Retreat from specialisation: A coal port's search for sustainability

Journal of Transport History

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 168-190

  Todd, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Coal; Diversification; Ports; Specialisation; Survival

Indexed keywords

COAL TRADE; HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY; PORT; SPECIALIZATION; SUSTAINABILITY; TRANSPORTATION SAFETY;

ENGLAND(CUMBRIA); MARYPORT; UNITED KINGDOM;

EID: 0033791929     PISSN: 00225266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.7227/TJTH.21.2.3     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. In terms of modern coal carriage, considered globally, sea transport accounts for 35-45 per cent of the total delivered cost, rail and inland, navigation together account for 30-50 per cent, with the balance imputed to terminal charges. See F. E. Banks, The Political Economy of Coal (Lexington MA, 1985).
2. Reviews of the rail-port partnership and its evolution are legion. See J. E. Vance, Capturing the Horizon: the historical geography of transportation (New York, 1986).
3. Special ports are dedicated to handling a single bulk commodity (or a few like commodities). They are the antithesis of general ports. See G. Alexandersson and G. Norström, World Shipping: an economic geography of ports and trade (New York, 1963). Coal ports are typical special ports.
4. Strictly, port engineers regard excavated structures - dredged channels, docks and the like - as infrastructure, reserving the term 'superstructure' for erected structures such as warehouses. For a good review of all port facilities refer to P. Bruun, Port Engineering (Houston TX, 1973).
5. Details of the stages or eras are to be found in J. Bird, The Major Seaports of the United Kingdom (1963), pp. 27-34. The existence of small, specialised ports, distinct from the general Anyport, is explicitly recognised in J. Bird, Seaports and Seaport Terminals (1971), p. 74. They may be viewed as appendages of large ports, geographically detached representatives of the sixth era, that of 'specialised quayage'.
6. Details of the stages or eras are to be found in J. Bird, The Major Seaports of the United Kingdom (1963), pp. 27-34. The existence of small, specialised ports, distinct from the general Anyport, is explicitly recognised in J. Bird, Seaports and Seaport Terminals (1971), p. 74. They may be viewed as appendages of large ports, geographically detached representatives of the sixth era, that of 'specialised quayage'.
7. Many British dock companies in the nineteenth century succumbed to this tendency, with their expansion schemes outstripping their ability to raise capital. Strapped for cash, they were compelled to turn to rich donors outside the port industry, particularly the railways. Hull and Southampton were cases in point. See A. G. Kenwood, 'Port investment in England and Wales, 1851-1913', Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research 17 (1965), pp. 156-67.
8. They made sure that their grip on the management of the port remained secure. The 1749 legislation sanctioning the port granted Humphrey Senhouse the right to set dues. The same Act gave him and his successors management rights over the associated settlement. Expansion and its calls on investment necessitated new legislation, the Maryport Act of 1833, which extended the management base of port and town to thirteen trustees: the lord of the manor as chairman (J. Pocklington Senhouse), four of his nominees, and eight others (elected by secret ballot every five years) drawn from the ranks of the ratepayers and shipowners. The composition of the original board of trustees can be elicited from the Harbour Trustees' Minute Books I, 1833-39. The Local Government Act of 1894 was instrumental in diluting Senhouse control. A parallel piece of legislation, the Maryporr Harbour Act of 1894, succeeded in hiving the town off from the port and broadening the board of management at the same time. However, the lord of the manor retained his chairmanship, together with the right to nominate one of the new commissioners (and this situation obtained until the port's withdrawal from commercial shipping).
9. The town was later to spread on to the coastal extremity of the ridge.
10. T. Eastwood, The Geology of the Maryport District (1930), pp. 2-7.
11. This industry got under way in the 1870s. An interesting portent, dating from the 1750s, was a furnace erected on the outskirts of the new town which used Broughton Moor coal to smelt local ironstone. This establishment was overshadowed by the much more important Clifton furnace near Workington and, like it, had ceased operating during the Napoleonic Wars. Note J. C. Carr and W. Taplin, History of the British Steel Industry (1963), p. 2, and O. Wood, West Cumberland Coal, 1600-1982/3 (Carlisle, 1988), p. 36.
12. This industry got under way in the 1870s. An interesting portent, dating from the 1750s, was a furnace erected on the outskirts of the new town which used Broughton Moor coal to smelt local ironstone. This establishment was overshadowed by the much more important Clifton furnace near Workington and, like it, had ceased operating during the Napoleonic Wars. Note J. C. Carr and W. Taplin, History of the British Steel Industry (1963), p. 2, and O. Wood, West Cumberland Coal, 1600-1982/3 (Carlisle, 1988), p. 36.
