Why prosecute? Critics of punishment for mass atrocity

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 118-147

  Osiel, Mark J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CRIME; HUMAN RIGHTS;

EID: 0034103762     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.2000.0013     Document Type: Article

References (139)

1. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); David Crocker, Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, 13 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 43 (1999); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (A. James McAdams ed., 1997); Juan E. Méndez,Responsabilización Por Los Abusos del Pasado, 7/8 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES 29 (1998).
2. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); David Crocker, Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, 13 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 43 (1999); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (A. James McAdams ed., 1997); Juan E. Méndez,Responsabilización Por Los Abusos del Pasado, 7/8 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES 29 (1998).
3. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); David Crocker, Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, 13 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 43 (1999); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (A. James McAdams ed., 1997); Juan E. Méndez,Responsabilización Por Los Abusos del Pasado, 7/8 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES 29 (1998).
4. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); David Crocker, Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, 13 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 43 (1999); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (A. James McAdams ed., 1997); Juan E. Méndez,Responsabilización Por Los Abusos del Pasado, 7/8 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES 29 (1998).
5. JUDITH SHKIAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 155 (1964). See also the critical observations of Telford Taylor, who devoted much of his professional life to such prosecutions, in TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NURLMBERG TRIAL: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 571-640 (1992).
6. JUDITH SHKIAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 155 (1964). See also the critical observations of Telford Taylor, who devoted much of his professional life to such prosecutions, in TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NURLMBERG TRIAL: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 571-640 (1992).
7. See, e.g., JAIME MALAMUD-GOTI, GAME WITHOUT END: STATE TERROR AND THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE 3-24, 167-98 (1996).
8. Though my focus will be on laying out the case of the skeptics, the reader will find that I have not entirely resisted the temptation to refute it, in key places at least.
9. I therefore do not try to refute those who reject criminal prosecution because they deny, with respect to Germany or Argentina, that wrongful acts occurred. Neither do I seek to refute those who find punishment an inappropriate response to any crime. For a careful exposition of the latter view, see TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 26-34, 63-64, 89-93 (1969).
10. I shall leave to others the examination of such national contingencies and their implications for the efficacy and defensibility of prosecution.
11. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 71 (1992).
12. This article does not discuss what is perhaps the most frequently proffered objection to criminal prosecution: that it prevents the reconciliation among social antagonists, considered essential to the restoration of social solidarity. I devote considerable attention elsewhere to this concern, arguing that trials can help restore such solidarity. See MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE LAW 36-56 (1997).
13. For the present author's response, see id.; MARK OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE, AND THE LAW OF WAR (1999).
14. Karl Jaspers, Der Spiegel, 10 Mar. 10 1965, at 7.
15. SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 167.
16. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 135 (Penguin Books, rev. ed. 1994).
17. See THORSTEN VEBLEN, THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP 347 (1914).
18. Richard C. Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 125, 129 (1968).
19. Id.
20. SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 162.
21. See generally William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 767 (1999); Darryl Robinson, Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 43 (1999); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 289 (1994). Touvier was a leader of the Milice, political police for the Vichy regime. He was convicted in 1994 of murdering seven French Jews, at the instigation of Nazi occupation authorities. See generally ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, REMEMBERING IN VAIN: THE KLAUS BARBIE TRIAL AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (1992).
22. See generally William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 767 (1999); Darryl Robinson, Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 43 (1999); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 289 (1994). Touvier was a leader of the Milice, political police for the Vichy regime. He was convicted in 1994 of murdering seven French Jews, at the instigation of Nazi occupation authorities. See generally ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, REMEMBERING IN VAIN: THE KLAUS BARBIE TRIAL AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (1992).
23. See generally William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 767 (1999); Darryl Robinson, Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 43 (1999); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 289 (1994). Touvier was a leader of the Milice, political police for the Vichy regime. He was convicted in 1994 of murdering seven French Jews, at the instigation of Nazi occupation authorities. See generally ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, REMEMBERING IN VAIN: THE KLAUS BARBIE TRIAL AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (1992).
24. See generally William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 767 (1999); Darryl Robinson, Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 43 (1999); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 289 (1994). Touvier was a leader of the Milice, political police for the Vichy regime. He was convicted in 1994 of murdering seven French Jews, at the instigation of Nazi occupation authorities. See generally ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, REMEMBERING IN VAIN: THE KLAUS BARBIE TRIAL AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (1992).
25. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 Dec. 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force 12 Jan. 1951) (entered into force for U.S. 23 Feb. 1989).
26. See Prosecutor V. Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T, available on 〈http//www.ictr.org/ english/casehist/akayesu.html〉 (visited 22 Nov. 1999).
27. The juntas were prosecuted, and most convicted, for their role in organizing and directing the "Dirty War," during which (from 1976 through 1980) members of Argentina's officer corps kidnapped and murdered between 11,000 and 15,000 people. For more information on this trial and its political context, see Mark Osiel, The Making of Human Rights Policy in Argentina, 18 J. LATIN AMER. STUD. 135 (1986).
28. Julio Carlos Stressera, El Diarlo del Juicio, 25 Sept. 1985, (unpaginated) (statement delivered Sept. 11, 1985).
29. GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 392 (1966).
30. "Disappearance" has recently been added to the acts that may constitute a crime against humanity. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conf. of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Int'l Crim. Ct., art. 7(1)(i), U.N. Doc A/ CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999, 1005 (1998)
31. See Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 129.
32. On Arendt's affinities with the Frankfurt School and related Marxist critiques of modern Western society, see her discussion of "mass society" in HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 305-40 (1951).
33. SHKIAR, supra note 2, at 167.
34. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 635.
35. See id. at 630. Taylor's argument here adopted the standard reasoning of current German law on legal mistake, which is that no one may be punished who is inculpable and that a reasonable or "invincible" mistake of law strips the defendant of culpability. This rule applies to civilians no less than soldiers.
36. See id. at 509, 276-77.
37. See id. at 282-83.
38. See José E. Álvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadić Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2039-40 (1998).
39. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 553.
40. See id. at 116-17.
41. See ROBERT PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE: OLD GUARD AND NEW ORDER, 1940-1944, at 221-27 (1972); JOHN F. SWEETS, THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE IN FRANCE, 1940-1944, at 200 (1976). In their generic demonization of all members of the Jewish people, the Nazis engaged in ascriptions of responsibility that were both collective and, of course, false.
42. See ROBERT PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE: OLD GUARD AND NEW ORDER, 1940-1944, at 221-27 (1972); JOHN F. SWEETS, THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE IN FRANCE, 1940-1944, at 200 (1976). In their generic demonization of all members of the Jewish people, the Nazis engaged in ascriptions of responsibility that were both collective and, of course, false.
43. See H.D. Lewis, Collective Responsibility, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 17, 31 (Larry May ed., 1991). Lewis's critique in this connection would extend to the conspiracy offense and to the US federal racketeering statute.
44. See HAUSNER, supra note 22, at 399. I respond to this view in a forthcoming book, MARK J. OSIEL, LAWFUL ATROCITY, TORTURED LEGALITY (forthcoming 2000).
45. The appearance of arbitrariness persists particularly in the minds of those who wish to see a greater number of defendants prosecuted than the executive is prepared to allow and who come to suspect that not moral, but more crudely "prudential," considerations are really at work.
46. Interview with confidential source (Sept. 18, 1991). See JAIME MAIAMUD-GOTI, GAME WITHOUT END: STATE TERROR AND THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE 12 (pre-publication manuscript, 1996) (on file with author).
47. Id. at 18.
48. See, e.g., KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT (1947) (representing an early, influential attempt to address the issue by way of distinctions between different kinds of responsibility (legal, moral, political)). Under the influence of existentialism, however, Jaspers understood moral responsibility as largely a matter of personal choice. This permitted its easy disentanglement from questions of legal responsibility in ways that today strike most readers as unpersuasive.
49. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 326-29 (2d ed. 1985).
50. I examine this issue at some length in OSIEL, supra note 8, at 79-141.
51. Argentine scholars long identified with the left now openly acknowledge this fact. See, e.g., GUILLERMO O'DONNELL, ¿Y A Mi, QUE ME IMPORTA?: NOTAS SOBRE SOCIABILIDAD Y POLÍTICA EN ARGENTINA Y BRASIL 23-24 (1984); Marcelo Suarez-Orozco, A Grammar of Terror: Psychocultural Responses to State Terrorism in Dirty War and Post-Dirty War Argentina, in THE PATHS TO DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, AND TERROR 231 (Carolyn Nordstrom & JoAnn Martin eds., 1993). See also Tulio Halperin-Donghi, El Presente Transforma el Pasado: el impacto del reciente terror en la imágen de la historia argentina, in FICCIÓN Y POLÍTICA: LA NARRATIVA ARGENTINA DURANTE EL PROCESO 78-79 (Rene Jara & Hernan Vidai eds., 1987).
