Credible commitment and success with public enterprise reform

World Development

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 221-243

  Campos, Jose Edgardo ^a   Esfahani, Hadi Salehi ^b  

^a Asian Development Bank   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Commitment; Economic reform; Institutions; Political economy; Public enterprise

Indexed keywords

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM; POLITICAL ECONOMY; REFORM PROCESS;

EID: 0034058684     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0305-750X(99)00128-X     Document Type: Article

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