Socioeconomic transformation in Russia: Where is the rural elite?

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 237-

  Wegren, Stephen K ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CLASS; RURAL SOCIETY; SOCIAL CHANGE; SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS;

RUSSIAN FEDERATION;

EID: 0034097114     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668130050006781     Document Type: Review

References (173)

1. See T. I. Zaslavskaya, 'Stratifikatsiya sovremmenogo Rossiiskogo obshchestva', Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya: ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny (henceforth Monitoring), 1996, 1, pp. 7-15; N. M. Rimashevskaya (ed.), Rossiya 1997: sotsial'no-demograficheskaya situatsiya (Moscow, 1998), pp. 140-146; and Bertram Silverman & Muray Yanowitch, New Rich, New Poor, New Russia: Winners and Losers on the Russian Road to Capitalism (Armonk, NY, 1997), chapter 6.
2. See T. I. Zaslavskaya, 'Stratifikatsiya sovremmenogo Rossiiskogo obshchestva', Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya: ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny (henceforth Monitoring), 1996, 1, pp. 7-15; N. M. Rimashevskaya (ed.), Rossiya 1997: sotsial'no-demograficheskaya situatsiya (Moscow, 1998), pp. 140-146; and Bertram Silverman & Muray Yanowitch, New Rich, New Poor, New Russia: Winners and Losers on the Russian Road to Capitalism (Armonk, NY, 1997), chapter 6.
3. See T. I. Zaslavskaya, 'Stratifikatsiya sovremmenogo Rossiiskogo obshchestva', Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya: ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny (henceforth Monitoring), 1996, 1, pp. 7-15; N. M. Rimashevskaya (ed.), Rossiya 1997: sotsial'no-demograficheskaya situatsiya (Moscow, 1998), pp. 140-146; and Bertram Silverman & Muray Yanowitch, New Rich, New Poor, New Russia: Winners and Losers on the Russian Road to Capitalism (Armonk, NY, 1997), chapter 6.
4. See David Lane & Cameron Ross, 'Russian Political Elites, 1991-1995: Recruitment and Renewal', International Politics, 34, 1997, pp. 169-192; and T. H. Rigby, 'New Top Elites for Old in Russian Politics', British Journal of Political Science, 29, 1999, pp. 323-343.
5. See David Lane & Cameron Ross, 'Russian Political Elites, 1991-1995: Recruitment and Renewal', International Politics, 34, 1997, pp. 169-192; and T. H. Rigby, 'New Top Elites for Old in Russian Politics', British Journal of Political Science, 29, 1999, pp. 323-343.
6. L. Khakhulina & M. Tuchek, 'Imushchestvennoe rassloenie v perekhodnyi period', Monitoring, 1996, 3, pp. 19-23; and M. D. Krasil'nikova, 'Bogatye: 1% naseleniya', Monitoring, 1996, 3, pp. 29-33.
7. L. Khakhulina & M. Tuchek, 'Imushchestvennoe rassloenie v perekhodnyi period', Monitoring, 1996, 3, pp. 19-23; and M. D. Krasil'nikova, 'Bogatye: 1% naseleniya', Monitoring, 1996, 3, pp. 29-33.
8. The urban elite - pejoratively termed 'new Russians' by other Russians - are relatively few in number. The very richest, earning several million dollars a year, number only about 1000 persons. An estimated 60 000 Russians earn about $1 million a year. Another 800 000 Russians earn between $120 000 and $500 000 a year (John D. Varoli, 'There are More "New Poor" Than "New Russians"', Transition, 2, 20, 1996, p. 7). On the formation of the urban elite see Boris V. Golovachev, Larisa B. Kosova & Lyudmila A. Khakhulina, 'The Formation of the Ruling Elite in Russia', Sociological Research, 35, 6, 1996, pp. 38-54; and Igor V. Kukolev, 'The Formation of the Business Class', Sociological Research, 36, 1, 1997, pp. 23-43.
9. The urban elite - pejoratively termed 'new Russians' by other Russians - are relatively few in number. The very richest, earning several million dollars a year, number only about 1000 persons. An estimated 60 000 Russians earn about $1 million a year. Another 800 000 Russians earn between $120 000 and $500 000 a year (John D. Varoli, 'There are More "New Poor" Than "New Russians"', Transition, 2, 20, 1996, p. 7). On the formation of the urban elite see Boris V. Golovachev, Larisa B. Kosova & Lyudmila A. Khakhulina, 'The Formation of the Ruling Elite in Russia', Sociological Research, 35, 6, 1996, pp. 38-54; and Igor V. Kukolev, 'The Formation of the Business Class', Sociological Research, 36, 1, 1997, pp. 23-43.
10. The urban elite - pejoratively termed 'new Russians' by other Russians - are relatively few in number. The very richest, earning several million dollars a year, number only about 1000 persons. An estimated 60 000 Russians earn about $1 million a year. Another 800 000 Russians earn between $120 000 and $500 000 a year (John D. Varoli, 'There are More "New Poor" Than "New Russians"', Transition, 2, 20, 1996, p. 7). On the formation of the urban elite see Boris V. Golovachev, Larisa B. Kosova & Lyudmila A. Khakhulina, 'The Formation of the Ruling Elite in Russia', Sociological Research, 35, 6, 1996, pp. 38-54; and Igor V. Kukolev, 'The Formation of the Business Class', Sociological Research, 36, 1, 1997, pp. 23-43.
