The real value of welfare: Why poor families do not migrate

Politics and Society

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 39-66

  Schram, Sanford ^a   Soss, Joe ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033485089     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329299027001003     Document Type: Review

References (112)

1. See Russell Hanson and David T. Hartman, "Do Welfare Magnets Attract?" (Discussion Paper #1028-14, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994).
2. Sanford F. Schram and Gary Krueger, "'Welfare Magnets' and Benefit Decline: Symbolic Problems and Substantive Consequences," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 24, no. 4 (1994): 61-81.
3. Irene Lurie, "Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: A Green Light for the States," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 27, no. 2 (1997): 73-88.
4. See Helen Hershkoff and Stephen Loffredo, The Rights of the Poor (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1997), 45-46. Title 42 was amended to include a new Section 402(a), stating that "a State operating a program funded under this part may apply to a family the rules (including benefit amounts) of the program funded under this part of another State if the family has moved to the State from the other State and has resided in the State for less than 12 months." This option is now under review by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Anderson v. Roe (98-97).
5. Ibid., 45.
6. See John D. Donahue, Disunited States: What's at Stake as Washington Fades and the States Take the Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 133-36. The contemporary debate about a "race to the bottom" in welfare was initiated by Paul E. Peterson and Mark C. Rom, Welfare Magnets: A New Case for a National Standard (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990).
7. See John D. Donahue, Disunited States: What's at Stake as Washington Fades and the States Take the Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 133-36. The contemporary debate about a "race to the bottom" in welfare was initiated by Paul E. Peterson and Mark C. Rom, Welfare Magnets: A New Case for a National Standard (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990).
8. Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 6-13.
9. As Peterson and Rom have argued, policy makers could quickly undercut the potential for welfare migration by creating a national program offering uniform benefits in each state. See Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 119-50.
10. Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, The Breaking of the American Social Compact (New York: The New Press, 1997), 72.
11. Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Theda Skocpol, "African Americans in U.S. Social Policy," in Paul E. Peterson, ed., Classifying by Race (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
12. Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Theda Skocpol, "African Americans in U.S. Social Policy," in Paul E. Peterson, ed., Classifying by Race (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
13. Joel F. Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld, The Moral Construction of Poverty: Welfare Reform in America (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991).
14. Joel F. Handler, The Poverty of Welfare Reform (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 91.
15. Ibid.; Handler and Hasenfeld, The Moral Construction of Poverty.
16. Ibid.; Handler and Hasenfeld, The Moral Construction of Poverty.
17. Regarding the foundations of distributive justice, Michael Walzer writes, "The primary good we distribute to one another is membership in some human community. And what we do with regard to membership structures all our other distributive choices." See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 31.
18. Handler and Hasenfeld, The Moral Construction of Poverty.
19. Karl de Schweinitz, England's Road to Social Security, 1349-1947 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947).
20. Walter Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of Social Welfare in America (New York: Free Press, 1974), chap. 2.
21. Rand E. Rosenblatt, "Legal Entitlement and Welfare Benefits," in David Kairys, ed., Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon, 1982).
22. Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 139, 149.
23. Jim Baumohl, "Now We Won't Call It Lobbying: The Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Depression-Era Maintenance Controversy in California and Washington" (paper presented at the Conference on Historical Perspectives on Alcohol and Drug Use in American Society, 1800-1997, Philadelphia, PA, May 1997).
24. Linda Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare (New York: Free Press, 1994), 294.
25. Rosenblatt, "Legal Entitlement and Welfare Benefits," 266.
26. Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960-1973 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 72.
27. For instance, see Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Lawrence Mead, The New Politics of Poverty: The Nonworking Poor in America (New York: Basic Books, 1992); and Mickey Kaus, The End of Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
28. For instance, see Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Lawrence Mead, The New Politics of Poverty: The Nonworking Poor in America (New York: Basic Books, 1992); and Mickey Kaus, The End of Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
29. For instance, see Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Lawrence Mead, The New Politics of Poverty: The Nonworking Poor in America (New York: Basic Books, 1992); and Mickey Kaus, The End of Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
30. See Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974). For a critique, see Michael Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: Pantheon, 1989), 9-35.
31. See Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974). For a critique, see Michael Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: Pantheon, 1989), 9-35.
32. Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 12.
33. Thomas R. Dye, "The Policy Consequences of Intergovernmental Competition," Cato Journal 10, no. 1 (1990): 59-73 at 69.
