Negotiated transitions to democracy: Israel and the Palestinians as a case study

Democratization

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 113-141

  Waldman, Adir ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; ELECTION; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

ISRAEL; PALESTINE;

EID: 0033915814     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510340008403662     Document Type: Article

References (109)

1. Graham Usher, 'Palestinian Authority, Israeli Rule', The Nation, Vol.262, No.5 (1996), p.15.
2. Doug Struck, 'Arafat Takes Turn as a Democrat', The Baltimore Sun (22 Jan. 1996), A2.
3. For the sake of pragmatism, this article will refer to the Palestinian Authority as an 'entity'. While the future extent of Palestinian autonomy is still up for debate, the important point for this article is that it has been decided, almost certainly irreversibly, that the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip will have some degree of self-government. It is this process of self-government which is the focus of the study here. Whether the government will be considered to rule over a state, autonomous regions, or any other type of entity is irrelevant to the present purpose.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p.29. Huntington offers several works to support this claim. For a discussion of the theory's applicability to the specific case of Israel and the Palestinians, see Edy Kaufman, Shukri B. Abed and Robert L. Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) and David Garnham and Mark Tessler (eds.), Democracy, War, And Peace in the Middle East (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995).
5. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p.29. Huntington offers several works to support this claim. For a discussion of the theory's applicability to the specific case of Israel and the Palestinians, see Edy Kaufman, Shukri B. Abed and Robert L. Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) and David Garnham and Mark Tessler (eds.), Democracy, War, And Peace in the Middle East (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995).
6. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p.29. Huntington offers several works to support this claim. For a discussion of the theory's applicability to the specific case of Israel and the Palestinians, see Edy Kaufman, Shukri B. Abed and Robert L. Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993) and David Garnham and Mark Tessler (eds.), Democracy, War, And Peace in the Middle East (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995).
7. Huntington, op. cit., p.114.
8. Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro, 'South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional Order', Politics & Society, Vol.23, No.3 (1995), pp.269-308.
9. FBIS-NESA, 28 Feb. 1994, p.60. The author thanks Dr Shaul Mishal for passing along FBIS quotations, selections of which are quoted in this article. He, in turn, received the material from Dr Kenneth W. Stein.
10. Jerusalem Post International Edition, No.1847, week ending 30 March 1996.
11. FBIS-NESA, 15 Sept. 1995, p.9.
12. Jerusalem Post International Edition, No.1847, week ending 30 March 1996.
13. FBIS-NESA, 13 April 1995, p.4
14. FBIS-NESA, 11 April 1994, p.13.
15. Mubarak Awad and Edy Kaufman, 'Back From South Africa: Lessons for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process', Tikkun, Vol.10, No.5 (Sept.-Oct. 1995), p.64. Terje Larsen, the Norwegian who facilitated the Oslo talks, has highlighted the extreme importance of passing the point of no return in the negotiations: 'That is what pushes it along. Its genius is that if one fails the other fails.' Connie Bruck, 'The Wounds Of Peace', The New Yorker, Vol.LXXII, No.31 (14 Oct. 1996), p.73.
16. Mubarak Awad and Edy Kaufman, 'Back From South Africa: Lessons for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process', Tikkun, Vol.10, No.5 (Sept.-Oct. 1995), p.64. Terje Larsen, the Norwegian who facilitated the Oslo talks, has highlighted the extreme importance of passing the point of no return in the negotiations: 'That is what pushes it along. Its genius is that if one fails the other fails.' Connie Bruck, 'The Wounds Of Peace', The New Yorker, Vol.LXXII, No.31 (14 Oct. 1996), p.73.
17. Uri Avnery, 'Who Is The Opponent?', Tikkun, Vol.9, No.3 (May-June 1994), p.38. Sarid served as Environment Minister under Rabin and Peres. He currently holds the Education portfolio in Ehud Barak's government.
18. Huntington, op. cit., p.160.
19. Bruck, op. cit., p.63.
20. Ibid., p.71.
21. FBIS, 16 Sept. 1993, pp.22-4.
22. The holding of elections to aid Israel's perceived allies in the Palestinian community had long been a central component of Israeli peace plans. On this point, see David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p.95. The Palestinian political scientist Khalil Shikaki identified Israel's intentions when he maintained, 'The democratic agenda is absent, and [the January 1996] elections should not be seen necessarily as the start of transition to democracy but in their role of nation building and peacemaking'. Khalil Shikaki, 'The Palestinian Elections: An Assessment', Journal of Palestine Studies 99, Vol.XXV, No.3 (1996), p.7.