11. We should note, however, that the Russian middle class is a hybrid and not homogeneous, and most members of this class would be considered lower middle class in the United States. See Harley Balzer, 'Russia's Middle Classes', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14, 2, 1998, pp. 165-186. For a contrary view see E. Avraamova, 'K probleme formirovaniya srednego klassa v Rossii', Voprosy ekonomiki, 1998, 7, pp. 78-87.
12. We should note, however, that the Russian middle class is a hybrid and not homogeneous, and most members of this class would be considered lower middle class in the United States. See Harley Balzer, 'Russia's Middle Classes', Post-Soviet Affairs, 14, 2, 1998, pp. 165-186. For a contrary view see E. Avraamova, 'K probleme formirovaniya srednego klassa v Rossii', Voprosy ekonomiki, 1998, 7, pp. 78-87.
13. Gavin Kitching, 'The Development of Agrarian Capitalism in Russia 1991-1997: Some Observations from Fieldwork', The Journal of Peasant Studies, 25, 3, 1998, pp. 1-30.
14. On distinctions between formal and liberal democracies, see Larry Diamond, 'Is the Third Wave Over?', Journal of Democracy, 7, 3, 1996, pp. 20-37.
15. Linda J. Cook & Vladimir E. Gimpelson, 'Exit and Voice in Russian Managers' Privatisation Strategies', Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, 7, 4, 1995, pp. 465-483.
16. S. F. Nagel, cited in Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (New York, 1984), pp. 8-9.
17. In contrast to large agricultural enterprises and private farms, both of which have seen unprofitability rates increase dramatically since 1992, food processors as a group were profitable every year during 1992-97, before experiencing a net loss in 1998. See Rossiya v tsifrakh 1999 (Moscow, 1999), p. 196.
18. See the discussion on characteristics and types of classes by Max Weber in Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich (eds), Max Weber: Economy and Society, vol. 1 (Berkeley, 1978), pp. 302-307.
19. See for example, Richard Rose & Ellen Carnaghan, 'Generational Effects on Attitudes to Communist Regimes: A Comparative Analysis', Post-Soviet Affairs, 11, 1, 1995, pp. 28-56.
20. The same survey found that 8% of farm managers, and 50% of private farmers, had at least a secondary education. See R. V. Ryvkina & L. Ya. Kosals (eds), Sotsial'nye posledstviya rynochnykh reform v Rossii (Moscow, 1997), p. 229.
21. William C. Thiesenhusen, 'Introduction: Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin America', in William C. Thiesenhusen (ed.), Searching for Agrarian Reform in Latin America (Boston, 1989), p. 13.
22. A detailed description of the land and property distribution process may be found in Stephen K. Wegren, Agriculture and the State in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia (Pittsburgh, 1998), chapter 3.
23. The amount of land actually distributed free of charge to a farm family could not exceed the norm per person, but might be less than the norm, and there were reports of land allocations less than established norms, which put additional downward pressure on the size of private farms.
24. Rossiiskie vesti, 29 December 1992, p. 1.
25. Stephen K. Wegren, 'Building Market Institutions: Agricultural Commodity Exchanges in Post-Communist Russia', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 27, 3, 1994, pp. 195-224.
26. For these indices see Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1997 (Moscow, 1997), p. 494.
27. Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1994 (Moscow, 1994), p. 341.
28. A. Petrikov, 'Ekonomicheskaya politika v APK', Ekonomist, 1998, 7, p. 32.
29. Rossiya v tsifrakh 1999, p. 204.
30. These regions included the Northwestern (57%), Central (51%), Eastern Siberian (59%) and Far Eastern (52%). Petrikov, 'Ekonomichestaya politika v APK', p. 32.
31. Sel'skaya zhizn', 9 June 1998, p. 1. For an analysis of the barter economy in English see Clifford G. Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, 'Russia's Virtual Economy', Foreign Affairs, 77, 5, 1998, pp. 53-67.
32. Sel'skaya zhizn', 9 June 1998, p. 1. For an analysis of the barter economy in English see Clifford G. Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, 'Russia's Virtual Economy', Foreign Affairs, 77, 5, 1998, pp. 53-67.
33. We can see this especially in the animal husbandry sector, which has been most challenged by the open trade policy adopted during the post-Soviet period. During the first seven years of contemporary agrarian reform (1991-97), the number of cattle on large agricultural enterprises declined by 50% and the number of pigs fell by nearly 65%. During the first seven years of collectivisation (1928-34) the number of cattle decreased by 40% and the number of pigs by 33%.
34. The customs service, which has been under pressure from the government to increase annual custom receipts, has responded through a dual policy. Officially, the federal government determines the tariff rate. However, what the customs service has done is to declare increased percentages of imported food to be of sub-standard quality. For example, the percentage of many animal husbandry products considered to be of poor quality doubled between 1996 and 1997 (see Krest'yanskaya Rossiya, 6-12 April 1998, p. 2). If a customs officer rejects goods, a different tariff is then applied which allows the customs service to maximise revenue. On this latter point see Peter Davies, 'Customs Reform is Urgent in Russia', Transition: The Newsletter about Reforming Economies, 9, 4, 1998, p. 9.