13. Ironically, many of the early shipments from Ellenfoot came from the Dearham pits of Sir James Lowther (and Lowtherowned coal from Dearham was to continue to flow through Maryport until the beginning of the twentieth century). Increasingly, however, the Lowthers' coal shipments were directed through Whitehaven. The consequences of their investment in Whitehaven were soon plain to see, as is recorded in J. E. Williams, 'Whitehaven in the eighteenth century', Economic History Review, second series, 8 (1956), pp. 393-404.
14. An aspect of the port judged of sufficient merit to warrant mentioning in Hannix & Whelan's History, Gazetteer, and Directory of Cumberland (Beverley, 1874), p. 544.
15. Wood, West Cumberland Coal, p. 106.
16. Ibid., p. 127.
17. J. Simmons, The Maryport and Carlisle Railway (Chislehurst, 1947).
18. In 1864, after gaining operating rights over the Cockermouth Keswick & Penrith Railway, which fed into its main London - Carlisle line at the last-named town, the LNWR gathered up a string of west Cumberland railways. In 1866 the Whitehaven Junction (opened in 1846 between Maryport and Workington before pushing through to Whitehaven the following year) and the Cockermouth & Workington (opened in 1847) were absorbed. A decade later the Whitehaven Cleator & Egremont Railway (WCER) fell under the joint control of the LNWR and the Furness Railway. The WCER had been incorporated in 1854 with the express purpose of linking the haematite orefield with the coast. Thus, between them, the LNWK, Furness Railway and Cleator & Workington Junction Railway (authorised in 1876) controlled the distribution of Cumberland iron ore. Refer to M. C. Reed, The London & North Western Railway: a history (Penryn, 1996), pp. 100-2.
19. Port authorities of the day charged dues according ro net registered tonnage (nrt) - a measure of a ship's volume available for cargo - rather than by deadweight, the ship's actual carrying capacity by weight. The nrt of a ship roughly corresponds to 40 per cent of its deadweight. See H. Agerschou, H. Lunderen and T. Sorensen, Planning and Design of Ports and Marine Terminals (Chichester, 1983), pp. 38-9. As for collier size, in his classic 1915 book Jevons made much of the cheapening of coal freights after 1850, attributing the cause in part to economies of scale in marine transport. See H. S. Jevons, The British Coal Trade (New York, 1969), pp. 689-91. The fact remains, however, that the pioneer modern collier, the John Bowes of 1852. had a carrying capacity of only 650 tons. Note P. S. Bagwell and J. Armstrong, 'Coastal shipping', in M. J. Freeman and D. H. Aldcroft (eds), Transport in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 1988), pp. 171-217.
20. Port authorities of the day charged dues according ro net registered tonnage (nrt) - a measure of a ship's volume available for cargo - rather than by deadweight, the ship's actual carrying capacity by weight. The nrt of a ship roughly corresponds to 40 per cent of its deadweight. See H. Agerschou, H. Lunderen and T. Sorensen, Planning and Design of Ports and Marine Terminals (Chichester, 1983), pp. 38-9. As for collier size, in his classic 1915 book Jevons made much of the cheapening of coal freights after 1850, attributing the cause in part to economies of scale in marine transport. See H. S. Jevons, The British Coal Trade (New York, 1969), pp. 689-91. The fact remains, however, that the pioneer modern collier, the John Bowes of 1852. had a carrying capacity of only 650 tons. Note P. S. Bagwell and J. Armstrong, 'Coastal shipping', in M. J. Freeman and D. H. Aldcroft (eds), Transport in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 1988), pp. 171-217.
21. Port authorities of the day charged dues according ro net registered tonnage (nrt) - a measure of a ship's volume available for cargo - rather than by deadweight, the ship's actual carrying capacity by weight. The nrt of a ship roughly corresponds to 40 per cent of its deadweight. See H. Agerschou, H. Lunderen and T. Sorensen, Planning and Design of Ports and Marine Terminals (Chichester, 1983), pp. 38-9. As for collier size, in his classic 1915 book Jevons made much of the cheapening of coal freights after 1850, attributing the cause in part to economies of scale in marine transport. See H. S. Jevons, The British Coal Trade (New York, 1969), pp. 689-91. The fact remains, however, that the pioneer modern collier, the John Bowes of 1852. had a carrying capacity of only 650 tons. Note P. S. Bagwell and J. Armstrong, 'Coastal shipping', in M. J. Freeman and D. H. Aldcroft (eds), Transport in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 1988), pp. 171-217.