23. The holding of elections to aid Israel's perceived allies in the Palestinian community had long been a central component of Israeli peace plans. On this point, see David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p.95. The Palestinian political scientist Khalil Shikaki identified Israel's intentions when he maintained, 'The democratic agenda is absent, and [the January 1996] elections should not be seen necessarily as the start of transition to democracy but in their role of nation building and peacemaking'. Khalil Shikaki, 'The Palestinian Elections: An Assessment', Journal of Palestine Studies 99, Vol.XXV, No.3 (1996), p.7.
24. Shimon Peres with Arye Naor, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), p.64.
25. Huntington, op. cit., pp.182-6.
26. Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.19-20.
27. Graham Usher, 'Arafat's Opening', New Statesman & Society, Vol.8, No.381 (1995), p.25.
28. Lijphart, op. cit., pp.20-21.
29. Eric Silver, 'Keeping Gaza Out of the West Bank', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.V, No.18 (1995), p.21.
30. Jung and Shapiro, op. cit., p.292.
31. It has never been made clear exactly how the two negotiating teams agreed to the electoral system. Israeli officials have claimed that the details of the electoral law were determined by the Palestinians without much consultation from the Israeli side. Joel Singer insists Throughout the negotiations regarding the elections, Israel was mindful of the fact that the elections were to be Palestinian elections. Accordingly, Israel was prepared to allow the Palestinian side to decide all issues relating exclusively to the conduct of the electoral process without any Israeli interference, and to express its concerns only with regard to issues affecting Israel, such as the maintenance of security during the electoral process.' Joel Singer, 'The Emerging Palestinian Democracy Under the West Bank and Gaza Strip Self-Government Arrangements', Israel Yearbook On Human Rights (forthcoming). However, the Israelis naturally might try to lay any blame for the system's bias on the Palestinians. Whichever negotiating team suggested the system, what is certain is that both knew its probable effects and neither vetoed its adoption, so both should be held responsible for the electoral engineering.
32. For evidence of gerrymandering, see Edmund Blair, 'Hard choices after election victory', Middle East Economic Digest, Vol.40, No.5 (1996), p.7. For evidence of malapportionment, see As'ad Ghanem, The First Palestinian General Elections: A Challenge for Democracy (in Hebrew), (Givat Haviva, Israel: The Institute for Peace Research, 1996), p.8.
33. For evidence of gerrymandering, see Edmund Blair, 'Hard choices after election victory', Middle East Economic Digest, Vol.40, No.5 (1996), p.7. For evidence of malapportionment, see As'ad Ghanem, The First Palestinian General Elections: A Challenge for Democracy (in Hebrew), (Givat Haviva, Israel: The Institute for Peace Research, 1996), p.8.
34. Blair, op. cit., p.7.
35. Ethan Eisenberg, 'Democracy in Gaza: An Election Diary', Congress Monthly, Vol.63, No.2 (March-April 1996), p.9.
36. 'Peace Monitor', Journal of Palestine Studies 99, Vol.XXV, No.3 (1996), p.121.
37. Bassam Eid, 'Arafat's Justice', The New York Times (16 Jan. 1996), p.A29.
38. In the European Union Electoral Unit's final report on the elections, the observers expressed their 'hope that the newly elected President of the Palestinian Authority and the members of the Council will have the confidence to dispense with a tendency to intimidate the media which has been noted during the elections process'. See Lamis Andoni, 'The Palestinian Elections: Moving Toward Democracy or One-Party Rule?', Journal of Palestine Studies 99, Vol.XXV, No.3 (1996), p.6. For a report on media bias during the campaign see Michael Foley, 'Democracy Courtesy Thomas Cook', Index On Censorship, Vol.25, No.2 (March/April 1996), pp. 17-20.
39. In the European Union Electoral Unit's final report on the elections, the observers expressed their 'hope that the newly elected President of the Palestinian Authority and the members of the Council will have the confidence to dispense with a tendency to intimidate the media which has been noted during the elections process'. See Lamis Andoni, 'The Palestinian Elections: Moving Toward Democracy or One-Party Rule?', Journal of Palestine Studies 99, Vol.XXV, No.3 (1996), p.6. For a report on media bias during the campaign see Michael Foley, 'Democracy Courtesy Thomas Cook', Index On Censorship, Vol.25, No.2 (March/April 1996), pp. 17-20.
