Community in gay male experience and moral discourse

Journal of Homosexuality

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 5-37

  Woolwine, David ^a  

^a NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Friendship networks; Gay community; Moral discourse; Theory of Community

Indexed keywords

COMMUNITY; HOMOSEXUALITY; HUMAN; MALE; MORALITY; REVIEW; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL STRUCTURE; SOCIOLOGY;

EID: 0034047498     PISSN: 00918369     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1300/J082v38n04_02     Document Type: Review

References (23)

1. Talcott Parsons The Social System (New York, Routledge, 1991, New Edition).
2. Martin P. Levine (editor) Gay Men: The Sociology of Male Homosexuality, (New York, Harper and Row, 1979).
3. Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swindler and Steven M. Titon, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Community in American Life (N.Y., Harper and Row, 1985).
4. Stephen O. Murray. "The Institutional Elaboration of a Quasi-Ethnic Community," International Review of Modern Sociology (1979), 9, 165-78; "Components of Gay Community in San Francisco" in Gilbert Herdt (editor) Gay Culture in America: Essays from the Field (Boston, Beacon Press, 1992); American Gay (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996).
5. Stephen O. Murray. "The Institutional Elaboration of a Quasi-Ethnic Community," International Review of Modern Sociology (1979), 9, 165-78; "Components of Gay Community in San Francisco" in Gilbert Herdt (editor) Gay Culture in America: Essays from the Field (Boston, Beacon Press, 1992); American Gay (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996).
6. Stephen O. Murray. "The Institutional Elaboration of a Quasi-Ethnic Community," International Review of Modern Sociology (1979), 9, 165-78; "Components of Gay Community in San Francisco" in Gilbert Herdt (editor) Gay Culture in America: Essays from the Field (Boston, Beacon Press, 1992); American Gay (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996).
7. There is a tradition of writing on community, deriving largely from the classical sociological theorist Tonnies, which defines "community" as "Gemeinschaft," that is, as a form of social/cultural organization which exists on the level of face to face interactions. See Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1988). This tradition seems ultimately to be derived from Rousseau. This is an understanding which has, to a certain extent, been directly absorbed into the American sociological tradition (most notably via the symbolic interactionism of Herbert Blumer and his followers) from Tonnies. See Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Methood (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1996). This view does not maintain that all members of a community must meet face to face everyday. What its emphasis intends is that in the "true" community some reasonably large percentage of its members either know each other personally or can, with little difficulty and effort, bring about a face to face meeting with any other member, even those not known personally. Within this tradition of thought other characteristics are also usually viewed as necessary for the existence of community. For instance, it is held that individuals in a particular community must recognize its existence and must identify themselves as members of it and they must feel some (no matter how weak) emotional attachment to the group and to the other members of the group. It is also held that the criteria for membership in a true community (a Gemeinschaft), as opposed to membership in a formal association (a Gesellschaft, such as a professional association), are personalistic ones, that is, membership is not open to everyone who might gain it by their own achieved merit or by their own efforts, but, rather, at least in part, depends on possession of a status over which the individual does not have complete control. Finally, it should be added that the ideas of the 19th century French sociologist Emile Durkheim are easily assimilated into this tradition. Durkheim held that shared rituals and/or shared values, and especially shared norms, are characteristic of all organized groups, but especially predominate and are especially important in the case of any smaller group which is not highly differentiated by division of labor. The Durkheimian view also emphasizes the coercive power of such a community over the individual, and the way in which this power works, at least in part, unconsciously. Here the individual feels a moral obligation to act in a certain way but is not able to fully and "rationally" state the reasons for this felt moral obligation. Moral discourse in this case may be "indirect," i.e., mythological, religious, ritualistic, but is not legalistic or "rational" in the sense of propositions derived from philosophical first principles or entirely stated or expressed in terms of written secular law. Durkheim also held that division of labor, and population size and, more importantly, population density, forced the development of more "rational," i.e., more legalistic, more self-reflective and more individualistic forms of moral discourse, ones contained in legal codes and rules of contract as opposed to rituals and religious teaching. But he also held that no society, or grouping, ever completely eliminated the older forms, that is, no group or form of social organization completely replaces the older ritualistic and less conscious modes of control and ways of determining and expressing moral conduct with the later, supposedly more rationalistic and universalistic ones. See Emile Durkheim Division of Labor In Society, translated by W.D. Halls (New York, Free Press, 1984) and The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, translated by Karen E. Fields (New York, Free Press, 1995).
