From populism to neoliberalism: Labor unions and market reforms in Latin America

World Politics

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 135-174

  Murillo, M Victoria ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

NEOLIBERALISM; POLITICAL ECONOMY; STATE ROLE; TRADE UNION;

CENTRAL AMERICA; SOUTH AMERICA;

EID: 0034108405     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0043887100002586     Document Type: Article

References (84)

1. Salinas was president of Mexico from the end of 1988 to the end of 1994, and LJarios Anures pérez was president of Venezuela from the beginning of 1989 to mid-1993. To hold the international conditions constant in the comparison with Mexico and Venezuela, I analyze the first administration of Carlos Menem in Argentina, which ran from mid-1989 to mid-1995.
2. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
3. The politics of Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela have a strong effect in Latin America and the Caribbean. By 1995 they made up 32 percent of the regional population, 43 percent of the regional gross domestic product, and 48 percent of regional exports. Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 357-61.
4. Market-oriented reform included short-term stabilization measures, fiscal restraint, tax reform, financial liberalization, competitive exchange and interest rates, trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation of most markets, including the labor market. See John William-son, Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, D.C.; Institute for International Economics, 1990).
5. Alex Cukierman and Manano Tommasi, "Credibility of Policymakers and of Economic Reform," in Federico Sturzenegger and Tommasi, eds., The Political Economy of Reform (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).
6. In Argentina, according to the permanent household surveys of the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), unemployment increased from 6.5 percent in 1988 to 18.6 percent in 1995. In Venezuela unemployment rose from 6.9 percent in 1988 to 9.6 percent in 1989 and 10.4 percent in 1990, although it fell to 6.5 percent in 1993. See Keila Betancourt, Samuel Kreije, and Gustavo Márquez, Mercado labora: Instituciones y regulaciones (Labor markets: Institutions and regulations) (Caracas: IESA, 1995), 5. In Mexico, according to the International Labour Organisation, (ILO), unemployment measurements are highly contentious, but open unemployment peaked in 1983 and 1984. See ILO, Yearbook of Labour Stattstics (Geneva; ILO, various years). In addition, the combined official rate of open unemployment and underemployment grew frorn 6.8 percent in 1989 to 8 percent in 1994. See Carlos Salinas de Gortari, VI Informe de Gobifrno (VI State of the union) (Mexico City: Presidencia de la Nación, 1994).
7. In Argentina, according to the permanent household surveys of the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), unemployment increased from 6.5 percent in 1988 to 18.6 percent in 1995. In Venezuela unemployment rose from 6.9 percent in 1988 to 9.6 percent in 1989 and 10.4 percent in 1990, although it fell to 6.5 percent in 1993. See Keila Betancourt, Samuel Kreije, and Gustavo Márquez, Mercado labora: Instituciones y regulaciones (Labor markets: Institutions and regulations) (Caracas: IESA, 1995), 5. In Mexico, according to the International Labour Organisation, (ILO), unemployment measurements are highly contentious, but open unemployment peaked in 1983 and 1984. See ILO, Yearbook of Labour Stattstics (Geneva; ILO, various years). In addition, the combined official rate of open unemployment and underemployment grew frorn 6.8 percent in 1989 to 8 percent in 1994. See Carlos Salinas de Gortari, VI Informe de Gobifrno (VI State of the union) (Mexico City: Presidencia de la Nación, 1994).
8. In Argentina, according to the permanent household surveys of the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), unemployment increased from 6.5 percent in 1988 to 18.6 percent in 1995. In Venezuela unemployment rose from 6.9 percent in 1988 to 9.6 percent in 1989 and 10.4 percent in 1990, although it fell to 6.5 percent in 1993. See Keila Betancourt, Samuel Kreije, and Gustavo Márquez, Mercado labora: Instituciones y regulaciones (Labor markets: Institutions and regulations) (Caracas: IESA, 1995), 5. In Mexico, according to the International Labour Organisation, (ILO), unemployment measurements are highly contentious, but open unemployment peaked in 1983 and 1984. See ILO, Yearbook of Labour Stattstics (Geneva; ILO, various years). In addition, the combined official rate of open unemployment and underemployment grew frorn 6.8 percent in 1989 to 8 percent in 1994. See Carlos Salinas de Gortari, VI Informe de Gobifrno (VI State of the union) (Mexico City: Presidencia de la Nación, 1994).
9. In Argentina, hyperinflation cut manufacture real wages by 36.3 percent between January 1989 and March 1991. Even after the success of stabilization, manufacture real wages fell by 12 percent between April 1989 and June 1995. Consejo Ténieo de Inversiones, La economía argentina:. Anuario 1997 (The Argentine economy: Yearbook 1997) (Buenos Aires: CTI, 1997), 65. In Venezuela the real industrial wage fell 35 percent in the 1989-93 period. Unido Industrial Statistics Database, 3-digit (1998). In Mexico real wages in manufacturing had dropped by almost 40 percent between 1982 and 1988, and despite improvements during; the Salinas administration, they did not recover their 1982 level. ILO (fn 7)
10. Jeffry Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," International Organization 45 (Autumn 1991); Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions, (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1989).