40. A week before the election five Palestinian secret police raided a rally for Khamis al Hammad, a Fatah opponent, and abducted his campaign manager. In addition, there were reports that Palestinian police patrolled the streets at night tearing down posters for any non-Fatah candidates. See Shyam Bhatia, 'Vote Arafat For Dictator', The Observer (London) (14 Jan. 1996), p.21.
41. Isabel Kershner, 'Power to the Palestinians', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.19 (25 Jan. 1996), pp.20-24.
42. The Value of the Palestinian Vote', The Boston Globe (24 Jan. 1996), p.12.
43. Agence France Presse (23 Jan. 1996).
44. Deborah Horan, 'Independents Loosen Grip of PLO "Tunis Old Guard"', Inter Press Service (22 Jan. 1996).
45. See Huntington, op. cit., p. 187. Arafat gave voice to the acute sensitivity of legitimacy concerns - the need to balance the guarantee of victory with the appearance of propriety - when he joked with the press two days after the election, 'I was looking for 51 per cent.' Jon Immanuel, 'Arafat Wins 88 Per Cent of Vote; 75 Per Cent of Council to Fatah', The Jerusalem Post (22 Jan. 1996).
46. See Huntington, op. cit., p. 187. Arafat gave voice to the acute sensitivity of legitimacy concerns - the need to balance the guarantee of victory with the appearance of propriety -when he joked with the press two days after the election, 'I was looking for 51 per cent.' Jon Immanuel, 'Arafat Wins 88 Per Cent of Vote; 75 Per Cent of Council to Fatah', The Jerusalem Post (22 Jan. 1996).
47. Huntington, op. cit., p.186.
48. Usher, 'Arafat's Opening', p.25.
49. Sami Aboudi, 'Palestinian Militants Rail against False Democracy', Reuters (19 Jan. 1996).
50. In the fall of 1995 for example, one Hamas leader told the public, 'Hamas has stated from the beginning that it is ready to participate in the process of construction. If a new reality is imposed that requires the establishment of parties then parties will participate' (see FBIS-NESA, 11 Oct. 1995, pp.23-4). However, just two days later a second leader insisted 'No change has taken place in the position of Hamas. The movement refuses to participate in the self-rule elections for many reasons' (see FBIS-NESA, 13 Oct. 1995, p.5). For an analysis of Hamas's decision on whether or not to participate in the elections see: Graham Usher, 'What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupie Territories', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XXII, No.4 (1993), pp.65-80.
51. In the fall of 1995 for example, one Hamas leader told the public, 'Hamas has stated from the beginning that it is ready to participate in the process of construction. If a new reality is imposed that requires the establishment of parties then parties will participate' (see FBIS-NESA, 11 Oct. 1995, pp.23-4). However, just two days later a second leader insisted 'No change has taken place in the position of Hamas. The movement refuses to participate in the self-rule elections for many reasons' (see FBIS-NESA, 13 Oct. 1995, p.5). For an analysis of Hamas's decision on whether or not to participate in the elections see: Graham Usher, 'What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupie Territories', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XXII, No.4 (1993), pp.65-80.
52. In the fall of 1995 for example, one Hamas leader told the public, 'Hamas has stated from the beginning that it is ready to participate in the process of construction. If a new reality is imposed that requires the establishment of parties then parties will participate' (see FBIS-NESA, 11 Oct. 1995, pp.23-4). However, just two days later a second leader insisted 'No change has taken place in the position of Hamas. The movement refuses to participate in the self-rule elections for many reasons' (see FBIS-NESA, 13 Oct. 1995, p.5). For an analysis of Hamas's decision on whether or not to participate in the elections see: Graham Usher, 'What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupie Territories', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XXII, No.4 (1993), pp.65-80.
53. Khalil Shikaki, 'The Palestinian Elections: An Assessment', p.20.
54. Nadav Haetzni, 'In Arafat's Kingdom', Commentary, Vol.102, No.4 (Oct. 1996), p.45.
55. For the Amnesty report see 'Trial At Midnight: Secret, Summary, Unfair Trials In Gaza', Journal of Palestine Studies 97, Vol.XXV, No.1 (1995), pp.141-6. For the first B'Tselem report see 'Neither Law Nor Justice', Journal of Palestine Studies 98, Vol.XXV, No.2 (1996), pp. 148-57. For a second B'Tselem report, written in conjunction with a Palestinian human rights organization see Human Rights in the Occupied Territories Since the Oslo Accords: Status Report (Dec. 1996), Joint Report of The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group and B'Tselem.
