'Defrosting' the French welfare state

West European Politics

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 113-136

  Palier, Bruno ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

SOCIAL POLICY; WELFARE PROVISION; WELFARE REFORM;

FRANCE;

EID: 0033940343     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402380008425369     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. P. Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and The Politics of Retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), p.5.
2. G. Esping-Andersen (ed.), Welfare States in Transition, National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage 1996).
3. Welfare States in Transition, National Adaptations in Global Economies Ibid., p.267.
4. Myles and Quadagno show that retrenchment means targeting for universal benefits, reinforcing selectivity and adding conditions to already targeted benefits, and tightening the links between contribution and benefits for the contributory benefits.
5. J. Myles and J. Quadagno, 'Recent Trends in Public Pension Reform: A Comparative View', in K. Banting and R. Boadway (eds.), Reform of Retirement Income Policy. International and Canadian Perspectives (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University, School of Policy Studies 1997), pp.247-72.
6. J. Myles and P. Pierson, 'The Comparative Political Economy of Pension Reform', forthcoming in P. Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of The Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000).
7. P. Hall, 'Policy Paradigm, Social Learning and the State, the Case of Economic Policy in Britain', Comparative Politics (April 1993), p.278.
8. P. Hall, Comparative Politics Ibid., pp.278-9.
9. P. Pierson, 'Irresistible Forces, Immovable Objects: Post-industrial Welfare States Confront Permanent Austerity', Journal of European Public Policy 5/4 (Dec. 1998), p.558, n.8.
10. Régime général covering 60 per cent of the population.
11. This trou de la Sécurité sociale was usually at least ten times less important than the state budget's deficit, but much more publicised.
12. P. Pierson, 'The New Politics of the Welfare State', World Politics 48/1 (Jan. 1996), pp.162, 165.
13. G. Bonoli and B. Palier, 'Reclaiming Welfare. The Politics of Social Protection Reform in France', in M. Rhodes (ed.). Southern European Welfare States (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass 1996), pp.240-59.
14. Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State?.
15. V. George and P. Taylor-Gooby (eds.), European Welfare Policy - Squaring the Welfare Circle (London: Macmillan 1996).
16. V. George, 'The Future of the Welfare State', in European Welfare Policy - Squaring the Welfare Circle ibid., pp.20-22.
17. Source, SESI, Comptes de la protection sociale, various years.
18. Comptes de la protection sociale, SESI, various years.
19. A similar observation is made by Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? p.71, with reference to a comparison between the British and the US basic pensions
20. M. Ferrera, 'Modèles de solidarité, divergences, convergences: perspectives pour l'Europe', Swiss Political Science Review 2/1 (1996), pp.55-72.
21. D. Gaxie et al., Le 'social' transfiguré (Paris: PUF, 1990), p.145.
22. M.-T. Join-Lambert, Politiques sociales (Paris: Dalloz, 1997), p.575.
23. Esping-Andersen, Welfare States in Transition, Chapter 3.
24. J. Bichot, Les politiques sociales en France au 20ème siècle (Paris: Armand Colin 1997), p.132.
25. J. Bichot, Les politiques sociales en France au 20ème siècle, 1997, p.132 Ibid.
26. Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail.
27. G. Bonoli, 'Pension Politics in France: Patterns of Co-operation and Conflict in Two Recent Reforms' West European Politics 20/4 (1997), pp. 160-81.
28. Join-Lambert, Politiques sociales, p.510.
29. Myles and Pierson, 'The Comparative Political Economy of Pension Reform'.
30. J.B. de Foucauld, Le financement de la protection sociale (Paris: La documentation française, 1995).
31. G. Bonoli and B. Palier, 'Changing the Politics of Social Programmes: Innovative Change in British and French Welfare Reforms', Journal of European Social Policy 8/4 (Nov. 1998), pp.317-30.
32. B. Palier, 'La référence aux territoires dans les nouvelles politiques sociales', Politique et Management public 3 (1998), pp. 13-41.
33. CNAF, 'Revenu Minimum d'Insertion au 31 décembre 1998', Recherche, prévisions et statistiques (May 1999).
34. CERC, 'Les minima sociaux', les dossiers de Cerc-association 2 (1997).
35. Join-Lambert, Politiques sociales, p.339.
36. Libération, 22 Sept. 1999, p.15.
37. Family benefits were frozen in 1996, and it was planned to make them taxable in 1997 and means-tested in 1998 (the Jospin government means-tested them in 1998, but removed the measure for 1999). Resources have been raised through the increase in health insurance contributions for unemployed and retired people by 2.4 per cent in 1996; and the introduction of a new tax, levied at the rate of 0.5 per cent on all revenues, earmarked for the repayment of the debt accumulated by the social security system.
38. This has been done regularly in autumn 1997, 1998 and 1999.
39. See B. Palier, 'Réformer la Sécurité sociale' (Ph.D. thesis, IEP de Paris 1999).
40. In both cases, these Prime Ministers tried to raise social benefits in order to boost private consumption and then economic activity. They both ended up with large public deficits, negative trade balances and increases in interest rates. In both 1976 and 1982, their economic policies had to be switched to a restrictive monetarist one.
41. Force Ouvrière, Confederation Générale du Travail.
42. Pierson, 'The New Politics of the Welfare State'.
43. All these reforms have been made in the name of the distinction between insurance and assistance (called 'national solidarity' in French). Trade unions wanted this rationalisation in order to preserve their realm of social insurance, whereas governments and civil servants expected more responsibilities in social protection through these changes. RMI was seen by the left as a means to deliver money and social help (vocational training for instance) through the contract, while the right supported the RMI since it was money given in return for an effort made by the contracting beneficiary. The left supported CSG because it was a fairer tax than social contributions for employees, whereas the right supported this as means for lowering social charges for employers; civil servants supported CSG because it was leading to state control over the expenses financed by this new tax, whereas employers and the CFDT argued that it would allow the social partners to preserve the purity of social insurance, non-contributory benefits being financed by this new tax.