35. The customs service, which has been under pressure from the government to increase annual custom receipts, has responded through a dual policy. Officially, the federal government determines the tariff rate. However, what the customs service has done is to declare increased percentages of imported food to be of sub-standard quality. For example, the percentage of many animal husbandry products considered to be of poor quality doubled between 1996 and 1997 (see Krest'yanskaya Rossiya, 6-12 April 1998, p. 2). If a customs officer rejects goods, a different tariff is then applied which allows the customs service to maximise revenue. On this latter point see Peter Davies, 'Customs Reform is Urgent in Russia', Transition: The Newsletter about Reforming Economies, 9, 4, 1998, p. 9.
36. For example, domestic poultry prices are estimated to exceed those of imported poultry by some 20-40% and thus imported poultry products are attractive because of their lower price.
37. Russian grain imports declined from 35 million tons in 1991 to 11 million in 1993, 3 million in 1994, 2.7 million in 1995 and 1.5 million in 1998. One main reason for the decline in grain imports has been the decrease in the number of livestock.
38. In addition, Russia in 1997 imported 18% of milk and milk products, 73% of sugar, 42% of vegetable oil and 37% of fish and fish products. V. Shcherbak, 'Po puti real'nykh preobrazovanii', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1998, 4, p. 7. meat import data from Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii: Yanvar' 1999 god (Moscow, 1999), p. 74.
39. In addition, Russia in 1997 imported 18% of milk and milk products, 73% of sugar, 42% of vegetable oil and 37% of fish and fish products. V. Shcherbak, 'Po puti real'nykh preobrazovanii', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1998, 4, p. 7. meat import data from Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii: Yanvar' 1999 god (Moscow, 1999), p. 74.
40. Poultry imports increased from 45, 000 tons in 1992 to 850, 000 tons in 1996. The USA is the largest supplier of poultry imports to Russia, accounting for about 75% of poultry imports. See Economic Research Service, 'NIS/B Farm Sector Continues Adjustment to Market Forces; U.S. Agricultural Exports to Region Post Recovery', Newly Independent States and the Baltics: Situation and Outlook Series, WRS-97-1 (Washington, DC, 1997), pp. 14-15.
41. For food consumption data see Sel'skaya zhizn', 10 January 1998, p. 3.
42. Ibid.
43. See G. Elistratov, 'Prodovol'stvennoe obespechenie Moskvy', Ekonomist, 1996, 12, pp. 76-79; and N. Popov, 'Mozhet li Rossiya sokhranit' natsional'nuyu prodovol'stvennuyu bezopasnost'?', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1997, 1, p. 8. In order to keep food prices low for urban consumers, tariff exemptions for imported food were granted for Russia's largest cities.
44. See G. Elistratov, 'Prodovol'stvennoe obespechenie Moskvy', Ekonomist, 1996, 12, pp. 76-79; and N. Popov, 'Mozhet li Rossiya sokhranit' natsional'nuyu prodovol'stvennuyu bezopasnost'?', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1997, 1, p. 8. In order to keep food prices low for urban consumers, tariff exemptions for imported food were granted for Russia's largest cities.
45. Tariffs on agricultural goods average 40% worldwide at present. 'World Trade: Fifty Years On', The Economist, 16 May 1998, p. 22. In March 1994 import duties were announced for food imports into Russia averaging 15% of the customs value for meat products, fish, butter, milk products, fresh fruits and vegetables, white sugar, grain and grain products. These import duties went into effect on 1 July 1994, and since then have been raised and lowered on an annual basis. In 1997 most products, such as vegetables, dairy products, confectioneries, red meats, processed fish, sausages and beverages faced tariffs of 10-20%. Rates on other products are somewhat higher, for example poultry (25-35%), cigarettes (30%), potatoes (25%) and ethyl alcohol (100%).
46. For example, large farms curtailed livestock herds from 47.2 million head of cattle in 1991 to 23.7 million during 1997. Meat production on large farms in 1997 was 40% of its 1992 level.
47. Rossiya v tsifrakh 1999, p. 196.
48. V. Zvolinsky, 'Obespechenie prodovol'stvennoi bezopasnosti Rossii', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1996, 1, pp. 21-27.
49. Sel'skaya zhizn', 10 January 1998, p. 3; for international comparisons, see A. Rutskoi & N. Radugin, 'Prodovol'stvennaya bezopasnost': zarubezhnyi opyt', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1997, 2, pp. 7-14.
50. Sel'skaya zhizn', 10 January 1998, p. 3; for international comparisons, see A. Rutskoi & N. Radugin, 'Prodovol'stvennaya bezopasnost': zarubezhnyi opyt', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1997, 2, pp. 7-14.
51. See S. Piliev, 'Ob obespechenii prodovol'stvennoi dostatochnosti naseleniya Rossii', Ekonomist, 1998, 7, p. 25.
52. This argument is explored in more detail in Stephen K. Wegren, 'State Withdrawal and the Impact of Marketization on Rural Russia', Policy Studies Journal, 28, 1, 2000.
53. Sel'skaya zhizn', 23 September 1997, p. 2.
54. Sel'skaya zhizn' (henceforth Sel. zh.), 6 December 1997, p. 1. Even so, the leasing funds, which commonly supplied mechanised services to farms, were also underfunded. The head of Rosagrosnab, N. Pavlov, revealed that in 1997 his organisation received just over one-third of the budgetary financing that had been allocated to it (Sel. zh., 20 June 1998, p. 2).