56. For the Amnesty report see 'Trial At Midnight: Secret, Summary, Unfair Trials In Gaza', Journal of Palestine Studies 97, Vol.XXV, No.1 (1995), pp.141-6. For the first B'Tselem report see 'Neither Law Nor Justice', Journal of Palestine Studies 98, Vol.XXV, No.2 (1996), pp. 148-57. For a second B'Tselem report, written in conjunction with a Palestinian human rights organization see Human Rights in the Occupied Territories Since the Oslo Accords: Status Report (Dec. 1996), Joint Report of The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group and B'Tselem.
57. For the Amnesty report see 'Trial At Midnight: Secret, Summary, Unfair Trials In Gaza', Journal of Palestine Studies 97, Vol.XXV, No.1 (1995), pp.141-6. For the first B'Tselem report see 'Neither Law Nor Justice', Journal of Palestine Studies 98, Vol.XXV, No.2 (1996), pp. 148-57. For a second B'Tselem report, written in conjunction with a Palestinian human rights organization see Human Rights in the Occupied Territories Since the Oslo Accords: Status Report (Dec. 1996), Joint Report of The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group and B'Tselem.
58. Silver, op. cit., p.21.
59. James M. Wall, 'Palestinian Reality: A Historic Vote', The Christian Century, Vol.113, No.5 (7 Feb. 1996), p.123.
60. Silver, op. cit., p.20.
61. Isabel Kershner, 'The Moderate Extremist', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.6, (27 July 1995), p.32; Kershner, 'Power to the Palestinians', p.23; and Khaled Abu Toameh and Isabel Kershner, 'Hot on the Press', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.3 (15 June 1995), p.32.
62. Isabel Kershner, 'The Moderate Extremist', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.6, (27 July 1995), p.32; Kershner, 'Power to the Palestinians', p.23; and Khaled Abu Toameh and Isabel Kershner, 'Hot on the Press', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.3 (15 June 1995), p.32.
63. Isabel Kershner, 'The Moderate Extremist', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.6, (27 July 1995), p.32; Kershner, 'Power to the Palestinians', p.23; and Khaled Abu Toameh and Isabel Kershner, 'Hot on the Press', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.3 (15 June 1995), p.32.
64. Hussein Hijazi, 'Interview with Mahmoud Zahhar', Journal of Palestine Studies 95, Vol.XXIV, No.3 (1995), p.83.
65. There have been reports that Arafat and Hamas have already reached a pact between themselves. See for example, Beni Begin, 'Take Arafat at His Violent Word', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VII, No. 15 (28 Nov. 1996), p.68. And Israeli leaders have in the past talked about the possibility of signing a deal with Hamas if it disavows violence. See, for example, Mahmood Monshipouri, 'The PLO Rivalry With Hamas: The Challenge of Peace, Democratization and Islamic Radicalism', Middle East Policy, Vol.IV, No.3 (March 1996), p.105. One should note that the focus here has been on Hamas rather than its main competing Islamist group, Islamic Jihad, because Hamas is the larger and more powerful group and thus more likely to form an effective opposition and also because Islamic Jihad's extreme hardline stance makes it unlikely that it will ever cease its violence as long as Israel exists. One should further note that even if Hamas does become a meaningful non-violent opposition, there remain questions as to whether its Islamist ideology is suitable to democracy. This article cannot adequately deal with the likelihood of a Hamas political party, its potential stance on democracy or its possible political strength, but it is important to recognize that Arafat's coddling has left open the possibility that it could serve as a viable opposition. For a discussion of Islamic Jihad's political ideology see Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics In Palestine (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), pp.218-19. For an interesting discussion of the potential for a Hamas party see Isabel Kershner, 'The Moderate Extremist', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.6 (27 July 1995), pp.32-3. Also see James Piscatori (ed.), Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis (Boston, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), Ziad Abu-Amr, 'Hamas: A Historical and Political Background', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XXII, No.4 (1993), pp.5-19, and a more sceptical piece by the same author, 'Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism, and Democracy', in Kaufman, Abed and Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.245-55.
