the Argentine Provinces (London [1853], Buenos Aires, 1969) p. 158.
28. J. C. Chiaramonte, Mercaderes del literal: economiaj sociedad en la provincia de Corrientcs, primera mitad del siglo XIX (Mexico, 1991) p. 34 and endnote 17 in particular. For a similar conclusion derived from different approach see also R. Cortés Conde, La economia argentins en el largo plazo (siglos XIXy XX) (Buenos Aires, 1997) chapter IV, 'El origen de la banca en la Argentina en el siglo XIX' in particular pp. 114, 124.
29. 'In the conditions of general illiquidity, (this) unequal relationship of exchange (..) typical of precapitalist systems, prioritised commercial profits ', Chiaramonte, Mercaderes P- 33.
30. Complete data on foreign trade are known just for 1822, 1825, 1856-39 and 1849-51. For the years 1835, 1836, 1848 and 1848 data are partial. Data for 1829 include trade with other provinces. New data on Buenos Aires trade in particular for the mid-iSjos in Informes de la Comisiôn de Cuentas presentado a la Asamblea General Legislativa del Esta Jo (Informeshereafter) (Buenos Aires, 1854-55, 1856 and 1858). Recent studies on regional trade show the significance of exports goods produced in the Litoral. See R. Schmit and M. Rosal, 'Las Exportaciones del Litoral Argentino al Puerto de Buenos Aires entre 1783-1850', Revista de Historia Econômica XIII, 3 (1995) pp. 581-607.
31. A. Vaillant, Apuntes estadisticos y mercantiles sobre la Repûblica Oriental del Uruguay (Montevideo, 1863) pp. 12-5 ; H. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1960) pp. 492-3; V. B. Reber, British Mercantile Houses in Buenos Aires, iSio-iiio (Camb, MA, 1979) table 4.; Brown, A Socioeconomic pp. 75-9.
32. W. Parish, Buenos Ayres and Provinces of the Rio de la Plata (London, 1852) pp. 357, 362.
33. T. Halperin Donghi, Gutrray finanças en los origines delestado argentine. ij)i-ii)o (Buenos Aires, 1982) pp. 227, 247. For exchanges with the US see Brown, A Socieoeconomic, pp. 69, 80-83.
34. Parish, Buenos Ayres, p. 354; Burgin, Economic Aspects pp. 271-73 table 44-47. Informes (1854-55) Ch. IV, Informes (1858). Estadistica de Aduana iS6i (Buenos Aires, 1863). Sparse figures on trade between Buenos Aires and Mendoza for 1828, 1833 and 1834 and between Buenos Aires and Corrientes for 1825-30 confirm this estimate. Severe outflows of the specie from trade deficits may be underpinning the claims for protectionist fiscal policies requested by some provincial governments to Rosas in the 18305. Nicolau, Industria argentina, pp. 28-9.
35. As described early by W. P. Robertson in his Letters on South America (London, 1843) vol. II, pp. 174-186.
36. Research on the performance of British merchants remains confined to Reber, British Mercantile and C. Lewis, British Business in Argentina. (London, 1995).
37. See Baring intelligence reports on the state of commercial affairs in the River Plate at Baring Brothers Archives (BB hereafter) HC 16/114 for 1843, HC 16/115 f°r 1844 and HC 16/117 for 1857.
38. See J. C. Brown, 'Dynamics and Autonomy of a Traditional Marketing System. Buenos Aires 1810-1860" in HAHR 56 (4) pp. 605-629; for the case of wool sec Sabato, 'Wool Trade'.
39. Other levies besides Customs like Contribution Dirtcta were lower to such merchants (4 %) than to those who dealt in their own goods (8 %) during most of the period. Memoria sobre el estado de la Hacienda Pûblica, escrita por orden del Gobierno (Buenos Aires, 1834).
40. Reber, British Mercantile, p. 27. Although Reber failed to identify consumers as the final bearers of the tax burden.
41. Some changes occurred in the late 186os. European manufacturers started to send their representatives to River Plate to buy wool on the spot. Notably, Sabato found that ' In the late i88os, when speculation became the most profitable activity in the River Plate, we find several of them investing in land, mortgage, Ccdulas, government bonds, and shares of private and public companies'. However, being years of high monetary disturbances, Sabato made no relation between such 'speculative' practices with the (not so) new diversification in investments. 'Wool Trade", p. 53 and fn. 29.
42. Paradoxically, the ancborenas -the archetype of the merchants turned into landowners- 'unlike most of the great landowners, who tended to maintain their diverse business ties, appear, to have left commerce completely". Brown, .'An Nineteenth Century Argentine" p. 161.
43. 'The discount of bills is a monopoly of very well known lenders, of whom a half are foreigners at least, and is satisfactorily to say that Irishmen do this in great proportions'. MacCann, Ta'o Thousand Miles' Ride, p. 158.