55. Sel'skaya zhizn' (henceforth Sel. zh.), 6 December 1997, p. 1. Even so, the leasing funds, which commonly supplied mechanised services to farms, were also underfunded. The head of Rosagrosnab, N. Pavlov, revealed that in 1997 his organisation received just over one-third of the budgetary financing that had been allocated to it (Sel. zh., 20 June 1998, p. 2).
56. Sel. zh., 18 April 1998, p. 1.
57. Krest'yanskaya Rossiya (henceforth Krest. Ross.), 9-15 March 1998, p. 3.
58. Krest. Ross., 16-22 February 1998, p. 2.
59. Krest. Ross., 11-17 May 1998, p. 2. Private farmers received less than 10% of subsidised credits, a total of 350 million pre-denominated rubles.
60. Economic Research Service, Transition Economies: Situation and Outlook Series, WRS-98-2 (Washington, DC, 1998), p. 19.
61. Shcherbak, 'Po puti real'nykh preobrazovanii', p. 8.
62. Industry also experienced a decline in federal investment, from 41% of all federal investment in 1992 to 36% in 1997. Investment in education and housing construction also contracted slightly. Other branches of the economy experienced an increase in the percentage of investment: construction, transport, communications and trade.
63. Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii 1996 g. (Moscow, 1997), p. 44.
64. A. V. Petrikov, 'Sotsial'nye problemy Rossiiskoi derevni', in A. V. Petrikov (ed.), Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye problemy agrarnogo sektora (Moscow, 1998), pp. 161-171, data cited on p. 165.
65. Henceforth the terms 'collective sector' and 'large agricultural enterprises' refer to former state and collective farms. Most of these previously state-owned farms have been privatised, which means land and property shares have been distributed to farm memberrs who now are the 'owners'. However, for the most part, these farms, while changing their legal status, have retained a collective form of labour organisation.
66. See for example, Don Van Atta (ed.), The Farmer Threat: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Post-Soviet Russia (Boulder, 1993), introduction and chapter 10. Relating to land ownership and a land market, see Karen Brooks et al., Agricultural Reform in Russia: A View From the Farm Level, World Bank Discussion Paper 327 (Washington, DC, 1996), p. 63.
67. See for example, Don Van Atta (ed.), The Farmer Threat: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Post-Soviet Russia (Boulder, 1993), introduction and chapter 10. Relating to land ownership and a land market, see Karen Brooks et al., Agricultural Reform in Russia: A View From the Farm Level, World Bank Discussion Paper 327 (Washington, DC, 1996), p. 63.
68. See David J. O'Brien, Valeri Patsiorkovski & Larry D. Dershem, 'Rural Responses to Land Reform in Russia: An Analysis of Household Land Use in Belgorod, Rostov, and Tver' Oblasts from 1991 to 1996', in Stephen K. Wegren (ed.), Land Reform in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (New York and London, 1998), at p. 48.
69. Kitching, 'The Development of Agrarian Capitalism in Russia 1991-1997: Some Observations from Fieldwork', pp. 1-30.
70. Sel. zh., 5 August 1997, p. 2.
71. Sel. zh., 26 August 1997, p. 2.
72. Interview, Ya. Uzun, Agrarian Institute, Moscow, 7 August 1997.
73. Rimashevskaya (ed.) Rossiya 1997: sotsial'no-demograficheskaya situatsiya, p. 232.
74. See O'Brien, Patsiorkovski & Dershem, 'Rural Responses to Land Reform in Russia', pp. 54-57. See also these authors' work in David J. O'Brien, Valeri V. Patsiorkovski, Larry D. Dershem & Oksana Lylova, 'Household Production and Symptoms of Stress in Post-Soviet Russian Villages', Rural Sociology, 61, 4, 1996, pp. 688-692; and David J. O'Brien, Valeri V. Patsiorkovski, Larry D. Dershem, Alessandro Bonanno & Charles Timberlake, Services and Quality of Life in Rural Villages in the Former Soviet Union: Data from 1991 and 1993 Surveys (Lanham, MD, 1998), especially chapter 6.
75. See O'Brien, Patsiorkovski & Dershem, 'Rural Responses to Land Reform in Russia', pp. 54-57. See also these authors' work in David J. O'Brien, Valeri V. Patsiorkovski, Larry D. Dershem & Oksana Lylova, 'Household Production and Symptoms of Stress in Post-Soviet Russian Villages', Rural Sociology, 61, 4, 1996, pp. 688-692; and David J. O'Brien, Valeri V. Patsiorkovski, Larry D. Dershem, Alessandro Bonanno & Charles Timberlake, Services and Quality of Life in Rural Villages in the Former Soviet Union: Data from 1991 and 1993 Surveys (Lanham, MD, 1998), especially chapter 6.
76. See O'Brien, Patsiorkovski & Dershem, 'Rural Responses to Land Reform in Russia', pp. 54-57. See also these authors' work in David J. O'Brien, Valeri V. Patsiorkovski, Larry D. Dershem & Oksana Lylova, 'Household Production and Symptoms of Stress in Post-Soviet Russian Villages', Rural Sociology, 61, 4, 1996, pp. 688-692; and David J. O'Brien, Valeri V. Patsiorkovski, Larry D. Dershem, Alessandro Bonanno & Charles Timberlake, Services and Quality of Life in Rural Villages in the Former Soviet Union: Data from 1991 and 1993 Surveys (Lanham, MD, 1998), especially chapter 6.