66. There have been reports that Arafat and Hamas have already reached a pact between themselves. See for example, Beni Begin, 'Take Arafat at His Violent Word', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VII, No. 15 (28 Nov. 1996), p.68. And Israeli leaders have in the past talked about the possibility of signing a deal with Hamas if it disavows violence. See, for example, Mahmood Monshipouri, 'The PLO Rivalry With Hamas: The Challenge of Peace, Democratization and Islamic Radicalism', Middle East Policy, Vol.IV, No.3 (March 1996), p.105. One should note that the focus here has been on Hamas rather than its main competing Islamist group, Islamic Jihad, because Hamas is the larger and more powerful group and thus more likely to form an effective opposition and also because Islamic Jihad's extreme hardline stance makes it unlikely that it will ever cease its violence as long as Israel exists. One should further note that even if Hamas does become a meaningful non-violent opposition, there remain questions as to whether its Islamist ideology is suitable to democracy. This article cannot adequately deal with the likelihood of a Hamas political party, its potential stance on democracy or its possible political strength, but it is important to recognize that Arafat's coddling has left open the possibility that it could serve as a viable opposition. For a discussion of Islamic Jihad's political ideology see Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics In Palestine (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), pp.218-19. For an interesting discussion of the potential for a Hamas party see Isabel Kershner, 'The Moderate Extremist', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.6 (27 July 1995), pp.32-3. Also see James Piscatori (ed.), Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis (Boston, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), Ziad Abu-Amr, 'Hamas: A Historical and Political Background', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XXII, No.4 (1993), pp.5-19, and a more sceptical piece by the same author, 'Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism, and Democracy', in Kaufman, Abed and Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.245-55.
67. There have been reports that Arafat and Hamas have already reached a pact between themselves. See for example, Beni Begin, 'Take Arafat at His Violent Word', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VII, No. 15 (28 Nov. 1996), p.68. And Israeli leaders have in the past talked about the possibility of signing a deal with Hamas if it disavows violence. See, for example, Mahmood Monshipouri, 'The PLO Rivalry With Hamas: The Challenge of Peace, Democratization and Islamic Radicalism', Middle East Policy, Vol.IV, No.3 (March 1996), p.105. One should note that the focus here has been on Hamas rather than its main competing Islamist group, Islamic Jihad, because Hamas is the larger and more powerful group and thus more likely to form an effective opposition and also because Islamic Jihad's extreme hardline stance makes it unlikely that it will ever cease its violence as long as Israel exists. One should further note that even if Hamas does become a meaningful non-violent opposition, there remain questions as to whether its Islamist ideology is suitable to democracy. This article cannot adequately deal with the likelihood of a Hamas political party, its potential stance on democracy or its possible political strength, but it is important to recognize that Arafat's coddling has left open the possibility that it could serve as a viable opposition. For a discussion of Islamic Jihad's political ideology see Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics In Palestine (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), pp.218-19. For an interesting discussion of the potential for a Hamas party see Isabel Kershner, 'The Moderate Extremist', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.6 (27 July 1995), pp.32-3. Also see James Piscatori (ed.), Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis (Boston, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), Ziad Abu-Amr, 'Hamas: A Historical and Political Background', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XXII, No.4 (1993), pp.5-19, and a more sceptical piece by the same author, 'Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism, and Democracy', in Kaufman, Abed and Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.245-55.
68. There have been reports that Arafat and Hamas have already reached a pact between themselves. See for example, Beni Begin, 'Take Arafat at His Violent Word', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VII, No. 15 (28 Nov. 1996), p.68. And Israeli leaders have in the past talked about the possibility of signing a deal with Hamas if it disavows violence. See, for example, Mahmood Monshipouri, 'The PLO Rivalry With Hamas: The Challenge of Peace, Democratization and Islamic Radicalism', Middle East Policy, Vol.IV, No.3 (March 1996), p.105. One should note that the focus here has been on Hamas rather than its main competing Islamist group, Islamic Jihad, because Hamas is the larger and more powerful group and thus more likely to form an effective opposition and also because Islamic Jihad's extreme hardline stance makes it unlikely that it will ever cease its violence as long as Israel exists. One should further note that even if Hamas does become a meaningful non-violent opposition, there remain questions as to whether its Islamist ideology is suitable to democracy. This article cannot adequately deal with the likelihood of a Hamas political party, its potential stance on democracy or its possible political strength, but it is important to recognize that Arafat's coddling has left open the possibility that it could serve as a viable opposition. For a discussion of Islamic Jihad's political ideology see Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics In Palestine (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), pp.218-19. For an interesting discussion of the potential for a Hamas party see Isabel Kershner, 'The Moderate Extremist', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.6 (27 July 1995), pp.32-3. Also see James Piscatori (ed.), Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis (Boston, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), Ziad Abu-Amr, 'Hamas: A Historical and Political Background', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XXII, No.4 (1993), pp.5-19, and a more sceptical piece by the same author, 'Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism, and Democracy', in Kaufman, Abed and Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.245-55.