44. For instance, in the 18405 Samuel Hale -a known US businessman -acted as unofficial provider of European goods to Indian allies of Governor Rosas. Hale must have benefited from exchanges in rural produce with Indians. See accounting of Négocia Pacißco in Libros Mayores de la Contaduria de Buenos Aires. Archive General de la Naciön Sala III over several years. The same source shows the deals that a French merchant house, E. Rams y Ruberts, carried out as a main government supplier during 1852. Another Englishman Daniel Gowland acted as the official Confederation Commercial Agent in Buenos Aires during the secession 1852-61 'this gentleman is essentially a porteno, by residence and connections [although] his business that of an auctioneer, is a native one". Quoted by Consul Parish in a letter to Lord Clarendon, Buenos Aires 30 April 1856 in Public Record Office. Foreign Office. 6.192 ms 7 (PRO.FO hereafter).
45. An agent of Baring labelled those heavily involved in the discount of bills as being of 'dubious credit' in opposition to the 'prudence' of others. For 1843 he listed as such native and foreign merchants like Th. Amstrong, S. Lafone, Parlane & McAllister, Ayres frères, D. Gowland, J. Llavallol, N. A. Martinez de Hoz y Ortfz Basualdo. See BB.HC 16.115.1.
46. For an account of these reforms see Burgin, Economic Aspects (1971) chs. 3 and 4. For monetary events see N. Pinero, la moneda, el crédita j las bancos en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1921) ch. IV, p. 61.
47. It is difficult to say whether the crisis was indirectly provoked by fiscal consequences of the war with Brazil or by the collapse of the exports following the blockade. Some real problems arose from high speculation from over optimistic expectations about pastoral exports potential at the time. See S. Amaral, 'El descubrimiento de la financiaciön inflacionaria, Buenos Aires. 1790-1830', Invcstigacionesy Ensajos 37. (1988) p. 414.
48. Quoted by T. Halperin Donghi Revolution y guerra. Formation de una elite dirigente en la Argentina criolla (Mexico, 1979) p. 91. Corrientes unsuccessfully issued paper money in 1826,1827 and 1841. Chiaramonte Mcrcadercs, p. 161. Santa Fe did in 1823 and Cordoba in 1829. J. Alvarez, Temas de Historia Economisa Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1921) p. 97. Finally, between 1854 and 1856 while Buenos Aires was a seceding state, the Confederation issued notes -the paptl Fragueiro. The issue amounted to 1.6 millions and resulted in a complete fiasco. Temas, pp. 100-1. The same fate befell bank notes issued by Banco Maua established in the Confederation by 1858. R. Cârcano, De Caseras al il de setiembre (Buenos Aires, 1921) vol. 2 p. 470.
49. Until 1879, f°r instance, Chilean paper money was 'preferred to Argentine provinces' paper currencies' in Mendoza. Monetary anarchy lasted until 1881 when the 'gold peso' was adopted as a national monetary unit. For currency diversity within the country see Alvarez, Temas, pp. 97, 100 ff.
50. For 1863, an expert estimated the amount of Bolivian and cordobcsa silver coins in circulation as 'one million pesos fuertes at the rate of 22 pesos per gold ounce'. A. Brougnes, Cutstiones finantieras y econômicas de la Repûb/ifa Argentina. Deuda exigible, su consolidation y sistema monctario (Buenos Aires, 1863) p. 61.
51. For the setting up of the tariff see Informe sobre elcomercio exterior de Buenos Aires durante elgobierno de Martin Rodrigue (Buenos Aires, 1978) appendix I and J pp. 6j-6j. 'When the tariff is based on current prices (precios de consuma déplaça) it is assumed that the duty is already included in the price. In consequence the contribution is added to the price already after taxes', Informes, (1854-55).
52. By 1866 taxes on exports yielded around a third of total Custom revenues. Under Mitre's presidency (1862-68) the tariff rose to ten per cent. J Alvarez, Laiguerrai chiles argintinas (Buenos Aires, 1983) p. 93, fn. 8.
53. For Buenos Aires public finances in the period 1820-1850 see Burgin, 'Economic Aspects and Halperin Donghi, Guerra j finanças.
54. The establishment offered to receive deposit in specie but without bearing interests. It also offered some discounting of bills at i per cent monthly. Although the rate in the market was roughly 1.5 per cent 'few people obtained any benefit of such privilege'. Noted by MacCann, Two Thousand Miles' Ride, p. 159.