52. Argentine scholars long identified with the left now openly acknowledge this fact. See, e.g., GUILLERMO O'DONNELL, ¿Y A Mi, QUE ME IMPORTA?: NOTAS SOBRE SOCIABILIDAD Y POLÍTICA EN ARGENTINA Y BRASIL 23-24 (1984); Marcelo Suarez-Orozco, A Grammar of Terror: Psychocultural Responses to State Terrorism in Dirty War and Post-Dirty War Argentina, in THE PATHS TO DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, AND TERROR 231 (Carolyn Nordstrom & JoAnn Martin eds., 1993). See also Tulio Halperin-Donghi, El Presente Transforma el Pasado: el impacto del reciente terror en la imágen de la historia argentina, in FICCIÓN Y POLÍTICA: LA NARRATIVA ARGENTINA DURANTE EL PROCESO 78-79 (Rene Jara & Hernan Vidai eds., 1987).
53. Argentine scholars long identified with the left now openly acknowledge this fact. See, e.g., GUILLERMO O'DONNELL, ¿Y A Mi, QUE ME IMPORTA?: NOTAS SOBRE SOCIABILIDAD Y POLÍTICA EN ARGENTINA Y BRASIL 23-24 (1984); Marcelo Suarez-Orozco, A Grammar of Terror: Psychocultural Responses to State Terrorism in Dirty War and Post-Dirty War Argentina, in THE PATHS TO DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, AND TERROR 231 (Carolyn Nordstrom & JoAnn Martin eds., 1993). See also Tulio Halperin-Donghi, El Presente Transforma el Pasado: el impacto del reciente terror en la imágen de la historia argentina, in FICCIÓN Y POLÍTICA: LA NARRATIVA ARGENTINA DURANTE EL PROCESO 78-79 (Rene Jara & Hernan Vidai eds., 1987).
54. Interviews with confidential sources, Buenos Aires (Summers 1985 & 1987).
55. See Jaspers, supra note 10, at 31-37.
56. HANNAH ARENDT, Cura Posterior: Eichmann in Jerusalem, in HANNAH ARENDT: FOR LOVE OF THE WORLD 328, 373 (Elisabeth Young-Bruehl ed., 1982). Arendt repeated this charge in many writings.
57. HANNAH ARENDT/KARL JASPERS: CORRESPONDENCE, 1926-1969, at 54 (Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner eds., Robert Kimber & Rita Kimber trans., 1992).
58. See HANNAH ARENDT, Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps, in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING, 1930-1954, at 232, 243 (Jherome Kohn ed., 1994) [hereinafter ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING].
59. See HANNAH ARENDT, Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps, in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING, 1930-1954, at 232, 243 (Jherome Kohn ed., 1994) [hereinafter ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING].
60. The Israeli Supreme Court, however, did not share Arendt's view of Eichmann as a "minor cog." See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENSE OF "OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS" IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 213 (1965). But despite his considerable authority over Jewish "relocation" issues, Eichmann never passed beyond the rank of lieutenant colonel.
61. I examine Arendt's argument here in detail in OSIEL, supra note 36.
62. On Arendt's enormous influence over prevalent understandings of the agents of state-sponsored mass murder, see STEPHEN WHITFIELD, INTO THE DARK: HANNAH ARENDT AND TOTALITARIANISM 211 (1982).
63. Id. at 211-12.
64. Id. See also TOM SEGEV, SOLDIERS OF EVIL 214 (1979) (noting of Arendt's notorious subtitle that "these words were a sort of magic formula, an expression of a very pessimistic (and very fashionable) understanding of the nature of man - 'We are all Eichmann's.'")
65. See, e.g., LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 101-03 (1993); HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 15, 318(1989) (comparing Eichmann's sense of duty and personal loyalty to his leader with that of the Watergate and Iran-Contra defendants); STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 5-6 (1974) ("After witnessing hundreds of ordinary people submit to the authority in our own experiments, I must conclude that Arendt's conception of the banality of evil comes closer to the truth than one might dare imagine.").
