Risk averseness in user equilibrium traffic assignment: An application of game theory

Proceedings of the Conference on Traffic and Transportation Studies, ICTTS

Volumn , Issue , 2000, Pages 9-16

  Bell, Michael G H ^b   Cassir, Chris ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE   (Australia)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Costs; Risk management; Traffic assignment; Uncertainty principles

Indexed keywords

ALTERNATIVE APPROACH; CONVENTIONAL APPROACH; COST DISTRIBUTION; ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES; MIXED STRATEGY; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NETWORK USERS; NONCOOPERATIVE GAME; RISK AVERSE; ROUTE CHOICE; ROUTE COST; SOLUTION PROCEDURE; STANDARD DEVIATION; TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT; TRANSPORT NETWORKS; UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLES; USER EQUILIBRIUM; ZERO SUMS;

COSTS; GAME THEORY; RISK ANALYSIS; RISK MANAGEMENT; STATISTICS; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; DECISION THEORY; HIGHWAY SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION; PROBABILITY; RISK ASSESSMENT; TRANSPORTATION ROUTES;

RISK PERCEPTION; MOTOR TRANSPORTATION;

RISK AVERSE TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT; ROUTE CHOICE; ROUTE COSTS;

EID: 0033697434     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1061/40503(277)2     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (4)

1. Bell, M G H (1999) A game theory approach to measuring the performance reliability of transport networks. To appear in Transportation Research B.
2. Hall, P R (1983) Travel outcome and performance: The effect of uncertainty on accessibility. Transportation Research B, Vol. 17B, 275-290.
3. Nash, J (1951) Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics. Vol 54, pp 286-295.
4. th International Symposium on transportation and Traffic Theory (Ed. C F Daganzo), Elsevier, 89-105.