55. Parish, Buenos Ajres, p. 352; Halperin Donghi, Ctierra y finanças, Table XIV p. 283.
56. Ibid. p. 219 and pp. 251-75.
57. Lack of information on the subject prevents further speculation on the scope of a secondary market for bonds. Nevertheless, such bonds have not been considered in the expansion of currency in recent studies on inflationary finances. See footnote 5 2:
58. Amaral, 'El Descubrimiento' and, more recently M. Bordo and C. Vegh, 'What if Alexander Hamilton had been Argentinean? A Comparison of the Early Monetary Experiences of Argentina and the United States', National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series No. 6862 Nov. 1998.
59. Burgin, Economic Aspects pp. 68-9, 74, 160, 165, 169 and 206-13. Halperín Donghi, Guerra y financzas, pp. 215 ff and 244.
60. T. Halperin Donghi, 'loquées, emisiones monetarias y precios en el Buenos Aires rosista (1838-1850)' in Historia, Problemaj Promesa. Homenaje a J. Basadre (Lima, 1978) remains the single study on the subject. See esp. pp. 307-41 ; S. Amaral, ' Alta inflacion y precios relativos. El Pago de las obligaciones en Buenos Aires, 1790-1830. El Trimestre Econômico, 221 (1989) pp. 163-221.
61. Probably the most conspicuous case is Simon Pereyra, another supplier to the army during the Rosas regime who had failed in his business in the 18405. However, by the time of his death in 1852, he had gathered an enormous fortune and several hundred thousand acres of land. Pereyra's bankruptcy is quoted in Reber, British Mercantile, pp. 108-9 Haiperm Donghi, Guerraj finanças, p. 231 ; For a biography of the Pereyra-Iraola family see D. Hernando, 'Casa y Familia. Spatial Biographies in Nineteenth CenturyBuenos Aires' (unpubl. PhD. Diss. UCLA 1973) pp. 421-88.
62. Reber, British Mercantile, p. 16 and notes 16, 17.
63. To summarise, the law holds that two monies are unstable over time since the weak (paper pesos) drives the stronger (specie) into hoarding.
64. Halperfn Donghi, Gtterra y finanças, p. 220. The peso exchange rate was far more volatile than gold in the international economy. Neither changes in time nor the'effects of international crisis be effectively appraised. My own estimates and J. Klovland, 'Zooming in Sauerbeck. Monthly wholesale prices in Britain 1845-1890', Explorations in 'Economic History, jo (1993) pp. 195-228.
65. M. A. Irigoin and E. Salazar , 'Linking Political Events and Economic Uncertainty: an econometric examination of the volatility in the Buenos Aires paper peso's rate of exchange, 1826-1866' (mimeo 1997).
66. For instance, the cumulative treasury deficit rose from $15 million to $15 million in 1833. In 1831 alone, the deficit was $4 million. At the end of 1831, treasury bills amounted to $2,848,595 compared to a debt of $199,611 in 1830. Burgin indicates that they bore a rate of 3.5 per cent a month at a time when discount rate in the market was 2.250. Economic Aspects p. 57 and 173, fn. 31.
67. Prices of Bonds from 'Actual Prices of the 6 per cent Internal bonds quoted on the Buenos Aires Stock of Exchange' cited in Burgin, Economic Aspects p. 175, table 32.
68. For rates of discount see 'Yearly averages of Buenos Aires discount rates per month quoted in the British Packet and Argentine News', ibid. fn. 41 p. 266. For the Buenos Aires paper pesos exchange rate to gold see Alvarez, Temas p 99. For the performance of relative prices of goods and services in the early 18305 see Amaral, 'El Descubrimiento' p. 414 and J. Broide, La evolution de lospreciospeciiarios en Argentina en elperiodo 1830-1850 (Buenos Aires, 1951) p.71.
69. For an analysis of the process of public confidence building see M. A. Irigoin, Finance, Politics and Economics in Buenos Aires 18205-1860S: The Political Economy of Currency Stabilisation' (Unpubl PhD diss., University of London 1999).
70. H. Southern to Baring Bros, Buenos Aires, 9 March 1852 in BB.HC.4.1.24.4. (Emphasis added.) See also idem on 27 May 1851.
71. B. Victorica to J. J. Urquiza, Gualeguaychu, Feb1854 in Archivo Elizalde. Vol. 4 ms. 441.
72. The author calls General Paunero's attention to the fact that 'as soon as rumours about appointing a commission to arbitrate (the reunification of the country) the ounces have declined 3 or 4 pesos ; and the dismissal of such news in the newspaper La Tribuna made them rise again'. C. Oyuela to W. Paunero, Buenos Aires 1 Oct 1855, Archivo Mitre. Colecciôn Paunero ms. 1931.
73. For political incidents see T. Halpen'n Donghi, DC la revolution de independencia a la Confederation rosista (Buenos Aires, 1980) pp. 260-68. J. Lynch, Argentine Dictator, pp. 37-9.
74. th.
