Expense preference behavior in public transit systems

Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review

Volumn 36, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 249-265

  Obeng, K ^a  

^a NORTH CAROLINA A AND T STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MASS TRANSPORTATION; URBAN TRANSPORTATION;

BEHAVIOUR MODELS; CAPITAL SUBSIDY; ESTIMATED MODEL; FIRST-ORDER CONDITIONS; MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR; PUBLIC TRANSIT SYSTEMS; RELATIVE PRICES; SHADOW PRICE; TRANSIT SYSTEMS;

COSTS;

METHODOLOGY; PUBLIC TRANSPORT; SHADOW PRICING; SUBSIDY SYSTEM; TRANSPORTATION PLANNING;

EID: 0033831575     PISSN: 13665545     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1366-5545(99)00033-2     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. A test of relative and absolute price efficiency in regulated utilities
2. Implications of property rights for government investment choices
3. Expense preference behavior and contract-management: Evidence from US hospital
4. Allocative inefficiency in the production of hospital services
5. A distance function approach to price efficiency
6. Productive efficiency and contract management: Some evidence from public transit agencies
7. Local public sector bureaucrats and their input choices
8. Expense preference and managerial control: The case of the banking system
9. The relative efficiency of city manager and mayor-council forms of government
10. Profit sharing and productivity: Microeconomic evidence from the US
11. Renegotiation and optimality in agency contracts
12. Testing for expense preference behavior: Mutual versus stock savings and loans
13. Nonmarket decision making: The peculiar economics of bureaucracy
14. Specification of long-run cost function to estimate input bias from transit subsidies
15. The intended relationship between federal operating subsidy and cost
16. Type of management and subsidy-induced allocative distortions in urban transit firms: A time series approach
17. Subsidies and inefficiency: A stochastic frontier approach
18. Delegation of monitoring in a principal-agent relationship