8. There is a tradition of writing on community, deriving largely from the classical sociological theorist Tonnies, which defines "community" as "Gemeinschaft," that is, as a form of social/cultural organization which exists on the level of face to face interactions. See Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1988). This tradition seems ultimately to be derived from Rousseau. This is an understanding which has, to a certain extent, been directly absorbed into the American sociological tradition (most notably via the symbolic interactionism of Herbert Blumer and his followers) from Tonnies. See Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Methood (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1996). This view does not maintain that all members of a community must meet face to face everyday. What its emphasis intends is that in the "true" community some reasonably large percentage of its members either know each other personally or can, with little difficulty and effort, bring about a face to face meeting with any other member, even those not known personally. Within this tradition of thought other characteristics are also usually viewed as necessary for the existence of community. For instance, it is held that individuals in a particular community must recognize its existence and must identify themselves as members of it and they must feel some (no matter how weak) emotional attachment to the group and to the other members of the group. It is also held that the criteria for membership in a true community (a Gemeinschaft), as opposed to membership in a formal association (a Gesellschaft, such as a professional association), are personalistic ones, that is, membership is not open to everyone who might gain it by their own achieved merit or by their own efforts, but, rather, at least in part, depends on possession of a status over which the individual does not have complete control. Finally, it should be added that the ideas of the 19th century French sociologist Emile Durkheim are easily assimilated into this tradition. Durkheim held that shared rituals and/or shared values, and especially shared norms, are characteristic of all organized groups, but especially predominate and are especially important in the case of any smaller group which is not highly differentiated by division of labor. The Durkheimian view also emphasizes the coercive power of such a community over the individual, and the way in which this power works, at least in part, unconsciously. Here the individual feels a moral obligation to act in a certain way but is not able to fully and "rationally" state the reasons for this felt moral obligation. Moral discourse in this case may be "indirect," i.e., mythological, religious, ritualistic, but is not legalistic or "rational" in the sense of propositions derived from philosophical first principles or entirely stated or expressed in terms of written secular law. Durkheim also held that division of labor, and population size and, more importantly, population density, forced the development of more "rational," i.e., more legalistic, more self-reflective and more individualistic forms of moral discourse, ones contained in legal codes and rules of contract as opposed to rituals and religious teaching. But he also held that no society, or grouping, ever completely eliminated the older forms, that is, no group or form of social organization completely replaces the older ritualistic and less conscious modes of control and ways of determining and expressing moral conduct with the later, supposedly more rationalistic and universalistic ones. See Emile Durkheim Division of Labor In Society, translated by W.D. Halls (New York, Free Press, 1984) and The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, translated by Karen E. Fields (New York, Free Press, 1995).
9. There is a tradition of writing on community, deriving largely from the classical sociological theorist Tonnies, which defines "community" as "Gemeinschaft," that is, as a form of social/cultural organization which exists on the level of face to face interactions. See Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1988). This tradition seems ultimately to be derived from Rousseau. This is an understanding which has, to a certain extent, been directly absorbed into the American sociological tradition (most notably via the symbolic interactionism of Herbert Blumer and his followers) from Tonnies. See Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Methood (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1996). This view does not maintain that all members of a community must meet face to face everyday. What its emphasis intends is that in the "true" community some reasonably large percentage of its members either know each other personally or can, with