The nature and future of civil-military relations in Indonesia

Asian Survey

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 692-706

  Lee, Terence ^a,b  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP; MILITARY GOVERNMENT; NATIONAL POLITICS; POLITICAL PARTICIPATION;

INDONESIA;

EID: 0033789176     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3021189     Document Type: Article

References (53)

1. "Survey Reveals ABRI's Poor Image," Jakarta Post, September 29, 1998.
2. Harold Crouch, "Indonesia," in Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, eds. Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 50. A similar but less fleshed out argument by Crouch also appears in Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1988), p. 35.
3. Harold Crouch, "Indonesia," in Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, eds. Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 50. A similar but less fleshed out argument by Crouch also appears in Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1988), p. 35.
4. S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), chaps. 4-6; and Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 255-73.
5. S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), chaps. 4-6; and Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 255-73.
6. Muthiah Alagappa, "The Military: Professionalism and the Developmental Role," in Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia, eds. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), p. 25.
7. David Jenkins, "The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of Dwifungsi," Southeast Asian Journal of Social Sciences 11:2 (1983), pp. 16-17.
8. Guy Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John Johnston (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 207.
9. The PRRI and Permesta rebellions were regional uprisings, the former occurring in Sulawesi and the latter in Sumatra. Both originated with the regional military commanders' dissatisfaction over Jakarta's unequal distribution of political power and economic returns from regional exports of raw materials.
10. See Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, p. 127; Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-58 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1966), pp. 191-92; and A. H. Nasution, Tonggak, Tonggak Dwi Fungsi (Milestones of dwifungsi) (Jakarta, mimeograph, 1981), p. 17.
11. See Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, p. 127; Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-58 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1966), pp. 191-92; and A. H. Nasution, Tonggak, Tonggak Dwi Fungsi (Milestones of dwifungsi) (Jakarta, mimeograph, 1981), p. 17.
12. See Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, p. 127; Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-58 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1966), pp. 191-92; and A. H. Nasution, Tonggak, Tonggak Dwi Fungsi (Milestones of dwifungsi) (Jakarta, mimeograph, 1981), p. 17.
13. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 191.
14. Much of the discussion here on the reasons behind the Indonesian military's involvement in politics has been drawn from Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, chap. 7.
15. Finer, The Man on Horseback, pp. 83-84.
16. For an account of these elections see Nasution, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Nasional Dibidang Bersendjata (History of the national armed struggle) (Jakarta: [n.p.], 1966), p. 85, cited in Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, pp. 20-21.
17. For an account of these elections see Nasution, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Nasional Dibidang Bersendjata (History of the national armed struggle) (Jakarta: [n.p.], 1966), p. 85, cited in Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, pp. 20-21.
18. For more details, see George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), chaps. 6, 9, and 10.
19. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 171; Crouch, The Army and Politics, p. 28; and Jenkins, "The Evolution," p. 15.
20. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 171; Crouch, The Army and Politics, p. 28; and Jenkins, "The Evolution," p. 15.
21. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964), p. 171; Crouch, The Army and Politics, p. 28; and Jenkins, "The Evolution," p. 15.
22. Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, pp. 166-70 and 180-95. The term NASAKOM-ization is derived from Nasionalis (nationalism), Agama (religion), and Komunis (communism), which Sukarno identified as the three major sociopolitical forces in Indonesian society. The NASAKOM-ization effort represented his attempt to unify these forces into a singular ideology. For more details, see Donald Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966). The Fifth Force was suggested by Sukarno as a parallel service to the army, air force, navy, and police that would be staffed by peasants and workers. It likely was meant to counterbalance the influence of the army.
23. Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, pp. 166-70 and 180-95. The term NASAKOM-ization is derived from Nasionalis (nationalism), Agama (religion), and Komunis (communism), which Sukarno identified as the three major sociopolitical forces in Indonesian society. The NASAKOM-ization effort represented his attempt to unify these forces into a singular ideology. For more details, see Donald Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966). The Fifth Force was suggested by Sukarno as a parallel service to the army, air force, navy, and police that would be staffed by peasants and workers. It likely was meant to counterbalance the influence of the army.
24. Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, p. 266.