34. From 1970 to 1996, the real value of the maximum welfare benefit for a family of three in the average state fell 46 percent. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means, "The 1996 Green Book," WMCP: 104-14 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996; available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/wm001.html) (hereafter The 1996 Green Book).
35. Robert B. Albritton, "Impacts of Intergovernmental Financial Incentives on State Welfare Policymaking and Interstate Equity," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 19, no. 2 (1989): 127-41.
36. See Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 12; Walter W. McMahon, "Geographical Cost of Living Differences: An Update," Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association 19, no. 3 (1991): 426-50; and Herman Leonard and Monica Friar, State Cost of Living Indexes (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996).
37. See Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 12; Walter W. McMahon, "Geographical Cost of Living Differences: An Update," Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association 19, no. 3 (1991): 426-50; and Herman Leonard and Monica Friar, State Cost of Living Indexes (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996).
38. See Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 12; Walter W. McMahon, "Geographical Cost of Living Differences: An Update," Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association 19, no. 3 (1991): 426-50; and Herman Leonard and Monica Friar, State Cost of Living Indexes (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996).
39. See Dye, "The Policy Consequences of Intergovernmental Competition," 59-73; Robert B. Moffitt, "Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review," Journal of Economic Literature 30, no. 2 (1992): 32-36.
40. See Dye, "The Policy Consequences of Intergovernmental Competition," 59-73; Robert B. Moffitt, "Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review," Journal of Economic Literature 30, no. 2 (1992): 32-36.
41. Food Stamps are reduced approximately $.30 for each additional dollar of income.
42. See Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 12-13; Todd Zubler, "The Right to Migrate and Welfare Reform: Time for Shapiro v. Thompson to Take a Hike," Valparaiso University Law Review 31, no. 3 (1997): 893-950 at 935; and Donahue, Disunited States, 133.
43. See Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 12-13; Todd Zubler, "The Right to Migrate and Welfare Reform: Time for Shapiro v. Thompson to Take a Hike," Valparaiso University Law Review 31, no. 3 (1997): 893-950 at 935; and Donahue, Disunited States, 133.
44. See Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 12-13; Todd Zubler, "The Right to Migrate and Welfare Reform: Time for Shapiro v. Thompson to Take a Hike," Valparaiso University Law Review 31, no. 3 (1997): 893-950 at 935; and Donahue, Disunited States, 133.
45. See Sanford Schram, Lawrence Nitz, and Gary Krueger, "Without Cause or Effect: Reconsidering Welfare Migration as a Policy Problem," American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 1 (1998): 217-19.
46. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean; it enables us to compare data "entirely different in magnitude or units of measure," according to Patricia E. Gaynor and Rickey C. Kirkpatrick, Introduction to Time-Series and Forecasting in Business and Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), This coefficient is appropriate for comparing welfare benefits to the cost of living because these items are measured in entirely different units. By contrast, the standard deviation is more appropriate for comparing variation in welfare benefits, including benefits measured in constant dollars over time. Inappropriate use of the coefficient variation can lead researchers to underestimate compression in the real value of welfare benefits. By dividing a declining standard deviation by a declining mean, researchers are likely to incorrectly produce evidence that there has been no decline in variation. This is one reason why benefit compression has been neglected by other researchers. See Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 8.
47. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean; it enables us to compare data "entirely different in magnitude or units of measure," according to Patricia E. Gaynor and Rickey C. Kirkpatrick, Introduction to Time-Series and Forecasting in Business and Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), This coefficient is appropriate for comparing welfare benefits to the cost of living because these items are measured in entirely different units. By contrast, the standard deviation is more appropriate for comparing variation in welfare benefits, including benefits measured in constant dollars over time. Inappropriate use of the coefficient variation can lead researchers to underestimate compression in the real value of welfare benefits. By dividing a declining standard deviation by a declining mean, researchers are likely to incorrectly produce evidence that there has been no decline in variation. This is one reason why benefit compression has been neglected by other researchers. See Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 8.
48. We adjusted combined Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamp benefits by dividing them by a cost-of-living index score for each state. See Leonard and Friar, State Cost of Living Indexes.
49. Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 12.
50. Richard J. Cebula, "A Survey of the Literature on the Migration-Impact of State and Local Government Policies," Public Finance/Finages Publiques 37, no. 1 (1979): 69-84.
51. Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 50-83; Dye, "The Policy Consequences of Intergovernmental Competition," 59-73.
52. Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 50-83; Dye, "The Policy Consequences of Intergovernmental Competition," 59-73.
