From East Timor to Aceh: The disintegration of Indonesia?

Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars

Volumn 32, Issue 1-2, 2000, Pages 97-104

  Tiwon, Sylvia ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

PEACEKEEPING; SOVEREIGNTY; STATE BUILDING; TERRITORIAL DISINTEGRATION;

INDONESIA;

EID: 0034029429     PISSN: 00074810     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2000.10415792     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. International legitimacy was secured through the 1949 Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty (Charter van Souvereiniteitsoverdracht) between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.
2. The curriculum for elementary through secondary education places heavy emphasis on uniform civic education requirements ("Pancasila Moral Education") and national history. All instruction is in the Indonesian language (bahasa Indonesia), with fewer than 10 percent of courses offering local content. All textbooks are uniform and must go through the Department of Education for approval. State control over course content is so strict that it determines, for example, precisely which poems by a particular poet are to be taught. See Darmaningtyas, Pendidikan Pada dan Setelah Krisis (Yogyakarta: LPIST-PUSTAKA PELAJAR, 1999). Under the New Order, all teachers had to belong to a single state-controlled teachers' union, the PGRI, and they were expected to vote for Golkar, the ruling party, in the general elections.
3. Formally recognized religions are these: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. The category "beliefs" (kepercayaan) has remained problematic, as is shown by a 1997 case whereby the state registrar refused to register the marriage of a Sundanese couple who had followed only Sundanese custom (adat Sunda) without the presence of a formally recognized cleric. A 1998 court ruling granting the couple formal married status was greeted by protests from some Islamic groups.
4. Political parties are only allowed to have branch offices at the kecamatan (district) level and are not allowed to enter into villages except during the brief and strictly controlled official campaign time that occurred once every five years shortly before the general elections. The New Order's "political package" includes Act no. 3, 1975, and its 1985 revision concerning political parties, and the Golongan Karya (Golkar). This political package was rescinded in 1999 (with the exception of laws governing mass organizations, Act no. 5, 1985). The large numbers of rural votes garnered by PDI-P (Megawati) and PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Abdurrahman Wahid) is a result of the cancellation of this policy.
5. Its geographical location earns it special mention in such nation-affirming songs as "Dari Sabang sampai Merauke" ("From Sabang to Merauke"). Sabang is a small island located at the tip of Aceh. During colonial times it was the last port for pilgrims going to Mecca from all over the archipelago.
6. The sultanate of Perlak, visited by Marco Polo in the thirteenth century.
7. See C. Snouck Hurgronje, The Acehnese, trans. A. W. S. O'Sullivan, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1906), Vol. 2, pp. 4-5. This work, which is the classic colonial text on Aceh, formed the basis of colonial Aceh policy.
8. The Batak women traders are commonly called inang-inang. Many of these are informal traders.
9. See Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in North Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 19.
10. Important works on Aceh are James Siegel, The Rope of God (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), and Anthony Reid, Blood of the People. Siegel explores some of the tensions between broadly matrifocal adat (custom) in the villages and the Islamic pesantren (boarding school) tradition and shows the role of these pesantren in forging an identity different in both gender and spatial imagination. Reid's work discusses the major lines of social and political fragmentation in Aceh. His explanation of the Dutch Atjeh politiek (Aceh policy) is especially important. He explains the attempts by the colonial government to shore up the uleebalang (traditional lords) in a bid to counter the threat perceived to be coming from the combination of muslimin and communism in the early 1920s. The uleebalang were dealt a major blow by the ulama (religious leader) movement in the Cumbok war of the 1940s. This short essay cannot do sufficient justice to the important analytical contributions of these two scholars. Siegel's analysis of the adat-Muslim tensions will be very important for the implementation of Syari'at Law and expanded autonomy in the near future. Moreover, although the role of the uleebalang may have been eclipsed, a new type of uleebalang has arisen in the New Order, particularly among government officials.