11. Jeffry Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," International Organization 45 (Autumn 1991); Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions, (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1989).
12. Jeffry Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," International Organization 45 (Autumn 1991); Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions, (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1989).
13. For example, Frieden presents a general argument about sector-driven policy preferences and applies it to unions and exchange rate policies. Frieden (Ibid.); and idem, "Labor and Polities of Exchange Rates; The Case of the European System," in Sanford Jacoby, ed., The Workers of Nations: Industrial Relations in a Global Economy (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1995). Peter Swenson focuses on cross-class coalitions based on sector-level preferences with regard to collective bargaining decentralization and state adjustment. Swenson, "Bringing Capital Back In, Or Social Democracy Reconsidered," World Politics 43 (July 1991). The Latin American literature uses a similar logic to explain populist coalitions between urban workers and industrialists producing for the domestic market based on the transfer of resources from exporting to protected sectors for import substitution industrialization. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dcpendencia desarrollo en America Latina (Dependency and development in Latin America) (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1969); and Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973).
14. For example, Frieden presents a general argument about sector-driven policy preferences and applies it to unions and exchange rate policies. Frieden (Ibid.); and idem, "Labor and Polities of Exchange Rates; The Case of the European System," in Sanford Jacoby, ed., The Workers of Nations: Industrial Relations in a Global Economy (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1995). Peter Swenson focuses on cross-class coalitions based on sector-level preferences with regard to collective bargaining decentralization and state adjustment. Swenson, "Bringing Capital Back In, Or Social Democracy Reconsidered," World Politics 43 (July 1991). The Latin American literature uses a similar logic to explain populist coalitions between urban workers and industrialists producing for the domestic market based on the transfer of resources from exporting to protected sectors for import substitution industrialization. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dcpendencia desarrollo en America Latina (Dependency and development in Latin America) (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1969); and Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973).
15. For example, Frieden presents a general argument about sector-driven policy preferences and applies it to unions and exchange rate policies. Frieden (Ibid.); and idem, "Labor and Polities of Exchange Rates; The Case of the European System," in Sanford Jacoby, ed., The Workers of Nations: Industrial Relations in a Global Economy (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1995). Peter Swenson focuses on cross-class coalitions based on sector-level preferences with regard to collective bargaining decentralization and state adjustment. Swenson, "Bringing Capital Back In, Or Social Democracy Reconsidered," World Politics 43 (July 1991). The Latin American literature uses a similar logic to explain populist coalitions between urban workers and industrialists producing for the domestic market based on the transfer of resources from exporting to protected sectors for import substitution industrialization. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dcpendencia desarrollo en America Latina (Dependency and development in Latin America) (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1969); and Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973).
16. For example, Frieden presents a general argument about sector-driven policy preferences and applies it to unions and exchange rate policies. Frieden (Ibid.); and idem, "Labor and Polities of Exchange Rates; The Case of the European System," in Sanford Jacoby, ed., The Workers of Nations: Industrial Relations in a Global Economy (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1995). Peter Swenson focuses on cross-class coalitions based on sector-level preferences with regard to collective bargaining decentralization and state adjustment. Swenson, "Bringing Capital Back In, Or Social Democracy Reconsidered," World Politics 43 (July 1991). The Latin American literature uses a similar logic to explain populist coalitions between urban workers and industrialists producing for the domestic market based on the transfer of resources from exporting to protected sectors for import substitution industrialization. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dcpendencia desarrollo en America Latina (Dependency and development in Latin America) (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1969); and Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973).
17. Geoffrey Garretf and Peter Lange, "Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change," in Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996).
18. Volumes by Joan Nelson, Steven Haggard and Robert Kaufman, and Dani Rodrik assume that liberalization has concentrated costs and diffused benefits, making it difficult to organize collective action in support of reform. Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); idem, Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economie Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Haggard and Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); idem, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Rodrik "Understanding Economic Reform," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (March 1996). Therefore, the management of reform implies the thwarting of socieral resistance and the insulation of reformist policymakcrs. Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy and Carlos Acuńa and William Smith also point out the combination of repression, co-optation, and insulation by skillful policyrnakers for the implementation of market reforms for Latin America. Conaghan and Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the-Central Andes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Acuńa and Smith, "The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Logic of Support and Opposition to Neoliberal Reform," in Smith, Acuńa, and Eduardo G amarra, eds., Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994).
