Knights, not pawns: Ethno-nationalism and regional dynamics in post-colonial Balochistan

International Journal of Middle East Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 47-69

  Titus, Paul ^a   Swidler, Nina ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY   (New Zealand)

^b FORDHAM UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ETHNIC CONFLICT; NATIONALISM; POST-COLONIALISM;

PAKISTAN;

EID: 0034058074     PISSN: 00207438     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020743800021048     Document Type: Article

References (128)

1. Stephen Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India's North-West Frontier Province (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1988), 234-40.
2. See, for example, Wayne Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967); idem, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger, 1980); Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
3. See, for example, Wayne Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967); idem, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger, 1980); Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
4. See, for example, Wayne Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967); idem, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger, 1980); Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
5. See, for example, Wayne Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Khalid Bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967); idem, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger, 1980); Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
6. Khurshid Hasan, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations," Asian Survey 11, no. 7 (1962): 15, and S. M. M. Qureshi, "Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan," Pacific Affairs 39, 1-2 (1966): 99-114.
7. Khurshid Hasan, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations," Asian Survey 11, no. 7 (1962): 15, and S. M. M. Qureshi, "Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan," Pacific Affairs 39, 1-2 (1966): 99-114.
8. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), 426-27, 486.
9. The core of Kalat State consisted of the provinces of Sarawan, Jhalawan, and Kachhi. The coastal areas of Las Bela and Makran as well as the western area of Kharan had been largely independent prior to the expansion of Kalat in the mid-18th century and became so again with the weakening of Kalat's power during the unrest of the mid-19th century: see Baluchistan (Pakistan), Baluchistan District Gazetteer, Kharan (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1986), 33-35 (originally published in 1906), and Baluchistan (Pakistan), Baluchistan District Gazetteer, Makran (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1986), 26 (originally published in 1906).
10. The core of Kalat State consisted of the provinces of Sarawan, Jhalawan, and Kachhi. The coastal areas of Las Bela and Makran as well as the western area of Kharan had been largely independent prior to the expansion of Kalat in the mid-18th century and became so again with the weakening of Kalat's power during the unrest of the mid-19th century: see Baluchistan (Pakistan), Baluchistan District Gazetteer, Kharan (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1986), 33-35 (originally published in 1906), and Baluchistan (Pakistan), Baluchistan District Gazetteer, Makran (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1986), 26 (originally published in 1906).
11. Inayataullah Baloch, The Problem of "Greater Baluchistan": A Study of Baluch Nationalism (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987), 159.
12. Malik Muhammad Saeed Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan (Quetta: Third World Publications, 1994), 310. The Kalat State National Party was founded in 1937, but opposition from tribal leaders led the khan to ban it in 1939. After the war, the party revived and was for a time affiliated with the Congress-backed All India States Peoples Conference: see Baloch, The Problem of "Greater Baluchistan," 15-57, and Commissioner Quetta Division, file 275-S/45.
13. Malik Muhammad Saeed Dehwar, Contemporary History of Balochistan (Quetta: Third World Publications, 1994), 310. The Kalat State National Party was founded in 1937, but opposition from tribal leaders led the khan to ban it in 1939. After the war, the party revived and was for a time affiliated with the Congress-backed All India States Peoples Conference: see Baloch, The Problem of "Greater Baluchistan," 15-57, and Commissioner Quetta Division, file 275-S/45.
14. Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia (London: Routledge, 1998), 211-14; Seyyed V. R. Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama⊂at Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 117.
15. Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia (London: Routledge, 1998), 211-14; Seyyed V. R. Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama⊂at Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 117.
16. Those dynamics are in turn part of broader regional dynamics, such as those created by Pakistan's dispute with India over Kashmir, as well as Cold War politics involving the Soviet Union and the West. These are, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
17. Riccardo Redaelli, The Father's Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India (Florence: Manent, 1997), 122-32.
18. Ibid., 143-46. During a 1995 visit to the home of the veteran nationalist Malik Faiz Muhammad Yusafzai in Pringabad, Titus saw copies of letters from the khan of Kalat to Malik Faiz Muhammad, Abdul Karim Khwajakhel (usually known as Abdul Karim Shorish), Gul Khan Nasir, and others forbidding them to enter Kalat State because of their political activities.
19. See Commissioner Quetta Division, file 309-5/46.
20. In 1942, the Political Branch reported that Prince Abdul Karim was instrumental in the khan's efforts to increase Kalat's store of arms. See Redaelli, The Father's Bow, 172.
