Ethics as problem and ethics as solution

International Journal of Biotechnology

Volumn 2, Issue 1-3, 2000, Pages 239-256

  Saner, Marc A ^a,b  

^a Environmental Science and Ethics   (Canada)

^b CARLETON UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

biotechnology; debate; discourse; Ethics; objectivity; regulation; tool; trade; value laden; values

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; HEALTH CARE; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE; RISKS; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

DEBATE; ETHICS; HUMAN HEALTH; OBJECTIVITY; VALUE LADEN;

BIOTECHNOLOGY;

EID: 0033720508     PISSN: 09636048     EISSN: 17415020     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1504/ijbt.2000.000137     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. I use ‘objective’ here in the sense of interpersonally verifiable. Lack of objectivity in this sense does not imply that ethical theories cannot be discussed rationally and objectively.
2. Note that I neither wish nor need to discuss fundamental critiques of science based on the argument that science is a social construct. The view that risk assessments are value-laden supports the opposite because the separation of science and values (or descriptive and normative dialogues risk and ethics) protects science from this line of criticism.
3. See, for example, Brunk, C., Haworth, L. and Lee, B. (1991) Value Assumptions in Risk Assessment: A Case Study of the Alachlor Controversy, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press
4. Levidow, L. and Carr, S. (1997) ‘How biotechnology regulation sets a risk/ethics boundary’, Agriculture and Human Values, Vol. 14, pp.29–43
5. Regal, P. (1996) ‘Metaphysics in genetic engineering: cryptic philosophy and ideology in the ‘science’ of risk assessment’, in Coping with Deliberate Release: The Limits of Risk Assessment (Ed.) Van Dommelen, A., Tilburg: International Centre for Human and Public Affairs, pp.15–32.
6. This observation is perhaps less obvious in the assessment of human health risks because, unlike in the case of our natural environment, we all share an approximately identical physiology.
7. This increased input by stakeholders is already a reality, see for example, Pittinger, C.A. (Ed.) (1998) Multi-Stakeholder Framework for Ecological Risk Management: Summary of a SETAC Technical Workshop. Pensacola, FL: SETAC Press.
8. See for example Bright, C. (1998) Life Out of Bounds: Bioinvasion in a Borderless World, New York: W.W. Norton & Company
9. orBaskin, Y. (1996) “Curbing undesirable invaders: The Norway/United Nations Conference on Alien Species calls for global action to squelch the rising tide of unwanted species”, BioScience, Vol. 46, pp.732–736. An aside: note in this context the important role that terminator technology could play at the stage of field trials and full registration of products.
10. Note that I have only discussed ethics in the regulatory context. Ethical issues such as environmental justice, the ethics of the monopolization of food resources, and so forth, could be added to what would become a substantial catalogue of additional issues.
11. Products with multiple intended effects and abiotic agents are not listed. Further, nondeliberate or accidental releases of biotechnological products are not covered. By nondeliberate release I mean, for example, the environmental release of genetically engineered micro-organisms after human consumption of milk products containing living specimens of these organisms or the outcrossing of transgenic plants with wild relatives. By accidental release I mean, for example, the escape of genetically engineered organisms designed for laboratory use.
12. Anderson, B. (1999) “Market access issues for Canadian seeds”, AgBiotech Bulletin No. 7/2, p.8, discusses diverging regulatory approaches between Canada and the European Union. Available at http://www.agwest.sk.ca.
13. Note that deontology and utilitarianism do by no means exhaust the possible approaches to ethics. A broader overview would have to, at least, discuss virtue ethics (ethics of character) where the focus is attitude rather than action.
14. The myth of Prometheus provides another way to illustrate how old and fundamental this debate is. Note that the full title of Mary Shelley’s book: Shelley, M. (1818) Frankenstein, or The Modern Prometheus, World’s Classic Paperback Edition, Oxford: University Press, 1980 - originally published in 1818 and 1831. In the most commonly known versions of this myth Prometheus is a half-god who steals fire from the primary god Zeus in order to protect humankind (sometimes expanded into the provision of the arts and sciences as a unique means of survival for humans). As retaliation for this act Zeus sends Pandora with a jar containing all evils to Prometheus’s brother who marries her. Pandora then opens the jar (‘Pandora’s Box’) and all evils immediately flow over the earth. Prometheus himself is tortured by Zeus. The key point is that Prometheus conserves his rebellious attitude despite Zeus’ terrible punishment. Why? Prometheus has the gift of foresight (as expressed by the name ‘Prometheus’) one could conceive of him as the ultimate consequentualist agent. Having foresight, it is not necessarily unwise to challenge the supreme god (Zeus) because Prometheus knows about the ultimately good consequences. Accordingly, the classical wrong of stealing fire does not lead only to undesirable consequences. The benefits of having technology are enormous, but Zeus’s revenge is powerful, and affects both the bearer of the ‘gift’ (Prometheus) and the receivers (humankind). The audience, who is not gifted with perfect foresight, must ponder the wisdom of this bold stance. The myth leaves room for justification of both a bold god-defeating attitude and the attitude of respect for the divine (or natural) order and the hesitation to commit hubris. There is a close relationship between this ancient riddle and our contemporary reflections about biotechnology and its diverging conceptions.