77. Rimashevskaya (ed.) Rossiya 1997: sotsial'no-demograficheskaya situatsiya, p. 231.
78. The villages were located in Rostov, Belgorod and Tver oblasti.
79. O'Brien, Patsiorkovski & Dershem, 'Rural Responses to Land Reform in Russia', pp. 47-48, 51.
80. O'Brien, Patsiorkovski, Dershem, Bonanno & Timberlake, Services and Quality of Life in Rural Villages in the Former Soviet Union, p. 98.
81. International Finance Corporation, Monitoring Russian Reorganized Farms: An Integrated Analysis of Economic and Social Change in Nizhniy Novgorod, Oryol and Other Oblasts, Results of 1997 Studies (Washington, DC, 1998), p. 9.
82. Ibid., p. 28.
83. Ibid., p. 31.
84. Sel. zh., 12 May 1998, p. 1.
85. Gavin Kitching, 'The Revenge of the Peasant? The Collapse of Large-Scale Russian Agriculture and the Role of the Peasant "Private Plot" in that Collapse, 1991-1997', The Journal of Peasant Studies, 26, 1, 1998, pp. 43-81.
86. Izvestiya, 25 July 1998, pp. 1-2.
87. M. P. Kozlov, 'Preprinimatel'skaya deyatel'nost' sel'skokhozyaistvennykh tovaroproizvoditelei v sovremennykh usloviyakh', Ekonomika sel'skokhozyaistvennykh i pererabatyvayushchikh predpriyatii, 1998, 2, p. 50. The second most common restraint was the deterioration of the material-technical base of the farm, cited by 89% of large farm enterprises. Many farming regions have de-mechanised owing to a lack of funds for fuels and spare parts or the inability to retain skilled operators. The third most commonly cited restraint on entrepreneurial activities in the survey was high taxes, cited by 86% of large farms. This view was confirmed in interviews with farm managers in Kostroma oblast'. One manager, whose name I cannot cite because tax avoidance is illegal, stated: 'if today we gave to the tax inspectorate real data about our production, tomorrow we would have to close. We simply do not have the means to pay all taxes' (Interview, 6 August 1998).
88. M. P. Kozlov, 'Preprinimatel'skaya deyatel'nost' sel'skokhozyaistvennykh tovaroproizvoditelei v sovremennykh usloviyakh', Ekonomika sel'skokhozyaistvennykh i pererabatyvayushchikh predpriyatii, 1998, 2, p. 50. The second most common restraint was the deterioration of the material-technical base of the farm, cited by 89% of large farm enterprises. Many farming regions have de-mechanised owing to a lack of funds for fuels and spare parts or the inability to retain skilled operators. The third most commonly cited restraint on entrepreneurial activities in the survey was high taxes, cited by 86% of large farms. This view was confirmed in interviews with farm managers in Kostroma oblast'. One manager, whose name I cannot cite because tax avoidance is illegal, stated: 'if today we gave to the tax inspectorate real data about our production, tomorrow we would have to close. We simply do not have the means to pay all taxes' (Interview, 6 August 1998).
89. Brooks et al., Agricultural Reform in Russia: A View From the Farm Level, Table 3.16 on p. 41 and Table 3.20 on p. 43; V. Ya. Uzun (ed.), Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii analiz rezul'tatov reorganizatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii (Moscow, 1999), p. 64.
90. Brooks et al., Agricultural Reform in Russia: A View From the Farm Level, Table 3.16 on p. 41 and Table 3.20 on p. 43; V. Ya. Uzun (ed.), Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii analiz rezul'tatov reorganizatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii (Moscow, 1999), p. 64.
91. Brooks et al., Agricultural Reform in Russia: A View From the Farm Level, Table 3.16 on p. 41 and Table 3.20 on p. 43; V. Ya. Uzun (ed.), Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii analiz rezul'tatov reorganizatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii (Moscow, 1999), p. 64.
92. Interview, 29 July 1998.
93. V. Brichko, 'APK i vneshnyaya torgovlya', Ekonomist, 1997, 3, p. 89.
94. Rossiya v tsifrakh 1999, p. 204.
95. Sel. zh., 10 January 1998, p. 3; 23 February 1999, p. 1. Acording to survey data from the Agrarian Institute in Moscow, 74% of farms which were privatised according to the Nizhny Novogord model of farm privatisation were unprofitable in 1998, while 85% of those farms that did not adopt the Nizhny model were unprofitable. Thus the macroeconomic environment affected all types of farms. See Uzun (ed.), Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii analiz rezul'tatov reorganizatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii, p. 60.
96. Sel. zh., 10 January 1998, p. 3; 23 February 1999, p. 1. Acording to survey data from the Agrarian Institute in Moscow, 74% of farms which were privatised according to the Nizhny Novogord model of farm privatisation were unprofitable in 1998, while 85% of those farms that did not adopt the Nizhny model were unprofitable. Thus the macroeconomic environment affected all types of farms. See Uzun (ed.), Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii analiz rezul'tatov reorganizatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii, p. 60.