19. Volumes by Joan Nelson, Steven Haggard and Robert Kaufman, and Dani Rodrik assume that liberalization has concentrated costs and diffused benefits, making it difficult to organize collective action in support of reform. Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); idem, Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economie Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Haggard and Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); idem, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Rodrik "Understanding Economic Reform," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (March 1996). Therefore, the management of reform implies the thwarting of socieral resistance and the insulation of reformist policymakcrs. Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy and Carlos Acuńa and William Smith also point out the combination of repression, co-optation, and insulation by skillful policyrnakers for the implementation of market reforms for Latin America. Conaghan and Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the-Central Andes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Acuńa and Smith, "The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Logic of Support and Opposition to Neoliberal Reform," in Smith, Acuńa, and Eduardo G amarra, eds., Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994).
20. Volumes by Joan Nelson, Steven Haggard and Robert Kaufman, and Dani Rodrik assume that liberalization has concentrated costs and diffused benefits, making it difficult to organize collective action in support of reform. Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); idem, Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economie Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Haggard and Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); idem, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Rodrik "Understanding Economic Reform," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (March 1996). Therefore, the management of reform implies the thwarting of socieral resistance and the insulation of reformist policymakcrs. Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy and Carlos Acuńa and William Smith also point out the combination of repression, co-optation, and insulation by skillful policyrnakers for the implementation of market reforms for Latin America. Conaghan and Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the-Central Andes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Acuńa and Smith, "The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Logic of Support and Opposition to Neoliberal Reform," in Smith, Acuńa, and Eduardo G amarra, eds., Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994).
21. Volumes by Joan Nelson, Steven Haggard and Robert Kaufman, and Dani Rodrik assume that liberalization has concentrated costs and diffused benefits, making it difficult to organize collective action in support of reform. Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); idem, Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economie Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Haggard and Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); idem, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Rodrik "Understanding Economic Reform," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (March 1996). Therefore, the management of reform implies the thwarting of socieral resistance and the insulation of reformist policymakcrs. Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy and Carlos Acuńa and William Smith also point out the combination of repression, co-optation, and insulation by skillful policyrnakers for the implementation of market reforms for Latin America. Conaghan and Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the-Central Andes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Acuńa and Smith, "The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Logic of Support and Opposition to Neoliberal Reform," in Smith, Acuńa, and Eduardo G amarra, eds., Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994).
22. Volumes by Joan Nelson, Steven Haggard and Robert Kaufman, and Dani Rodrik assume that liberalization has concentrated costs and diffused benefits, making it difficult to organize collective action in support of reform. Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); idem, Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economie Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Haggard and Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); idem, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Rodrik "Understanding Economic Reform," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (March 1996). Therefore, the management of reform implies the thwarting of socieral resistance and the insulation of reformist policymakcrs. Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy and Carlos Acuńa and William Smith also point out the combination of repression, co-optation, and insulation by skillful policyrnakers for the implementation of market reforms for Latin America. Conaghan and Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the-Central Andes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Acuńa and Smith, "The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Logic of Support and Opposition to Neoliberal Reform," in Smith, Acuńa, and Eduardo G amarra, eds., Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994).
23. Volumes by Joan Nelson, Steven Haggard and Robert Kaufman, and Dani Rodrik assume that liberalization has concentrated costs and diffused benefits, making it difficult to organize collective action in support of reform. Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); idem, Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economie Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Haggard and Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); idem, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Rodrik "Understanding Economic Reform," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (March 1996). Therefore, the management of reform implies the thwarting of socieral resistance and the insulation of reformist policymakcrs. Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy and Carlos Acuńa and William Smith also point out the combination of repression, co-optation, and insulation by skillful policyrnakers for the implementation of market reforms for Latin America. Conaghan and Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the-Central Andes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Acuńa and Smith, "The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Logic of Support and Opposition to Neoliberal Reform," in Smith, Acuńa, and Eduardo G amarra, eds., Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994).
24. Volumes by Joan Nelson, Steven Haggard and Robert Kaufman, and Dani Rodrik assume that liberalization has concentrated costs and diffused benefits, making it difficult to organize collective action in support of reform. Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); idem, Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economie Adjustment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989); Haggard and Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); idem, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Rodrik "Understanding Economic Reform," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (March 1996). Therefore, the management of reform implies the thwarting of socieral resistance and the insulation of reformist policymakcrs. Catherine Conaghan and James Malloy and Carlos Acuńa and William Smith also point out the combination of repression, co-optation, and insulation by skillful policyrnakers for the implementation of market reforms for Latin America. Conaghan and Malloy, Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the-Central Andes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Acuńa and Smith, "The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Logic of Support and Opposition to Neoliberal Reform," in Smith, Acuńa, and Eduardo G amarra, eds., Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994).
25. A number of scholars have analyzed the effect of union density and concentration, centralization of wage bargaining, and partisan affiliation on union behavior. Sec, for example, Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," Review of Politics 36 (January 1974); David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society," and Peter Lange, "Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, "Centralization and Wage Bargaining," Economic Policy 3 (April 1988); R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 35 (June 1991); and Peter Lange and George Tscbelis, "Strikes around the World: A Game Theoretic Approach," in Jacoby (fn.10).