15. Posted on the new USDA Biotech Web site under Frequently Asked Questions ‘Why has biotechnology become a trade issue’? see http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/faqs.html.
16. At http://www.planetark.org.
17. This has been studied in much detail, particularly in Hawaii. See for example, Howarth, F.G. (1983) ‘Classical biocontrol: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?’ Proceedings, Hawaiian Entomological Society 24, pp.239–244.
18. This is, perhaps, what Val Giddings, vice president of the Washington-based Biotechnology Industry Organization, meant when he put forward during the last Biosafety meeting in Columbia: “The argument that gene exchange is problematic [i.e., risky] is bogus. Greenpeace and its likes have made a decision for metaphysical reasons that is opposed to biotechnology.” Anonymous (1999) “Greens and growers wide apart on bio-tech food”, Reuters Environmental News (http://www.planetark.org, 23 February).
19. After Norton, B. (1997) ‘Convergence and contextualism: some clarifications and a reply to Steverson’, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 19, pp.87–100; see also his 1991 book Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, New York: Oxford University Press.
20. HRH the Prince of Wales (1998) ‘Seeds of disaster’, The Ecologist, Vol. 28, No. 5, p.252.
21. Latin American Peasant, Indigenous, Environmental, and other Civil Society Sector Organizations (1999) ‘Latin American declaration on transgenic organisms’, posted on the Biodiversity Convention Listserver (biodiv-conv@igc.org, 18 February 1999).
22. Interesting in this context is that insiders (scientists, governments, industry) focus on ‘How small is the risk?’ while outsiders (the public) focus on ‘How large is the hazard?’.
23. SeeMiles, R. (1998) ‘Communication strategies for accessing the international market place’, AgBiotech Bulletin 6/7, pp.8–10.
24. This proposition is not far removed from the first of the five possibilities for the reconciliation between deontological and teleological (consequentualist) views that Robert Nozick lists: “1. Deontology as superstructure. While teleology is the correct theory, deontological rules are good rules of thumb to follow in attempting to maximize the good.”
25. SeeNozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge: Belknap Harvard University Press, p.495.
26. Connole, P. (1998) ‘Environmental issues popular, myths persist’, Reuters Environmental News (http://www.planetark.org, December 14,).
27. Rifkin, J. (1998) The Biotech Century: Harnessing the Gene and Remaking the World, New York: J.P. Tarcher/Putnam, p.79.
28. See alsovon Weizsäcker, C. (1996) ‘Lacking scientific knowledge or lacking the wisdom and culture of not-knowing’, in Coping with Deliberate Release: The Limits of Risk Assessment (Ed.) Van Dommelen, A., Tilburg: International Centre for Human and Public Affairs, pp.195–206.
29. Note that this prescription is designed to make the debate possible. It does not entail that many products will be rejected. Instead, it may cause policy makers and the public to develop reasonable expectations on what science is able to deliver a step away from the unreasonable expectations of absolute safety towards acceptance or risk in the light of expected benefits. \
30. See alsoLudwig, D. (1994) ‘Bad ecology leads to bad public policy’, Trends in Ecology and Evolution, Vol. 9, p.411.
31. Ongoing dialogue requires a forum. For an interesting idea see Graham, G. (1999) ‘A global conversation on biotechnology’, Viewpoint posted to the conference web site at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidbiotech/comments32.htm
32. As described by von Schomborg, R. (1999) ‘The precautionary principle in trade- environmental interface’, Viewpoint posted to the conference web site at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidbiotech/comments19.htm
33. ‘Respect for Nature’ is also known as biocentric ethics where moral standing is given to all life forms. See, for example, Taylor, P. (1986) Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, Princeton, NJ: University Press.
34. It is sometimes confusing when this concept is applied to the description of moral attitudes. The assessment of the values people hold are expressed as ‘is statements’ even if the content of this description is the normative beliefs (‘ought statements’) people hold.
35. Note that this argument only supports the emergence of an ethics debate over technology assessment. It does not explain the emergence of many of the other ethics issues discussed in the context of modern biotechnology.
36. It is sometimes proposed that a clear separation of risk assessment and risk management could solve this problem. In this view, risk assessment would contain only scientific analysis while risk management would contain all value assumptions. I have briefly argued in this paper that risk assessment conceived in this way cannot be stripped of all implicit value assumption (see the references cited for a full analysis of this issue).
37. I refer here one more time to the Promethean myth.