69. There have been reports that Arafat and Hamas have already reached a pact between themselves. See for example, Beni Begin, 'Take Arafat at His Violent Word', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VII, No. 15 (28 Nov. 1996), p.68. And Israeli leaders have in the past talked about the possibility of signing a deal with Hamas if it disavows violence. See, for example, Mahmood Monshipouri, 'The PLO Rivalry With Hamas: The Challenge of Peace, Democratization and Islamic Radicalism', Middle East Policy, Vol.IV, No.3 (March 1996), p.105. One should note that the focus here has been on Hamas rather than its main competing Islamist group, Islamic Jihad, because Hamas is the larger and more powerful group and thus more likely to form an effective opposition and also because Islamic Jihad's extreme hardline stance makes it unlikely that it will ever cease its violence as long as Israel exists. One should further note that even if Hamas does become a meaningful non-violent opposition, there remain questions as to whether its Islamist ideology is suitable to democracy. This article cannot adequately deal with the likelihood of a Hamas political party, its potential stance on democracy or its possible political strength, but it is important to recognize that Arafat's coddling has left open the possibility that it could serve as a viable opposition. For a discussion of Islamic Jihad's political ideology see Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics In Palestine (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), pp.218-19. For an interesting discussion of the potential for a Hamas party see Isabel Kershner, 'The Moderate Extremist', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.6 (27 July 1995), pp.32-3. Also see James Piscatori (ed.), Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis (Boston, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), Ziad Abu-Amr, 'Hamas: A Historical and Political Background', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XXII, No.4 (1993), pp.5-19, and a more sceptical piece by the same author, 'Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism, and Democracy', in Kaufman, Abed and Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.245-55.
70. There have been reports that Arafat and Hamas have already reached a pact between themselves. See for example, Beni Begin, 'Take Arafat at His Violent Word', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VII, No. 15 (28 Nov. 1996), p.68. And Israeli leaders have in the past talked about the possibility of signing a deal with Hamas if it disavows violence. See, for example, Mahmood Monshipouri, 'The PLO Rivalry With Hamas: The Challenge of Peace, Democratization and Islamic Radicalism', Middle East Policy, Vol.IV, No.3 (March 1996), p.105. One should note that the focus here has been on Hamas rather than its main competing Islamist group, Islamic Jihad, because Hamas is the larger and more powerful group and thus more likely to form an effective opposition and also because Islamic Jihad's extreme hardline stance makes it unlikely that it will ever cease its violence as long as Israel exists. One should further note that even if Hamas does become a meaningful non-violent opposition, there remain questions as to whether its Islamist ideology is suitable to democracy. This article cannot adequately deal with the likelihood of a Hamas political party, its potential stance on democracy or its possible political strength, but it is important to recognize that Arafat's coddling has left open the possibility that it could serve as a viable opposition. For a discussion of Islamic Jihad's political ideology see Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics In Palestine (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), pp.218-19. For an interesting discussion of the potential for a Hamas party see Isabel Kershner, 'The Moderate Extremist', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.6 (27 July 1995), pp.32-3. Also see James Piscatori (ed.), Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis (Boston, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), Ziad Abu-Amr, 'Hamas: A Historical and Political Background', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XXII, No.4 (1993), pp.5-19, and a more sceptical piece by the same author, 'Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism, and Democracy', in Kaufman, Abed and Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.245-55.
71. There have been reports that Arafat and Hamas have already reached a pact between themselves. See for example, Beni Begin, 'Take Arafat at His Violent Word', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VII, No. 15 (28 Nov. 1996), p.68. And Israeli leaders have in the past talked about the possibility of signing a deal with Hamas if it disavows violence. See, for example, Mahmood Monshipouri, 'The PLO Rivalry With Hamas: The Challenge of Peace, Democratization and Islamic Radicalism', Middle East Policy, Vol.IV, No.3 (March 1996), p.105. One should note that the focus here has been on Hamas rather than its main competing Islamist group, Islamic Jihad, because Hamas is the larger and more powerful group and thus more likely to form an effective opposition and also because Islamic Jihad's extreme hardline stance makes it unlikely that it will ever cease its violence as long as Israel exists. One should further note that even if Hamas does become a meaningful non-violent opposition, there remain questions as to whether its Islamist ideology is suitable to democracy. This article cannot adequately deal with the likelihood of a Hamas political party, its potential stance on democracy or its possible political strength, but it is important to recognize that Arafat's coddling has left open the possibility that it could serve as a viable opposition. For a discussion of Islamic Jihad's political ideology see Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics In Palestine (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), pp.218-19. For an interesting discussion of the potential for a Hamas party see Isabel Kershner, 'The Moderate Extremist', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VI, No.6 (27 July 1995), pp.32-3. Also see James Piscatori (ed.), Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis (Boston, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), Ziad Abu-Amr, 'Hamas: A Historical and Political Background', Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.XXII, No.4 (1993), pp.5-19, and a more sceptical piece by the same author, 'Palestinian Islamists, Pluralism, and Democracy', in Kaufman, Abed and Rothstein (eds.), Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.245-55.