26. A number of scholars have analyzed the effect of union density and concentration, centralization of wage bargaining, and partisan affiliation on union behavior. Sec, for example, Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," Review of Politics 36 (January 1974); David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society," and Peter Lange, "Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, "Centralization and Wage Bargaining," Economic Policy 3 (April 1988); R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 35 (June 1991); and Peter Lange and George Tscbelis, "Strikes around the World: A Game Theoretic Approach," in Jacoby (fn.10).
27. A number of scholars have analyzed the effect of union density and concentration, centralization of wage bargaining, and partisan affiliation on union behavior. Sec, for example, Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," Review of Politics 36 (January 1974); David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society," and Peter Lange, "Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, "Centralization and Wage Bargaining," Economic Policy 3 (April 1988); R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991); and Peter Lange and George Tsebelis, "Strikes around the World: A Game Theoretic Approach," in Jacoby (fn.10).
28. A number of scholars have analyzed the effect of union density and concentration, centralization of wage bargaining, and partisan affiliation on union behavior. Sec, for example, Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," Review of Politics 36 (January 1974); David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society," and Peter Lange, "Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, "Centralization and Wage Bargaining," Economic Policy 3 (April 1988); R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991); and Peter Lange and George Tsebelis, "Strikes around the World: A Game Theoretic Approach," in Jacoby (fn.10).
29. A number of scholars have analyzed the effect of union density and concentration, centralization of wage bargaining, and partisan affiliation on union behavior. Sec, for example, Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," Review of Politics 36 (January 1974); David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society," and Peter Lange, "Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, "Centralization and Wage Bargaining," Economic Policy 3 (April 1988); R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991); and Peter Lange and George Tsebelis, "Strikes around the World: A Game Theoretic Approach," in Jacoby (fn.10).
30. A number of scholars have analyzed the effect of union density and concentration, centralization of wage bargaining, and partisan affiliation on union behavior. See, for example, Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism," Review of Politics 36 (January 1974); David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Labor Quiescence, and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society," and Peter Lange, "Unions, Workers, and Wage Regulation: The Rational Bases of Consent," in John H. Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, "Centralization and Wage Bargaining," Economic Policy 3 (April 1988); R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991); and Peter Lange and George Tsebelis, "Strikes around the World: A Game Theoretic Approach," in Jacoby (fn.10).
31. In Schmitter 's original definition, organized interests in "societal" corporatism emerged more autonomously from the state than in "state" corporatism. In the comparative Lahn American literature, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier emphasize state "incorporation" of labor, and Francisco Zapata stresses the deeply political character of union activity resulting from the high degree of state intervention. Country studies confirm this view. In particular, these three countries arc classified by both Zapata and Collier and Collier as having historically high levels of state intervention and legal benefits for formal workers. Collier and Collier (fn. 3); idem, "Inducement versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,'" American Political Science Review 73 (December 1979); Zapata, El conficto imdical en America Latina (Labor conflict in Latin America) (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1986); and idem, Autonomía y subordinatión en el sindicalismo lalinocimencano (Autonomy and subordination of Latin American unionism) (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993).
32. In Schmitter 's original definition, organized interests in "societal" corporatism emerged more autonomously from the state than in "state" corporatism. In the comparative Lahn American literature, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier emphasize state "incorporation" of labor, and Francisco Zapata stresses the deeply political character of union activity resulting from the high degree of state intervention. Country studies confirm this view. In particular, these three countries arc classified by both Zapata and Collier and Collier as having historically high levels of state intervention and legal benefits for formal workers. Collier and Collier (fn. 3); idem, "Inducement versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,'" American Political Science Review 73 (December 1979); Zapata, El conficto imdical en America Latina (Labor conflict in Latin America) (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1986); and idem, Autonomía y subordinatión en el sindicalismo lalinocimencano (Autonomy and subordination of Latin American unionism) (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993).
33. In Schmitter 's original definition, organized interests in "societal" corporatism emerged more autonomously from the state than in "state" corporatism. In the comparative Lahn American literature, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier emphasize state "incorporation" of labor, and Francisco Zapata stresses the deeply political character of union activity resulting from the high degree of state intervention. Country studies confirm this view. In particular, these three countries arc classified by both Zapata and Collier and Collier as having historically high levels of state intervention and legal benefits for formal workers. Collier and Collier (fn. 3); idem, "Inducement versus Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,'" American Political Science Review 73 (December 1979); Zapata, El conficto imdical en America Latina (Labor conflict in Latin America) (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 1986); and idem, Autonomía y subordinatión en el sindicalismo lalinocimencano (Autonomy and subordination of Latin American unionism) (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993).