11. Important works on Aceh are James Siegel, The Rope of God (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), and Anthony Reid, Blood of the People. Siegel explores some of the tensions between broadly matrifocal adat (custom) in the villages and the Islamic pesantren (boarding school) tradition and shows the role of these pesantren in forging an identity different in both gender and spatial imagination. Reid's work discusses the major lines of social and political fragmentation in Aceh. His explanation of the Dutch Atjeh politiek (Aceh policy) is especially important. He explains the attempts by the colonial government to shore up the uleebalang (traditional lords) in a bid to counter the threat perceived to be coming from the combination of muslimin and communism in the early 1920s. The uleebalang were dealt a major blow by the ulama (religious leader) movement in the Cumbok war of the 1940s. This short essay cannot do sufficient justice to the important analytical contributions of these two scholars. Siegel's analysis of the adat-Muslim tensions will be very important for the implementation of Syari'at Law and expanded autonomy in the near future. Moreover, although the role of the uleebalang may have been eclipsed, a new type of uleebalang has arisen in the New Order, particularly among government officials.
12. Hasan di Tiro, who declared the independence of Aceh in 1976, is a descendant of Tengku Chik di Tiro, the hero of the Aceh War against the Dutch.
13. Act concerning the Implementation of Aceh's Special Status (Undang-Undang Penyelenggaraan Keistimewaan Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh), passed on 22 September 1999.
14. By contrast with the statements issued by the Habibie government, the Council of Religious Leaders in Jakarta, and other Jakarta-based political elites, Megawati offered one solution to the Aceh problem when she said in her "victory speech" that under her government the people of Aceh would have full access to the wealth of the Arun fields. Not surprisingly, these remarks were met with a great deal of cynicism by the Acehnese, who are tired of empty campaign promises. It is significant that the Habibie government did not respond to this important statement.
15. From a presentation by an Acehnese activist at the Asia Forum meeting, Jakarta, August 1998.
16. For FY1998-99, Aceh's portion of the state budget was US$57 million. Indonesia's revenue from Aceh is calculated at roughly US$1.1 billion for the same fiscal year. Figures reported by Aceh Regional Parliament member Djalaluddin Hassan in Waspada, 18 September 1999.
17. While this is true of many other provinces of Indonesia, mountainous regions with poor infrastructure such as Aceh and Irian Jaya have even fewer public services in the rural areas.
18. Kraft Paper, USA. In addition, George Aditjondro, in a 3 November 1999 Jakarta Post interview notes that the Suharto family has long involvement in Aceh. For example, Suharto's son Bambang Triatmojo has a twenty-year contract to deliver gas from PT Arun to East Asia. "With this contract," Aditjondro states, "Bambang's company becomes one of the biggest tankers in Asia, transporting 10 percent of the world's total liquefied natural gas."
19. Most of the mid-level entrepreneurs are of Chinese (non-Muslim) and South Indian (Muslim) origin. Although there have been incidents involving attacks on businesses, these generally do not seem to be inspired by the same type of anti-Chinese sentiment found in other Indonesian areas. The picture may well change, of course, with increased provocation along religious lines.
20. I am indebted to Ayi Bunyamin of LPIST, Jakarta, and Nurina Widagdo's 1998 report on Aceh for Remdec Swaprakarsa.
21. In mid 1999, there was some discussion about setting up a separate military command (Iskandar Muda command) for Aceh. This has now fallen through.
22. Operation Red Net (Operasi Jaring Merah) began in May 1990. By July of that year, around 12,000 troops had been sent to Aceh. Officially, the DOM comprised the daerah rawan (critical areas) of North Aceh, East Aceh, and Pidie. The DOM was officially revoked in August 1998 by General Wiranto, after pressure from students forced the Acehnese Regional Parliament (DPRD) and Governor Syamsuddin Mahmud to make a formal request for its end.
23. There are reports of collusion between the military and Mobil Indonesia in some of the human rights violations. See, for example, "Mobil Operations in Sumatra Investigated as Villagers Sue," Drillbits and Tailings 3, no. 24 (24 December 1998).