53. Moffitt, "Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System," 36.
54. Hanson and Hartman, "Do Welfare Magnets Attract?"; James R. Walker, "Migration among Low-Income Households: Helping the Witch Doctors Reach Consensus" (Discussion Paper #1031-94, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994); William H. Frey, Kao-Lee Liaw, Yu Xie, and Marcia Carlson, "Interstate Migration of the U.S. Poverty Population: Immigration 'Pushes' and Welfare Magnet 'Pulls'" (Research Report #95-331, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan 1995); Phillip B. Levine and David J. Zimmerman, "An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare Magnet Debate Using the NLSY" (Working Paper #5264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 1995); Carole Roan Gresenz, "An Empirical Investigation of the Role of AFDC Benefits in Location Choice" (Working Paper Series 97-05, DRU-1611-RC, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1997); and Schram, Nitz, and Krueger, "Without Cause or Effect," 210-30.
55. Hanson and Hartman, "Do Welfare Magnets Attract?"; James R. Walker, "Migration among Low-Income Households: Helping the Witch Doctors Reach Consensus" (Discussion Paper #1031-94, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994); William H. Frey, Kao-Lee Liaw, Yu Xie, and Marcia Carlson, "Interstate Migration of the U.S. Poverty Population: Immigration 'Pushes' and Welfare Magnet 'Pulls'" (Research Report #95-331, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan 1995); Phillip B. Levine and David J. Zimmerman, "An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare Magnet Debate Using the NLSY" (Working Paper #5264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 1995); Carole Roan Gresenz, "An Empirical Investigation of the Role of AFDC Benefits in Location Choice" (Working Paper Series 97-05, DRU-1611-RC, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1997); and Schram, Nitz, and Krueger, "Without Cause or Effect," 210-30.
56. Hanson and Hartman, "Do Welfare Magnets Attract?"; James R. Walker, "Migration among Low-Income Households: Helping the Witch Doctors Reach Consensus" (Discussion Paper #1031-94, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994); William H. Frey, Kao-Lee Liaw, Yu Xie, and Marcia Carlson, "Interstate Migration of the U.S. Poverty Population: Immigration 'Pushes' and Welfare Magnet 'Pulls'" (Research Report #95-331, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan 1995); Phillip B. Levine and David J. Zimmerman, "An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare Magnet Debate Using the NLSY" (Working Paper #5264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 1995); Carole Roan Gresenz, "An Empirical Investigation of the Role of AFDC Benefits in Location Choice" (Working Paper Series 97-05, DRU-1611-RC, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1997); and Schram, Nitz, and Krueger, "Without Cause or Effect," 210-30.
57. Hanson and Hartman, "Do Welfare Magnets Attract?"; James R. Walker, "Migration among Low-Income Households: Helping the Witch Doctors Reach Consensus" (Discussion Paper #1031-94, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994); William H. Frey, Kao-Lee Liaw, Yu Xie, and Marcia Carlson, "Interstate Migration of the U.S. Poverty Population: Immigration 'Pushes' and Welfare Magnet 'Pulls'" (Research Report #95-331, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan 1995); Phillip B. Levine and David J. Zimmerman, "An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare Magnet Debate Using the NLSY" (Working Paper #5264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 1995); Carole Roan Gresenz, "An Empirical Investigation of the Role of AFDC Benefits in Location Choice" (Working Paper Series 97-05, DRU-1611-RC, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1997); and Schram, Nitz, and Krueger, "Without Cause or Effect," 210-30.
58. Hanson and Hartman, "Do Welfare Magnets Attract?"; James R. Walker, "Migration among Low-Income Households: Helping the Witch Doctors Reach Consensus" (Discussion Paper #1031-94, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994); William H. Frey, Kao-Lee Liaw, Yu Xie, and Marcia Carlson, "Interstate Migration of the U.S. Poverty Population: Immigration 'Pushes' and Welfare Magnet 'Pulls'" (Research Report #95-331, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan 1995); Phillip B. Levine and David J. Zimmerman, "An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare Magnet Debate Using the NLSY" (Working Paper #5264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 1995); Carole Roan Gresenz, "An Empirical Investigation of the Role of AFDC Benefits in Location Choice" (Working Paper Series 97-05, DRU-1611-RC, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1997); and Schram, Nitz, and Krueger, "Without Cause or Effect," 210-30.