21. Like Gul Khan Nasir, Muhammada Hussain Unka was an activist poet. For the backgrounds of both men and extracts of their poetry, see Carina Jahani, "Poetry and Politics: Nationalism and Language Standardization in the Balochi Literary Movement," in Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan, ed. Paul Titus (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 105-37.
22. Agent to the Governor-General's Fortnightly Reports, file 1-S/48.
23. Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), 26;
24. Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992), 120.
25. Other charges leveled against the KSNP were that it was an ally of the Indian National Congress, that it had created "bad feelings" among the khan and the sardārs, and that its members were "poorly educated," of "doubtful character," and thus manipulated by party leaders for their "selfish ends": Commissioner Quetta Division, file 267-S/48.
26. Special Branch of the Baluchistan Secretariat, file 932-S/55.
27. See Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan (Folkestone, U.K.: Dawson, 1979), 115-17; Charles Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 47; Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, 33-36; and Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 101.
28. See Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan (Folkestone, U.K.: Dawson, 1979), 115-17; Charles Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 47; Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, 33-36; and Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 101.
29. See Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan (Folkestone, U.K.: Dawson, 1979), 115-17; Charles Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 47; Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, 33-36; and Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 101.
30. See Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan (Folkestone, U.K.: Dawson, 1979), 115-17; Charles Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 47; Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, 33-36; and Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 101.
31. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1-S/49; Baluchistan Secretariat (Secret Branch, file 351-5/50.
32. Hamza Alavi, "Class and State," in Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, ed. H. Gardezi and J. Rashid (London: Zed Press, 1983), 81; Yunas Samad, A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958 (New Delhi: Sage, 1995), 194.
33. Hamza Alavi, "Class and State," in Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, ed. H. Gardezi and J. Rashid (London: Zed Press, 1983), 81; Yunas Samad, A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958 (New Delhi: Sage, 1995), 194.
34. See Commissioner Quetta Division, file 10-5/53(3), and Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 200. Wilcox asserts that the center used a combination of carrots and sticks to induce the khan to agree to the consolidation, which entailed the virtual elimination of Kalat as a political entity. The biggest carrot was an increase in his annual allowance from 425,000 rupees to 650,000 rupees (Wilcox, Pakistan, 186-87).
35. See Commissioner Quetta Division, file 10-5/53(3), and Jalal, State of Martial Rule, 200. Wilcox asserts that the center used a combination of carrots and sticks to induce the khan to agree to the consolidation, which entailed the virtual elimination of Kalat as a political entity. The biggest carrot was an increase in his annual allowance from 425,000 rupees to 650,000 rupees (Wilcox, Pakistan, 186-87).
36. The other parties in the PNP were the Wror-i-Pushtun, the Sindhi Awami Mahaz, the Azad Party, the Sind Hari Committee, and the Khudai Khidmatgar.
37. Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958 (Islamabad: Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), 216-19; and Y. V. Gankovsky and L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan 1947-58 (Lahore: People's Publishing House, n.d.), 268, 292.
38. Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958 (Islamabad: Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), 216-19; and Y. V. Gankovsky and L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan 1947-58 (Lahore: People's Publishing House, n.d.), 268, 292.
39. Though he was later to affiliate with the NAP, Akbar Bugti appears to have been initially more closely affiliated with the Republican Party, a splinter from the Muslim League, which took an ambiguous position toward One Unit. With Republican Party support, he was briefly minister of the interior in the central government when Firoz Khan Noon attempted to salvage his government by expanding his cabinet a month prior to the military coup in October, 1958: see Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1-S/58.
40. Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, 261.
41. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1-S/58.
42. There are, not surprisingly, radically different versions of the khan's actions prior to the coup. Jalal, for example, repeats the army's contention that the khan seceded from Pakistan in response to the army building bases in Balochistan, while the khan emphatically denies this: see Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, 274; Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan: A Political Biography of His Highness Baiglar Baigi Khan-e-Azam XII (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975), 182. Wilcox (Pakistan, 206-7) appears to agree with the khan.
43. There are, not surprisingly, radically different versions of the khan's actions prior to the coup. Jalal, for example, repeats the army's contention that the khan seceded from Pakistan in response to the army building bases in Balochistan, while the khan emphatically denies this: see Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, 274; Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan: A Political Biography of His Highness Baiglar Baigi Khan-e-Azam XII (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1975), 182. Wilcox (Pakistan, 206-7) appears to agree with the khan.
44. Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969 (Islamabad: National Institute of Cultural Research, 1987), 11.
45. The legend of Nauroz Khan holds that he was arrested when Pakistani military officers broke an oath they swore on the Qur⊃an that he would receive amnesty and safe conduct following cease-fire negotiations. Among those hanged was Nauroz Khan's son. The government tried the rebels in military court because there was no provision for the death penalty in Kalat law. A report on the incident cited a number of sardārs in Jhalawan and the khan's wife as accessories to the rebellion for providing weapons or supplies to the rebels. Several of them were tried by jirga: see Commissioner Quetta Division, confidential report 90 ML/29A.
46. The Achakzai tribe occupies the strategic lands on both sides of the border around Chaman. Abdul Samad Khan was born in 1907 in the town of Gulistan in British Balochistan, though his subsection of the tribe, the Barkhordar Kahol Hamidzais, was more influential in Afghanistan. We are indebted to Aziz Luni (personal communication, 14 June 1999) for details on the life of Abdul Samad Khan.
47. See Commissioner Quetta Division, file 309-5/46; Commissioner Quetta Division, file 315-3/46; and Commissioner Quetta Division, file 275-S/45.
48. These are the words of Abdur Rehim Mandokhel, senator in the Pakistan assembly and member of the Pushtunkwa Milli Awami Party, successor to the Pushtunkwa National Awami Party founded by Samad Khan. See also Kalimullah Bareach, "Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai: Hero of the Pushtoonkhwa," The News (2 December 1995), and Ali Jan, "Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai - A Victim of Dissent," The News (3 December 1995).
49. These are the words of Abdur Rehim Mandokhel, senator in the Pakistan assembly and member of the Pushtunkwa Milli Awami Party, successor to the Pushtunkwa National Awami Party founded by Samad Khan. See also Kalimullah Bareach, "Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai: Hero of the Pushtoonkhwa," The News (2 December 1995), and Ali Jan, "Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai - A Victim of Dissent," The News (3 December 1995).
50. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1 -S/49.
51. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1 -S/58.
52. In some Afghan versions, Pushtunistan would include all of Balochistan; in others, it would include only the northerly Pushtun majority districts.
53. Kulwant Kaur, Pak-Afghan Relations (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1985), 45-46.
54. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1-S/61.
55. See, for example, the statement of Liaqat Ali Khan in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 7 October 1950, printed in Saeeduddin Ahmad Dar, Selected Documents on Pakistan's Relations with Afghanistan 1947-1985 (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1986), 31.
56. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 22/51 PhS.
57. Kaur, Pak-Afghan Relations, 86; Dupree, Afghanistan, 538.
58. Kaur, Pak-Afghan Relations, 86; Dupree, Afghanistan, 538.
59. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 819-S/53-66.
60. Special Branch of the Baluchistan Secretariat, file 932-S/55. The maulvi is sometimes referred to as Maulvi Ghulam Haidar Tajik.
61. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1-S/68.
62. Ibid., files 1-S/65 and 1-S/68.
63. Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971), 15.
64. Jalal, The State of Martial Law, 302-3.
65. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1-S/62.
66. Swidler interviewed Nawab Ghaws Bakhsh Raisani in Mehrgar in January 1965.
67. Ahmad Nawaz Bugti is the brother of Akbar Khan, the Bugti nawab who was not permitted to run for office because he had been convicted of murdering his uncle. Ahmad Nawaz was elected to the provincial (West Pakistan) assembly, while Mengal and Marri were elected to the national assembly. For an analysis of the standing of the sardārs of the Marri, Bugti, and Mengal tribes in the tribal and national spheres, see Paul Titus, "Political Alignment of Baluchi Sardars in Relation to the Government of Pakistan," Newsletter of Baluchistan Studies (1990), 59-67.
68. The government replaced the sardār with collateral relatives. Akbar Bugti's son, Saleem, became the Bugti sardār after his father was imprisoned for murdering the man who was given his sardārī.
69. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 30. Ahmad (Balochistan, 175-76) cites Harrison and the Pakistani journal Outlook for his discussion of the guerrilla movement in the 1960s. Some references to the government operations against the guerrillas in the Mengal area are in Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1065/S-64.
70. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 30. Ahmad (Balochistan, 175-76) cites Harrison and the Pakistani journal Outlook for his discussion of the guerrilla movement in the 1960s. Some references to the government operations against the guerrillas in the Mengal area are in Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1065/S-64.
71. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 33.
72. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1-S/65.
73. Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969, 110.
74. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 143-44, 193. This ideological split between the West Pakistan and East Pakistan branches of the NAP had been present since the party's inception: Samad, A Nation in Turmoil, 194.
75. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 143-44, 193. This ideological split between the West Pakistan and East Pakistan branches of the NAP had been present since the party's inception: Samad, A Nation in Turmoil, 194.
76. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1-S/68.
77. Ibid., file 1160-S/68.
78. Ayub's economic policies alienated another key group, villagers in the unirrigated Potawar plateau region who supply the bulk of army recruits: Clive Dewey, "The Rural Roots of Pakistani Militarism," in The Political Inheritance of Pakistan, ed. D. A. Low (London: Macmillian, 1991), 255-83.
79. Kaur, Pak-Afghan Relations, 109-11; Dupree, Afghanistan, 539.
80. Kaur, Pak-Afghan Relations, 109-11; Dupree, Afghanistan, 539.
81. Dupree, Afghanistan, 553; Marvin Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 3.
82. Dupree, Afghanistan, 553; Marvin Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 3.
83. Fred Scholz, "Tribal Structures and Religious Tolerance: Hindus in Pakistani Baluchistan," in Marginality and Modernity, 193-222.
84. Dar, Selected Documents, 72-73.
85. Dupree, Afghanistan, 553.
86. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1-S/64.
87. Pushtunkwa is Pushtu for Pushtunistan. The Pushtunkwa NAP was formed in July 1970.
88. For a discussion of the JUI, see Paul Titus, "Islam and Identity Politics in Pakistan: The Case of the Jami⊂at Ulama-i-Islam," in Beyond Conflict: Re-Visioning Politics and Religion in South Asia, ed. William Sax (forthcoming).
89. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1-S/1971.
90. Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986), 213.
91. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1-S/1972/77.
92. Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1974), 13-14.
93. Ibid., 41-43. Rushbrook Williams repeats many of the charges made in the government's white paper, often quoting it directly without acknowledgment. Compare, for example, the first paragraph of Pakistan (1974:44) with the first paragraph of Williams (1975:72), or the first paragraph of Pakistan (1974:13) with the last paragraph of Williams (1975:85). Williams expands upon the theme of separatism, contending that the NAP, along with the Afghan government, sought Soviet support to establish a "land corridor of weak states affording access to the Arabian Sea": L. F. Rushbrook Williams, Pakistan under Challenge (London: Stacey International, 1975), 63.
94. Ibid., 41-43. Rushbrook Williams repeats many of the charges made in the government's white paper, often quoting it directly without acknowledgment. Compare, for example, the first paragraph of Pakistan (1974:44) with the first paragraph of Williams (1975:72), or the first paragraph of Pakistan (1974:13) with the last paragraph of Williams (1975:85). Williams expands upon the theme of separatism, contending that the NAP, along with the Afghan government, sought Soviet support to establish a "land corridor of weak states affording access to the Arabian Sea": L. F. Rushbrook Williams, Pakistan under Challenge (London: Stacey International, 1975), 63.
95. See Shahid Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 96; A. B. Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Process (London: New Century, 1985), 267, 274; Robert Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pushtun (London: Minority Rights Group, 1987), 11; Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, 115-17; Rizvi, The Military and Politics, 213; Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 34-35.
96. See Shahid Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 96; A. B. Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Process (London: New Century, 1985), 267, 274; Robert Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pushtun (London: Minority Rights Group, 1987), 11; Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, 115-17; Rizvi, The Military and Politics, 213; Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 34-35.
97. See Shahid Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 96; A. B. Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Process (London: New Century, 1985), 267, 274; Robert Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pushtun (London: Minority Rights Group, 1987), 11; Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, 115-17; Rizvi, The Military and Politics, 213; Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 34-35.
98. See Shahid Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 96; A. B. Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Process (London: New Century, 1985), 267, 274; Robert Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pushtun (London: Minority Rights Group, 1987), 11; Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, 115-17; Rizvi, The Military and Politics, 213; Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 34-35.
99. See Shahid Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 96; A. B. Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Process (London: New Century, 1985), 267, 274; Robert Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pushtun (London: Minority Rights Group, 1987), 11; Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, 115-17; Rizvi, The Military and Politics, 213; Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 34-35.