24. Land-appropriation often involves clearing people off traditionally claimed lands. Payments to these people are far less than the actual value of the land, and even these inadequate payments are frequently held up in the bureaucratic maze.
25. The name means "tiger in meditation," a term referring to spiritual retreat in the forest. The routine of this group includes debus, a spiritually inspired, often trance-like art form invoking martial arts. Debus is also believed to inspire men to battle. Tengku Bestari Raden is thus a village religious leader who remains rooted in rural adat.
26. "Perlawanan Rakyat," in the WALHI Aceh publication, haBA Rakan, September 1998.
27. See especially other Acehnese NGO publications, among them Aras, issued by the network SULoH, and TAGA, issued by the research organization Cordova.
28. This case was reported in the Jakarta weekly Forum Keadilan, April 1998.
29. This seems to be similar to the type of "myopia" that Reid describes in the Aceh colonial policies of the Dutch. Reid, Blood of the People, p. 26.
30. The following account is based on two trips I made to Aceh (November 1998 and August 1999). During these trips I interviewed a number of NGO activists, journalists, university instructors, taxi drivers, and market women (nyak-nyak).
31. See Australian Financial Review, 14 August 1999. This report was corroborated by some representatives of international humanitarian organizations in informal conversations.
32. Oral reports, August 1999. The marking of houses with colored "X"s has been reported also in West Java (Bandung) during the time of the anti-Chinese riots in May and June 1998, and in the Banyuwangi area during the dukun santet (traditional healers) killings in the same year. Reports about lists of peoples' names being in the hands of armed groups (military or militias) and rumors that were circulating about these lists were used to incite villagers to violence in the Banyuwangi (East Java) case. Of course, the most notorious lists were the ones used in the anti-communist massacres of 1965-67.
33. See, for example, reports in Serambi Indonesia, August 1999. Unidentified corpses were also found in the Banyuwangi area.
34. Such tactics were employed around the Komando Jihad, the Malari riots (15 January 1974), and, more recently, in the May 1998 riots. See D. Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983, Monograph Series (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984); and the 1998 official report on the May 1998 riots presented to the Habibie government by the Joint Fact-Finding Team (Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta). Similar destabilizing action has also been behind the Banyuwangi, East Java, killings. See Laporan Penelitian Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Wilayah Tapal Kuda, a report prepared by the Nahdlatul Ulama (Jombang) Institute of Research and Human Development (Lakpesdam NU), 1998.
35. Such tactics were employed around the Komando Jihad, the Malari riots (15 January 1974), and, more recently, in the May 1998 riots. See D. Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983, Monograph Series (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984); and the 1998 official report on the May 1998 riots presented to the Habibie government by the Joint Fact-Finding Team (Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta). Similar destabilizing action has also been behind the Banyuwangi, East Java, killings. See Laporan Penelitian Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Wilayah Tapal Kuda, a report prepared by the Nahdlatul Ulama (Jombang) Institute of Research and Human Development (Lakpesdam NU), 1998.
36. Labeling organized rebellions "GPK" (Movement to Disrupt the Peace) has been a common tactic to create the image of disorganized "wild" (liar) bands. This label also has enabled the Indonesian military - and the Jakarta-controlled press - to refuse to recognize East Timor's Falintil, and the Organisasi Papua Merdeka in Irian Jaya.
37. One of the first reports was the Hasil Observasi Proses Peradilan Kasus Aceh, issued by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), July 1991.
38. Ibid., p. 1. This type of categorizing was first introduced during the 1974 trials of students, intellectuals, and individuals with PSI (the banned Indonesian Socialist Party) links. During the interrogations in preparation of these trials, interrogators were assisted by charts displaying the different groups.
