The challenge of the 1997 Hong Kong handover for Taiwan

Pacific Affairs

Volumn 72, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 553-569

  Chu, Yun Han ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BORDER REGION; GEOPOLITICS; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS;

CHINA; HONG KONG; TAIWAN;

EID: 0033504560     PISSN: 0030851X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2672397     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. According to the PRC's official definition, the "three links" are trade, shipping and postal links. But, in popular usage, they usually refer to direct air, sea and trade links. Pessimists worried that the PRC might threaten to block Taiwan's access to Hong Kong shipping and airport facilities after 1997 to force a resolution on the "three links."
2. For a sample of various concerns over how the deterioration in cross-strait relations might affect the prospect of Taiwan-Hong Kong relations beyond 1997, see Yun-han Chu, ed., The 1997 Transition and Taiwan-Hong Kong Relations (Jiuqi guodu yu taigang guanxi) (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1995).
3. The policy guideline was unveiled on 22 June 1995 at the meeting of the Preliminary Working Committee of the Preparatory Committee for the H.K.S.A.R. For full text of the seven-point guideline, see Beijing Review, 10-16 July 1995, p. 6.
4. The essence of the "one country, two systems" formula first appeared in a nine-point statement by Ye Jianying, Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, in January 1981. Deng Xiaoping officially coined the phrase in a meeting with Margaret Thatcher discussing the future of Hong Kong in September 1982. See Qiushi Yuan, ed., Collections of Important Policy Documents during Hong Kong's Transition (Xianggang guoduqi zhongyao wenjian huibian) (Hong Kong: Sanlian Publishers, 1997).
5. For example, Jiang Zemin in his interview by a Japanese news agency in 1997 indicated that the future top leader of Taiwan can serve concurrently as the vice-president of the PRC. Zhu Rongji repeated this message during his April 1999 trip to the United States.
6. See Richard Baum, "Britian's 'Betrayal' of Hong Kong: A Second Look," Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 8, no. 20 (March 1999), pp. 9-28.
7. See, for example, John Phipps, "Linking Hong Kong's and Taiwan's Future," in Donald H. McMillen and Michael E. DeGolyer, eds., One Culture, Many Systems: Politics in the Reunification of China (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993), and Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China's Challenge (London: Routledge, 1996).
8. See, for example, John Phipps, "Linking Hong Kong's and Taiwan's Future," in Donald H. McMillen and Michael E. DeGolyer, eds., One Culture, Many Systems: Politics in the Reunification of China (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993), and Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China's Challenge (London: Routledge, 1996).
9. Taipei was alarmed by this prospect because, through the bilateral negotiation over Taiwan's admission into the WTO, Hong Kong trade representatives had raised their concern about Taiwan's foreign investment regime, which prohibits any overseas firms with more than 20 percent mainland China ownership.
10. It is estimated that between 70 and 90 percent of the current trade between Taiwan and mainland China will be diverted from Hong Kong it the two sides of the Taiwan Strait establish direct trade and shipping links. As of 1997, the triangular trade accounts for more than 1 million 20-foot containers out of a total of just over 13 million handled annually by Hong Kong.
11. The United Kingdom does not officially recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan.
12. Due to some dispute over the nomenclature issue, in the conclusion of the meeting, the issue of Taiwan-Hong Kong relations was not explicitly included in the agenda for the upcoming semiofficial high-level talk. It was referred to, based on a tacit understanding, as "other important matters" to the conclusion.
13. It was known as the four joint editorials of New China News Agency and the People's Daily. The last time the CCP leadership used this conspicuous form to launch its political attack was the publication of "the Nine Editorials (jiuping)" on the eve of the breakup of Sino-Soviet relations.
14. On this point, please refer to Yun-han Chu, "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Mainland Policy," Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 15 (July 1997), pp. 229-57.
15. For the profile and function of the Taiwan Affairs Leaders Small Group, see Yun-han Chu, "Jiang Zemin and the Evolution of Beijing's Policy toward Taiwan," in Tien Hung-mao and Chu Yun-han, eds., China Under Jiang Zemin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienners Publishers, forthcoming).
16. According to Taipei's Mainland Affairs Council, this is a quotation from Qian's address to a high-level Taiwan Affairs Working Meeting, held on 11-13 May 1994.
17. According to Taiwan's official source, this popular expression found its first official appearance in the CCP Central Office Directive (Zhongfa wenjian), no. 3, 1992.
18. See Mainland Affairs Council, Hong Kong and Macau Monthly (Gangao yuebao), no. 63 (15 January 1997).
19. For Taipei's official statement on this, see Mainland Affairs Council, Taipei, May 1996, "The Republic of China's Policy Toward Hong Kong and Macau," 〈http://www.mac.gov.tw/associ/ass_hm/87/880311.html〉.
20. There were nine semiofficial representative offices based in Hong Kong on the eve of the handover. For details, please refer to Mainland Affairs Council, " Policy Toward Hong Kong and Macau."
21. In the second half of 1996, Taipei approached the Hong Kong as well as British government to discuss the legal status of Chung-Hwa Travel Agency but did not get any positive response. This information is based on a private communcation with Cheng An-guo in May 1997.
22. Based on an interview with Tang Shubei, a deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office under the State Council, on 13 January 1997 in Beijing.
23. For the details of the agreement, see United Daily, 25 May 1997, p. 3.
24. The agreement allows the domestic shipping companies of the two sides to operate the Kaohsiung to Fuzhou and Xiamen route, initially for transshipping purpose only for Taiwan-bound trips.
25. See United Daily, 26 June 1997, p. 1.
26. Tang Shubei issued an unfriendly warning again on 25 June, accusing Taipei of its plot to stir things up around July 1st.
27. Beijing was irked by Lee's announced plan because the centerpiece of the proposed constitutional amendment was to abolish the Taiwan Provincial Government, thus tearing down one of the last remaining jurisdictional pretenses that Taiwan is a province of China. Beijing also suspected that Lee was eager to complete the constitutional reform by the time of the Hong Kong handover becaused he wanted to make a political statement to the international community that there is no longer a legal foundation for Beijing's "one country" claim, let alone "two systems."
28. For the latest statistical data, please refer to the Mainland Affairs Council's website at: 〈http://www.mac.gov.tw/associ/ass-hm/87/880311.html〉.
29. The only exception was when Cheng An-kuo was openly criticized by a senior official of the Xinhua News Agency for his comments on Lee Teng-hui's "state-to-state" formula. See South China Morning Post, 8 August 1999.
30. Chang was accompanied by Paul Yip throughout his visit. However, according to credible sources, Chang did not meet with C. H. Tung this time. For an account of his visit, see United Daily, 14 May 1998.
31. According to a poll conducted in October 1998, only 8.7 percent of the respondents accept the "one country, two systems" formula while 76.4 percent reject it. For more details, please refer to: 〈http:/www.mac.gov.tw/pos/871113/8711c8.gif〉.
32. See Elaine Chan and Rowena Kwok, "Domocratization in Turmoil? Elections in Hong Kong," Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 8, no. 20 (March 1999), pp. 47-60.