little difficulty and effort, bring about a face to face meeting with any other member, even those not known personally. Within this tradition of thought other characteristics are also usually viewed as necessary for the existence of community. For instance, it is held that individuals in a particular community must recognize its existence and must identify themselves as members of it and they must feel some (no matter how weak) emotional attachment to the group and to the other members of the group. It is also held that the criteria for membership in a true community (a Gemeinschaft), as opposed to membership in a formal association (a Gesellschaft, such as a professional association), are personalistic ones, that is, membership is not open to everyone who might gain it by their own achieved merit or by their own efforts, but, rather, at least in part, depends on possession of a status over which the individual does not have complete control. Finally, it should be added that the ideas of the 19th century French sociologist Emile Durkheim are easily assimilated into this tradition. Durkheim held that shared rituals and/or shared values, and especially shared norms, are characteristic of all organized groups, but especially predominate and are especially important in the case of any smaller group which is not highly differentiated by division of labor. The Durkheimian view also emphasizes the coercive power of such a community over the individual, and the way in which this power works, at least in part, unconsciously. Here the individual feels a moral obligation to act in a certain way but is not able to fully and "rationally" state the reasons for this felt moral obligation. Moral discourse in this case may be "indirect," i.e., mythological, religious, ritualistic, but is not legalistic or "rational" in the sense of propositions derived from philosophical first principles or entirely stated or expressed in terms of written secular law. Durkheim also held that division of labor, and population size and, more importantly, population density, forced the development of more "rational," i.e., more legalistic, more self-reflective and more individualistic forms of moral discourse, ones contained in legal codes and rules of contract as opposed to rituals and religious teaching. But he also held that no society, or grouping, ever completely eliminated the older forms, that is, no group or form of social organization completely replaces the older ritualistic and less conscious modes of control and ways of determining and expressing moral conduct with the later, supposedly more rationalistic and universalistic ones. See Emile Durkheim Division of Labor In Society, translated by W.D. Halls (New York, Free Press, 1984) and The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, translated by Karen E. Fields (New York, Free Press, 1995).
10. There is a tradition of writing on community, deriving largely from the classical sociological theorist Tonnies, which defines "community" as "Gemeinschaft," that is, as a form of social/cultural organization which exists on the level of face to face interactions. See Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1988). This tradition seems ultimately to be derived from Rousseau. This is an understanding which has, to a certain extent, been directly absorbed into the American sociological tradition (most notably via the symbolic interactionism of Herbert Blumer and his followers) from Tonnies. See Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Methood (Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1996). This view does not maintain that all members of a community must meet face to face everyday. What its emphasis intends is that in the "true" community some reasonably large percentage of its members either know each other personally or can, with little difficulty and effort, bring about a face to face meeting with any other member, even those not known personally. Within this tradition of thought other characteristics are also usually viewed as necessary for the existence of community. For instance, it is held that individuals in a particular community must recognize its existence and must identify themselves as members of it and they must feel some (no matter how weak) emotional attachment to the group and to the other members of the group. It is also held that the criteria for membership in a true community (a Gemeinschaft), as opposed to membership in a formal association (a Gesellschaft, such as a professional association), are personalistic ones, that is, membership is not open to everyone who might gain it by their own achieved merit or by their own efforts, but, rather, at least in part, depends on possession of a status over which the individual does not have complete control. Finally, it should be added that the ideas of the 19th century French sociologist Emile Durkheim are easily assimilated into this tradition. Durkheim held that shared rituals and/or shared values, and especially shared norms, are characteristic of all organized groups, but especially predominate and are especially important in the case of any smaller group which is not highly differentiated by division of labor. The Durkheimian view also emphasizes the coercive power of such a community over the individual, and the way in which this power works, at least in