97. Sel. zh., 10 January 1998, p. 3; 23 February 1999, p. 1. Acording to survey data from the Agrarian Institute in Moscow, 74% of farms which were privatised according to the Nizhny Novogord model of farm privatisation were unprofitable in 1998, while 85% of those farms that did not adopt the Nizhny model were unprofitable. Thus the macroeconomic environment affected all types of farms. See Uzun (ed.), Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii analiz rezul'tatov reorganizatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii, p. 60.
98. Rimashevskaya (ed.), Rossiya 1997: sotsial'no-demograficheskaya situatsiya, pp. 234-235; M. Brytkov, 'Khozyaistva naseleniya: problemy i tendenstii razvitiya', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1998, 9, pp. 50-53.
99. Rimashevskaya (ed.), Rossiya 1997: sotsial'no-demograficheskaya situatsiya, pp. 234-235; M. Brytkov, 'Khozyaistva naseleniya: problemy i tendenstii razvitiya', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1998, 9, pp. 50-53.
100. Uzun (ed.), Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii analiz rezul'tatov reorganizatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii, pp. 41-45.
101. See Alfred B Evans, Jr., 'The Decline of Rural Living Standards in Russia in the 1990s', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 293-314; 'Sotsial'noe razvitie sela: problemy i tendentsii (ekonomikcheskii obzor)', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1998, 2, pp. 21-32; and Rimashevskaya (ed.), Rossiya 1997: sotsial'no-demograficheskaya situatsiya, pp. 241-254.
102. See Alfred B Evans, Jr., 'The Decline of Rural Living Standards in Russia in the 1990s', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 293-314; 'Sotsial'noe razvitie sela: problemy i tendentsii (ekonomikcheskii obzor)', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1998, 2, pp. 21-32; and Rimashevskaya (ed.), Rossiya 1997: sotsial'no-demograficheskaya situatsiya, pp. 241-254.
103. See Alfred B Evans, Jr., 'The Decline of Rural Living Standards in Russia in the 1990s', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 12, 3, 1996, pp. 293-314; 'Sotsial'noe razvitie sela: problemy i tendentsii (ekonomikcheskii obzor)', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1998, 2, pp. 21-32; and Rimashevskaya (ed.), Rossiya 1997: sotsial'no-demograficheskaya situatsiya, pp. 241-254.
104. Uzun (ed.), Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii analiz rezul'tatov reorganizatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii, p. 31.
105. V. Ya. Uzun (ed.), Reformirovanie sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii: Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii analiz (1994-1997) (Moscow, 1998), p. 31.
106. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
107. V. Ya. Uzun (ed.), Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie posledstviya privatizatsii zemli i reorganizatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii (1994-1996 gg.) (Moscow, 1997), p. 88.
108. Kostroma oblast' is located in the northeastern part of the Central Region, and therefore falls within the non-black earth zone of Russia. The oblast' has a fairly significant climatic gradient between its northern and southern raiony which affects the growing season. The oblast' is not a particularly good agricultural region, but as a whole it is generally representative of other non-black earth oblasti, particularly in the Central Economic Region. Kostroma's agricultural production has done well in some respects and less than average in others. Yields in Kostroma are above average in the Central Region for potatoes, vegetables and eggs but below average for grains, flax, milk and wool. On the other hand, Kostroma oblast' has consistently produced less meat than the other Central Region oblasti.
109. Kostroma oblast' is located in the northeastern part of the Central Region, and therefore falls within the non-black earth zone of Russia. The oblast' has a fairly significant climatic gradient between its northern and southern raiony which affects the growing season. The oblast' is not a particularly good agricultural region, but as a whole it is generally representative of other non-black earth oblasti, particularly in the Central Economic Region. Kostroma's agricultural production has done well in some respects and less than average in others. Yields in Kostroma are above average in the Central Region for potatoes, vegetables and eggs but below average for grains, flax, milk and wool. On the other hand, Kostroma oblast' has consistently produced less meat than the other Central Region oblasti.
110. Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Kostromskoi oblasti (Kostroma, 1998), p. 181. The oblast' has experienced a net decline in its population during the 1990s, despite positive flows of net migration, due to the fact that death rates exceed birth rates, and even migrational inflows cannot compensate. This trend is evident in many Russian regions, particularly in central and northern Russia.
111. Finansovo-khozyaistvennaya deyatel'nost' sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii Kostromskoi oblasti v 1997 gody (Kostroma, 1998), p. 13.
112. Of the 22 farms in Kostromskoi raion, six were profitable, or 27%. Only one other raion had more than one profitable farm, and that was Krasnosel'sky raion, located to the southeast. It is a raion that is also adjacent to Kostromskoi raion and the city of Kostroma. Of the 18 farms located in Krasnosel'sky raion, four were profitable, or 22% (ibid).
113. The population of Kostroma oblast' numbered 798 000 at the beginning of 1998, divided into 24 raiony. More than 66% of the population is urban, with over 289 400 of the 522 300 urban residents living in the city of Kostroma. Outside of the city of Kostroma the urban population is scattered, as in 1997 only six cities had urban populations exceeding 18 000, and only five of those were larger than 20 000. Thus the distribution of the population is very unbalanced. Chislennost' naseleniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 1 Yanvarya 1998 g (Moscow, 1998), pp. 140-141.