75. For monthly accounts of the financial and economic situation during 1850-51 see Revista Comercialy Precios Corrienles. Suilto del Comercio del Plata, Montevideo, no. 72 30 Nov. 1849 -No. 109 6 March 1853.
76. This warning was noted by Amaral ' [they] hinder any estimate of profit rates since rates are high or low in relation to the prices of goods and money. ' in Rural Production, pp. 238. See also footnotes 11 and 12.
77. PRO.FO.6.20: Report on British merchants enclosed in W. Parish to Bidwell, Buenos Aires 31 Dec. 1827.
78. Ferns mentioned this for the aftermath of the war with Brazil. See Britain and Argentine, pp. 165-67.
79. See W. Forbes to J. Bates, Buenos Aires, 6 Oct 1829 in BB.HC.4-1.13.3.1.
80. See footnote 36.
81. Mati'as de Oliden quoted by J. C. Garavaglia, 'Precios de los Productos Rurales y Precios de la Tierra en la Campana de Buenos Aires: 1750-1826'. Boletin dellnstituto de Historia Argentina y Americana Dr E Ravignani. 3ra Serie. No 11 (1995) p. 100.
82. MacCann, Two Thousand Miles' Ride, p. 30. Strikingly, Amaral interprets the same observation as 'a lack of reaction to changes in the exchange rates' after 20 years of experience with depreciation, Tee Rise of Capitalism p. 298 fn. 5.
83. According to M. E. Infesta, 'La Enfiteusis de Buenos Aires, 1820-1850' in M. Bonaudo and A. Pucciarelli, La problemâtica agraria. Vol. I (Buenos Aires, 1993) pp. 93-120 table i.
84. The lowest estimate amounts to 51 per cent of the land acquired in paper currency, the remainder was realised with some compound of notes, treasury bills and advances in cattle to the government all denominated in paper pesos.
85. Own estimates from M. E. Infesta, 'El Negocio de la Tierra Pdblica. Las ventas en Buenos Aires entre 1833 y 1840 table 2 (mimeo 1998).
86. See J. Garavaglia, 'Un siglo de Estancias en la .Campana de Buenos Aires : 1751-1853' (mimeo, 1997).
87. MacCann, Two Thousand Miles' RiJi, p. 161 (Emphasis added.)
88. As shown by J. Adelman, Frontier Development. Land, Labour and Capital on the Wbiatlands of Argentina and Canada, 1890-1914. (Oxford, 1994) pp. 200-5. As occurs with most historians of nineteenth century Argentina, Adelman does not consider prevailing monetary conditions at the time.
89. This was Sarmiento's argument to guarantee returns on investments from foreign companies. See Bicameral Committee, in Diario de Seslonts Câmara de Diptttados del Estado de Buenos Aires, 1859. Legislative Assembly, Session of 21 June 1859.
90. Lynch, Argentine Dictator, pp. 129-34.
91. Nicolau, Industria argentina, pp. 76-8.
92. Legislation is abundant in cases of special laws in this respect. For example, the Public Lighting Company or all proposed construction of railways by local entrepreneurs in the 18505 -e.g. Del Oeste, San Fernando or up to Arroyo del Medio -demanded these sort of privileges; as did those commited to other minor ventures as a plant to produce meat stock, to mill grain or process tallow. See Indice de la Sala de Representantes de la Provincia (1821-1852) (La Plata, 1970) and Indice de la Cámara de Dipatados (La Plata 1970).
93. According to figures from Burgin, Economic Aspects Table 44. For the 1810S and the early 18205 exports of wheat see PRO.FO. 354-8.847 reproduced in Informe sobre el Comercio Exterior, appendix f.
94. 'The sad truth is that so long as the pastoral economy provides a return of 30 per cent on capital with virtually no effort on the part of the owner [the farming] has little chance of success'. These observations by Vicuña Mackcenna's became a favourite source for subsequent authors, like Scobie, who added, 'Easy profits, however, were not the sole determinants of the pastoral economy on the pampas at mid century', Revolution on the Pampas, p. 9.
95. Notes on the State of Buenos Aires 1852. BB.HC.4.1.24.4. (Emphasis added.)
96. 'It took a great deal to make a house fail in this city, the practice of deferring payments being so common that it has no serious effect on the credit of the parties'. Sec BB.HC 16.117 part, 1 & 2.
97. Reber, British Mercantile, pp. 108-9. 108-9. For cases of merchants gone bust and their peculiar proposals to settle defaults see Revista Comemal ... No. 50 and 51, 5 and 11 July 1848; No. 83, 21 Sept 1850, No. 84, 23 Nov 1850, No. 87, 18 Feb 1851.
98. For the fast financial recovery of Simon Pereyra see footnote 55.
99. MacCann, Two Thousand Miles' Ride, p. 127.