part, unconsciously. Here the individual feels a moral obligation to act in a certain way but is not able to fully and "rationally" state the reasons for this felt moral obligation. Moral discourse in this case may be "indirect," i.e., mythological, religious, ritualistic, but is not legalistic or "rational" in the sense of propositions derived from philosophical first principles or entirely stated or expressed in terms of written secular law. Durkheim also held that division of labor, and population size and, more importantly, population density, forced the development of more "rational," i.e., more legalistic, more self-reflective and more individualistic forms of moral discourse, ones contained in legal codes and rules of contract as opposed to rituals and religious teaching. But he also held that no society, or grouping, ever completely eliminated the older forms, that is, no group or form of social organization completely replaces the older ritualistic and less conscious modes of control and ways of determining and expressing moral conduct with the later, supposedly more rationalistic and universalistic ones. See Emile Durkheim Division of Labor In Society, translated by W.D. Halls (New York, Free Press, 1984) and The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, translated by Karen E. Fields (New York, Free Press, 1995).
11. A tradition of thought, related to and derived in part from the Durkheimian one, is that of Durkheim's nephew, Marcel Mauss, who held that "exchange" of "gifts" (broadly defined) is the source and origin of the development, and cohesion, of communities and, in turn, of societies. See Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies, translated by Ian Cunnison (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1954). Mauss held that gift exchange establishes, and symbolizes, moral obligations between individuals, and in his view, operates most importantly between groups in society, overcoming competition and violence. This view has been most recently modified and utilized by Robert Wuthnow in a treatment of issues similar to those raised here. See Robert Wuthnow, Acts of Compassion: Caring for others and Helping Ourselves (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991). Wuthnow sees voluntarism and compassion in our own modern, complex, and non-Gemeinschaftlich society, as establishing a type of exchange with the most important outcome being (in the Durkheimian sense) a symbolic and moral one, i.e., as producing a particular image of society or community-an image containing and expression in itself moral codes and binding together in various ways those who hold, or are held by, that image.
12. A tradition of thought, related to and derived in part from the Durkheimian one, is that of Durkheim's nephew, Marcel Mauss, who held that "exchange" of "gifts" (broadly defined) is the source and origin of the development, and cohesion, of communities and, in turn, of societies. See Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies, translated by Ian Cunnison (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1954). Mauss held that gift exchange establishes, and symbolizes, moral obligations between individuals, and in his view, operates most importantly between groups in society, overcoming competition and violence. This view has been most recently modified and utilized by Robert Wuthnow in a treatment of issues similar to those raised here. See Robert Wuthnow, Acts of Compassion: Caring for others and Helping Ourselves (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991). Wuthnow sees voluntarism and compassion in our own modern, complex, and non-Gemeinschaftlich society, as establishing a type of exchange with the most important outcome being (in the Durkheimian sense) a symbolic and moral one, i.e., as producing a particular image of society or community-an image containing and expression in itself moral codes and binding together in various ways those who hold, or are held by, that image.
13. This is a term used by Benedict Anderson in his work, aptly titled Imagined Communities-a treatment drawing from Marxist social thought and from literary theoretical notions of "narrative." See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and NY, Verso, Revised Edition, 1991). Anderson treats the rise of nationalism and nation states and their connection and dependence upon imagined national communities in previously colonized areas. His major themes are the creation of a notion of time and space, largely by print media (but any mass media will do), into which events and individuals as part of a bounded national community can be imaginatively placed in order that they may be seen as moving together in a common narrative and purpose. The nation state can then itself be secondarily constructed in a similar way by native elites as also having a unity, a purpose, and its own narrative. Anderson argues that members of the native elites construct the new nation state primarily because their own social situation ("free floating" in the sense of not being bound in their careers to particular local communities) allows, or even encourages, them to think of the whole former colony (the nascent nation state) as the arena upon which the narrative of their "career" must be played out if they are to be "successful."