114. Severnaya pravda, 18 February 1999, p. 4. Private farmers accounted for the remaining 1%.
115. I have chosen 1994 as the starting data point because in that year the Russian government initiated a tight monetary policy to reduce inflation and stablise the ruble.
116. The data are 'official' statistics and therefore subject to the same shortcomings as all Russian data, namely, possible under-reporting of farm income and profitability in order to lessen the tax burden.
117. A. V. Kazakova & E. I. Telyatnikova, 'O sostoyanii promyshlennoi pererabotki moloka v Moskovskoi oblasti', Ekonomika sel'skokhozyaistvennykh i pererabatyvayushchikh predpriyatii, 1998, 8, pp. 18-19.
118. Uzun (ed.), Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii analiz rezul'tatov reorganizatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii, pp. 61, 65; and Zemfira I. Kalugina, 'Survival Strategies of Enterprises and Families in the Contemporary Russian Countryside', paper presented at Kennan Insitute Rural Workshop II, Washington, DC, 4-6 May 1999.
119. Uzun (ed.), Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii analiz rezul'tatov reorganizatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii, pp. 61, 65; and Zemfira I. Kalugina, 'Survival Strategies of Enterprises and Families in the Contemporary Russian Countryside', paper presented at Kennan Insitute Rural Workshop II, Washington, DC, 4-6 May 1999.
120. IFC, Monitoring Russian Reorganized Farms, p. 30.
121. Ibid., p. 31.
122. Some 73% of farms surveyed by the IFC study were unprofitable, including both privatised and non-privatised farms.
123. Sel. zh., 25 April 1998, p. 1.
124. Ryvkina & Kosals (eds), Sotsial'nye posledstviya rynochnykh reform v Rossii, p. 232.
125. Sel. zh., 26 July 1997, p. 2.
126. See S. M. Yagutkin, 'Osobennosti realizatsii mekhanizma bankrotstv sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii', Ekonomika sel'skokhozyaistvennykh i pererabatyvayushchikh predpriyatii, 1998, 5, pp. 46-47; and M. D. El'diev, I. B. Maslova & M. L. Lishansky, 'Protsedury bankrotstva i osobennosti ikh primeneniya v agrarnoi sfere', Ekonomika sel'skokhozyaistvennykh i pererabatyvayushchikh predpriyatii, 1998, 7, pp. 30-35.
127. See S. M. Yagutkin, 'Osobennosti realizatsii mekhanizma bankrotstv sel'skokhozyaistvennykh predpriyatii', Ekonomika sel'skokhozyaistvennykh i pererabatyvayushchikh predpriyatii, 1998, 5, pp. 46-47; and M. D. El'diev, I. B. Maslova & M. L. Lishansky, 'Protsedury bankrotstva i osobennosti ikh primeneniya v agrarnoi sfere', Ekonomika sel'skokhozyaistvennykh i pererabatyvayushchikh predpriyatii, 1998, 7, pp. 30-35.
128. See Sel. zh., 30 April 1998, p. 2.
129. Severnaya pravda, 14 July 1998, p. 3.
130. Interview, V. Lapshin, 3 August 1998.
131. Severnaya pravda, 31 March 1998, p. 4.
132. Economic Research Service, Transition Economies: International Agriculture and Trade, p. 22.
133. Interviews, N. Egorov, 31 July 1998; and G. Kosopanov, 29 July 1998, respectively.
134. See Van Atta (ed.), The Farmer Threat, on the first point; and on the second point see Roy L. Prosterman, Robert G. Mitchell & Bradley J. Rorem, Prospects for Peasant Farming in Russia, RDI Reports on Foreign Aid and Development no. 92 (Seattle, 1997).
135. See Van Atta (ed.), The Farmer Threat, on the first point; and on the second point see Roy L. Prosterman, Robert G. Mitchell & Bradley J. Rorem, Prospects for Peasant Farming in Russia, RDI Reports on Foreign Aid and Development no. 92 (Seattle, 1997).
136. A survey by the Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research in July 1998 asked people of different age groups, education levels and social status in which stratum (or class) (sloi) they would place private farmers. Between 50% and 59% of respondents, across age, education and social status, perceived farmers to be members of the middle class. Another 15-26% perceived farmers to be in the lower class. In general, older respondents with lower education and lower social status think farmers are in the upper class, but this response was generally 10% or less across the different sociological characteristics. See Monitoring, 1998, 5, p. 83.
137. Collective or state farm members were able to obtain land directly from the parent farm free of charge during farm reorganisation (1992-94), while urban dwellers who wished to undertake private farming received land from a raion land fund. Prior to December 1993 urbanites received land free, but after that date they had to purchase the land. Farm members wishing to withdraw from a parent farm continue to be able to obtain land free of charge, but once farm reorganisation was completed this land was allotted from land funds, not from the farm itself.
138. Karen Brooks & Zvi Lerman, Land Reform and Farm Restructuring in Russia, World Bank Discussion Paper 233 (Washington, DC, 1994), p. 48.
139. Each member of the farm family, upon exit, was granted an equal land share. See Brooks et al., Agricultural Reform in Russia, p. 62.