72. Susan R. Benda and Kevin Johnson, A Report on the First Months of the Palestinian Legislative Council (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1996), p.18.
73. Sami Aboudi, 'Gazan Doctor Seeks Healthy Palestinian Democracy', Reuters (6 Feb. 1996).
74. In recent interviews with Palestinian legislators, every one of them made a point of saying that the legislature would serve as a check on the executive. The Speaker of the Legislative Council, Abu Alla, declared, 'My highest priority as Speaker of the Legislative Council is to build an independent, democratic institution.' Author's interviews with Ziad Abu-Amr, Marwan Al-Barghouti, Kadura Fares, Ahmed Qurei and Mufid Abed Raboo, 9 Jan. 1997.
75. While it has been argued here that the bargaining incentives of each side made both negotiating teams push for Arafat to be as strong as possible, a different dynamic governed the negotiations over the make-up of the PA governing bodies. Interestingly, the Palestinians pushed for a large Legislative Council whose functions were to be formally separated from those of an executive body. They wanted a separation of powers because then the government would look more like that of an independent state than an autonomous entity. Of course, for their part the Israelis pressed for one small body to have only executive powers. In the end, the negotiators met half-way on the size question and left the issue of separation of powers vague. For an analysis of this dynamic see Joel Singer, op. cit.
76. See Isabel Kershner, 'Arafat's 88 Watchdogs', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VII, No.6 (25 July 1996), p.28 and Marjorie Miller and Summer Assad, 'Arafat Chafes Under the Yoke of Democracy', LA Times (11 April 1996). Other information from author's interviews with legislators, 9 Jan. 1997.
77. See Isabel Kershner, 'Arafat's 88 Watchdogs', The Jerusalem Report, Vol.VII, No.6 (25 July 1996), p.28 and Marjorie Miller and Summer Assad, 'Arafat Chafes Under the Yoke of Democracy', LA Times (11 April 1996). Other information from author's interviews with legislators, 9 Jan. 1997.
78. For an analysis of these factors see Adir Waldman, 1997 Yale mimeo.
79. See, for example, Dankart Rustow's classic article 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', Comparative Politics., Vol.2, No.3 (1970), pp.337-63.
80. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), esp. pp.4-5. And Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990).
81. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), esp. pp.4-5. And Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990).
82. Etel Solingen, 'Quandaries of the Peace Process', Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.3 (1996), p.142.
83. Ghassan Salame, 'Introduction: Where Are the Democrats?', Ghassan Salame (ed.), Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994), p.3.
84. For a discussion of the debate and an analysis of how it relates to one case of democratization see Ian Shapiro, 'Democratic Innovation: A South African Perspective on Schumpeterianism' in his Democracy's Place (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp.79-108. For Schumpeter s classic work see Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942).
85. For a discussion of the debate and an analysis of how it relates to one case of democratization see Ian Shapiro, 'Democratic Innovation: A South African Perspective on Schumpeterianism' in his Democracy's Place (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp.79-108. For Schumpeter s classic work see Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942).
86. O'Donnell and Schnitter, op. cit., p.61.
87. Lijphart, op. cit., pp.143 and 54.
88. Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), pp.271-9.
89. Moshe Ma'oz, 'Democratization Among West Bank Palestinians and Palestinian-Israeli Relations', in Kaufrnan, Abed and Rothstein (eds.), op. cit., p.227. For further arguments on the efficacy of outside pressure to help the Palestinians democratize see Robert L. Rothstein, 'Democracy in the Third World: Definitional Dilemmas', in Garnham and Tessler (eds.), op. cit., esp. p.80.