22. The rationale of the hurry was explained to the trustees at the meeting of 18 November 1862. See Harbour Trustees' Minute Books III, 1855-66.
23. The original St Helens collieries (Nos. 1 and 2) were located just off the LNWR line from Maryport to Workington, south of the settlement of Flimby. The new St Helens No. 3, sunk at Siddick, was barely 2 km north of Workington port.
24. There is some evidence to suggest that the LNWR lost interest in shipping coal through Maryport in subsequent years. For example, at their meeting of 12 October 1892 the trustees were lamenting the neglected condition of the LNWR's 'coal drop' in the Elizabeth Basin. See Harbour Trustees/Commissioners' Minute Books VI, 1882-98.
25. Mineral carriage earned the company £138,610 in 1873, contrasting significantly with the next peak of 1881, when only £82,955 was earned. By 1899 minerals were accounting for only £56, 125 of the MCR's revenues. See P. Robinson, Maryport & Carlisle 150 (Grange over Sands, 1995), p. 182.
26. For a brief period the MCR indulged in the carriage of iron ore, transferring haematite from west Cumberland (e.g. from Baird's mines at Kelton and Knockmurton) to Caledonian tracks at Brayton Junction for onward carriage to Clydeside. However, this traffic had drastically diminished by 1880. Note S. Edgar amd J. M. Sinton, The Solway Junction Railway (Oxford, 1990), p. 21.
27. Equivalent totals for Furness were 336,828 tons and 784,507 tons. Recorded in R. Burt, P. Waite and R. Burnley, The Cumberland Mineral Statistics, 1845-1913 (Exeter, 1982).
28. The year 1882 marked the peak of Cumberland output prior to 1914, when the mines raised 1,725,478 tons, or 9.6 per cent of British production. That same year was also the peak for the north-west coast in respect of its share (12 per cent) of British pig-iron production. See A. Birch, The Economic History of the British Iron and Steel Industry, 1784-1879 (1967), pp. 343-4.
29. In addition, the Ellen Rolling Mills, founded in 1869, produced wrought iron and later dabbled in Bessemer steel production. Full details are to be found in J. Y. Lancaster and D. R. Wattleworth, The Iron and Steel Industry of West Cumberland: a historical survey (Workington, 1977).
30. The coastal location was judged so superior to an inland alternative that Charles Cammell & Co., the Sheffield steelmakers, not only bought the Derwent Iron Company at Workington in 1883 but transferred their rail-making plant from Dronfield to the Cumbrian port. See J. Austin and M. Ford, Steel Town Dronfield and Wilson Cammell, 1873-83 (Sheffield, 1983).
31. M. W. Flinn, 'British steel and Spanish ore, 1870-1914', Economic History Review, second series, 8 (1955), pp. 84-90. The Cumberland iron and steel producers were eager to import Spanish ore - notwithstanding the still rising output of local ore - because it served to drive down the price of Cumberland haematite. Note H. G. Roepke, Movements of the British Iron and Steel Industry, 1720-1951 (Urbana IL, 1956), pp. 76-7.
32. M. W. Flinn, 'British steel and Spanish ore, 1870-1914', Economic History Review, second series, 8 (1955), pp. 84-90. The Cumberland iron and steel producers were eager to import Spanish ore - notwithstanding the still rising output of local ore - because it served to drive down the price of Cumberland haematite. Note H. G. Roepke, Movements of the British Iron and Steel Industry, 1720-1951 (Urbana IL, 1956), pp. 76-7.
33. By 1889 ore shipments were arriving from both northern and southern Spain, and Cartagena had come to rival Bilbao, Santander and Castro Urdiales as a major source of ore discharged at Maryport. See Arrivals and Sailings Books, 1888-1951.
34. Ironically, one proposal, prepared by Hawkshaw Sons & Hayter, would have avoided the channel entrance problem which was to plague the Senhouse Dock at a later date. Built on reclaimed land north of the existing piers, this 12 ha enclosed dock would have been graced with an entrance lock fronting directly on the sea. Plans for it exist in the Proposed New Dock (1874) file of the Maryporr Harbour Trustees' materials at the Cumbria Record Office.