66. See, e.g., LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 101-03 (1993); HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 15, 318(1989) (comparing Eichmann's sense of duty and personal loyalty to his leader with that of the Watergate and Iran-Contra defendants); STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 5-6 (1974) ("After witnessing hundreds of ordinary people submit to the authority in our own experiments, I must conclude that Arendt's conception of the banality of evil comes closer to the truth than one might dare imagine.").
67. See, e.g., LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 101-03 (1993); HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 15, 318(1989) (comparing Eichmann's sense of duty and personal loyalty to his leader with that of the Watergate and Iran-Contra defendants); STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 5-6 (1974) ("After witnessing hundreds of ordinary people submit to the authority in our own experiments, I must conclude that Arendt's conception of the banality of evil comes closer to the truth than one might dare imagine.").
68. See Alvarez, supra note 31, at 2031 (arguing this effect).
69. TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 29 (citing unpublished memorandum).
70. See SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, L'EXISTENTIALISME ET LA SAGESSE DES NATIONS 125-65 (1948).
71. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 34.
72. Id. at 31.
73. Id. at 33.
74. TONY JUDT, PAST IMPERFECT: FRENCH INTELLECTUALS, 1944-1956, at 94 (1992).
75. Id.
76. For the history of this argument, which regularly recurs during periods of regime change, see ANNE SA'ADAH, GERMANY'S SECOND CHANCE: TRUST, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRATIZATION 10-58 (1998).
77. For a response to this position, see OSIEL, supra note 8, at 36-56, 293-300.
78. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 278-80, 287. Former Soviet Bloc countries faced similar questions and conflicts. See also TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE'S GHOSTS AFTER COMMUNISM 67-121 (1995); Andrzej Rzeplinski, A Lesser Evil?, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 33 (1992); ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES 56-74 (1998).
79. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 278-80, 287. Former Soviet Bloc countries faced similar questions and conflicts. See also TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE'S GHOSTS AFTER COMMUNISM 67-121 (1995); Andrzej Rzeplinski, A Lesser Evil?, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 33 (1992); ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES 56-74 (1998).
80. See TAYLOR, supra note 2, at 278-80, 287. Former Soviet Bloc countries faced similar questions and conflicts. See also TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE'S GHOSTS AFTER COMMUNISM 67-121 (1995); Andrzej Rzeplinski, A Lesser Evil?, 1 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 33 (1992); ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES 56-74 (1998).
81. SHKLAR, supra note 2, at 194.
82. Interview with President Alfonsin, Buenos Aires, Argentina (Aug. 1985).
83. See Juan Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, in THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 45-46 (Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., 1986).
84. See Ackerman, supra note 7, at 96. Offe's views, discussed there as well, ultimately appeared in Claus Offe, Coming to Terms with Past Injustices, 33 EUR. J. Soc:. 195 (1992). On the variety of approaches to this question recently adopted by several societies, see generally Herman Schwartz, Lustration in Eastern Europe, 1 PARKER SCH. J.E. EUR. L. 141 (1994).
85. See Ackerman, supra note 7, at 96. Offe's views, discussed there as well, ultimately appeared in Claus Offe, Coming to Terms with Past Injustices, 33 EUR. J. Soc:. 195 (1992). On the variety of approaches to this question recently adopted by several societies, see generally Herman Schwartz, Lustration in Eastern Europe, 1 PARKER SCH. J.E. EUR. L. 141 (1994).
86. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974-1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994). See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Overview, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 73, 79 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; Kathleen E. Smith, Destalinization in the Former Soviet Union, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 113, 124-25; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Conclusion: Combating Impunity, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 281.
87. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974-1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994). See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Overview, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 73, 79 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; Kathleen E. Smith, Destalinization in the Former Soviet Union, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 113, 124-25; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Conclusion: Combating Impunity, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 281.
88. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974-1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994). See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Overview, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 73, 79 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; Kathleen E. Smith, Destalinization in the Former Soviet Union, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 113, 124-25; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Conclusion: Combating Impunity, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 281.
89. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974-1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994). See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Overview, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 73, 79 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; Kathleen E. Smith, Destalinization in the Former Soviet Union, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 113, 124-25; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Conclusion: Combating Impunity, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 281.
90. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974-1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994). See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Overview, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 73, 79 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) [hereinafter IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; Kathleen E. Smith, Destalinization in the Former Soviet Union, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 113, 124-25; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Conclusion: Combating Impunity, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 281.
91. Aryeh Neier, What Should Be Done About the Guilty?, 37 N.Y. REV. BOOKS., 1 Feb. 1990, at 32, 34.
92. See THE JUSTICE AND SOCIETY PROGRAM OF THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 93 (1988).
93. The unusual subpoena powers of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission make it a rare exception to this rule.
94. "The rest," in this regard, must be understood to include much of Western legal history. See, e.g., OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAI JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL ENDS (1961).
95. Interview with President Alfonsín, Buenos Aires, Argentina (Aug. 1985).
96. This irony is noted by ROSENBERC, supra note 65, at 315-55 (discussing the democratic transition in the former German Democratic Republic).
97. Arendt observed, for instance, that it was "the quintessence of moral confusion that during the post-war period in Germany those who personally were completely innocent assured each other and the world at large how guilty they felt, while few of the criminals were prepared to admit even the slightest remorse." Hannah Arendt, Personal Responsibility in Dictatorship, in THE LISTENER 185 (1969). She makes the same point in HANNAH ARENDT, The Aftermath of Nazi Rule: Report From Germany, in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 48, at 248, 259.
98. Arendt observed, for instance, that it was "the quintessence of moral confusion that during the post-war period in Germany those who personally were completely innocent assured each other and the world at large how guilty they felt, while few of the criminals were prepared to admit even the slightest remorse." Hannah Arendt, Personal Responsibility in Dictatorship, in THE LISTENER 185 (1969). She makes the same point in HANNAH ARENDT, The Aftermath of Nazi Rule: Report From Germany, in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 48, at 248, 259.
99. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission differed from other truth commissions in possessing such powers.
100. This point is emphasized by Andres D'Allessio, one of the trial judges who convicted the juntas and other military officers for dirty war crimes. Andres D'Allessio, Oral presentation at Human Rights and Deliberative Democracy: A Conference in Honor of the Memory of Carlos Nino, Schell Center for Human Rights, Yale Law School, 24-25 Sept. 1994 (on file with author).
101. Cf. Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 19 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (noting the arguable necessity of such gag rules on certain issues in new democracies) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY].
102. The best-known example of this in twentieth century US law is surely the qualification, in the Supreme Court's judgment in Brown v. Board of Educ., that public schools in Topeka be racially integrated - not immediately, but only "with all deliberate speed." Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
103. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 231 (1991).
104. See, e.g., Jon Elster, The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 80, at 267, 272 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
105. HUNTINGTON, supra note 82, at 214.
106. See Paul Zagorski, Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy: The Armed Forces Under the Menem Government, 20 ARMED FORCES & SOC'Y 423, 433-34 (1994).
107. See HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY (1948).
108. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 72-73.
109. Among the more influential works in this regard, see TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES (Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986). See also GIUSEPPE DI PALMA, To CRAFT DEMOCRACIES: AN ESSAY ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS 6 (1990) (noting that "these issues do not appear to lend themselves to simple and parsimonious predictions.... Thus, the realm of the possible, the plausible, indeed, the probable, can be expanded.").
110. Among the more influential works in this regard, see TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES (Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986). See also GIUSEPPE DI PALMA, To CRAFT DEMOCRACIES: AN ESSAY ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS 6 (1990) (noting that "these issues do not appear to lend themselves to simple and parsimonious predictions.... Thus, the realm of the possible, the plausible, indeed, the probable, can be expanded.").
111. CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 92 (pre-publication manuscript, 1996).
112. The basis for such an analysis could certainly be sought in the work of Pierre Bourdieu. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 171-83 (1977).
113. See especially Alfonsin's speech in LUIS AZNAR, AIFONSÍM: DISCURSOS SOBRE EL DISCURSO 21 (1986).
114. Samuel Fitch & Andres Fontana, Military Policy and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America, paper presented to the XII World Congress of Sociology, Madrid, July 1990, at 19. Both authors are specialists on the Argentine armed forces. 93. For a good presentation of the constitutional arguments, see MARCEIO SANCISEHI, DERECHOS HUMANOS EN LA ARGENTINA POST-DICTATORIAL (1988).