140. Prosterman, Mitchell & Rorem, Prospects for Peasant Farming in Russia, p. 7.
141. Brooks & Lerman, Land Reform and Farm Restructuring in Russia, p. 56.
142. See Gennadii Sazonov, 'Pochemu Vologda protiv Saratova', Rossiiskaya Federatsiva segodnya, 1998, 6, pp. 44-46.
143. Krest'yanskie (fermerskie) khozyaistva Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 1 Yanvarya 1998 goda (Moscow, 1998), p. 2.
144. Ibid.
145. The World Bank found in a 1994 survey that these large farms often included 10-15 families, or in a few cases as many as 90 families. Brooks et al., Agricultural Reform in Russia: A View From the Farm Level, p. 61; M. Brytkov, 'Obosnovanie proizvodstvennykh tipov krest'yanskikh (fermerskikh) khozyaistv', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1999, 5, pp. 51-52.
146. The World Bank found in a 1994 survey that these large farms often included 10-15 families, or in a few cases as many as 90 families. Brooks et al., Agricultural Reform in Russia: A View From the Farm Level, p. 61; M. Brytkov, 'Obosnovanie proizvodstvennykh tipov krest'yanskikh (fermerskikh) khozyaistv', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1999, 5, pp. 51-52.
147. Ibid., p. 51; E. Kharebov & V. Kudryashov, 'Faktory effektivnogo zemlepol'zovaniya v krest'yanskikh khozyaistvakh', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1999, 2, p. 60.
148. Ibid., p. 51; E. Kharebov & V. Kudryashov, 'Faktory effektivnogo zemlepol'zovaniya v krest'yanskikh khozyaistvakh', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1999, 2, p. 60.
149. Krest. Ross., 15-21 March 1999, p. 3.
150. Calculated from unpubished data obtained from Kostroma Goskomstat and Kostroma Committee on Land Resources and Land Tenure.
151. Rossiya v tsfrikh 1999, p. 203.
152. Ibid., p. 204.
153. For example, on 1 January 1994 private farmers had over 619 000 head of cattle and 346 500 pigs. By 1 January 1998 those numbers had declined to 500 000 head of cattle and 300 000 pigs. Itogi khozyaistvennoi deyatel'nosti krest'yanskikh (fermerskikh) khozyaistv Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1994 godu (Moscow, 1995), p. 10; and Rossiya v tsifrakh 1998 (Moscow, 1998), p. 226.
154. For example, on 1 January 1994 private farmers had over 619 000 head of cattle and 346 500 pigs. By 1 January 1998 those numbers had declined to 500 000 head of cattle and 300 000 pigs. Itogi khozyaistvennoi deyatel'nosti krest'yanskikh (fermerskikh) khozyaistv Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1994 godu (Moscow, 1995), p. 10; and Rossiya v tsifrakh 1998 (Moscow, 1998), p. 226.
155. Sel. zh., 30 October 1997, p. 3.
156. Sel'skoe khozyaistvo v Rossii 1998 (Moscow, 1998), pp. 316, 318.
157. Ibid., p. 68.
158. Brytkov, 'Obosnovanie proizvodstvennykh tipov krest'yanskikh (fermerskikh) khozyaistv', p. 49.
159. See, for example, I. Nagibina, 'Stanovlenie fermerstva v Tverskoi oblasti', APK: ekonomika, upravlenie, 1999, 5, pp. 57-58.
160. Kharebov & Kudryashov, 'Faktory effektivnogo zemlepol'zovaniya v krest'yanskikh khozyaistvakh', pp. 61-62.
161. Brytkov, 'Obosnovanie proizvodstvennykh tipov krest'yanskikh (fermerskikh) khozyaistv', p. 49.
162. Proizyodstvo produktov zhivotnovodstva v Rossiiskoi Federatsii za 1996 god (Moscow, 1997), pp. 80, 89.
163. Financial data for private farms ceased to be published after 1993, but for financial data by region for 1992 see Gruppirovka krest'yanskikh (fermerskikh) khozyaistv po vremeni ikh sozdaniya (po dannym obsledovaniya na 1 Yanvarya 1993 goda (Moscow, 1993), pp. 8, 165-173.
164. Sel. zh., 28 May 1998, p. 3.
165. Severnaya pravda, 30 June 1998, p. 3.
166. Krest. Ross., 15-21 March 1999, p. 3. In 1999 state allocations to private farmers were 70 million denominated rubles, meaning that the downward trend in state support continued. Krest. Ross., 31 May-6 June 1999, p. 2.
167. Krest. Ross., 15-21 March 1999, p. 3. In 1999 state allocations to private farmers were 70 million denominated rubles, meaning that the downward trend in state support continued. Krest. Ross., 31 May-6 June 1999, p. 2.
168. See Sel. zh., 10 November 1998, p. 2, on the difficulties private farmers have obtaining bank loans.
169. Interview, 14 August 1998.
170. Interview, N. Ivanovich, 28 July 1998.
171. See Frank A. Durgin, 'Russia's Private Farm Movement: Background and Perspectives', Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 21, 2-3, 1994, p. 229.
172. Stephen K. Wegren, 'Rural Politics and Agrarian Reform in Russia', Problems of Post-Communism, 43, 1, 1996, pp. 23-34.
173. See Stephen K. Wegren, 'The Politics of Private Farming in Russia', The Journal of Peasant Studies, 24, 4, 1996, pp. 106-140.