34. Katrina Burgess's dissertation, an institutionalist work on the reshaping of the alliance between organized labor and labor parties, focuses on the external costs created by political parties on the decision making of unions at the national level. Instead, I propose to analyze the internal dynamics of unions and the effect of competition for leadership or for members on their relations with political parties. Burgess, "Alliances under Stress: Economic Reform and Party-Union Relations in Mexico, Spun, and Venezuela" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University. 1998).
35. Allcsandro Pizzorno, "Political Exchange and Collective Identity," in Colin Crouch and Pizzorno eds.,The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968 , vol.2 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978); and Crouch, Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Fontana Paperback, 1982).
36. Allcsandro Pizzorno, "Political Exchange and Collective Identity," in Colin Crouch and Pizzorno eds.,The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968 , vol.2 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978); and Crouch, Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Fontana Paperback, 1982).
37. Volumes edited by Miriam Golden and Jonas Pontusson and by Christopher Candland and Rudra Sil provide a nice sample of new work in this direction for the developed and the developing world respectively. Golden and Pontusson, eds., Bargaining for Change: Union Politics in North America and Europe (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992); and Candland and Sil, eds., Industrial Relations in the Age of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
38. Volumes edited by Miriam Golden and Jonas Pontusson and by Christopher Candland and Rudra Sil provide a nice sample of new work in this direction for the developed and the developing world respectively. Golden and Pontusson, eds., Bargaining for Change: Union Politics in North America and Europe (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992); and Candland and Sil, eds., Industrial Relations in the Age of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
39. Due to the effect of institutional and cultural constraints, militancy was measured using diverse forms. For instance, the meaning of a general strike in Argentina, where they have occurred often in the past - even under Peronist administrations - is different from that of a general strike in Venezuela, where there were no antecedents of such means of protest for economic demands. See James W. McGuire, Peronism without Peron: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997); and Steve Eliner, Organized Labor in Venezuela, 1958-1991 (Wilrnington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1993).
40. Due to the effect of institutional and cultural constraints, militancy was measured using diverse forms. For instance, the meaning of a general strike in Argentina, where they have occurred often in the past - even under Peronist administrations - is different from that of a general strike in Venezuela, where there were no antecedents of such means of protest for economic demands. See James W. McGuire, Peronism without Peron: Unions, Parties, and Democracy in Argentina (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997); and Steve Eliner, Organized Labor in Venezuela, 1958-1991 (Wilrnington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1993).
41. Miriam Golden, Heroic Defeat: The Politics of Job Loss (Cambridge: Cambrigc University Press, 1997).
42. Pizzorno (fn. 16), 278.
43. Crouch (fn. 16), 161. The imperfection of the union agency may be a desirable goal for workers that select union leaders not just to carry their demands but also to articulate them and to calculate the benefits of intertemporal exchanges.
44. Henry Farber, "The Analysis of Union Behavior," in O. Ashenfclter and R. Layard, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics (Amsterdam: North-Holland. 1986), 1080.
45. Farber argues that the democratic constraints on the leadership range from cases where the limits arc so loose that the leadership can maximize their objective function without regard to the constraints of the political process (dictatorship) to cases where the leadership is severely hampered by the political process and the need to answer the rank and file. Yet, he shows that the possibility of insurgcncy constrains leaders even in imperfect democracies. Ibid.
46. In a Hirschmanian sense, replacement by alternative leaders can be assimilated to "voice" within the same organization while the abandonment of the union by members is similar to his concept of "exit." Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
47. J. Samuel Valcnzucla, "Labour Movements and Political Systems: Some Variations," in Marino Regini, ed., The Future of Labour Movement (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1992).
48. Walter Korpi explains this pattern as the result of a trade-off between industrial and political resources. Korpi, The Working Class in Wtlfan Capitalism (London: Routledgc and Kegan Paul, 1978). In the Latin American context, Zapata explains the empirical regularity of political strikes by the influence of the state on industrial relations. Zapata (fn. 14, 1986).
49. Walter Korpi explains this pattern as the result of a trade-off between industrial and political resources. Korpi, The Working Class in Wtlfan Capitalism (London: Routledgc and Kegan Paul, 1978). In the Latin American context, Zapata explains the empirical regularity of political strikes by the influence of the state on industrial relations. Zapata (fn. 14, 1986).
50. The cost of bargaining with nonallied union leaders is higher due to the lack of mutual trust while part of the agency costs may indirectly feed the coffers of opposition parties.
51. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collection Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 48.
52. Miriam Golden shows that coordination In wage bargaining is most likely when union monopoly is high because the competition for members "provides a strong incentive for unions to trv to maximize their wage gains in order to retain members or to attract them away from competitors." Golden, The Dynamics of Trade Unionism and National Economic Performance," American Political Science Review 87 (June 1993), 441.