14. Fran Markowitz, A Community in Spite of Itself: Soviet Jewish Émigrés in New York (Washington and London, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993).
15. To give some sense of how representative the respondents quoted in the text are I have numbered each quotation and will describe here the major demographic characteristics of each quoted respondent. (1) White, with "some American Indian background," 46, resident in NYC, university administrator, graduate degrees, tested negative for HIV, Protestant in background and present religious practice, identifies as "gay." (2) Hispanic, 31, resident in NYC, freelance in marketing, BA degree, tested negative for HIV, Buddhist in practice, Roman Catholic in background, identifies as "homosexual" and "bisexual." (3) Hispanic, 38, resident in NYC, freelance in art field, 2 year degree, not tested for HIV, non practicing but believes in God, Roman Catholic in background, identifies as "homosexual" rather than "gay." (4) African American, 31, resident in NJ, works in government, BA degree, not tested for HIV, present religious practice not volunteered. Protestant in religious background, identifies as "gay." (5) Identifies as "Black" but with "American Indian and Anglo Saxon heritage," 34, resident in NYC, works in AIDS related organization, BA and some graduate credits, would not indicate HIV status, Roman Catholic in present practice, Protestant in background, identifies as "gay." (6) White, 49, resident in upstate NY and in NYC, works in AIDS related organization, graduate degree, not tested for HIV, non-affiliated but "spiritual" in practice, Protestant in background, identifies as "gay." (7) White, 54, resident in NYC, BA with some graduate credits, works for newspaper, not tested for HIV, present religious practice not volunteered, Protestant in background, identifies as "homosexual." (8) Hispanic, 33, resident in NYC, 2 year degree, manager, not tested for HIV, religious practice and background not volunteered, identifies as "sexual being," says attracted to both sexes and "gay for political reasons." (9) White, 34, resident in NYC, BA and started graduate work, manager, not tested for HIV, non-affiliated at present, Protestant in background, identifies as "gay." (10) White, 29, resident in NYC, BA, writer and part-time work, not tested for HIV, gives present religious practice as "recovering Catholic," Roman Catholic in background, identifies as "gay." (11) Afro-Caribbean, 34, resident in NYC, BA and some graduate credits, student, HIV positive, practicing Catholic and has studied Buddhism, Roman Catholic in background, identifies as "gay." (12) African American, 35, resident in NYC, BA, word processor, not tested for HIV, "Christian" given as present religious practice, Protestant in background, identifies as "gay." (13) Hispanic, 30, resident in NYC, graduate degree, self employed architect, HIV negative, presently non-affiliated and non-practicing, Roman Catholic in background, identifies as "gay." (14) White, 36, resident in NYC, BA, journalist/ writer, HIV negative, presently practices with a gay oriented new age group and identifies as "atheist" and "believer in the Goddess," Roman Catholic in background, identifies as "gay."
16. Two Hispanic respondents also noted that, as children, they felt alienation from the culturally dominant white non-Hispanic society, specifically mentioning that they felt that their families did not fit their perception of the American norm, either based on their images of the families of their non-Hispanic peers or of families as presented on popular American television shows. And one Hispanic respondent, who is quoted in the text as questioning the existence of a single gay community, also stated that he felt he had been, in his words, "positively" treated by "American" gay men precisely because of the sexual stereotypes non-Hispanic gay men held of some Hispanic groups.
17. I judged 22 out of the 28 men responding to questions about either their involvement in, or attitudes toward, local organizations or to an open ended question about the gay community's response in general to the AIDS crisis to have exhibited either a personal pragmatic attitude or a tactical pragmatic one (or both).
18. Robert Wuthnow, Acts of Compassion (opus cited) and Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart (opus cited).
19. Robert Wuthnow, Acts of Compassion (opus cited) and Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart (opus cited).
20. This is the position of Emile Durkheim in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (opus cited).
21. Kath Weston, Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Friendship (New York, N.Y. Columbia University Press, 1991).
22. See especially Chapter 5 of Kath Weston's Families We Choose (opus cited) for her treatment of community, especially the section of that chapter entitled "From Friendship to Community." It should also be pointed out that a minority of the men interviewed either said that the gender and sexual orientation of their friends were not important (although some of these men then went on to say that the majority of either their friends or best friends "happened" to be gay) and/or said that their best friend was either a lesbian, or, in several cases, a straight woman.
23. Fran Markowitz, A Community in Spite of Itself: Soviet Jewish Émigrés in New York, opus cited, page 256.