115. Samuel Fitch & Andres Fontana, Military Policy and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America, paper presented to the XII World Congress of Sociology, Madrid, July 1990, at 19. Both authors are specialists on the Argentine armed forces. 93. For a good presentation of the constitutional arguments, see MARCEIO SANCISEHI, DERECHOS HUMANOS EN LA ARGENTINA POST-DICTATORIAL (1988).
116. See Jaime Malamud-Goti & Ricardo Entelman, La "Ley de Punto Final": Respuesta al Profesor Julio Maier, 38 DOCTKINA PENAL 339 (1987). In this article, the authors defend presidentially-sponsored legislation (drafted by Malamud-Goti) aimed at sharply curtailing prosecutorial efforts. Their argument is that once democracy is firmly reestablished, theories of justice do not require more than a few exemplary prosecutions, against a small proportion of culpable officers.
117. This critique of the role of Alfonsín's philosophers is pressed most vigorously by SANCINETTI. suora note 93, at 149.
118. Id. The phrase means, "Enough with government by philosophers!"
119. See Owen P. Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55, 63 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993) (focusing specifically on the Argentine and Chilean judiciaries).
120. On the problematic nature of such compromise, see MARTIN BENJAMIN, SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE: COMPROMISE AND INTEGRITY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS (1990).
121. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalarianism, cited in RAINER C. BAUM, THE HOLOCAUST AND THE GERMAN ELITE: GENOCIDE AND NATIONAL SUICIDE IN GERMANY, 1871-1945, at 12 (1990).
122. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalarianism, cited in RAINER C. BAUM, THE HOLOCAUST AND THE GERMAN ELITE: GENOCIDE AND NATIONAL SUICIDE IN GERMANY, 1871-1945, at 12 (1990).
123. To understand the scientific causes of serious birth defects, for instance, is not to reject the desirability of redressing, through corrective surgery, the "natural" hardship they cause.
124. Suarez-Orozco, supra note 43, at 221.
125. Id. at 222.
126. Claude Lanzmann, quoted in TZVETAN TODOROV, FACING THE EXTREME: MORAL LIFE IN THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS 277 (1996); Claude Lanzmann, The Obscenity of Understanding: An Evening With Claude Lanzmann, 48 AM. IMAGO 473 (1991).
127. Claude Lanzmann, quoted in TZVETAN TODOROV, FACING THE EXTREME: MORAL LIFE IN THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS 277 (1996); Claude Lanzmann, The Obscenity of Understanding: An Evening With Claude Lanzmann, 48 AM. IMAGO 473 (1991).
128. Bruno Bettelheim, Their Speciality Was Murder, N.Y. TIMES, 5 Oct. 1986, at 62 (reviewing ROBERT J. LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS (1986)).
129. Bruno Bettelheim, Their Speciality Was Murder, N.Y. TIMES, 5 Oct. 1986, at 62 (reviewing ROBERT J. LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS (1986)).
130. Hence the title of the Honduran truth commission's report. COMISIONADO NACIONAL DE PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, Los HECHOS HABLAN FOR SI MISMOS (1994).
131. See HORACIO LYNCH & ENRIQUE DEL CARRILL, DEFINITIVAMENTE . . . NUNCA MAS: LA OTRA CARA DEL INFORME DE LA CONADEP (1985).
132. See OSIEL, supra note 9, at 71-90.
133. On this problem, see id. passim.
134. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1985).
135. MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 37 (1993).
136. For defenses of compatibilism, see ALFRED J. AVER, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 271 (1954); John V. Canfield, The Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism, 71 PHIL. REV. 352 (July 1962); R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 2-11, 96-103, 187-94 (1994).
137. For defenses of compatibilism, see ALFRED J. AVER, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 271 (1954); John V. Canfield, The Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism, 71 PHIL. REV. 352 (July 1962); R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 2-11, 96-103, 187-94 (1994).
138. For defenses of compatibilism, see ALFRED J. AVER, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 271 (1954); John V. Canfield, The Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism, 71 PHIL. REV. 352 (July 1962); R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 2-11, 96-103, 187-94 (1994).
139. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454-70 (1990) for a notable use of pragmatism in legal theory.