The US antitrust system and recent trends in antitrust enforcement

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 255-306

  Lin Ping, ^a,c   Raj, Baldev ^c   Sandfort, Michael ^b   Slottje, Daniel ^a  

^a LINGNAN UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

^b WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust enforcement; Time series analysis; US antitrust system

Indexed keywords

POLICY STRATEGY; TIME SERIES ANALYSIS; TRADE POLICY;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0033939487     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6419.00111     Document Type: Article

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