90. Moshe Ma'oz, 'Democratization Among West Bank Palestinians and Palestinian-Israeli Relations', in Kaufrnan, Abed and Rothstein (eds.), op. cit., p.227. For further arguments on the efficacy of outside pressure to help the Palestinians democratize see Robert L. Rothstein, 'Democracy in the Third World: Definitional Dilemmas', in Garnham and Tessler (eds.), op. cit., esp. p.80.
91. Like his predecessors, Benjamin Netanyahu focused on short-term security considerations and tried to give Arafat as much power over his radicals as possible. He and others in the Likud Party spoke of the need to negotiate with democratic governments, but it seems that such statements were meant more as justifications for stalling the negotiations than as sincere reflections of their sentiments. Furthermore, even if Netanyahu himself had been more committed to a democratic Palestinian entity than his predecessors, he probably would not have been able to afford more leeway than they could in pushing for democratization. This is because the right-wing held even greater power over his government than that of Labor, given that his government would fall without its support.
92. For lobbying in favour of more pressure on Arafat see 'Prepared Testimony of Neil Hicks, Coordinator of the Middle East And North Africa Program of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Before the House Subcommittee on International Relations Subcommittee in International Operations and Human Rights', Federal News Service (23 July 1996). For arguments against such pressure see Jonathan S. Paris, 'When to Worry in the Middle East', Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Vol.37, No.4 (1993), pp.553-65.
93. Monshipouri, op. cit., p.101. For a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of Israel's negotiating with an authoritarian see Robert L. Rothstein, 'Democracy and Conflict', pp.17-40. Horowitz, op. cit., p.280, also presents an interesting discussion on the relative merits of bilateral versus multilateral talks.
94. Monshipouri, op. cit., p.101. For a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of Israel's negotiating with an authoritarian see Robert L. Rothstein, 'Democracy and Conflict', pp.17-40. Horowitz, op. cit., p.280, also presents an interesting discussion on the relative merits of bilateral versus multilateral talks.
95. Monshipouri, op. cit., p.101. For a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of Israel's negotiating with an authoritarian see Robert L. Rothstein, 'Democracy and Conflict', pp.17-40. Horowitz, op. cit., p.280, also presents an interesting discussion on the relative merits of bilateral versus multilateral talks.
96. Ahmad S. Khalidi, 'The Palestinians' First Excursion Into Democracy', Journal of Palestine Studies 100, Vol.XXV, No.4 (1996), p.22.
97. Moreover, we should not assume that because there are arguments claiming it would be easier for Israel to negotiate with a democracy and others claiming it would be easier for her to deal with an authoritarian regime that Arafat's standing would necessarily have made a difference in the case at hand. An analysis of the history of Israeli negotiations with Arab states reveals that Israel has not seriously considered a state's democratic nature when deciding with whom and how to bargain for peace. See Gabriel Sheffer, 'Israel and the Liberalization of Arab Regimes', in Garnham and Tessler (eds.), pp.268-86.
98. Ian Shapiro, 'Elements of Democratic Justice' in his Democracy's Place (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp.251-4.
99. Eisenberg, op. cit., p.11.
100. Robert L. Rothstein, 'Cooperation Across the Lines: Constraints and Opportunities', in Kaufman, Abed and Rothstein (eds.), op. cit., p.302.
101. James M. Shannon, 'Turning PLO Activists into Voices of the People', The Christian Science Monitor (10 Feb. 1997), p.18.
102. Di Palma, op. cit., pp.79-81. Note that Di Palma thinks elections can still be positive, though, even if there has not been enough liberalization and even if they are manipulated - see his discussion around p.85. For Shapiro's views on the 'speed debate' see 'Democratic Innovation', pp.92-3.
103. Di Palma, op. cit., pp.79-81. Note that Di Palma thinks elections can still be positive, though, even if there has not been enough liberalization and even if they are manipulated - see his discussion around p.85. For Shapiro's views on the 'speed debate' see 'Democratic Innovation', pp.92-3.
104. Robert A. Dahl, Polvarchy. Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), pp.33-47.
105. For an example of the first argument, see Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', Comparative Politics, Vol.23, No.1 (1990), esp. p.16. For the latter, see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
106. For an example of the first argument, see Terry Lynn Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', Comparative Politics, Vol.23, No.1 (1990), esp. p.16. For the latter, see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
107. These cases are culled from Huntington, op. cit., p.113.
108. For a short analysis of the Uruguayan case see the author's mimeo as cited at 58. Also see Charles Guy Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
109. and Luis E. Gonzalez, Political Structures and Democracy in Uruguay (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991).