100. See Shahid Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 96; A. B. Awan, Baluchistan: Historical and Political Process (London: New Century, 1985), 267, 274; Robert Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pushtun (London: Minority Rights Group, 1987), 11; Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan, 115-17; Rizvi, The Military and Politics, 213; Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 34-35.
101. Awan, Baluchistan, 268, 272-75. It is unclear what Awan's own role was during this period, and it should be noted that his critical stance toward the PPP could have been influenced by the fact that his book appeared when Zia's martial law was still in force and Bhutto was officially held to be the cause of many of Pakistan's difficulties.
102. Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1989), 301-2.
103. Gul Khan Nasir and Shaista Khan are Zagar Mengals, a branch of the Mengals who live in Sarawan, outside the main Mengal region in Jhalawan.
104. Titus and Swidler interviewed Khair Jan in Quetta, November and December 1995, and Titus interviewed Shaista Khan in Kalat, December 1995.
105. Selig Harrison, "After the Afghan Coup, Nightmare in Baluchistan," Foreign Policy 32 (1978): 136-60.
106. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (22 April 1977), 28301.
107. Salamat Ali, "Baluchistan: Bhutto's Waiting Game," Far Eastern Economic Review (13 May 1974), 20-21.
108. Mahnaz Ispahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), 61.
109. The Quetta commissioner reported numerous ambushes in the Marri area in mid-1974, but in June 1975. Marris were reported to be making an exodus for Afghanistan. This followed intensified army operations against them beginning in June 1974. These included, by Harrison's account, a major battle at Chamalang in which the army attacked a large Marri nomadic encampment, then fought a three-day battle with guerrilla forces attempting to protect it (Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 38). The Quetta commissioner does not report the incident, and no ambushes were reported in the Marri area in 1975 or in 1976.
110. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (22 April 1977), 28301.
111. Harrison estimates that there were 7,500 members of the BPLF in 1980, three years after the guerrilla war ended: Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 75.
112. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 110-S/75.
113. Salamat Ali, "Bhutto's deadline for Balochistan," Far Eastern Economic Review (11 October 1974), 37-38.
114. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 1109-S/76, vol. II.
115. Ibid., file 110-S/65, source report 18/3/75.
116. Dupree suggests that one of Daud's primary incentives for staging his coup was the potential to promote Pushtunistan given Pakistan's instability after the loss of Bangladesh and Bhutto's inability to stabilize the situation in the border region: Dupree, Afghanistan, 757.
117. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 81; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 23 July 1976, 27851.
118. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, 81; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 23 July 1976, 27851.
119. Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 74-75.
120. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (20 February 1976), 27585.
121. As with the assassinations of Liaqat Ali Khan and Zia ul-Haq, no one claimed responsibility for the grenade blast that killed Samad Khan in his Quetta residence. In this vacuum, speculation thrives, and rumored culprits include Zulfikar Bhutto and the PPP government; Akbar Bugti, who was governor at the time of the assassination; and members of the Marri tribe acting in retaliation for the murder of Ghulam Nabi Marri.
122. Commissioner Quetta Division, file 110-S/65.
123. Ibid., file 1-S/75.
124. Janmahmad, Essays on Baloch National Struggle, 293-94.
125. The notion of an objectified ethnic identity is derived from Eickelman and Piscatori, who identify an "objectification" of Muslim consciousness. They argue that as a result of state education and mass communication, most people in the Middle East no longer practice a local variant of a religion they learn from ulema trained in traditional manners. Rather, they now see themselves, Islam, and other religions from a perspective that allows greater reflexivity and objectivity: Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 37-45.
126. Nina Swidler, "Beyond Parody: Ethnography Engages Nationalist Discourse," in Marginality and Modernity, 168-90.
127. Paul Titus, "Honor the Baloch, Buy the Pushtun: Stereotypes, Social Organization, and History in Western Pakistan," Modern Asian Studies 32, 3 (1998): 3.657-88; and idem, "Routes to Ethnicity: Roads, Buses and Differential Ethnic Relations in Pakistani Balochistan," in Marginality and Modernity, 273-97.
128. Paul Titus, "Honor the Baloch, Buy the Pushtun: Stereotypes, Social Organization, and History in Western Pakistan," Modern Asian Studies 32, 3 (1998): 3.657-88; and idem, "Routes to Ethnicity: Roads, Buses and Differential Ethnic Relations in Pakistani Balochistan," in Marginality and Modernity, 273-97.