53. Ellner (th. 18).
54. Authors interviews with AD union leaders of different factions confirmed the account of Steve Ellner. Sec Ellncr, "Organized Labor's Political Influence and Party Ties in Venezuela: Acción Demoerática and Its Labor Leadership, " Journal of Interamerican studies and World Affairs 31 (Winter 1989).
55. Author's interview with Ford's labor relations manager and AD union leader was confirmed by Consuelo Iranzo, Lutsa Bethencourt, Hector Lueena, and Fausto Sandoval Bauza. See Iranzo, Bethencourt, Lucena, and Bauza, "Competitividad, Calificación yTrabajo: Sector Automotriz Venezolano" (Competition, qualifications, and work: Automobile sector in Venezuela) (Manuscript, Caracas, 1996 ).
56. Cite from El National, January 9, 1991. Former Minister Gustavo Roosen and union leaders of FetraMagisterio and Fenatev confirmed this account derived from a press chronology, in interviews with the author, Caracas, June 1996.
57. The information on the Argentine cases is derived from a press chronology, union annual reports and other documents, interviews with union leaders of all factions, three ministers of labor and other government officials, as well as labor relations managers in the involved companies. The Argentine press chronology was elaborated in the archives of the newspaper Clann and includes newspapers such as Clarin, La Nacion, La Rozon, Crunica, FJCwnhta Comeraal, Pagina 12, and Amlnlo Financier. Union sources included the internal constitution, annual minutes, and balances for the 1988 to 1994 period for SMATA, FATLyF, CTERA, FOETRA, and SUPE. Documents included collective bargaining contracts signed by the unions and approved by the Ministry of Labor, bill proposals, parliamentary information on introduced, modified, and passed bills. Interviews included SUPK and CGT union leader Antonio Cassia (Buenos Aires, 1993, 1995), FATLyF union leader Cartes Alderete (Buenos Aires, 1993), CTA union leader Victor De Gennaro (Buenos Aires, 1995), CTERA union leader Mart Marffci (Buenos Aires, 1995), ministers of labor Armando Caro Figueroa (Buenos Aires, 1994), Rodoltb Diaz (Buenos Aires, 1992, 1995), and Enrique Rodriguez. (Buenos Aires, 1992, 1995), managers of labor relations, such as YPF's Roberto Teglia (Buenos Aires, 1995), and Telecom's Juan Giar (Buenos Aires, 1995).
58. State imposed limits on strike activity discard the usefulness of using strikes as a measure of militancy but do not imply that militancy docs not take place. Mexican workers have held illegal strikes, used strike petitions as a threat to show their militancy, and resorted very often to sit-ins, demonstrations, and even extreme measures such as going naked or on hunger strikes. On repertoires of protest, see the account of Maria Lorena Cook, Organizing Dissent (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996). For a historial analysis of the evolution of union strategics, sec Alberto Axiz Nassif,El estado mexicano y la CTM(The Mexican state and the CTM) (Mexico City: Ed. La Casa Chata, 1989); llán Bizberg, Estado y sindicalismo en México (State and unionism in Mexico) (Mexico City: El Colegio dc México, 1990); and Kevin Middlehrook, The Paradox of Revolution (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995).
59. State imposed limits on strike activity discard the usefulness of using strikes as a measure of militancy but do not imply that militancy docs not take place. Mexican workers have held illegal strikes, used strike petitions as a threat to show their militancy, and resorted very often to sit-ins, demonstrations, and even extreme measures such as going naked or on hunger strikes. On repertoires of protest, see the account of Maria Lorena Cook, Organizing Dissent (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996). For a historial analysis of the evolution of union strategics, sec Alberto Axiz Nassif,El estado mexicano y la CTM(The Mexican state and the CTM) (Mexico City: Ed. La Casa Chata, 1989); llán Bizberg, Estado y sindicalismo en México (State and unionism in Mexico) (Mexico City: El Colegio dc México, 1990); and Kevin Middlehrook, The Paradox of Revolution (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995).
60. State imposed limits on strike activity discard the usefulness of using strikes as a measure of militancy but do not imply that militancy docs not take place. Mexican workers have held illegal strikes, used strike petitions as a threat to show their militancy, and resorted very often to sit-ins, demonstrations, and even extreme measures such as going naked or on hunger strikes. On repertoires of protest, see the account of Maria Lorena Cook, Organizing Dissent (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996). For a historial analysis of the evolution of union strategics, sec Alberto Axiz Nassif,El estado mexicano y la CTM(The Mexican state and the CTM) (Mexico City: Ed. La Casa Chata, 1989); llán Bizberg, Estado y sindicalismo en México (State and unionism in Mexico) (Mexico City: El Colegio dc México, 1990); and Kevin Middlehrook, The Paradox of Revolution (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995).
