Multiple buyers, rent-defending and the observed social costs of monopoly

Pacific Economic Review

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 389-410

  Davis, Douglas D ^a   Reilly, Robert J ^a  

^a VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; MONOPOLY;

EID: 0033664585     PISSN: 1361374X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0106.00112     Document Type: Article

References (14)

1. Effort levels in contests: The public-good prize case
2. Competitive-share group formation in rent-seeking contests
3. Rent-seeking with multiple winners
4. Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer
5. Rent-seeking with non-identical sharing rules: An equilibrium rescued
6. Strategic buyers and the social cost of monopoly
7. An experimental investigation of efficient rent seeking
8. Risk aversion and rent seeking: An extension and some experimental evidence
9. Rent-seeking with non-identical sharing rules
10. The size of the prize: Testing rent-dissipation when transfer quantity is endogenous
11. Asymetric tournaments, equal opportunity laws, an affirmative action: Some experimental results
12. Reexamining efficient rent-seeking in laboratory markets
13. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft
14. On perfect rent dissipation