59. Hanson and Hartman, "Do Welfare Magnets Attract?"; James R. Walker, "Migration among Low-Income Households: Helping the Witch Doctors Reach Consensus" (Discussion Paper #1031-94, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994); William H. Frey, Kao-Lee Liaw, Yu Xie, and Marcia Carlson, "Interstate Migration of the U.S. Poverty Population: Immigration 'Pushes' and Welfare Magnet 'Pulls'" (Research Report #95-331, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan 1995); Phillip B. Levine and David J. Zimmerman, "An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare Magnet Debate Using the NLSY" (Working Paper #5264, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 1995); Carole Roan Gresenz, "An Empirical Investigation of the Role of AFDC Benefits in Location Choice" (Working Paper Series 97-05, DRU-1611-RC, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1997); and Schram, Nitz, and Krueger, "Without Cause or Effect," 210-30.
60. Schram, Nitz, and Krueger, "Without Cause or Effect," 227.
61. According to the Public Use Microdata Set of the 1990 U.S. census, all poor single mothers in 1990 were no longer living in the house in which they had resided in 1985, but only 9 percent of them had moved out of state. See ibid., 220.
62. See Sanford F. Schram, Words of Welfare: The Poverty of Social Science and the Social Science of Poverty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 59-76.
63. See Carol B. Stack, Call to Home: African-Americans Reclaim the Rural South (New York: Basic Books, 1996), xi-xix.
64. Schram, Words of Welfare, 59-76.
65. See Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein, Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Survive Welfare and Low-Wage Work (New York: Russell Sage, 1997).
66. Elliot Liebow, Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Stack, All Our Kin.
67. Elliot Liebow, Tally's Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Stack, All Our Kin.
68. See Edin and Lein, Making Ends Meet, 20-59; Joe Soss, "Unwanted Claims: Politics, Participation and the U.S. Welfare System" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996); and Stack, Call to Home, xi-xix.
69. See Edin and Lein, Making Ends Meet, 20-59; Joe Soss, "Unwanted Claims: Politics, Participation and the U.S. Welfare System" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996); and Stack, Call to Home, xi-xix.
70. See Edin and Lein, Making Ends Meet, 20-59; Joe Soss, "Unwanted Claims: Politics, Participation and the U.S. Welfare System" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996); and Stack, Call to Home, xi-xix.
71. Carol B. Stack, "A Critique of Method in the Assessment of Policy Impact," Research in Social Problems and Public Policy 4 (1987): 137-47.
72. Paul Voss, Thomas Corbett, and Richard Randell, "Interstate Migration and Public Welfare: The Migration Decision Making of a Low Income Population," in P. C. Jobes, W. F. Stinner, and J. M. Wardell, eds., Community, Society, and Migration (New York: University Press of America, 1992).
73. See Thad A. Brown, Migration and Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Lawrence A. Brown, Susan A. Gustavus, Edward J. Malecki, and Karen Walby, Choice Mechanisms in Migration Decisions (Columbus: Center for Human Resource Research, Ohio State University, 1985).
74. See Thad A. Brown, Migration and Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Lawrence A. Brown, Susan A. Gustavus, Edward J. Malecki, and Karen Walby, Choice Mechanisms in Migration Decisions (Columbus: Center for Human Resource Research, Ohio State University, 1985).
75. Patrick C. Jobes, William F. Stinner, and John M. Wardell, eds., Community, Society, and Migration (New York: University Press of America, 1992), 22-23.
76. Patrick C. Jobes, "Economic and Quality of Life Decisions in Migration to a High Natural Amenity Area," in Jobes, Stinner, and Wardell, eds., Community, Society, and Migration, 354.
77. See Carol B. Stack, All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community (New York: Harper & Row, 1974); Stack, Call to Home.
78. See Carol B. Stack, All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community (New York: Harper & Row, 1974); Stack, Call to Home.
79. Carol B. Stack and John B. Cromartie, "The Journeys of Black Children: An Intergenerational Perspective," in Jobes, Stinner, and Wardell, eds., Community, Society, and Migration, 364.
80. L. A. Brown and J. Holmes, "Search Behavior in an Intra-Urban Migration Context: A Spatial Perspective," Environment and Planning 3, no. 3 (1971): 307-26.
81. Voss, Corbett, and Randell, "Interstate Migration and Public Welfare," 125.
82. Ibid., 129.
83. Gordon F. De Jong and Zafar M. N. Ahmad, "Motivation for Migration of Welfare Clients," in Anthony Richmond and Daniel Kubat, eds., Internal Migration: The New World and the Third World (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976).