61. State imposed limits on strike activity discard the usefulness of using strikes as a measure of militancy but do not imply that militancy docs not take place. Mexican workers have held illegal strikes, used strike petitions as a threat to show their militancy, and resorted very often to sit-ins, demonstrations, and even extreme measures such as going naked or on hunger strikes. On repertoires of protest, see the account of Maria Lorena Cook, Organizing Dissent (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996). For a historial analysis of the evolution of union strategics, sec Alberto Axiz Nassif,El estado mexicano y la CTM(The Mexican state and the CTM) (Mexico City: Ed. La Casa Chata, 1989); llán Bizberg, Estado y sindicalismo en México (State and unionism in Mexico) (Mexico City: El Colegio dc México, 1990); and Kevin Middlehrook, The Paradox of Revolution (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995).
62. Graciela Bensusán confirms interviews with union leaders and government officials. Bcnsusan, "Los déterminantes institucionales de la flexibilización lahoral" (Institutionij influences on labor flexibility), Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 1 (1994).
63. For instance, the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (CROC) and the Revolutionary Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM) explicitly boycotted CTM protest against wage ceilings in the Congress of Labor and were publicly rewarded by the government. Subsequent exit ot unions from the CTM into preferred organizations, most notably the CROC, increased the pressure on its leadership. See my press chronology, which derives from the archives of Entomo Laboral and which includes newspapers such as La Jornada, Excelsion, El sol de Mexico, Uno mas Uno, and Reforma.
64. Ruth Berins Collier and James Samstad analyze the evelopment of the FESEBES and the "new unionism" in "Mexican Labor and Structural Reform: New Unionism or Old Stalemate?" in Riordan Roett, ed., The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico (Boulder,Colo: Lynne Ricnner, (1995). Interviews with union leaders, government officials, and company managers confirmed the numerous account on the strategy of this union. For telecommunications, see Enrique De La Garza, "Sindicato y rcstructuración productiva en Mexico" (Union and labor restructuring in Mexico), Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 1 (1994); and De La Garza and Javier Melgoza, "Rccstructuracion y camhio en las relaciones laborales la telefonía mexicana" (Restructuring and change in labor relations in the Mexican telephone industry), in Jorge Walter and Cecilia Senen González, eds., La privatización de las telecomunicaciones en América Latina (Privatization of telecommunications in Latin America) (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1998). For electricity, see Javicr Melgoza, "El SME y la productividad: Los saldos de la negociación" (SME and productivit: Outcomes of bargaining), Polis 93 (1994).
65. Ruth Berins Collier and James Samstad analyze the evelopment of the FESEBES and the "new unionism" in "Mexican Labor and Structural Reform: New Unionism or Old Stalemate?" in Riordan Roett, ed., The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico (Boulder,Colo: Lynne Ricnner, (1995). Interviews with union leaders, government officials, and company managers confirmed the numerous account on the strategy of this union. For telecommunications, see Enrique De La Garza, "Sindicato y rcstructuración productiva en Mexico" (Union and labor restructuring in Mexico), Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 1 (1994); and De La Garza and Javier Melgoza, "Rccstructuracion y camhio en las relaciones laborales la telefonía mexicana" (Restructuring and change in labor relations in the Mexican telephone industry), in Jorge Walter and Cecilia Senen González, eds., La privatización de las teleco-municaciones en América Latina (Privatization of telecommunications in Latin America) (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1998). For electricity, see Javicr Melgoza, "El SME y la productividad: Los saldos de la negociación" (SME and productivit: Outcomes of bargaining), Polis 93 (1994).
66. Ruth Berins Collier and James Samstad analyze the evelopment of the FESEBES and the "new unionism" in "Mexican Labor and Structural Reform: New Unionism or Old Stalemate?" in Riordan Roett, ed., The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico (Boulder,Colo: Lynne Ricnner, 1995). Interviews with union leaders, government officials, and company managers confirmed the numerous account on the strategy of this union. For telecommunications, sec Enrique De La Garza, "Sindicato y rcstructuración productiva en Mexico" (Union and labor restructuring in Mexico), Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 1 (1994); and De La Garza and Javier Melgoza, "Rccstructuracion y camhio en las relaciones laborales la telefonía mexicana" (Restructuring and change in labor relations in the Mexican telephone industry), in Jorge Walter and Cecilia Senen González, eds., La privatización de las teleco-municaciones en América Latina (Privatization of telecommunications in Latin America) (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1998). For electricity, see Javicr Melgoza, "El SME y la productividad: Los saldos de la negociación" (SME and productivit: Outcomes of bargaining), Polis 93 (1994).