25. These admissions of past abuses have been repeated by current TNI Chief Admiral Widodo and Army Chief Tyasno in April this year. See "TNI Begins to Reassess Its Role, Plans Action," Jakarta Post, April 20, 2000; and "Tyasno Apologizes for Army's Past Mistakes," Jakarta Post, April 27, 2000.
26. These admissions of past abuses have been repeated by current TNI Chief Admiral Widodo and Army Chief Tyasno in April this year. See "TNI Begins to Reassess Its Role, Plans Action," Jakarta Post, April 20, 2000; and "Tyasno Apologizes for Army's Past Mistakes," Jakarta Post, April 27, 2000.
27. Derwin Pereira, "ABRI Concedes It Was Tool of Suharto," Straits Times, October 7, 1998; and Imanuddin, "1998: A Year of Questions and Turmoil for ABRI," Jakarta Post, December 31, 1998.
28. Derwin Pereira, "ABRI Concedes It Was Tool of Suharto," Straits Times, October 7, 1998; and Imanuddin, "1998: A Year of Questions and Turmoil for ABRI," Jakarta Post, December 31, 1998.
29. Deriwn Pereira, "Indonesia's ABRI Goes Into Soul Searching," Straits Times, July 2, 1998; and David Jenkins, "Army Reform Vows Fall on Skeptical Ears," Sydney Morning Herald, June 1, 1999. TNI Chief Admiral Widodo also reaffirmed this commitment to quit the legislature by 2004. See "Widodo Says Military Ready to Quit Parliament," Straits Times, February 26, 2000.
30. Deriwn Pereira, "Indonesia's ABRI Goes Into Soul Searching," Straits Times, July 2, 1998; and David Jenkins, "Army Reform Vows Fall on Skeptical Ears," Sydney Morning Herald, June 1, 1999. TNI Chief Admiral Widodo also reaffirmed this commitment to quit the legislature by 2004. See "Widodo Says Military Ready to Quit Parliament," Straits Times, February 26, 2000.
31. Deriwn Pereira, "Indonesia's ABRI Goes Into Soul Searching," Straits Times, July 2, 1998; and David Jenkins, "Army Reform Vows Fall on Skeptical Ears," Sydney Morning Herald, June 1, 1999. TNI Chief Admiral Widodo also reaffirmed this commitment to quit the legislature by 2004. See "Widodo Says Military Ready to Quit Parliament," Straits Times, February 26, 2000.
32. Imanuddin, "1998."
33. Derwin Pereira, "Key Position in ABRI Scrapped in Line with Reform," Straits Times, November 11, 1998.
34. "Police Will Be Under President's Control," Indonesian Observer, May 24, 2000.
35. The armed forces are organized primarily along territorial lines. The country is divided into 10 regional commands, which are further subdivided all the way down to the village level. For greater detail on the command structure, see Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1996), pp. 57-63.
36. Harold Crouch, "Wiranto and Habibie: Military-Civilian Relations Since May 1998," in Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, eds. Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (Clayton, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), pp. 139-40.
37. See Wimar Witoelar, "But Does Gus Dur See the Problem?" International Herald Tribune, May 12, 2000; and Donald K. Emmerson, "Indonesia's Problems Mount, and Jakarta Isn't Doing Much," International Herald Tribune, June 2, 2000.
38. See Wimar Witoelar, "But Does Gus Dur See the Problem?" International Herald Tribune, May 12, 2000; and Donald K. Emmerson, "Indonesia's Problems Mount, and Jakarta Isn't Doing Much," International Herald Tribune, June 2, 2000.
39. "Gus Dur Fires Two Ministers," Jakarta Post, April 25, 2000; and "Laksaman Denies Graft Allegations," Jakarta Post, April 29, 2000.
40. "Gus Dur Fires Two Ministers," Jakarta Post, April 25, 2000; and "Laksaman Denies Graft Allegations," Jakarta Post, April 29, 2000.
41. "President Announces Replacement of TNI Spokesman," Antara, January 13, 2000; and "TNI Spokesman Sudrajat Set to Be Replaced," Jakarta Post, January 14, 2000.
42. "President Announces Replacement of TNI Spokesman," Antara, January 13, 2000; and "TNI Spokesman Sudrajat Set to Be Replaced," Jakarta Post, January 14, 2000.
43. "A Blind Seer Points the Way: Indonesia's Frail New President Has Given His Country a Clear New Start," Economist, October 30, 1999; and Susan Sim, "Gus Dur Names Diverse Team," Straits Times, October 27, 1999.
44. "A Blind Seer Points the Way: Indonesia's Frail New President Has Given His Country a Clear New Start," Economist, October 30, 1999; and Susan Sim, "Gus Dur Names Diverse Team," Straits Times, October 27, 1999.
45. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, "Introduction," in Civil-Military Relations, pp. xxviii. Much of the discussion here has been adapted from this article.
46. Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 253-66.
47. Susan Sim and Robert Go, "Criticize but Don't Impeach," Straits Times, June 8, 2000; and "Alliance Reprimands Gus Dur," Jakarta Post, June 10, 2000.
48. Susan Sim and Robert Go, "Criticize but Don't Impeach," Straits Times, June 8, 2000; and "Alliance Reprimands Gus Dur," Jakarta Post, June 10, 2000.
49. See Kebijakan Pertahanan Keamanan Negara Republik Indonesia (The policy of state defense and security of the Republic of Indonesia) (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan, 1997), pp. 59-63.
50. "Indonesian Police Formally Separates from Armed Forces," Agence-France Presse, April 1, 1999.
51. "Abdurrahman to Install New Army Chief of Staff," Jakarta Post, November 20, 1999.
52. It is important to note that there are armed groups in Indonesia aside from the military itself. See Vedi R. Hadiz, "Paramilitaries: Civil Society Gets Ugly," Jakarta Post, May 24, 2000, p. 4; and "Civilian Guards 'Hamper TNI,' Kostrad Chief Agus Complains," Jakarta Post, April 26, 2000.
53. It is important to note that there are armed groups in Indonesia aside from the military itself. See Vedi R. Hadiz, "Paramilitaries: Civil Society Gets Ugly," Jakarta Post, May 24, 2000, p. 4; and "Civilian Guards 'Hamper TNI,' Kostrad Chief Agus Complains," Jakarta Post, April 26, 2000.