84. Voss, Corbett, and Randell, "Interstate Migration and Public Welfare," 141.
85. Edin and Lein, Making Ends Meet, 43.
86. Ibid.
87. Stack, Call to Home, xiii-xix.
88. Among many others, see Edin and Lein, Making Ends Meet; Joel F. Handler, The Poverty of Welfare Reform; Mark R. Rank, Living on the Edge: The Realities of Welfare in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
89. Among many others, see Edin and Lein, Making Ends Meet; Joel F. Handler, The Poverty of Welfare Reform; Mark R. Rank, Living on the Edge: The Realities of Welfare in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
90. Among many others, see Edin and Lein, Making Ends Meet; Joel F. Handler, The Poverty of Welfare Reform; Mark R. Rank, Living on the Edge: The Realities of Welfare in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
91. All of the figures cited in the following paragraph can be found in Voss, Corbett, and Randell, "Interstate Migration and Public Welfare," 128-33.
92. See Edin and Lein, Making Ends Meet.
93. Joe Soss, "Welfare Application Encounters: Subordination, Satisfaction, and the Puzzle of Client Evaluations," Administration & Society, forthcoming (1999).
94. The 1996 Green Book.
95. The state breakdowns in this section are from American Public Welfare Association (APWA), State-by-State Welfare Reform Policy Decisions (Washington, DC: APWA, 1997), 22-24.
96. As cognitive theories of decision making suggest, the value of what one already possesses is likely to outweigh the value of what one might (or might not) be able to obtain under changed circumstances - especially if changing those circumstances entails the potential for substantial losses. See Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision-Making (New York: Norton, 1997).
97. Frances Fox Piven suggested James Scott's argument that the economically marginal will choose "security over advantage." See James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence and Rebellion in Southeast Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976).
98. Edin and Lein, Making Ends Meet, 20-45.
99. Rebecca M. Blank, It Takes a Nation: A New Agenda for Fighting Poverty (New York: Russell Sage, 1997), 163.
100. Voss, Corbett, and Randell, "Interstate Migration and Public Welfare," 129.
101. See Barbara Sard, Ed Lazare, Robert Greenstein, and Jennifer Daskal, Housing Bills Could Weaken Welfare Reform and Create Problems for the Working Poor (Washing" ton, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1997); Tracy L. Kaufman, Out of Reach: Rental Housing at What Cost? (Washington, DC: National Low Income Housing Coalition, 1997).
102. See Barbara Sard, Ed Lazare, Robert Greenstein, and Jennifer Daskal, Housing Bills Could Weaken Welfare Reform and Create Problems for the Working Poor (Washing" ton, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1997); Tracy L. Kaufman, Out of Reach: Rental Housing at What Cost? (Washington, DC: National Low Income Housing Coalition, 1997).
103. Approximately 70 percent of the welfare population does not receive rent subsidies. See The 1996 Green Book and Kaufman, Out of Reach.
104. Edin and Lein, Making Ends Meet, 40.
105. Sard et al., Housing Bills Could Weaken Welfare Reform.
106. Ibid.
107. See 57 Federal Register 45468 (1 October 1992) and 61 Federal Register 6690 (21 February 1997). The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) uses the fortieth percentile rent for the 1996 Fair Market Rent and so do we.
108. Peterson and Rom, Welfare Magnets, 12-13.
109. APWA, State-by-state Welfare Reform Policy Decisions, 22-24.
110. See Edin and Lein, Making Ends Meet.
111. Mark Alan Hughes, "The Welfare Dustbowl," The Honolulu Advertiser, 20 October 1996, B1.
112. The concern that reform may push recipients from one state to another has already intensified in adjacent states where people are cut from the rolls. See Stacy Milbouer, "Mass. Welfare Deadline Causes Concern: Some Could Seek Benefits in N.H.," Boston Globe, 22 November 1998, p. 8. In its Amicus Curiae brief submitted to the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Roe (98-97), the U.S. Government argues that Congress anticipated how the | Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 could well induce migration. Unfortunately, the Solicitor General went on to write that this justified allowing states to establish two-tier benefit schedules to discourage migration. Whether the Court agrees and upholds this option at the expense of the right to travel is yet to be determined. A better argument would be to agree that welfare reform may well cut people off from services and induce migration, but that is exactly why states should not be able to create barriers and deny access to such needed services.