35. It became Great Lakes practice to build ore docks - steel and concrete piers containing ore pockets in series - capable of marshalling loads up to 10,000 tons. In the 1880s, however, ore carriage was largely in the hands of 3,000 ton vessels and only after 1895 did 10,000 dwt vessels become prevalent. See D. L. Burn, The Economic History of Steelmaking, 1867-1939 (Cambridge, 1940), p. 152, and P. C. Dorin, The Lake Superior Iron Ore Railroads (Seattle, 1969). British ports, lacking the huge volume shipments of Great Lakes ports, settled for smaller ore consignments. It is worth remembering that the average size of steamers in the British tramp fleet was only 3,500 gross tons (roughly 5,250 dwt) as late as 1910. Note P. N. Thomas, British Ocean Tramps I, Builders and Cargoes (Wolverhampton, 1992), p. 18.
36. It became Great Lakes practice to build ore docks - steel and concrete piers containing ore pockets in series - capable of marshalling loads up to 10,000 tons. In the 1880s, however, ore carriage was largely in the hands of 3,000 ton vessels and only after 1895 did 10,000 dwt vessels become prevalent. See D. L. Burn, The Economic History of Steelmaking, 1867-1939 (Cambridge, 1940), p. 152, and P. C. Dorin, The Lake Superior Iron Ore Railroads (Seattle, 1969). British ports, lacking the huge volume shipments of Great Lakes ports, settled for smaller ore consignments. It is worth remembering that the average size of steamers in the British tramp fleet was only 3,500 gross tons (roughly 5,250 dwt) as late as 1910. Note P. N. Thomas, British Ocean Tramps I, Builders and Cargoes (Wolverhampton, 1992), p. 18.
37. It became Great Lakes practice to build ore docks - steel and concrete piers containing ore pockets in series - capable of marshalling loads up to 10,000 tons. In the 1880s, however, ore carriage was largely in the hands of 3,000 ton vessels and only after 1895 did 10,000 dwt vessels become prevalent. See D. L. Burn, The Economic History of Steelmaking, 1867-1939 (Cambridge, 1940), p. 152, and P. C. Dorin, The Lake Superior Iron Ore Railroads (Seattle, 1969). British ports, lacking the huge volume shipments of Great Lakes ports, settled for smaller ore consignments. It is worth remembering that the average size of steamers in the British tramp fleet was only 3,500 gross tons (roughly 5,250 dwt) as late as 1910. Note P. N. Thomas, British Ocean Tramps I, Builders and Cargoes (Wolverhampton, 1992), p. 18.
38. Calculated by the author from data furnished in the dock returns for that month, namely Maryport Arrivals and Sailings Books, 1888-1951, file S/H2, Cumbria Record Office.
39. All the Workington operations had succumbed to Cammell Laird by 1909, reappearing as the Workington Iron & Steel Company. Maryport, too, had been subjected to Cammell's attentions, since the Solway Haemarite Iron Company had fallen under their control in 1896. Note Lancaster and Wattleworth, The Iron and Steel Industry of West Cumberland, p. 175. Cammell's, accordingly, wielded great influence over ore imports.
40. The port trustees, anticipating local government restructuring, were clamouring for extra powers to handle the mortgage debt incurred in building the Senhouse Dock. When duly constituted under the Maryport Harbour Act of 1894, the commissioners, chaired by the lord of the manor, consisted of two elected coal owners, two elected shipowners, three elected bondholders, the general manager of the MCR, a representative of the LNWR and a shipping agent: the last three appointed by Humphrey Pocklington Senhouse. In addition, the new Urban District Council nominated two commissioners. The meetings of 23 June 1893 and 17 October 1894, recorded in the Harbour Trustees/Commissioners' Minute Books VI, 1882-98, are especially informative on these matters. Port charges were generally revised upward to meet debt obligations.
41. To be sure, the 1920s were bad for British coal shipments in general, the result of problems in export markets. Note J. Armstrong, 'Climax and climacteric: the British coastal trade, 1870-1930', in D. J. Starkey and A. G. Jamieson (eds), Exploiting the Sea: aspects of Britain's maritime economy since 1870 (Exeter, 1998), pp. 37-58.
42. To all intents and purposes Cammell Laird comprised the remaining ore importers. Not only did they own the Workington steelworks but, by virtue of appointing five trustees, they retained a strong influence on the activities of the Workington Harbour & Dock Board, the body responsible for initiating the Prince of Wales Dock project.
43. Reported in the meeting of 4 March 1930. See Harbour Commissioners' Minute Books IX, 1923-38.
44. The terms of the assistance were spelled out in a letter to the Maryport commissioners from the Commissioner for Special Areas
45. Wood, West Cumberland Coal, pp. 261-2.
46. The life cycle of a coalfield, together with the ramifications for the associated transport infrastructure, receives an airing in H. Millward, 'A model of coalfield developmnet: six stages exemplified by the Sydney field', Canadian Geographer 29 (1985), PP. 234-48.