67. Ruth Berins Collier and James Samstad analyze the evelopment of the FESEBES and the "new unionism" in "Mexican Labor and Structural Reform: New Unionism or Old Stalemate?" in Riordan Roett, ed., The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico (Boulder,Colo: Lynne Ricnner, 1995). Interviews with union leaders, government officials, and company managers confirmed the numerous account on the strategy of this union. For telecommunications, sec Enrique De La Garza, "Sindicato y rcstructuración productiva en Mexico" (Union and labor restructuring in Mexico), Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 1 (1994); and De La Garza and Javier Melgoza, "Rccstructuracion y camhio en las relaciones laborales la telefonía mexicana" (Restructuring and change in labor relations in the Mexican telephone industry), in Jorge Walter and Cecilia Senen González, eds., La privatización de las teleco-municaciones en América Latina (Privatization of telecommunications in Latin America) (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1998). For electricity, see Javicr Melgoza, "El SME y la productividad: Los saldos de la negociación" (SME and productivit: Outcomes of bargaining), Polis 93 (1994).
68. Although my account derives from a press chronology and interviews with union leaders, government officials, and experts, the process of modernization and democratisation of the union has been widely studied. See, for instance, Cook (fn. 44); and Joe Foewaker, Popular Mobilisation in Mexico, the teachers' Movement 1977-87 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
69. Although my account derives from a press chronology and interviews with union leaders, government officials, and experts, the process of modernization and democratisation of the union has been widely studied. See, for instance, Cook (fn. 44); and Joe Foewaker, Popular Mobilisation in Mexico, the teachers' Movement 1977-87 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
70. Interviews and press releases are confirmed by Marisa Von Bulow, "Reestructuración productiva y estratcgias sindicates. El caso de la Ford en Cuahutitlán 1987-1993" (Production restructuring and union strategy: The case of Ford in Cuahutitlán 1987-1993) (M,A, thesis, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales-Scde Mexico, 1994); and Jorge Carrillo, "La Ford en México: Restructuratión industrial y cambio en las rclaciones sociales" (Ph.D. dissertation. El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, 1993).
71. Interviews and press releases are confirmed by Marisa Von Bulow, "Reestructuración productiva y estratcgias sindicates. El caso de la Ford en Cuahutitlán 1987-1993" (Production restructuring and union strategy: The case of Ford in Cuahutitlán 1987-1993) (M,A, thesis, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales-Scde Mexico, 1994); and Jorge Carrillo, "La Ford en México: Restructuratión industrial y cambio en las rclaciones sociales" (Ph.D. dissertation. El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, 1993).
72. Cardenas split from the PRI because he rejected the policy shift and failed to be selected as its presidential nominee. He launched a new coalition, later to be renamed as the PRD, and he delivered the strongest electoral blow to the PRI by dramatically reducing its share of votes (and even claiming victory stolen by fraud) in 1988.
73. Fabio Barbosa gives a graphic account of the process that confirms interviews and press releases, Barbosa, "La rcestructuración de Pemex" (The restructuring of Pcmcx), El Cotidiano 46 (March-April 1992).
74. These two cases related to Burgess's argument about the PRI imposing external costs on union leaders' decisions. Burgess (fn. 15).
75. International Labour organization, Relaciones de Trabajo en Venezuela (Labor relations in Venezuela) (ILO report, 1991).
76. Not only did Causa R grow in the unions and in the 1994 elections, but also many political outsiders, including current President Chávez, challenged the traditional political parties after that election.
77. Geoffrey Garrett and Christopher Way, "The Rise of Public Sector Unions, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance, 1970-1990," in Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden, eds., The Politi-cal Economy of European Integration (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995).
78. Ivan Nuńez, "Sindicatos de maestros, Estado y Políticas Educacionales en America Latna" (Teachers unions, state and education policy in Latin America), in M. L, P. B, Franco and D. M. L. Zibas, eds., Final do Seculo Desafíos da educacao na América Latina (End of the century: Challenges far education in Latin America) (Sao Paulo: Cortes Editora, CLACSO) REDUC, 1990).
79. Cook (fn. 44)
80. The new political parties emerging during the policy shift-FREPASO in Argentina, PRl) in Mexico and Causa R in Venezuela - built alliances with labor unions. Labor leaders, however, were more aware of the costs of corporatism once the state started its retrenchment, and the terms of new associations tended to be more fluid than in the past, thus affecting the extent of future "loyalties."
81. Maria Victoria Murillo. "The Corporatist Paradox: Labor Parties and Labor Reform in Latin America" (Paper presented at the conference "Institutional Reforms, Growth, and Human Development in Latin America," Yale Center for International and Area Studies, April 16-17,1999).
82. Roberto Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of Oligarchical Tendencies in Modern Democ racy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York The Free Press, 1962). 365.
83. Ibid., 172.
84. These implications are consistent with Hirschman's claim on the superiority of voice over exit as a mechanism for improvement in certain contexts when exit is not easily available or could provoke the demise of the organization.