39. Such statements fit well into traditional ideas of folk heroes. The Malay hero Hang Tuah, for example, does not die; he disappears into the jungle to return when the people require his help (see, for example, Hikayat Hang Tuah). The mystery surrounding GAM has been reinforced by its underground nature and the absence of its founder, Hasan di Tiro, presently in exile in Stockholm and regularly rumored to be dead. See, for example, the interview with a GAM activist in exile, in Forum Keadilan, 11 June 1999.
40. Ulamas were urged to tell people to gather to say farewell to departing troops after Friday prayers, thus insuring that large crowds of people would be gathered around the ceremonies to see off the generally despised Kopassus special forces. Military personnel are reported to have mobilized high-school students. The human rights group Kontras has also reported military involvement in the provocation.
41. This incident was widely reported by the national media. Around 132 people were detained. These detainees were later attacked by army troops, leaving many dead, and leading to further retaliation.
42. Reports of the number of dead range between thirty-nine (Acehnese Student Forum) and sixty-five (Kontras).
43. The GAM has vigorously denied this, saying that GAM would not burn down institutions vital to the people. Also reported found at some sites have been sharpened bamboo stakes. Such stakes have been used by the militias operating in Jakarta in November 1998.
44. Excerpted from SiaR/MeunaSAH, 29 September 1999. On 8 October 1999, the SMUR office in Banda Aceh was attacked by a group of "unidentified people," Waspada, 11 October 1999.
45. I have been unable to find out who owns the minibuses. However, they have better access to Banda Aceh, and they are called "Cenderawasih" buses - Cenderawasih being the name of a bird indigenous to Irian. Siegel explains some of the intricacies of the bus businesses in Aceh, and the importance of this business for Acehnese men. Bus routes are very clearly parcelled out and controlled. Disrupting these bus routes would appear to be a good way to start conflict. See James Siegel, The Rope of God (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).
46. Waspada, 4 and 5 October 1999.
47. "Rakyat Lebih Mendengar Mahasiswa dan LSM Ketimbang Para Pejabat dan Ulama," Kontras, an Acehnese publication, 11 August 1999.
48. In Indonesia, Muslim women rarely wear the full veils covering the entire face. Most prefer to wear short veils, falling just below the shoulders, that leave the face bare. In at least one of the jilbab incidents in East Aceh, women were shaved bald (Serambi Indonesia, 5 October 1999). In South Aceh, a jilbab raid launched by some 500 young men on motorcycles ended in confrontation with the police, leaving five of the young men wounded.
49. "Razia Jilbab," by Ameer Hamzah, in Serambi Indonesia, 6 October 1999.
50. To counter the 1949 Charter of Sovereignty, which transfers the "complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia" (Article 1, paragraph 1 ), the GAM demands recognition of the 1873 Dutch declaration of war against Aceh as formal evidence that the Dutch recognized Aceh as an independent state.
51. Reid, Blood of the People, pp. 254-55.
52. Under the new autonomy laws, capital investments do not need to go through the central investment board in Jakarta. Companies deal directly with the Bupatis and municipal heads.
53. Suara Pembaruan, 27 October 1999. To most Indonesians, the mention of tattooed individuals brings to mind the "mystery killings" (penembak misterius) of the 1980s, in which alleged criminals were hunted down and shot by the military. Word quickly spread that these criminals were identified by their tattoos.
54. A new head is expected to be elected in November 1999. In May 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid was scheduled to speak at the Syiah Kuala University in Aceh but the large crowd of students would not allow him to speak. He left the campus and his party, the PKB, cancelled its campaign in Banda Aceh.
55. Berita Utama Sore, 2 November 1999. "How is it possible that the winning party [i.e., PDI-P] only gains the vice presidency?" remarked Teungku Abdullah Syafi'i.
56. Tattoos are commonly understood to be the mark of thugs.
57. Republika, 28 October 1999. NGOs and students have already been accused of being financed by "leftist" organizations, including Carmel Budiardjo's Tapol and the PRD (Democratic People's Party), the openly leftist and populist Indonesian political party chaired by jailed activist Budiman Soedjatmiko.