47. J. Thomas, The North British Railway (New York, 1969), p. 201.
48. Jackson cites Silloth as an example of wasted dock investment. See G, Jackson, 'The ports', in Freeman and Aldcroft, Transport in Victorian Britain, p. 232.
49. The MCR's aggressive pricing strategy was not out of keeping with the times. For an overview of general practice see G. R. Hawke, 'Pricing policy of railways in England and Wales before 1881', in M. C. Reed (ed.), Railways in the Victorian Economy: studies in finance and economic growth (New York, 1968), pp. 76-110.
50. The relevance of traffic capture ratios is demonstrated in F. H. Thomas, 'Some relationships between a railroad route and its region', Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 53 (1962), pp. 155-61.
51. J. U. Nef, The Rise of the British Coal Industry (1932), p. 71.
52. Goods shipment data are available from September 1881 until the end of 1896. In amended form they recur in a series of Import and Export Books, issued from 1904 to 1951.
53. Some idea of the scale can be got from the Cardiff experience. See M. J. Daunton, Coal Metropolis: Cardiff, 1870-1914 (Leicester, 1977). Hartlepool and the others are placed in context in G. Jackson, The History and Archaeology of Ports (Tadworrh, 1983).
54. Some idea of the scale can be got from the Cardiff experience. See M. J. Daunton, Coal Metropolis: Cardiff, 1870-1914 (Leicester, 1977). Hartlepool and the others are placed in context in G. Jackson, The History and Archaeology of Ports (Tadworrh, 1983).
55. B. R. Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, 1800-1914 (Cambridge, 1984).
56. Proximity proved to be a steadily degrading asset, offset by rising production costs. By 1953 Ayrshire coal landed at Belfast and Londonderry was decidedly cheaper than its Whitehaven competitor. See K. S. Isles and N. Cuthbert, An Economic Survey of Northern Ireland (Belfast, 1957), pp. 134-6.
57. Many ore carriers preferred to clear Maryport in ballast, loading at South Wales ports with coal for Spain. However, the extension of the ore trade to such North African ports as Beni Saf and Melilla in the 1910s did boost the loading of coal at Maryport for ships' bunkers.
58. G. H. J. Daysh, West Cumberland: a survey of industrial facilities (Whitehaven, 1938), p. 155.
59. The plan was considered at a meeting of 25 March 1909. A prospective company for overseeing the new dock, the Maryport Railways & Docks Company, had been mooted in the meeting of 21 January 1907. See Harbour Commissioners' Minute Books VII, 1898-1912.
60. Correspondence between the Ministry and port, dated 19 February 1920, is to be found in the Harbour Commissioners' Minute Books VIII, 1912-22.
61. The correspondence is detailed in the minutes of the meetings of 5 July 1916, 4 December 1916 and 28 February 1917. The Ministry of Munitions was eager to embrace American technology in ore handling. For a review of such developments, including the Hulett unloader and its grab attachment, see H. R. Mills and M. J. H. Giedroyc, 'Iron ore terminals', in A. J. Savory (ed.), Conference on Tanker and Bulk Carrier Terminals (1969), pp. 59-65.
62. Of course, all British railways proved tardy in adopting larger mineral wagons, a shortcoming pounced on by critics then and now. See, for example, J. Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914 (Leicester, 1978), pp. 205-7; T. C. Barker and C. I. Savage, An Economic History of Transport in Britain (1974), pp. 98-9; R. J. Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company, 1870-1914: an economic history (Leicester, 1976), pp. 211-23.
63. Of course, all British railways proved tardy in adopting larger mineral wagons, a shortcoming pounced on by critics then and now. See, for example, J. Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914 (Leicester, 1978), pp. 205-7; T. C. Barker and C. I. Savage, An Economic History of Transport in Britain (1974), pp. 98-9; R. J. Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company, 1870-1914: an economic history (Leicester, 1976), pp. 211-23.
64. Of course, all British railways proved tardy in adopting larger mineral wagons, a shortcoming pounced on by critics then and now. See, for example, J. Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914 (Leicester, 1978), pp. 205-7; T. C. Barker and C. I. Savage, An Economic History of Transport in Britain (1974), pp. 98-9; R. J. Irving, The North Eastern Railway Company, 1870-1914: an economic history (Leicester, 1976), pp. 211-23.